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3Abstract
The dominant view about Italian Industrial Districts (IDs) suggests that firms within 
IDs finance themselves through internal sources alone. This view, based on North­
eastern IDs - on which the mainstream literature concentrates - implicitly denies any 
potential role played by state subsidies available to small firms within the framework 
of national and regional industrial policies from the 1950s onwards. This thesis, 
focusing on a Southern ID, tests whether IDs can also emerge within the context of 
state intervention, and whether Southern EDs relied heavily on state funding in 
contrast with North-eastern IDs, which drew on public funds to a much smaller 
extent.
The thesis employs a two-pronged approach, analysing the issue from the 
perspective of both the lending institutions and the recipient firms. It discusses the 
development of the ‘Extraordinary intervention for the South’ - designed to 
overcome Southern backwardness - and compares it with the national industrial 
policies. It moves on to provide a detailed breakdown of the extent to which firms in 
Southern Italy benefited from subsidised loans and grants more than firms in the 
North-east, where far fewer firms sought subsidies.
The importance of subsidies for the recipient companies is studied using two 
samples of small manufacturing firms, within the Southern ID of Barletta and the 
North-eastern ID of San Mauro Pascoli. The analysis of the capital structure of the 
two samples confirms the greater reliance of Southern companies on subsidies, 
whereas private finance was more important for the North-eastern counterparts. 
However, subsidies to companies in the North-eastern ED appear to be more effective.
The thesis concludes that the received interpretative framework regarding the types 
of finance used by companies within EDs is severely limited, in that the role of state 
subsidies cannot be neglected, particularly for Southern IDs, but also for the more 
prosperous North-eastern EDs.
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Industrial districts (henceforth IDs) are geographical concentrations of small and 
medium-sized firms producing similar goods, with each firm specialising in one or 
more stages of production (as in the textile ID of Prato in Tuscany, where a single 
batch of raw material often passes through five, six or more firms before emerging as 
a finished product).1 This definition, among various discussed in the first chapter, 
has been adopted as it encapsulates two key elements of the Marshallian discussion 
of IDs, namely the concentration of firms in the same locality and the fragmentation 
of the production process among various firms. These two elements are sources of 
economies, such as external economies of scale and economies of specialization, 
enjoyed by concentrations of small firms that offset their disadvantages as compared 
to large firms.2
IDs have attracted the interest of academics who have seen them as a pattern of 
industrialization or as a model of business organization. IDs, not only in Italy but 
also in other Western European countries, in Japan, the US and recently in Latin 
America, have been studied from several perspectives, with the focus ranging from 
their production system and strategy (the flexible specialisation approach)4 to their 
economic and socio-political characteristics.5 One of the reasons for this interest in
1 M.J. Enright, ‘Organization and Coordination in Geographically Concentrated Industries’, in: N.R. 
Lamoreaux and D.M.G. Raff (eds), Coordination and Information. Historical Perspectives on the 
Organization o f Enterprise (Chicago, 1995), pp. 123-124.
For Marshall's writings on economies arising from the concentration of small firms see his 
Principles o f Economics (1890, Ninth Variorum ed. 1961), vol. 1, p. 271; and also The Early Writings 
o f Alfred Marshall, 1967-1890, edited by J.K. Whitaker (1975), vol. 2, pp. 197-198; for the 
fragmentation of the production process among small firms see Early Writings, vol. 2, p. 196.3
Among recent works concerning IDs in various countries see K. Odaka and M. Sawai (eds), Small 
Firms, Large Concerns: the Development o f Small Business in Comparative Perspective (New York, 
1999); A. Giunta, A. Lagendijk and A. Pike (eds), Restructuring Industry and Territory: the 
Experience o f Europe’s Regions (2000); R. Rabellotti and H. Schmitz, ‘The Internal Heterogeneity of 
Industrial Districts in Italy, Brazil and Mexico’, Regional Studies, 33/2 (1999), pp. 97-108.
4 The milestones of this approach are M.J. Piore and C.F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: 
Possibilities for Prosperity (New York, 1984), passim and especially pp. 213-216, 226-229; P.Q. 
Hirst and J. Zeitlin, Reversing Industrial Decline: Industrial Structure and Policy in Britain and Her 
Competitors (Oxford, 1989), pp. 22-28, 205-211.
5 F. Pyke, G. Becattini and W. Sengerberger (eds), Industrial Districts and Inter-firm Co-operation in 
Italy (Geneva, 1990); W. Sengerberger, G. W. Loveman and M. J. Piore (eds), The Re-emergence o f
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IDs is the observed striking contrast between the declining manufacturing sector, in 
the 1970s and 1980s, in countries like the United Kingdom and the United States and 
the success in manufacturing of countries such as former West Germany, Italy and 
Japan.6 This contrast focused international attention on the economic performance 
of regions such as Emilia Romagna in North-Eastern Italy, Baden-Wuttemberg in 
Germany, West Jutland in Denmark, characterized by the presence of IDs.7
Italian interest in IDs and the economy of the regions where these are located became 
particularly widespread in the 1980s. By this time, the economic importance of IDs 
for the Italian economy was clear, especially in contrast with the crisis of large firms, 
both privately and state-owned, and the limited achievements of the regional policy 
for Southern Italy.8 Attention was drawn to the importance of IDs in the post-war 
Italian economy, as these areas provide a major source of Italian export revenues in 
the textile, clothing, footwear and leather goods industries.9 Notable IDs are 
Sassuolo, a small town between Bologna and Reggio Emilia (Emilia Romagna), where 
roughly 35% of the world’s ceramic tiles is produced; Montebelluna in the Dolomites, 
which supplies approximately 50% of the world's ski boots; Prato and Biella, where 
production accounts for approximately 80% of Italy's woollen textiles output,10 and 
Como, which contains virtually the whole of Italy’s silk industry, and accounts for one 
tenth of Italy’s clothing sector.11
Another source of interest in this pattern of business organization concerns the rapid 
growth of regions like Emilia Romagna and Veneto, at the core of the so-called Third 
Italy or NEC (North-East and Centre). This area is said to have industrialized through 
the emergence and development of IDs. Although less developed than the so-called
Small Enterprises (Geneva, 1990); M. Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: the 
Problem o f Embeddedness’, American Journal o f Sociology, 91 (1985), pp. 481-510.
6 Hirst and Zeitlin, Reversing, pp. 1-16.7
F. Pyke and W. Sengenberger (eds), Industrial Districts and Local Economic Regeneration 
(Geneva, 1992).
g
M. Bellandi and G. Dei Ottati, ‘Per una «rilettura territoriale delle trasformazioni deU’economia 
italiana»: cronaca di un progetto’, in: G. Becattini, M. Bellandi, G. Dei Ottati and F. Sforzi (eds), II 
caleidoscopio dello sviluppo locale. Trasformazioni economiche nelVItalia contemporanea (Turin, 
2001), p. 29.
9
P. Guerrieri and C. Milana, L 'Italia e il commercio mondiale (Bologna, 1990), pp. 102-110.
10 Enright, ‘Organization’, p. 104.
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‘Industrial Triangle’ in the immediate post-war period, Emilia Romagna and Veneto 
have now reached the degree of development of Piedmont and Lombardy, the regions 
at the core of the Triangle.12
The working hypothesis -  the sources of finance of IDs
The literature dealing with the emergence of IDs since the post-war period
concentrates on the Third Italy - the classical area of IDs. It stresses the private
11origin of the initial capital invested in entrepreneurial activity there. It considers 
self-financing to be crucial not only in the initial stage but also in later stages of the 
trading life of small and medium-sized companies.14 However, the sources of finance 
utilised by firms within IDs have never been investigated and this neglect has 
allowed the long-held assumption that such firms relied entirely on self-financing to 
pass unchallenged.
There are historical and methodological reasons to question this assumption. It 
denies a priori any potential role played by state subsidies to small and medium­
sized firms and the financial institutions entrusted to manage them. As will be 
shown in this thesis, state subsidies had been available within the framework of the 
regional and national industrial policy since the early 1950s. In addition, the 
established approach does not take into account the role of financial institutions in 
stimulating the industrialization of countries and regions, the importance of which 
features prominently in economic history.15
11 A. Bull and P. Comer, From Peasant to Entrepreneur (Oxford, 1993), p. 135.
12 A. Rinaldi, Distretti ma non solo. L ’industrializzazione della provincia di Modena (1945-1995) 
(Milan, 2000), p. 32.
13 The possession of land is considered o f particular importance in the transformation o f the 
agricultural family into an entrepreneurial unit as the sale o f the land provides the initial capital to 
invest in the family business. See for instance M. Paci, La Struttura Sociale Italiana (Bologna, 1982), 
p. 118; Bull and Comer, From Peasant, pp. 144-145.
14 A. Saba, LI Modello Italiano (Milan, 1995), p. 132; in other studies die argument of the importance 
of self financing is implicit, see for instance G. Fua and C. Zacchia (eds), Industrializzazione senza 
fratture (Bologna, 1983); A. Bagnasco, Tre Italie. La problematica territoriale dello sviluppo italiano 
(Bologna, 1977).
15 B. Greenwald and J.E. Stigliz, ‘Information, Finance and Markets: The Architecture of Allocative 
Mechanisms’, in: V. Zamagni (ed.), Finance and the Enterprise (1992), p. 11; A. Gerschenkron, 
Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass., 1962); R.W. Goldsmith,
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This thesis sets forth to challenge the assumption concerning the use of self- 
financing alone, by evaluating the significance of the various sources of finance for 
the growth of small and medium-sized firms within IDs. In particular, it tests the 
hypothesis that IDs can develop against the background of state subsidies as well as 
private finance, and self-financing in particular, and that IDs developed in the South 
mainly through state subsidies and in the North-East through private finance.
Testing this hypothesis is important for various reasons. Despite the considerable 
attention given to the development and features of IDs, only one study so far has 
touched upon the issue of the sources of company finance.16 However, while this 
thesis and the Conti and Ferri study both start by questioning the implicit assumption 
of the ‘exhaustive role of self-financing’,17 Conti and Ferri are concerned solely with 
the role of local banks within IDs. Therefore, by investigating the importance of 
state subsidies as a source of company finance, this thesis helps fill a large void in 
the understanding of IDs.
The analysis and its potential contributions
This thesis employs a two-pronged approach, analysing the availability of state 
subsidies and market medium-term credit from the institutional perspective and from 
the perspective of recipient firms. The first perspective includes the study of the 
financial system specifically designed for small and medium-sized firms. This 
includes the so-called ‘Extraordinary Intervention for the South’, managed by the 
Cassa per il Mezzogiomo (hereafter Cassa), and the various schemes forming part of 
the national industrial policies. The study analyses the regional distribution of grants 
and subsidised and market medium-term credit. It also attempts to clarify whether 
the geographical distribution of subsidies was due to applications for subsidies from
Financial Structure and Development (New Haven, 1969); T.M. Rybczynski, ‘Business Finance in 
die EEC, USA and Japan’, Three Banks Review, 103 (1974), pp. 58-72.
16 G. Conti and G. Ferri, ‘Banche locali e sviluppo economico decentrato’ in F. Barca (ed.), Storia del 
capitalismo italiano dal dopoguerra ad oggi (Rome, 1997), pp. 429-465.
17 Ibid., p. 429.
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firms or to the availability of subsidies from the state, an issue that does not seem to 
have been explored.
This part of the analysis relies on published and unpublished sources. The regional 
distribution of subsidised and market credit is based on statistics published by the 
Bank of Italy (hereafter Bol). Information on Cassa subsidies, including their 
geographical distribution, and amounts requested and awarded has been provided by 
a Ministry of Industry (hereafter MI) dataset. A second MI dataset offers the same 
information for selected national subsidised credit schemes. These sources have 
their limits for the purposes of this thesis, in that they allow the focusing on small 
and medium-sized firms only to a very small extent. Generally, they offer little detail 
on the size of companies applying for or receiving subsidies. Nevertheless, an 
analysis of the Bol dataset helps clarify whether and when a diversion of subsidies 
from the South to the North-West took place, which is a much debated point in the 
specialist literature.18 The MI datasets allowed an assessment of whether the 
distribution of soft loans and grants was dictated by the availability of or requests for 
such subsidies. The MI dataset for the Cassa allowed a similar analysis for the 
South, together with information on the distribution of subsidies among regions 
within the South.
The second part of the thesis focuses primarily on a Southern ID, Barletta (in Bari 
province), which is then compared to the North-Eastern ID of San Mauro Pascoli 
(henceforth SMP, in Forli province). For each ID, a sample of public companies 
(limited liability and public share companies -  the only ones legally obliged to 
deposit their balance sheets at the local Chamber of Commerce) has been collected. 
These two IDs represent the case studies on which the analysis of the recipient 
perspective is based. Company balance sheets, collected at the Chambers of 
Commerce in Bari and Forli, allowed the study of their capital structure, to assess the 
relative importance of state subsides - grants, soft loans and fiscal subsidies - as 
compared to market and internally generated finance.
18 A. Del Monte and A. Giannola, Istituzioni economiche e Mezzogiomo. Analisi delle politiche di 
sviluppo (Rome, 1997), pp. 271-275; S. Pergolesi, II credito agevolato alle imprese industriali. Le 
incentivazionigestite dalMinistero dell’Industria, 1962-1984 (Milan, 1988), p. 116.
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Using the same samples, the effectiveness of subsidies has also been examined by 
applying a method recently developed by Bagella and Caggese. This analyzes the 
performance of recipient companies in the pre-subsidy stage, when they are 
subsidised and in the post-subsidy stage.19 Moreover, for those companies in the 
sample offering continuous records, it has been possible to perform a panel data 
analysis, testing the effectiveness of state subsidies and other sources of company 
finance in stimulating investment. The thesis also addresses the question whether 
subsidies have been ‘crucial* for recipient companies or whether their invested 
capital would have been profitable even in the absence of subsidies. This point is 
investigated from an ex-post perspective, by comparing the return on invested capital 
with subsidised and ordinary interest rates.
The samples consist of 33 companies for the Southern ID and 21 for the North- 
Eastern ID. The coverage is not equal for the whole period analysed in this thesis, as 
not all companies were trading as public companies throughout the period. The 
Southern sample is well covered for the 1970s, and both samples are well covered 
for the 1980s, but there are fewer records for the 1950s and 1960s. The problem of 
data limitation is unavoidable. As Padoa Schioppa Kostoris noted, ‘no Italian 
economic-policy document fails to assert the public sector’s involvement in efforts to 
overcome the country’s so-called economic dualism, and yet the first thing to strike 
the researcher is the lack of sufficient empirical evidence to judge the extent to which 
this concern is translated into observable facts’.20
Whatever the limitations of the balance sheet dataset, the analysis is highly 
worthwhile. It throws new light on the effectiveness and failures of state subsidies to 
recipient companies, by applying the methodology formulated by Bagella and 
Caggese. This methodology could not have been applied before as it requires a time 
series of company data, something which the two samples collected for this thesis 
provide. Moreover, the company dataset makes it possible to focus on small and
19 M. Bagella and A. Caggese, ‘Struttura del capitale, fmanziamenti agevolati e redditivita delle 
imprese manifatturiere italiane’, Rassegna Economica, 59 (1995), pp. 813-837.
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medium-sized firms from the recipient perspective, something which the datasets 
provided by the institutions (Bol, Cassa and the MI) allow only to a partial extent.
The case studies used in the thesis contribute to a wider understanding of the general 
pattern of IDs, based not only on the well-studied North-Eastern IDs, but also on the 
much less known IDs in the South. The comparison points out not only differences in 
the importance of the various sources of finance for firms within the two IDs, but 
also differences and similarities in such issues as profitability and capital intensity.
This thesis contributes also to the historiography of the national and regional policies 
in Italy. The comparative analysis of a Southern and a North-Eastern example places 
the development of IDs within the wider context of the North-South economic 
divide. In particular, by comparing the role of state subsidies for small and medium­
sized firms in the Barletta and SMP IDs, this thesis addresses controversial issues in 
regional policy, such as its effectiveness in promoting small-scale industrialization in 
the South, a problem regarded as requiring further research.21 This specific issue is 
not addressed in isolation, but within the comparison of the effectiveness of subsidies 
in the North-East. Although this comparison has been the subject of some recent 
studies,22 it has not been approached from an historical perspective. This thesis 
offers some historical perspective by pointing out the effects of subsidies on recipient 
companies at different stages of their trading lives.
A further contribution of the thesis to this historiography stems from its long-term 
approach and the detailed investigation it required. This meant expanding the 
analysis of issues covered in other works either for shorter periods of time or at a 
more aggregate level. Such issues include the regional distribution of soft loans and
20 F. Padoa Schioppa Kostoris, Italy, the Sheltered Economy: Structural Problems in the Italian 
Economy (Oxford, 1993), p. 75.
21 J. Cohen and G. Federico, The Growth of the Italian Economy 1820-1960 (Cambridge, 2001), p.
103.
22 Bagella and Caggese, ‘Struttura’; M. Bagella, L. Becchetti and A. Caggese, ‘Financial constraints 
on investments: evidence from direct revelation o f Italian firms’, Rivista di Politica Economica, 
86/11-12 (1996), pp. 35-62.
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grants;23 the overview of the main policies and areas of Cassa intervention;24 and the 
breakdown of the Cassa expenditure into grants and contributions on subsidised 
interest loans.25
Structure of the thesis
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first discusses the literature on IDs 
and puts forward the hypothesis of the thesis. The second reviews the historical 
debate on the effectiveness of regional policies. It examines the arguments in favour 
and against, and reviews the literature dealing with the effectiveness of regional 
policy in Britain and in Italy. While the studies on the British regional policy have 
been reviewed with particular attention to their methodology, the literature on the 
Italian regional policy has been reviewed paying attention both to methodology and 
to the debate on its effectiveness. Chapter DI examines the system of subsidies to 
small and medium-sized firms within the framework of the regional policy and 
compares it to soft loan schemes available through the national industrial policy. 
Moreover, using Cassa balance sheets, the relative weight of financial subsidies to 
industrial firms has been assessed. Chapter IV compares subsidised interest rates 
under the various national and regional schemes with market credit. In this context, 
it also analyses regional differentials in market interest rates. The geographical 
distribution of subsidised and market medium-term credit and grants is then 
analysed. As stated above, these records do not allow the separation of subsidies to 
small and medium-sized firms from those to large firms, apart from a few years when 
the statistics of the Bol provide detail on each of the major schemes, one of which 
was a soft loan scheme for small and medium-sized firms. The chapter includes also 
an analysis of the extent to which institutions were able to respond to the 
applications for subsidised loans coming from the various regions.
23 For the regional distribution of soft loans from 1964 to 1984 see Pergolesi, Credito, pp. 144-148. 
For data on government contributions on soft loans and grants to the South as compared to the Centre-
North from 1974 to 1990, see Del Monte and Giannola, Istituzioni, pp. 304-305.
24 Several works covering these issues for specific periods will be reviewed in Chapter III.
25 This issue has been covered from 1950 to 1993 in R. Vaccaro, Unita Politica e Dualismo 
Economico in Italia (1861-1993) (Padova, 1995), p. 283; however, her data are expressed as 
percentages only, so they do not give an idea of the magnitude o f the Cassa policy, do not specifiy the
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Chapter V opens the section of the thesis devoted to the analysis of the recipient 
perspective. It introduces the two case studies of this thesis, the Barletta and the 
SMP IDs. It identifies their geographical extent and analyses their evolution using 
labour force data, available in the decennial censuses from 1951 to 1991. Chapters 
VI and VII are the core chapters of the micro-analysis. In Chapter VI, the two 
company samples are introduced and the chapter focuses on the analysis of the firms’ 
capital structure. This aims to assess the relative importance of state subsidies as 
compared to market finance and internally generated funds, thus testing the 
assumption of the exhaustive role of self-financing within IDs. Chapter VII 
addresses the issue of the effectiveness of subsidies for the development of firms in 
the two samples, and analyses the effect of subsidies on firms’ investment activity 
and their overall performance. The thesis ends with the conclusion, which returns to 
the main hypothesis of the thesis - the undeniable importance of state subsidies for 
IDs in the South and the use of such subsidies even in the prosperous North-East.
The focus on the key issue identified above inevitably means that no attempt has 
been made to address all others surrounding regional and national industrial policies
•y/r
such as the costs of the policies and the sectoral distribution of subsidies. The 
analysis of the company samples has not been expanded to include factors other than 
subsidies that might have influenced their performance, such as different abilities of
77the management and the company’s ability to export and innovate its products. 
These issues have not been developed either because they would fall beyond the 
scope of the thesis or because they could not have been done justice within the thesis.
Cassa expenditure for contributions on soft loans, and the periodization does not suit the purposes of
this thesis.
26 The sectoral distribution of subsidies in the regions of the Cassa interventions has been examined 
by other works. For the 1959 to 1990 period, see Del Monte and Giannola, Istituzioni, pp. 277- 283, 
for the years between 1959 and 1987 see F. Moro, ‘Gli investimenti industriali agevolati dalle leggi di 
intervento straordinario’, Rivista Economica del Mezzogiomo, 3/1 (1989), pp. 164-165; as for the 
distribution of grants by regions and industrial sectors from 1959 to 1979, see E. Malfatti, ‘La 
distribuzione territoriale delle iniziative industriali benficiarie di contributi in conto capitale, nel 
ventennio d’applicazione dell’incentivo (1959-1979)’, Informazioni Svimez, Nuova Serie, 34/1-2
(1981), pp. 18-21.
27 The importance placed by the flexible specialization approach on the process of innovation within 
IDs will be shown in chapter I. As for the importance of exports see F. Pyke and W. Sengenberger, 
‘Introduction’, in: F. Cossentino, F. Pyke and W. Sengenberger (eds), Local and Regional Response 
to Global Pressure: the Case o f Italy and Its Industrial Districts (Geneva, 1996), p. 5.
CHAPTER I
25
Italian IDs and their sources of finance - a review of the literature 
Introduction
This chapter introduces the hypothesis tested in the thesis, namely that IDs can develop 
against the background of state intervention as well as through private sources of 
finance. The literature on Italian IDs places heavy emphasis on private sources of 
finance in explaining the development of small and medium-sized firms within IDs, 
although no specific analysis or evidence is provided. This assumption about the 
sources of company finance within IDs contrasts sharply with the broader 
understanding of the importance of the financial structure in the industrial development 
of regions and countries.
The first section presents the concept of industrial districts and gives an overview of 
the distinctive features of this model of business organization. The second section 
deals with the historical development of IDs in the North, North-east and South of 
Italy, from the 1950s. The third section contrasts the received understanding of the 
sources of company finance within Italian IDs with key works in economic history 
concerning the role of financial structure in the industrialization of various European 
countries.
1.1 IDs: concept and main features.
1.1.1 The economics and economic history legacy in the literature on IDs.
The term ‘industrial district’ was coined by Alfred Marshall in his Principles o f  
Economics in 1890, to indicate a ‘concentration of specific industries in particular 
localities’.1 Marshall observed the development of industrial districts in Sheffield and 
Lancashire in northern England. He explained their localisation in terms of either
1 Marshall, Principles, vol. 1, p. 266.
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historical or physical factors, such as the presence of foreign craftsmen invited by 
rulers in the 11th century in Lancashire, or the availability of raw materials and cheap 
fuel, as for instance in the case of metal industry in England and Scotland.2
The concept of the ID is expounded in the broader context of the factors of production: 
‘land, labour, capital and organization’. Organization is studied in two forms: the 
division of labour and business management. The chapter dealing with IDs falls under 
the heading of ‘division of labour’ and aims to examine those external economies 
arising from the ‘concentration of many small businesses of a similar character in 
particular localities’.3 In fact, Marshall previously distinguished between external and 
internal economies of scale. External economies were those derived from the general 
development of the industry, while internal were those dependent on the resources of 
the individual firms engaged in it.4
Two other concepts introduced by Marshall are worthy of mention: ‘differentiation’ 
and ‘integration’.5 Differentiation is ‘the increased subdivision of functions and it 
manifests itself in forms as the division of labour, and the development of specialised 
skill, knowledge and machinery’. Integration is a ‘growing intimacy and firmness of 
the connections between the separate parts of the industrial organism (which) shows 
itself in such forms as the increase of security of commercial credit, and of the means 
and habits of communication by sea and by road, by railway and telegraph, by post and 
printing press’.
Marshall focuses on those external economies arising from the ‘localisation of 
industries’,6 enjoyed by firms due to the development of subsidiary industries in the 
neighbourhood and the concentration of a specialized labour force. Subsidiary 
industries are likely to thrive in the neighbourhood of the district, supplying firms with 
raw materials, equipment and services. Although individual capital employed in the
2 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 268-269, and p. 269, fh. 1.
3
Ibid., vol. 1, p. 266. It seems worthwhile to mention the location of the chapter on IDs because it is a 
clear symptom of his approach to the topic.
4 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 266.
5 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 241.
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district may be small, subsidiary industries can enjoy a large market for their 
products/services, which enables subsidiary industries to use profitably highly 
specialized and expensive machinery. The concentration of workers involved in the 
same activity allows them to develop each other’s skills and transmit these to the 
younger generations, thus creating ‘hereditary skills’. Moreover, the concentration of 
skills creates ‘a constant market for special skills’ as either employers will resort to 
those areas where they are likely to find the skills they require, or else workers will 
move to those areas where they will find demand for their skills. The concentration of 
employers and employees involved in the same industry brings about a rapid diffusion 
of innovations in any field, from machinery to business organization, as ideas are 
readily discussed and developed.7
The external economies pointed out by Marshall or ‘economies of localization’ are 
generated by the proximity of various firms in the same industry. A different type of 
external economies - ‘economies of urbanization’, pointed out by Jacobs - arise from 
the build-up of knowledge through communications among local firms in various
Q
industries. Firms within IDs can reap benefits from both types of external economies 
as shown by the study of the cotton industry in Lancashire in the first half of the XXth 
century. Firms specialized in spinning and weaving enjoyed Marshallian external 
economies, whereas external economies of urbanization were generated through the 
presence in Lancashire of numerous small textile engineering firms and linkages with 
the West Yorkshire woollen industry.9
Although Marshall introduces IDs that expound the external economies enjoyed by 
small firms located in the same area, these economies outlined in The Principles o f 
Economics are beneficial to both small and large firms. In fact, here the broader 
context is economies of localisation, which are achievable both where labour division 
takes place in one large factory, or when it is divided among several small firms.
6 Ibid., vol. l ,p .  266.
7 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 271.
8 J. Jacobs, The Economy of Cities (1970), pp. 49-84.
9 S. Broadberry and A. Marrison, ‘External Economies o f Scale in the Lancashire cotton industry, 
1900-1950’, Economic History Review, 55 (2002), pp. 51-77.
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Elsewhere in his writing, Marshall focuses upon the gains for large firms. Thus, in 
Early Writings and Industry and Trade, Marshall focused on the comparison of 
economies enjoyed by large firms, and by a concentration of small firms involved in 
the same production process. From the comparison, it emerges that larger firms have 
superior advantages regarding the sale of their product, but the concentration of small 
specialized businesses will attract investment in subsidiary industry, providing special 
tools and machinery, and distributing materials and finished products .10
If subsidiary industries eliminate diseconomies, economies are linked to the particular 
market for the products that these small firms produce. There are some goods 
(specialities) for which marketing is difficult and ‘although the production itself might 
be economically increased very fast, sale could not’.11 Various items appeal to specific 
tastes, which may limit sales even if production of the items could be increased. The 
reason behind the limited sales could be directly related to individual requirements and 
idiosyncrasies. Goods may have merits that are not easily appreciated, and must be 
slowly introduced to the market in order to increase the sales potential. In addition, 
there are markets where the quality of the product is more important to the consumer 
than the price.
Another factor conferring advantage to the ‘aggregation into one district of many 
establishments of a moderate size as by the erection of a few huge factories’,12 is the 
possibility of dividing the production process among small firms. As Marshall states, 
with ‘many classes of commodities it is possible to divide the process of production 
into several stages, each of which can be performed with the maximum of economy in 
a small establishment’.13 Here Marshall is clearly pointing out the ‘economies of 
specialization’ enjoyed by the aggregation of small firms, a concept to which the author 
returned in his Industry and Trade, saying that the parcelling of the production process 
among firms enables them to specialize in a small range of work and perform it with
10 Marshall, Early Writings, vol. 2, p. 197.
11 Marshall, Principles, vol. 1, p. 287.
12 Marshall, Early Writings, vol. 2, p. 196.
13 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 196.
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little interruption.14 Therefore, Marshall is not talking about a generic cluster of small 
firms but a cluster of small firms, each of which carries on a particular stage of the 
production process. Moreover, such firms can enjoy the economies of the division of 
labour if the market for their products and the technology used in the process have a 
low minimum efficient scale.15
Marshall’s analysis of the ID interprets the division of labour essentially as a matter of 
production costs, an interpretation fully consonant with the Smithian tradition from 
which Stigler derived his hypothesis that ‘vertical disintegration is the typical 
development in growing industries, vertical integration in declining industries’.16
However, in 1937 Coase offered a new interpretation of the division of labour across 
various firms, according to which the firm is an entity which has its raison d'etre in the
1 7ability to minimise production costs and transaction costs. In 1960, the same author 
concluded that the neo-classical paradigm according to which the division of labour 
becomes more specific as the size of the market expands lies in the unrealistic 
assumption that market transactions are costless. In the presence of positive transaction 
costs, the allocation of resources is affected by the structures of property rights.18 
Organization is justified by the costliness of using the price mechanism for 
transactions. Thus an organization and an entrepreneur directing the resources 
economise market costs -  ‘a firm will tend to expand until the costs of organising an 
extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same 
transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organising in 
another firm’.19
14 A. Marshall, Industry and Trade. A Study o f Industrial Technique and Business Organization; and 
Their Influences on the Conditions o f Various Classes and Nations (4th ed., 1923), p. 601; see also 
Broadberry and Marrison, ‘External Economies’, p. 53.
15 C.F. Pratten, The Competitiveness o f Small Firms (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 27-34.
16 G. Stigler, ‘The Division of Labour Is Limited by the Extent of the Market’, The Journal o f 
Political Economy, 59/3 (1951), p. 189.
17 R.H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica, New Series, 4 (1937), pp. 386-405.
18 R. H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, The Journal o f Law and Economics, 3/2 (1960), pp.
15-16; D.C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1990), 
pp. 27-28.
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The transaction costs approach is normally applied to explain the emergence of the
large business organization.20 Langlois and Robertson, however, apply transaction
costs in order to explain different kinds of organization, since ‘changes in division of
labour [between firms, or differentiation] are rooted in changes in transaction costs’.21
Referring to the Marshallian concept of integration, Langlois and Robertson distinguish
• 00between ‘ownership integration’ and ‘co-ordination integration’. They regard 
Marshallian IDs as possessing the lowest level of ownership integration and the lowest 
level of co-ordination integration, because of the small size of the firms they contain, 
with each firm focusing on a single function in the production chain, and because of 
their heavy reliance on market mechanisms for exchange, due to minimal transaction 
costs 23
The viability of the market interface is due to the widespread capabilities that allow 
‘rapid exchanges of commercial and technical information through informal 
channels’.24 Since in Marshall's analysis the widespread knowledge is a consequence of 
the concentration of specialised firms in the same locality, it seems correct to conclude 
that ‘the major advantages of the Marshallian ID arise from simple propinquity of 
firms’.25 These Marshallian firms, it must be remembered, are firms involved in the 
same production process or the same industry.
The consequence of low transaction costs is the prevalence of the decision to buy 
rather than produce. Since the aim is ‘to economize on the sum of production and 
transaction costs’, ‘to the degree that transaction costs are negligible, buying rather 
than making will normally be the most cost-effective means of procurement’; in
Coase, Nature , p. 395.
20 O.E. Williamson, Market and Hierarchies. Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York, 1975),
p. 253.
21 R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, Firms, Markets and Economic Change. A Dynamic Theory o f 
Business Institutions (1995), p. 19.
22 Ibid., p. 125.
23 Ibid., p. 124.
24 Ibid., p. 125.
25 Ibid., p. 125.
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other words when production costs are great and transaction costs are small, supply 
arrangements clearly have more attraction. 26
The concept of the ID has been made familiar in the Italian literature by Becattini.27 In 
the Becattini definition of IDs, much emphasis is placed on cultural and social features. 
Thus, IDs are defined as socio-territorial entities in which the community of people and 
firms tend to merge in a historically delimited area. The local community is 
characterized by an homogeneous system of values, constituting a condition for the 
development and reproduction of IDs.28 Becattini claims that what holds firms 
together in a Marshallian ID and diminishes the production costs of the products is a 
‘complex and tangled web of external economies and diseconomies, of joint and 
associated costs, of historical and cultural vestiges, which envelops both inter-firm and
• 90interpersonal relationships’.
In Harrison's view, the historical and cultural vestiges invite us to refer to a body of 
theory different from the neo-classical and the new-institutionalist, for industrial 
districts are not explicable through agglomeration economies and internalization of 
transaction costs within the region.30 From the Marshallian common services to the 
Italian co-operative association, Harrison sees the unfolding of social cohesion and 
mutual trust. Associational activities, including financing, technical assistance, training, 
and marketing are seen as sources of external economies but ones originated by a co­
operative movement. The appropriate approach to interpret this industrial pattern is
91thus Granovetter’s concept of ‘embeddedness’. Harrison identifies in this last 
approach the intellectual stream that has fed the writing on industrial districts. The
26 O. E. Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: the Governance of Contractual Relations’, The 
Journal o f Law and Economics, 22 (1979), p. 245.
27 G. Becattini, ‘Sectors and/or Districts: Some Remarks on the Conceptual Foundations of Industrial 
Economics’, in: E. Goodman, J.Bamford and P.Saynor (eds), Small Firms and Industrial Districts in
Italy (London and New York, 1989), pp. 123-152.
28 G. Becattini, ‘The Marshallian industrial district as a socio-economic notion’, in: F. Pyke, G. 
Becattini and W. Sengenberger (eds), Industrial Districts and Inter-firm Co-operation in Italy 
(Geneva, 1990), pp. 38-39.
29 Becattini, ‘Sectors', p. 132.
30 B. Harrison, ‘Industrial Districts: Old Wine in New Bottles?’, Regional Studies, 26 (1992), pp.
469-483.
31 Granovetter, ‘Economic Action’, pp. 481-510.
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embeddedness approach claims that ‘the behaviour and institutions are so constrained 
by ongoing social relations that to construe them as independent is a grievous
9^misunderstanding’. Order and disorder, honesty and malfeasance have more to do 
with structures such as personal relations and the network of relations between and 
within firms, than with organizational form.
Thus, we know from the transaction costs theory that ‘transactions that are uncertain in 
outcome, recur frequently, and require substantial transaction-specific investment are 
more likely to take place within hierarchically organized firms, and those that are 
straightforward, non-repetitive and require no transaction specific investment will more 
likely take place between firms, that is, across the market interface’.33 In contrast to 
this, according to the embeddedness approach, we should expect pressures toward 
vertical integration in a market where transacting firms lack a network of personal 
relations that connects them or where such a network eventuates in conflict, disorder, 
opportunism, or malfeasance. On the other hand, where a stable network of relations 
mediates complex transactions and generates standards of behaviour between firms, 
such pressures should be absent.
1.1.2 The main features of Italian IDs
This section presents a general overview of the features of Italian IDs, in order to 
give a broader picture of the topic and the academic interest surrounding it. IDs have 
been approached from several perspectives, from geographical to sociological and 
historical and from political to economic.34 The following section addresses IDs as a 
model of business organization.
In the Piore and Sabel interpretation IDs are characterized by the ability to alter 
goods not simply in response to changing tastes but ‘partly to change tastes, in order
32 Ibid., pp. 481-482.
33 Ibid., p..493.
34 For an updated bibliography on the topic see N. Tessieri, ‘Rassegna bibliografica sullo sviluppo 
locale e sui sistemi locali di piccola e media impresa in Italia’ in: G. Becattini, M. Bellandi, G. Dei 
Ottati and F. Sforzi (eds), II caleidoscopio dello sviluppo locale. Trasformazioni economiche 
nell'Italia contemporanea (Turin, 2001), pp. 419-477.
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to open new markets’, which has been defined as ‘flexible specialization’. This 
strategy is based on skilled workers and highly specialised multi-purpose machinery 
as opposed to mass production based on unskilled or semi-skilled workers and 
special purpose machinery.
It should be added that Piore and Sabel interpret IDs only as one possible form of 
flexible specialization. Others include federated enterprises, typified by the looser 
post-war federation of Japanese enterprises; a solar system of firms such as the 
Boeing Company, and workshop factories, to be found in the American and West 
German economies.36
According to Piore and Sabel, IDs are characterized by three mutually dependent 
characteristics. These are: a wide and constantly up-dated range of products for a highly 
differentiated regional market at home and abroad; the flexible use of increasingly 
productive, widely applicable technology; and the creation of regional institutions 
which balance co-operation and competition among firms, so as to encourage 
permanent innovation. Technology had to be flexible in both the narrow and broad 
senses, meaning that it had to permit quick inexpensive shifts from one product to 
another within a family of goods. Moreover, it had to permit a constant expansion in 
the range of materials worked and operation performed, in order to facilitate the 
transition from one whole family of products to another. Regional institutions helped 
create the pre-conditions for fostering permanent innovation, by discouraging firms 
from competing through wage and price reduction, as opposed to competition through 
the innovation of products and processes. Therefore, the role of micro-regulation is to 
create and preserve the favourable conditions to encourage a competition based on 
more productive technology rather then cutting wages and violating health and safety 
standards. Furthermore, local government provided services beneficial to the whole 
community of firms, such as improving roads, constructing industrial parks, opening 
vocational schools where these were not established by associations of artisans or
35 Piore and Sabel, Second Industrial, p. 29.
36 Ibid., pp. 265-268.
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industrialists, and in some cases, as in Carpi, a knitwear ID in Emilia Romagna,
o n
operated regional research centres.
In the Piore and Sabel analysis, IDs represent the re-emergence of craft production, the 
growth of which was limited by the first industrial divide in the early nineteenth 
century, where divide means the ‘brief moments when the path of technological 
development itself is at issue’.38 In these moments social conflicts and political 
circumstances determine the direction of technological development for the following 
decades.39
The breakthrough to mass production technology was determined by social conflict or 
political choices, but this form of mechanization was not the only viable one. Zeitlin 
and Sabel argue that ‘high skill, universal-machine economies, which in many ways 
anticipate current developments, emerged in Western Europe and North America 
towards the end of the XVIII century. Areas using flexible specialization continued to 
be, in many cases, vital into the XX century. When they stagnated, the reasons had to 
do with social stalemates and unfavourable background conditions, not with the 
exhaustion of technological possibilities’.40
A critical view of small firms and flexible specialization is taken by Landes and 
Williams et a l41 They consider IDs as an unstable pattern of business organization, as 
they cannot compete with the resources available to large firms and there are historical 
examples of IDs transformed at the hand of large firms. Furthermore, flexible 
specialization cannot be considered ‘a realistic historical alternative’ to mass
37 Ibid., pp. 29-30 and 228-229; a detailed and critical discussion of local government intervention in 
British areas specialized in the production of clothing is provided by J. Zeitlin and P. Totterdill, 
‘Markets, Technology and Local Intervention: The case of Clothing’, in: P. Hirst and J. Zeitlin (eds), 
Reversing Industrial Decline? Industrial Structure and Policy in Britain and her Competitors
(Oxford, 1989), pp. 176-184.
38 Piore and Sabel, Second Industrial, p. 5.
39 Ibid., pp. 5, 38-39.
40 C. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, ‘Historical Alternative to Mass Production: Politics, Markets and 
technology in Nineteenth Century Industrialization’, Past and Present, 108 (1985), p. 134.
41 D.S. Landes, ‘Small is Beautiful. Small is Beautiful?’ in: S. Tolliday (ed.), The Rise and Fall o f 
Mass Production, vol. II (Cheltenham, 1998), pp. 285-298; K. Williams, T. Cutler, J. Williams and C. 
Haslam, ‘The End of Mass Production?’ in Tolliday, The Rise and Fall, vol. II, pp. 299-332.
35
production. Decreasing the production cost per unit remains the type of production 
best suited to meet the limited purchasing power of the great majority of consumers. In 
turn, this was the type of market catered for by the Industrial Revolution, and therefore 
the emergence of mass production was not due to social and political circumstances but 
was a consequence of the logic of industrialization itself.42 Moreover, other scholars 
pointed out various shortcomings that make small firms and flexible specialization a 
non-viable alternative to centralized and vertically integrated firms 43 Lazonick holds 
the view that economies of scale are overwhelmingly important and that the growth of 
national economies crucially depends on the ability to take advantage of economies of 
scale in major industrial sectors. Clearly, in these sectors small firms could not 
compete successfully 44 Therefore, it seems that small, competitive firms are able to 
retain strong positions in those industries such as engineering, clothing, and retailing. 
However, they have been historically wiped out in sectors, such as iron, steel and 
branches of the chemical industry where economies of scales are very important.45
The Piore and Sabel notion of flexible specialization as a strategy of ‘permanent 
innovation’46 is important in the context of this thesis because it helps to explain the 
competitiveness of IDs. Moreover, considering that this thesis focuses on the 
importance of state subsidies for firms within IDs, it is important to note Piore and 
Sabel recognise only local institutions as playing a significant role in the development 
of IDs, failing even to mention national institutions.
If Piore and Sabel focus on the production process within IDs, Best raises the issue of 
the managerial structure superintending a strategy characterized ‘by continuous 
improvement in process and product’. Continuous improvement requires production 
flexibility, which in turn demands a peculiar organizational form, as flexible as the 
production process. In Best’s analysis, the managerial structures which superintend the 
‘new competition’ (which ‘is manifest in a variety of inter-firm complexes which range
42 Landes, ‘Small Is Beautiful’, pp. 26-27.
43 For a review of arguments in favour and against the ‘flexible specialization’ approach see Langlois
and Robertson, Firms, pp. 120-123.
44 W. Lazonick, Business Organization and the Myth o f the Market Eeconomy (Cambridge, 1991).
45 Langlois and Robertson, Firms, p. 123.
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from group of small Italian firms linked by co-operative associations.... to giant 
Japanese organizational structures’) are the co-operative institutions.47
Similarly to Best, Langlois and Robertson stress the role of co-operative institutions in 
Italian IDs. A number of activities are entrusted to co-operatives, such as business 
services, including bookkeeping; R&D consortia; sponsorship of trade fairs, and other 
marketing ventures - domestic, and in particular international; and the provision of 
utilities and other infrastructure. Co-operation also extends to the provision of capital, 
which the banks lend through the intermediation of official co-operatives 48
In the Langlois and Robertson interpretation, co-operative institutions perform the 
function of co-ordinating the number of firms within the Italian ID. This co-ordination 
within Italian IDs distinguishes them from Marshallian IDs, as shown by the figure 
below. In the Marshallian IDs, there was little product differentiation and the 
competition among firms was much higher. On the contrary, firms within Italian IDs 
compete by differentiating their products, rather than through prices. They tend to 
favour co-operative agreements in those functions characterized by a high degree of 
standardization, such as bookkeeping, sponsorship of trade fairs and domestic and 
international marketing.49
46 Piore and Sabel, Second Industrial, p. 17.
47 M. Best, The New Competition. Institutions o f Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 3
and 208.
48 Langlois and Robertson, Firms, p. 125.
49 Ibid., pp. 124-125.

















Degree of coordination integration
Source: Langlois and Robertson, Firms, p. 124
However, both the Best and the Langlois and Robertson emphasis on co-operative 
institutions take into account only the most advanced stage in the development of IDs. 
For in Marche, which has been the last region to experience this pattern of 
industrialization on a large scale, functions such as bookkeeping, international 
marketing, consultancy and transportation services are often offered by other firms 
rather than co-operative institutions. In Emilia Romagna, the core of the Third Italy, 
co-operative services, provided either by the local government or by the handicraft and 
associations of small entrepreneurs are more usual.50 Therefore, following the 
historical approach to the topic, it would be possible to argue that Third Italian IDs 
describe a curve that goes from ownership integration (handicraft shops),51 to co­
ordination integration. These pass through a stage in which ownership of the 
production process is already fragmented and the only kind of co-ordination displayed 
is given by the subcontracting system from one firm to another.
50 G. Fua, ‘L’industrializzazione nel Nord Est e nel Centro’, in: G. Fua and C. Zacchia (eds), 
Industrializzazione senza Fratture (Bologna, 1983), p. 25.
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Co-ordination by market mechanisms is demonstrated by the engineering ID in Emilia 
Romagna, located in an area between Parma, Modena, Bologna and the Reggio Emilia. 
There some of the small and medium-sized firms were founded in the nineteenth 
century. More firms were established in the years after World War II and particularly 
following the ‘Hot Autumn’ of 1969, when thousands of skilled craftsmen were made 
redundant by Fiat and the other large companies. In the early 1970s, these firms began 
to split work among themselves, share information and skilled workers as well as 
apprentices and craftsmen rotated among various businesses. Individual firms would 
choose their subcontractors according to the specialization required for the particular 
job. Thus the same firm could be a leading firm on one occasion and a supplier on the 
following, depending on its specialization and the production capacity available at that 
moment. As Harrison pointed out: the ‘fluidity of the local labour market’ and the 
‘practice of changing partners’ when meeting new orders allowed the metal-working 
firms of Emilia Romagna to build a ‘non-hierarchical spatial production system that 
worked marvellously well’.52
Therefore, within IDs we can distinguish two tendencies - one towards the division 
of the production process among small firms and the other towards a horizontal 
integration of functions and services. The previous section has already provided the 
theoretical explanation for the horizontal integration of functions and services, in 
terms of economies of scale. Stigler pointed out that when an industry has reached a 
‘certain size and prospects it becomes profitable for other firms to supply equipment 
and raw materials, to undertake the marketing of the product and the utilization of
c i
by-products, and even to train skilled labour’. However, Marshall makes the case 
more suitable to our purpose, claiming that ‘if there exist a large number of such 
small establishments specialised for the performance of a particular stage of the
51 Fua mentions several industrial districts that present handicraft traditions in the same sector: 
footwear around Fermo-Marche, furniture in the Natisone valley and Friuli, ceramics around
Sassuolo-Emilia; Ibid., p. 22.
52 B. Harrison, Lean and Mean. The Changing Landscape o f corporate power in the age offlexibility 
(New York, 1994), pp. 81-82; the issues of subcontracting and flexibility have been studied on the 
basis of other case studies, see for instance E.H. Lorenz, ‘The Search for Flexibility: Subcontracting 
Networks in French and British Engineering’ in Hirst and Zeitlin, Reversing Industrial Decline?, pp. 
122-132.
53 Stigler, ‘Division of Labour’, p. 190.
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process of production, there will be room for the profitable investment of capital in 
the organizing of subsidiary industries adapted for meeting their special wants’.54 
Therefore, those activities whose economies of scale extend beyond the capacity of a 
small firm and present a certain degree of standardization are horizontally 
integrated.55
The horizontal integration of stages of the production process at ID level in turn 
implies the disintegration of the production process at firm level. Companies might be 
willing to shed to specializing firms those stages of the production process where 
internal economies of scale were lowered at the level of the firm. Dealing with the 
problem of the ‘spin off of stages, Leijonfvud also distinguishes ‘parallel-series scale 
economies’. His explanation is focused on the differences in efficiency of the single 
production stage.56 A multi-stage production process requires each stage of production 
to be closely co-ordinated in time, but production stages are unlikely to be uniformly 
efficient, therefore some stages will be bottlenecks and some others have excess 
capacity. If the demand for the latter increases, the stage may be organised within a 
firm. Here LenijonfVud's model can readily be translated to an understanding of the 
development of production disintegration in an industrial district.
Looking back to Stigler's approach, another factor emerges -  ‘localization is one of the 
methods of increasing the economic size of an industry and achieving the gains of 
specialisation’.57 Related to this is the fact that localisation of industry affects the size 
of plants. Geographically concentrated industries usually have fairly small plants,
ro
where individual firms can specialize in smaller ranges of products and functions. 
Therefore, localization enhances the tendency towards horizontal integration for those 
functions that present large economies of scale. Similarly, it strengthens the tendency 
towards vertical disintegration for those functions in which economies of specialization 
are more relevant than economies of large scale, because the market is not sufficiently
54 Marshall, Early Writings, vol. 2, p. 197.
55 Langlois and Robertson, Firms, p. 125.
56 A. Leijonhufvud, ‘Capitalism and the Factory System’, in: R.N. Langlois (ed.), Economics as a 
process. Essay in the New Institutional Economics (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 203-223.
57 Stigler,‘Division of Labour’, p. 192.
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large and homogeneous to exploit potential economies of large scale. Thus ‘the net 
result is that geographic concentration allows for the development of vertically 
disintegrated structures by allowing each activity to be performed at its optimal scale, 
reducing the transaction costs involved in market transactions, and by supplying 
additional mechanisms that foster firm interdependence’.59
Technological change should also be taken into account when trying to explain the 
vertical disintegration of the production process, or how technological change affects 
the boundaries of the firm. The impact of technological change on the division of the 
production process is exemplified by a case study of the ceramic tiles industry located 
in the area between Modena and Reggio Emilia.60 This was insignificant until the 
Second World War, but expanded in the 1960s and early 1970s due to the entry of 
many new firms. Many factors made entry far easier. The initial investment required - 
at that time - for a factory of minimum efficient size61 was almost insignificant, the 
know-how was not difficult to acquire, and domestic demand had increased sharply, 
partly because of changes in housing legislation (in the early 1960s) and partly because 
of changes in the technical and aesthetic characteristics of the product.
The sector was badly hit by the oil shock. Demand fell as prices rose because energy 
and fuel constituted a considerable part of total costs. The crisis particularly affected 
the worst equipped and worst organized factories with a poor quality product. The 
industry’s reaction was to attempt to open new markets by adopting a new production 
technique (with a consequent reorganization of the production process at the inter-firm 
and intra-firm level) and new marketing agreements between firms. This led the 
ceramic tile industry to take on a structure more suited to dealing with changing market 
conditions. In 1974, the invention of the double-firing process allowed manufacturers 
to choose between the integrated production of majolica ceramic tiles and a vertically 
disintegrated process, which allowed them to split the production process at the biscuit
59 Ibid., p. 192.
59 Enright, ‘Organization’, p. 108.
60 M. Russo, ‘Technical Change and Innovation in Italian Industrial Districts’, in: Goodman, Bamford 
and Saynor (eds), Small Firms, pp. 205-222.
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(pre-glazing) stage. Examining the variation in economies of scale that this 
technological change introduced, Russo concluded that the decrease of per unit costs 
was more consistent in the integrated process. However, the vertical disintegration 
reduced the minimum efficient size and enabled firms to enjoy more significant 
economies. Thus, ‘the stimulus to partial disintegration came from cost advantages in 
terms of product and process specialization’.62 Taking Pratten’s approach, 
specialization is an advantage of scale, and means ‘making distinct products for a niche 
market, making short runs and making a broader range of products’. The vertical 
disintegration of the double-firing process gave rise to the creation of new products that 
have served to widen the range of existing ones rather than to replace them. Since 
there are markets in which the image of a firm and a trade mark are stronger due to the 
wider range of product it is able to offer, the manufacturers will consequently adopt the 
technology that will allow for a greater product mix. Thus disintegration finds its 
justification in the creation of new opportunities for diversification of output and new 
types of product and process specialisation and in the lower level of investment 
required to create a firm of a minimum efficient size.
The example of the Sassuolo ceramic tile ID highlights the role of technology as a 
basic element in the disintegration of the production process. However, the market for 
the product also emerges as an important factor in the adoption of the new disintegrated 
production process. Langlois and Robertson describe these markets as characterised by 
‘parametric changes’.64 This means changes of certain known variables within a 
known framework. Thus, a firm does not know what kind of tiles will be fashionable 
the following year, but does know how to combine elements to produce a particular 
style of tile. In this example, the instability of the product market determined the 
boundaries of the firms involved in its process, and technology made it possible.
61 The point at which average costs cease to fall. See C.F. Pratten, Economies o f Scale in
Manufacturing Industry (1971), p. 7.
62 Russo, ‘Technical change’, p. 209.
63 Pratten, Competitiveness, p. 70.
64 Langlois and Robertson, Firms, p. 136.
1.2 The emergence of Italian IDs
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This section outlines the stylised development of Italian IDs since the post-war 
period.65 The first sub-section focuses on the emergence of IDs mainly in the so-called 
‘Third Italy’ (the North-East and Centre of Italy). The second sub-section focuses on 
Southern IDs.
1.2.1 North and North-East
In the Italian literature, three main approaches can be distinguished: political, 
sociological and economic. The interdisciplinary approach to the topic led to an 
interpretation of IDs as ‘a thickening of industrial and social interdependencies in a 
certain place. This thickening appears in at least three ways: as a relatively self- 
contained labour market; as a matrix of localised technical inter-relationships; as a web 
of socio-cultural connections’.66 Moreover, IDs are seen as a stage in one of the 
possible paths towards the industrialization of a country or of a region; more precisely 
the path of the NEC (North-East and Centre), which leads from an artisan-agricultural 
stage to an industrial one.67
Although long-established areas of specialization such as Prato, Como and Biella, had
/TO
previously attracted the interest of researchers, it was only m the second half of the 
1970s that the extent of the diffiision of IDs was noticed. The sociologist Bagnasco 
pointed out that in North-Eastern and Central regions industry was characterized 
almost entirely by small firms (with less than 250 employees) in traditional sectors and 
woodworking and metalworking.69 He noted that small firms in those regions tended
65 A collection of studies on long-established IDs, in Italy and other European countries, from their 
proto-industrial origin is available in G.L. Fontana (ed.), Le vie dell'industrializzazione europea 
(Bologna, 1997).
66 G. Becattini, ‘Italy’, in: W. Sengenberger, G. Loveman and M.J. Piore (eds), The Re-emergence o f  
Small Enterprises: Industrial Restructuring in Industrialised Countries (Geneva, 1990), p. 161.
67 Ibid., p. 163.
68 E. Avigdor, L ’industria tessile a Prato (Milan, 1961); R. Marchi, Storia economica di Prato 
(Milan, 1962); P. Pinchetti, L ’Industria della seta sul finire del sec. XIX (Como, 1894); G. Quazza,
L ’Industria laniera e cotoniera in Piemonte dal 1831 al 1861 (Turin, 1961).
69 Bagnasco, Tre Italie, pp. 153-162; traditional sectors include food processing, tobacco, textile and 
clothing, leather and footwear and non-metallic minerals.
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to concentrate in limited geographical areas and to develop marked specialization. 
Various examples of such concentration showed that the production of each firm was 
connected to other firms in the area, leading to the fragmentation of the production 
process among the various firms.70 The industrial pattern displayed by those regions 
made them stand apart from the industrial triangle (North-West) and from the under- 
industrialized South, hence the name of ‘Third Italy’ (or NEC).
71 . .Bmsco and Paba took a long-term approach to the development of IDs. They set out 
to analyze the growth in the number of IDs in the whole country, variations in their 
geographical location and their importance in terms of labour force, from the early 
1950s to 1991. This study, together with the Conti and Ferri contribution72 mentioned 
below, has the merit of pioneering a macro approach to the topic of IDs aimed at 
complementing the case-study approach. However, the Brusco and Paba study 
admittedly suffers from some limitations. In order to identify IDs the authors use the
7^methodology elaborated by Bmsco and the Istat (Italian Official Bureau of Statistics). 
This methodology identifies IDs on the basis of certain criteria. The ratio of workers in 
manufacturing to the total number of workers (excluding workers in agriculture) should 
be higher than the national average, as should the percentage of workers in firms with 
less than 250 workers. Clearly, such criteria cannot capture the phenomenon precisely 
enough. The ID of Canneto sull’Oglio, in Lombardy, where toys have been produced 
since the XIX century, qualifies as an ID according to data from the censuses from 
1951 to 1971. It does not qualify according to the 1981 census but is recognised again 
using the 1991 data. The reason for its disappearance in 1981 is that in that year the 
proportion of workers in firms with less than 100 employees was 54%, whereas the 
national average was 58%. Therefore, Canneto would be counted as a 'new' ID in 
1991, despite its long traditions.74
1Q Ibid., pp. 168-184.
71 S. Brusco and S. Paba, ‘Per una storia dei distretti industriali italiani dal secondo dopoguerra agli 
anni novanta’ in F. Barca, Storia del capitalismo italiano dal dopoguerra ad oggi (Rome, 1997), pp. 
265-333.
72 Conti and Ferri, ‘Banche locali', pp. 429-465.
73 Istat, Rapporto annuale. La situazione del Paese nel 1995 (Rome, 1996). The methodology is 
explained and partly adopted for the two case studies used in this thesis (see section 5.2.1).
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The study identifies the 1960s as the period of maximum expansion in the number of 
IDs and the 1950s and 1960s as the period of maximum expansion of their labour 
force. The growth of the labour force within IDs decreased considerably in the 1980s. 
This reflects a general trend, for workers in manufacturing in Italy decreased by 10.4 
per cent in the same decade. Therefore the very fact IDs increased their manufacturing 
workforce in the same decade is interpreted by the authors as an indicator of their 
competitiveness.75
Table LI The development of Italian IDs
Survival rate Birth rate Labour force variation
1951-1961 40 9 209 704
1961-1971 65.4 99 67.3
1971-1981 83.7 41.6 47.2
1981-1991 83.7 30.8 9.9
Keys: survival rate = IDs surviving throughout the decade as a percentage of IDs existing at the beginning 
of the decade; birth rate = new IDs established within the decade as a percentage of all IDs at the end of 
the decade; labour force variation = workers within the ID in the final year of each period as a percentage 
of workers in the initial year.
Source: Brusco and Paba, ‘Per una storia’, pp. 288-289; data source Istat, Censimento dell’Industria, 
1951,1961,1971,1981,1991.
In the development of IDs (and the success of small business in general), an important 
role is attributed to changes in economic and technological conditions. The economic 
conditions favouring IDs were dictated by new forms of market demand. Rising 
incomes resulted in an increase in demand for customised products (and a decrease in 
demand for standardized products) - a demand that could be satisfied through the use 
of flexible multi-purpose machinery and skilled workers. Given the product, the 
quality of the market for the product (shifting and volatile) and the availability of 
technology, small size became an advantage for companies. The new economic 
conditions were met on the supply side by the large number of small and medium-sized 
firms in the Italian industrial base, concentrated in the NEC area. These conditions 
are mainly identifiable by the presence in the area of small firms and handicraft
74 Brusco and Paba, ‘Per una storia’, p. 279.
75 Ibid., pp. 288-290.
76 V. Zamagni, The Economic History o f Italy, J860-1990 (Oxford, 1993), pp. 350-352.
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workshops earlier than the 1950s and their subsequent proliferation due to the 
dismissal of workers from war-related industries and agriculture.77 The emergence of 
IDs received further stimuli from the decentralisation and restructuring of large firms, 
mainly concentrated in the industrial triangle, and from the adversarial character of 
industrial relations in large-scale industry, which was to emerge from the so called "hot 
autumn" of 1969 onwards 78
Several technological conditions favoured the development of IDs. These include the 
reduction in diseconomies connected with distance, due to improvements in the 
transport and communication systems. In addition, the new electronic and 
information technologies reduced the importance of the integrated production cycle, 
changing the ratio between size and profit. This opened another way of achieving 
economies of scale, as can be inferred from the case study of the Sassuolo ceramic 
tile ID mentioned above. Another factor was the increased diffusion of multi­
purpose machinery that could be programmed to carry out different tasks.79
Therefore, the Third Italy held the best position to fully exploit the change in economic 
and technological conditions. The fact that a particular area took fuller advantage of 
these external inputs is explained as due to the presence of a social structure congruent
• OA ,to those mputs. In Emilia Romagna, the actors of this process were people leaving 
agriculture and reluctant to abandon the environment in which they were integrated.81 
Fua and Becattini maintain that the absence or low rates of out-migration is an 
enhancing factor in the development of IDs in the Third Italy, particularly in Tuscany 
and Emilia Romagna, which industrialized in the 1950s without losing population.82 
The rationale might lie in the fact that low rates of out-migration contributed to the 
survival of local skills and the availability of labour force for flexible specialized 
production, more labour-intensive than mass production.
77 Fua, ‘L’ industrializzazione’, p. 12.
78 Piore and Sabel, Second Industrial, pp. 155-156.
79 Zamagm, Economic History, pp. 151 -152.
80 A. Bagnasco, La Costruzione Sociale del Mercato, (Bologna, 1988).
81 Fua, ‘L’ industrializzazione’, p. 14.
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The analysis of the transition from agriculture to small-scale entrepreneurship 
received particular attention from the sociological approach toward IDs. In this strand 
of study, the analysis of Bagnasco, which demonstrated the existence of a correlation 
between share-cropping, tenants and small-scale landed property, and the ‘pattern of 
diffused industrialization’ as far as provinces of the NEC area are concerned, has been 
a milestone.83
The steps leading from the agricultural production to industrial production were as 
follows. For the largest part of the NEC area, the process started in the 1950s with the 
breakdown of the share-cropping and tenants system. Two aspects require 
clarification: being a share-cropper or a tenant meant possessing capital frozen in 
agricultural tools and domestic animals; the dominant family structure was the 
extended family, which allowed a concentration of household savings. In the 1950s, 
there were families expelled from agriculture with a modest financial capacity. The 
reaction to the loss of the previous agricultural work was a splitting of the economic 
activities among family members. Some were sent to earn a wage in industry, while 
the rest of the family acquired a plot of land. Once the previous share-cropping family 
acquired a plot of land, it discovered it could not make a living out of it through 
capitalist farming: the whole family was thus expelled from the primary sector. The 
presence of members of the same family in industry, their acquired expertise, and the 
sharing of it with the other members determined the transformation of the family into 
an entrepreneurial unit. In this process, the possession of land plays an extremely 
important role as it allowed the lowering of reproduction costs of the labour force (the 
self-sufficient family economy) and it constituted the initial private capital to
or
commence the entrepreneurial activity. The choice of the product was determined by
82 Ibid., p. 14; Becattini, ‘Italy’, p. 156
83 Bagnasco, Costruzione Sociale, pp. 75-88.
84 M. Paci, La Struttura Sociale Italiana (Bologna, 1982), pp. 114-119; the stages singled out by Paci 
have been recognized also in the evolution of IDs in the North-West of Italy. In cases like Como and 
Cantu (an area located North of Milan and specialized in the production of wooden furniture), the 
same stages can be recognized but with a different timing. The stages had started much earlier - in the 
case of Cantu as early as the late XVIII century - and the transition from one stage to the following 
extended over a longer period of time. See Bull and Comer, From Peasant, pp. 144-151. The 
development of Como since the 1960s presents similarities with IDs in the NEC; see A. Bull, M. Pitt
and J. Szarka, Entrepreneurial Textile Communities (London, 1993).
85 Paci, Struttura Sociale, p. 118.
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the limited amount of financial capital available (household savings) and those 
products and technology for which the small size was not a handicap (products with 
low entry barriers). Where a handicraft tradition already existed, this dictated the 
choice of the product.86 In this process, orders from outside acted as a catalyst, as did 
returning migrants, who brought experience in industry, savings and precise contacts 
with foreign markets. These migrants became a ‘demonstration effect’ for the whole
1.2.2 The South
The analysis of the emergence of IDs focuses mainly on the North and Centre of Italy,
QO
as only recent works acknowledge their existence in the South. This pattern of 
industrialisation is believed to hinge upon rural independence absent in the South, 
where agriculture was characterised by landed gentry and a disinherited landed 
proletariat. The Southern industry was also regarded as a hindrance to the development 
of IDs. In the 1970s, Southern industry consisted of entreprises concentrated at the 
opposite ends of the size spectrum, with very small labour-intensive firms in traditional 
sectors (such as food processing, textile and clothing, leather and footwear) and large 
capital-intensive plants in modem sectors such as metal processing, engineering and 
the chemical industry. The latter have a considerable relative weight in the Southern 
industry, but are disconnected from the regional economy in terms of sectors and 
capital. The lack of homogeneity of Southern industry and the high failure rate of 
Southern companies are seen as obstacles to the growth of small firms in traditional 
sectors, meaning those sectors where IDs are particularly frequent. The emphasis on 
the great relative weight of modem large plants in the Southern industry, in this
86 Fua, ‘L’ industrializzazione’, p. 15.
87 Ibid., p. 13.
88 G. Viesti, ‘Lo Sviluppo Possibile. Casi di Successo Intemazionale dei Distretti Industriali nel Sud 
d’ltalia’, Rassegna Economica, 59/1 (1995), pp. 119-140; Brusco and Paba, ‘Per una storia’; G. 
Molinari, ‘Signs of vocation for light industry’, in: L. Meldolesi and V. Aniello (eds), Invisible Italy: 
flashes on the missing Italian Mezzogiomo, special issue of Rivista di Politico Economica, 88/10-11 
(1998), pp. 363-387; L. Meldolesi and G. Molinari, ‘The first map of the Mezzogiomo’s vocation for 
light industry’, in: Meldolesi and Aniello (eds), Invisible Italy, pp. 389-394; G. Viesti, Come nascono 
i distretti industriali (Rome-Bari, 2000). Previous studies do not identify any ID further South than 
the Marche region, see F. Sforzi, ‘The Quantitative Importance of Marshallian industrial districts in
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context, implies a criticism of the regional policy which favoured the establishment of 
capital-intensive plants in modem sectors in the South with very limited potential to 
generate related industrial activities in the area. Only to a more limited extent did
on
subsidies play a role in supporting local traditional industries.
However, Bmsco and Saba threw new light on the issue of Southern IDs and identified 
examples in Puglia, Campania and Sardinia, using data from the 1991 Census of 
Industry. More interestingly, comparing the number of Southern IDs identified in 1951 
with those identified in 1991, it clearly emerges that there were many more IDs in the 
South in 1951 than in 1991. The IDs identified in 1951 specialized in food processing, 
clothing, footwear and wooden furniture, and it was mainly in the decade up to 1961 
that a large number of IDs disappeared. The authors explain this as due to the fierce 
competition from the Centre and North and to the outward migratory flows that 
destroyed the network of local skills existing before the Second World War.90
As mentioned above, Bagnasco considered the polarization of the Southern industry 
as a factor preventing the formation of IDs. This opinion, however, is not 
uncontroversial. Recent research has pointed out a variety of development paths of 
‘specialized areas’91 in the South, in which the establishment of large firms from 
outside the South has also played an important role.92 An example is Pomigliano 
d’Arco in Naples province; an area specialized in the production of civil aircraft. In 
1938, IRI (Institute for the Reconstruction of Industry) relocated part of its 
production capacity there. From an investigation undertaken in 1994, it emerged that 
75% of the suppliers of the IRI plant in Pomigliano d’Arco are located in the same 
area. Out of these 20 companies, 11 are run by local entrepreneurs. The authors see 
Pomigliano d’Arco as evidence that the establishment of a non-local (in this case
the Italian economy’, in: Pyke, Becattini and Sengenberger (eds), Industrial Districts and lnter-firm
Co-operation in Italy, p. 83.
89 Bagnasco, Tre Italie, pp. 67-86.
90 Brusco and Paba, ‘Per una storia’, pp. 281-283.
91 The works referred to in the remainder of this section do not investigate whether these areas can be 
considered IDs according to a codified definition of ID, therefore henceforth the expression ‘areas of
specialization’ will be adopted.
92 L. Baculo, ‘Modelli di relazioni imprenditoriali in alcune realta locali meridionali’,in: Becattini, 
Bellandi, Dei Ottati and Sforzi (eds), II caleidoscopio dello sviluppo locale, p. 171.
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state-owned) capital-intensive plant can generate features typical of an ID, through 
the spin-off of stages of the production process, the diffusion of technical knowledge 
and the creation of a specialized labour market. However, it needs to be added that 
the aircraft industry might represent a special case as it is characterized by a high
93fragmentation of the production process.
Other Southern specialized areas developed through handicraft traditions, as in the 
case of the production of clothing in the Bari province or in areas of the Abruzzi 
regions, where specialized production has been noted since the inter-war period. In 
other cases like Solofra, near Naples, the tanning of leather is an activity dating back 
to the XVI century and it is in turn related to the availability of tannin in the 
surrounding woods.94
Similarly to what has been said about the development of North-eastern IDs, also in 
the South returning migrants played an important role. The largest company 
producing clothing in the Abruzzi region, Brioni, was established by a local 
entrepreneur following his previous entrepreneurial experience in Rome. Other 
entrepreneurs in the clothing sector in the Abruzzi region and in the footwear sector 
in Barletta and Casarano started their own companies after working as employees in 
the same sectors in Lombardy in the inter-war period and in the 1950s.95
The decentralization of production by Northern and North-Eastern firms is 
considered a further important factor in the development of specialized areas in the 
South. In the area of Lavello in Basilicata, the production of lingerie was started by 
an entrepreneur from Carpi, in Emilia Romagna. He brought the equipment to 
Lavello, trained the local workforce and subcontracted part of his production there. 
The case of Lavello is unique as there the production is said to have been started by 
an external firm, but in several other Southern IDs, firms work as subcontractors for
93 A. Del Monte and A. Giunta, ‘Competitivita e rapporti tra imprese: esperienze meridionali a 
confronto’, in: Becattini, Bellandi, Dei Ottati and Sforzi (eds), U caleidoscopio dello sviluppo locale,
pp. 298-305.
94 Viesti, Come nascono, pp. 125-129; R. Garavini, F. Calistri and O. Cilona, La Quarta Italia
(Rome, 1988), pp. 343-348.
95 Viesti, Come nascono, p. 130.
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Northern companies. The importance of sub-contracting is shown by some figures. 
An investigation undertaken in 1991 showed that out of 300 Northern companies in 
the clothing sector, 75 sub-contract part of their production to the South. In 1993, 
the production of clothing in Puglia and Campania was worth l,465bn lire in Puglia 
region and 747bn in Campania, of which respectively 351bn and 121bn was due to 
sub-contracting from Northern firms. In turn, companies from the North and North- 
East subcontract to the South to avoid congestion and higher labour costs.96
1.3 Italian IDs and their sources of finance
This section compares two bodies of literature. One is the established view, which 
claims that internally generated funds and collective self-financing are the main 
sources of finance of companies within IDs. This traditional understanding contrasts 
with a broader understanding of the importance of bank and state finance in the 
industrialization of countries and regions. Moreover, recent research has begun to
07investigate the importance of bank capital in the development of IDs.
1.3.1 The sources of company finance within IDs
Italian IDs have generated an extremely rich literature. However, the financial 
sources used by small and medium-sized firms within IDs have not been the object
QQ
of specific investigation. There are some indications. For example, m the process
™ Ibid., pp. 131-135.
97 Conti and Ferri, ‘Banche locali’; G. Ferri and M. Messori, ‘Bank-firm Relationships and Allocative 
Efficiency in Northeastern and Central Italy and in the South’, Journal o f Banking and Finance, 24 
(2000), pp. 1067-1095. A similar line of research has been undertaken to investigate the role of bank 
finance in the development of the Spanish ID of Alcoi, in the Valencia region, specialized in the 
production of woolen goods, J. Cuevas, ‘Banking Growth and Industry Financing in Spain during the
Nineteenth Century’, Business History, 44 (2002), pp. 61-94.
98 A recent work concerning the pottery industrial cluster in North Staffordshire, between the second 
half of the XIX century and the First World War, has provided evidence of the existence o f a circuit of 
credit - particularly commercial credit - within the cluster. It also showed that banks’ draft and bills of 
exchange dominated transactions within the industry by the end of the 1880s. Due to the slackness of 
the market, company failures became more frequent and it was feared that the collapse o f one link in 
the credit circuit could have wide repercussions. See A. Popp, Business Structure, Business Culture 
and the Industrial District (Aldershot, 2001), passim and p. 226. However, extending these results to 
the Italian IDs in the second half of the XXth century seems inappropriate, due to the all too evident 
historical difference and to the different importance of commercial credit and bank capital in the two
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described by Paci and Bull et al.,99 the transformation of the agricultural family into 
an entrepreneurial unit was financed through household savings. Saba claims that as 
small firms are unable to access the financial market, their sources of finance must 
be either internal or external from banks. However, due to the high interest rates and 
requirement of collateral that banks demand from small firms, particularly those 
located in less developed areas, the only channel of finance left available to such 
firms is the private one, particularly self-financing by reinvesting profits.100 
Apparently, IDs have gone so far in the process of self-financing as to reach the stage 
of ‘collective self-financing’. Firms that have reached a good margin of profit might 
be willing to lend money to firms willing to invest but unable to cover the whole 
investment cost. The channel of information and contact among firms is the local 
accountant, who is aware of the ‘real’ financial situation of the client firms and thus 
suggests ‘temporary partnerships’, being able to assure the reliability of the 
borrowing firms.101
•I
Other studies have illustrated a different type of financing dynamic taking place 
within IDs. The proliferation of small firms within an ID is encouraged by 
‘interlinking relations of subcontracting and credit’. For workers wishing to start 
their own business in any of the specific stages of the production process but not 
possessing the financial means to do so, the easiest way to procure the capital is to 
borrow it from entrepreneurs involved in the final stages of the production process, 
or in the assembly or marketing of the final product. These entrepreneurs would be 
customers of the starting-up entrepreneur, who is then in the position of paying back 
his loan by discounting it from the payment of the work ordered by the lender. This
countries since their industrialization. Commercial credit played a key role in the industrialization of 
England. In Italy and other continental European countries, bank capital was of fundamental 
importance in promoting industrialization, see Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, pp. 11-16; M. 
Collins, Banks and Industrial Finance in Britain 1800-1939 (Houndmills, 1991), pp. 22-32; J.S. 
Cohen, ‘Financing Industrialization in Italy, 1894-1914: The Partial Transformation o f a Late-Comer’,
Journal o f Economic History, 27 (1967), pp. 363-382.
99 Paci, Struttura sociale, pp. 114-119; Bull and Comer, From Peasant, pp. 144-151; Bull, Pitt and 
Szarka, Entrepreneurial Textile.
100 Saba, H modello, p. 132.
101 Ibid., pp. 136-137.
102 G. Dei Ottati, ‘Trust, interlinking transactions and credit in the industrial district’, Cambridge 
Journal o f Economics, 18 (1994), pp. 529-546; G. Dei Ottati, Tra mercato e comunita: aspetti 
concettuali e ricerche empiriche sul distretto industriale (Milan, 1995), pp. 43-64.
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type of credit is based on the personal reputation of the borrower-subcontractor, 
with whom the lender had previous professional contacts, either as a subcontractor or
103employee. Therefore, the borrower is known to the lender as a trustworthy party. 
Dei Ottati refers to ‘reciprocal co-operation’ as the element on which circuits of 
credit internal to the ID rely.104 However, as Helper noted, in the case of the 
American automotive industry, supplying contracts with financially independent 
firms are expensive, as they should deal in advance with a wide variety of possible 
contingencies that may arise, which would not exclude the possibility of costly post­
contract disputes.105 Therefore, it is possible that the dynamic of supplying and 
credit described by Dei Ottati, offers economic advantages to the entrepreneurs in the 
final stage acting as lenders. These can rely to a greater extent on their financially 
dependent Suppliers, thus reducing the cost of contracts and the possibility of post­
contract disputes.
Other research mentions non-financial contribution provided by ‘mother firms’ 
deciding to decentralize stages of their production process and lending the initial 
equipment to employees willing to start their own firm.106 This is the case of 
Lombardini, one of the major engineering firms in the province of Reggio Emilia, in 
Emilia Romagna, specialized in the production of mechanical tools for agriculture. 
From the early 1950s, the market for such agricultural tools boomed as the primary 
sector lost much of its labour force in the North. This created increasing demand for 
tools that could be operated by one person alone, as typified by the soaring demand 
for pumps to irrigate the land in the Po Valley. This led the Lombardini company to 
decentralize stages of its production process. The company offered to lend 
equipment, enabling its employees to start their own companies, with the agreement 
that the mother company would subcontract work to them and pay immediately for
103 Dei Ottati, ‘Trust’, pp. 534-536.
104 Ibid., pp. 531-534; E.H. Lorenz, ‘Trust, Community, and Cooperation’, in: M. Storper and A. J. 
Scott, Pathways to Industrialization and Regional Development (1992), pp. 195-215.
105 S. Helper, ‘Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the US Automobile 
Industry’, Business History Review, 65 (1991), p. 782.
106 D. Pellegrini, ‘II profilo di un modello reggiano’, in: G.L. Basini and G. Lugli (eds),
L ’affermazione dell’industria. Reggio Emilia 1940-1973 (Rome-Bari, 1999), p. 173.
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the work. Similar stories are told about other major engineering companies in the
1A7area, like Slanzi and Landini.
1.3.2 The importance of banks and state intervention
The emphasis on internal sources of finance used by small firms within IDs contrasts 
sharply with a body of literature focusing on the importance of the financial structure in 
the industrial development of regions and countries. This body of literature spans from 
Schumpeter, who considered the banking system and entrepreneurship as the two 
fundamental elements in the process of development,108 to contemporary works in 
economic history.109 As this thesis compares public and private sources of finance in 
two Italian regions with different degrees of industrialization, this section focuses on 
those key works that have examined the nexus between financial institutions and 
industrialization in the context of various degrees of industrialization.
Discussing the industrialization of various European countries, Gerschenkron pointed 
out the specific features of their industrialization in relation to their degree of 
development. This wider discussion included the role of the financial system and 
government intervention.110 The Gerschenkron analysis focused on Russia, France, 
Italy and the German states, in the nineteenth century up until the beginning of the First 
World War, and considered these countries in terms of their backwardness as 
compared with Britain where industrialization had started much earlier.
Gerschenkron pointed out that the more backward a country, the more important was 
the role played by institutions designed to provide capital and entrepreneurial guidance 
to the nascent industry.111 In a context of medium backwardness, as in France or 
Germany, shortage of capital is often the major bottleneck. Capital in these countries
107 L. Segreto, ‘La storia, le stone. Imprese e imprenditori a Reggio Emilia dal 1945 agli anni 
Settanta’, in: G.L. Basini and G. Lugli (eds), L ’affermazione dell'industria. Reggio Emilia 1940-1973
(Rome-Bari, 1999), pp. 309, 321-322, 326.
108 J.A. Schumpeter, The Theory o f Economic Development (Cambridge, Mass., 1933).
109 V. Zamagni (ed.), Finance and the Enterprise (1992).
110 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness.
111 Ibid., p. 354.
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was scarce and diffused, therefore institutions such as investment banks, like the 
Credit Mobilier in France and various banks in Germany, Austria and Italy, that collect 
capital and make it available to industry, are of crucial importance to 
industrialization.112 In such circumstances, institutional intervention, such as a reform 
of the banking system could produce a specialised industrial investment bank that 
could break the bottleneck.113
In the specific case of Italy, the role of providing capital for the industrial boom of 
1896-1908 was performed by German-style banks.114 The Banca Commerciale and 
Credito Italiano were established in 1894-5 with German and Swiss capital, and with 
German management. The Banca Commerciale and Credito Italiano filled the void left 
by the Credito Mobiliare and Banca Generale, which collapsed in the 1890s banking 
crisis, and had been established on the model of the French Credit Mobilier. The banks 
established on the German model provided not only long-term capital but also 
entrepreneurship, a factor of industrialization considered even more scarce than 
capital.115
If the degree of backwardness exceeds certain limits, the scarcity of capital will be such 
that no banking system could conceivably succeed in attracting sufficient funds to 
finance large-scale industrialization. Such circumstances require state intervention, 
which might directly promote the ‘railroadization’ or industrialisation of the country or 
divert incomes from consumption to investment through taxes. In addition, backward 
economies are characterised by frequent bankruptcies, which generate public distrust, 
making it more difficult for a bank to attract even that capital which was available. 
Furthermore, banks would not commit themselves to a long-term credit policy in an 
economy so distressed that the probability of bankruptcies is very high.116 These
112 Ibid., p. 14.
113 Ibid., p. 10.
114 Ibid., pp. 72-89, especially p. 78.
115 G. Federico and G. Toniolo, ‘Italy’, in R. Sylla and G. Toniolo, Patterns o f European 
Industrialization. The Nineteenth Century (1991), p. 204. Gerschenkron emphasis on the importance 
of German-type hanks in the Italian industrialization has stimulated further research, both 
contradicting and supporting his interpretation; for a review of the debate see Ibid, pp. 204-206.
116 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, pp. 19-20. Gerschenkron clearly held the view that 
bankruptcies were due to particularly low standards of honesty in business, where fraudulent
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conditions might render private sector banking unviable. In this situation, the supply 
of capital requires the intervention of the state, as showed by the example of the Russia 
at the end of the XIX century, where the economic backwardness was reduced through 
a state-sponsored industrialization drive.117
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Cameron focused on the role of financial institutions 
in industrialization.118 Discussing the Gerschenkronian hypothesis for a larger number 
of countries, from Spain to Serbia and from Belgium to Japan, Cameron points out that 
the financial system plays a greater role in those countries of ‘imitative or derivative 
industrialization (i.e., in every case since England’s original industrial revolution)’. 
Therefore, the banking system should be a particular interest of policy-makers in 
developing countries.119
Table 1.2 GDP per capita in Western European countries (1990 international dollars)
1870 1900 1913 1950
Great Britain 3,263 4,593 5,032 6,847
West Germany 1,913 3.134 3,833 4,281
Austria 1,875 2,901 3,488 3,731
France 1,858 2,849 3,452 5,221
Italy 1,467 1,746 2,507 3,425
Russia 1,023 1,218 1,488 2,834
Source: A. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992 (Paris, 1995), p. 23.
Table 1.2 shows that in 1913 Italy is almost half way between a country of moderate 
backwardness like France and a particular backward country like Russia. However, by 
1950 the Italian GDP per capita is much closer to the Russian figure. In the first half of 
the XX century Italy did not keep pace with the growth of France, whereas Russia 
almost doubled its GDP per capita. Recent regional estimates of the Italian GNP, by
bankruptcies were a general business practice. However, one could wonder whether the higher 
probability o f going bankrupt in an extremely distressed economy was not of similar importance.
117 Ibid., pp. 20-22.
118R. Cameron, O. Crisp, H. T. Patrick and R. Tilly, Banking in the Early Stages o f Industrialization. 
A study in Comparative Economic History (New York, 1967); R. Cameron (ed.), Banking and 
Economic Development. Some Lessons o f History (New York, 1972).
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Esposto, covering the period between 1870 and 1910, show the large extent of the
Italian inter-regional differential. In 1910, the Southern GNP per capita was only
12055.5% of the North-western figure, whereas the North-eastern GNP was only 75%. 
Therefore, Gerschenkron’s discussion on the role of private sector banks and the state 
in industrialization seems to provide a useful framework for investigating the role of 
private and state finance in the development of IDs in the South and the North-East of 
Italy.
Conti and Ferri121 have investigated the nexus between bank capital and IDs and 
pointed out that although much has been written on the topic, not a single work has 
faced the issue of the financial sources utilized by these small and medium-sized firms. 
This neglect has allowed long-held assumptions, that such firms relied entirely on 
internal sources of finances, to pass unchallenged. This assumption seems doubtful, 
especially for the take-off stage and during economic downturns, and ignores the fact 
that an ID is a suitable environment for local banks. As local banks have access to 
informal and official information about firms applying for overdrafts and loans, they 
can easily monitor the way in which loans were used and act effectively in the 
collection of debts.122 The authors claim that local banks played an important role in 
the development of IDs, although they admit that the causal relationship is not easy to 
define. This study focuses on the examination of the characteristics of the banking 
system in municipalities located in IDs, using three benchmark years: 1936, 1970 and 
1990. Throughout this period, the percentage of municipalities with banks is higher in 
towns within IDs than in municipalities located in the same regions and provinces but 
not belonging to any ID. The size (calculated as the weighted average of the bank 
branches in each town, with each branch attributed a weight according to the deposit 
size of the bank to which it belongs) of the banks located in the IDs appears to be 
consistently smaller. Furthermore, saving banks hold the largest share of the market, 
although the market in ID towns is much less concentrated than in their non-ID
119 Cameron et al., Banking, p. 292.
120A.G. Esposto, ‘Estimating Regional per capita income: Italy, 1861-1914’, Journal o f European
Economic History, 26 (1997), p. 597.
121 Conti and Ferri, ‘Banche Locali’.
122 Ibid, pp. 429-430.
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counterparts. These contrasts persisted from 1936 to 1970 but became less 
pronounced thereafter, i.e. the size of bank increased everywhere and even more so in 
IDs. This is explicable through the fact that larger banks moved to the IDs and that 
more developed IDs require financial services that large banks are better equipped to 
offer.123
This study touches upon an extremely interesting issue: the importance of capital 
from small banks in the development of IDs, regardless of their geographical 
location. However, the analysis has simply shown that there are more bank branches 
in the IDs and that banks in IDs are smaller. This seems to be an important clue but 
it does not prove that bank capital has been important to the development of IDs, and 
thus it does not clearly disprove the long-held assumption of the exhaustive role 
played by internal sources of finance. Moreover, the Conti and Ferri study does not 
take into account the availability of state subsidies to firms in the South within the 
framework of the regional policy and in the rest of the country as part of the national 
policy. This thesis addresses this issue. It is expected that state subsidies were a 
more important source of finance for firms in the South, as, consistently with the 
Gerschenkronian argument, these were introduced from the 1950s to overcome the 
shortage of capital in the South - something that was seen as a constraint on 
investment in the region.
Conclusions
This chapter has presented a neo-classical interpretation of the ID in terms of 
economies from the division of labour and transaction costs, and compared it with 
more recent interpretations proposed by Beccattini and Harrison, claiming that Italian 
IDs can not be explained by agglomeration economies and internalisation of transaction 
costs within the region. They argue that concepts such as social cohesion and mutual 
trust are necessary to interpret this form of business organization. The theoretical 
foundation of the interpretations by Becattini and Harrison is the Granovetter concept
123 Ibid, pp. 446-450.
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of ‘embeddedness’.124 Therefore, the pressures towards vertical integration do not 
come from uncertainties, or repetitiveness and requirement of transactions specific 
investments, but when firms lack a network of interpersonal relations or where such a 
network eventuates in conflict, disorder or malfeasance. On the other hand, where a 
stable network of relations mediates complex transactions and generates standards of 
behaviour between firms, such pressures should be absent.
The interpretation proposed by Becattini and Harrison, informed by the 
‘embeddedness’ concept, does not seem completely convincing. Opportunistic 
behaviour and malfeasance within an ID would be very dangerous due to the presence 
of several firms in each stage of the production process, therefore if a subcontractor did 
not respect the terms of the agreement there would be quite a choice of alternative 
partners. Moreover, opportunistic behaviour could result in future exclusion from any 
partnership or subcontracting, given that within a number of firms concentrated in few 
neighbouring towns, a bad reputation could spread easily. Thus it is competition 
among firms and the restricted environment in which they are located which act as a 
deterrent to opportunistic behaviour, and not the development of social cohesion and 
mutual trust. Cohesion surely develops but it seems to be founded upon the business 
interdependence among firms. Therefore in this thesis, IDs will be analysed utilising 
economic concepts rather than sociological ones.
A key issue addressed in this chapter is the development of IDs in various regions. 
Their development received a strong stimulus by the change in macroeconomic 
conditions at the beginning of the 1960s, which meant a revival in the fortune of small 
firms. These firms, particularly those concentrated in the North-East and Centre of the 
country, had emerged in the 1950s and earlier in some cases, after the expulsion of 
families from the primary sector. Household savings and capital deriving from land 
sales were invested in handicraft firms, in production activities with low entry barriers. 
More controversial is the understanding of the development of IDs in the South. The 
traditional approach would not recognize their existence, whereas other studies hold 
the view that the Southern IDs developed much later and in smaller numbers because
124 Granovetter, ‘Economic Action’.
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of the lack of an agrarian petit-bourgeoisie and an unconducive industrial 
environment. On the contrary, recent research points to the disappearance of Southern 
IDs in the 1960s and their re-emergence at a later stage, as well as to a wide variety of 
factors stimulating their emergence and development.
It has also been shown that recent studies place much emphasis on self-financing not 
only in the establishment of the small firms but also in the subsequent financing of 
their activity. This interpretation clearly ignores any role that might have been played 
by other sources of finance, to which other schools of thought have paid much 
attention. In the early 1960s, Gerschenkron explained that in moderately backward 
areas capital is scarce and diffused, therefore institutions such as banks that collect this 
capital and make it available to industry are of crucial importance to industrialization. 
In particularly backward areas, ‘the scarcity of capital is such that no banking system 
can succeed in attracting sufficient funds to finance a large-scale industrialization’.125 
Besides, no bank would commit itself to a long-term credit policy in an economy so 
distressed that the probability of bankruptcies is very high. In this situation, the supply 
of capital requires the intervention of the State. A very recent study has shown that 
small banks were particularly concentrated in IDs, and thus claims that local bank 
capital was important to these small and medium-sized firms.126
The review of the literature on IDs has shown that neither the mainstream literature nor 
recent research takes into account the availability of credit to small and medium-sized 
firms through the various Medium-Term Credit Institutions. These were established in 
the 1950s, and in some cases even earlier (they will be introduced in chapter El). In the 
late 1950s, these institutions became channels of low-interest credit subsidised by the 
state, within the framework of national and regional industrial policies. Thus, this 
thesis intends to broaden the understanding of Italian IDs by including the study of the 
neglected state subsidies to small and medium-sized firms within the factors that might 
have stimulated the growth of firms within IDs.
125 Gershenkron, ‘Economic Backwardness’, p. 19.
126 Conti and Ferri, ‘Banche Locali’.
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CHAPTER n
The Debate on Regional Economic Policy: a review of the literature 
Introduction
This chapter surveys the historical debate on regional policies and the methodologies 
adopted to evaluate them. The first section summarizes the theoretical debate 
surrounding the implementation and effectiveness of regional policies. The second 
section surveys studies concerning the assessment of regional policy, mainly in Great 
Britain, paying particular attention to their methodology. The third section focuses on 
the Italian case. It presents some indicators of the North-South gap and their evolution 
during forty years of regional policy, and surveys studies that tried to identify and 
quantify the effects of the regional policy. As far as the literature on the Italian case is 
concerned, attention is paid to the methodology as well as to the results of the analysis.
2.1 The debate about regional policy
Regional policies are designed to address the problem of disparities between the 
regions of a country, when regions present marked and persistent economic 
inequalities. Disparities show themselves with a number of indicators demonstrating 
lesser economic welfare, such as high rates of unemployment, low activity rates, heavy 
out-migration and below-average income per head.1
There are two main approaches to explaining regional economic unbalances. The neo­
classical explanation focuses on supply side factors, while the Keynesian approach 
stresses the importance of demand for the regional produce, and explains regional 
imbalances as due to structural deficiencies of demand. From the two approaches to 
the causes of regional inequality, stem two fundamental approaches to reduce regional
1 B. Nicol and D. Yuill, Regional Problems and Policies in Europe: The Post-War Experience 
(Glasgow, 1980), p. 1.
2 R. Martin, ‘The New Economics and Politics of Regional Restructuring: The British Experience’, in: 
L. Albrechts, F. Moulaert, P. Roberts and E. Swyngedouw (eds), Regional Policy at the Crossroads, 
European Perspectives (1989), p. 28.
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disparities. The ‘restructuring for capital’ approach holds that market forces are the 
best mechanism for regenerating investment, employment and welfare in the local 
economy, while the interventionist ‘restructuring for labour’ approach claims that the 
market generates economic inequalities and ignores social needs.3 Martin argues that 
the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. Markets stimulate technical innovation 
and flexibility, and are thus favourable to local prosperity and employment. At the 
same time, market competitive forces are shaped by the specific institutional 
framework in which they operate. Therefore, there is scope for ‘influencing the 
functioning and outcome of market processes’.4
According to the neo-classical approach, regional growth is determined or constrained 
by the growth of factor supply and productivity, the latter due either to a lower capital 
to labour ratio, technical backwardness or to a concentration of the labour force in low- 
productivity sectors, such as agriculture. In the neo-classical approach, the free 
movement of capital, labour and technical progress across regions works as a balancing 
mechanism. In theory markets would clear employment disparities by a threefold 
mechanism: 1) wages would fall in the areas of low employment; 2) workers would 
migrate from low-wage to high-wage areas; 3) firms would move from high-wage to 
low-wage areas. Moreover, the regions with backward technology will gain 
productivity by reducing the technological gap.5
However, this adjustment process would be far too slow to eliminate regional 
disparities in wages and employment and there are frictions hindering the free 
movement of labour and capital.6 Thus free-market economists suggest that rents on 
council houses should reach market levels to enable normal mobility incentives to 
operate. In this case, net migration to low unemployment areas would increase, which 
would alleviate labour market pressures in these areas and would reduce 
unemployment in the areas of origin. However, the higher cost of property in more 
developed regions, as compared to the market level of rents in less developed regions
3 Ibid., p. 36.
4 Ibid., p. 36.
5 H. Armstrong and J. Taylor, Regional Economics and Policy (New York, 1993), pp. 58 -73 and 197.
6 Ibid., p. 197.
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could still be a factor discouraging labour mobility. Therefore more land needs to 
made available in more developed regions in order to increase supply and lower price 
of accommodation.
A further mechanism worsening unemployment is the level of benefits, as people will 
not take jobs that pay too little in comparison with the dole. Compulsory training 
programmes should be introduced for the long-term unemployed. This would have the 
further effect of increasing the productivity of manual workers and then increasing 
wages in the traded sector, to reduce unemployment. Two further measures are 
envisaged to reduce regional disparities: deregulating protected sectors and reducing 
union power. Both should reduce unemployment in all regions and particularly in the 
backward regions, where the lack of competition is most acute.7
The neo-classical approach suffers from three limitations. First, it assumes that 
investors and workers are perfectly informed of factor prices in all regions. However, 
neither investors nor workers are perfectly informed and there can be impediments to 
the mobility of factors. Furthermore, the neo-classical approach assumes that factor 
prices are perfectly flexible, whereas they often can be far from perfectly flexible. A 
further limitation of the neo-classical approach lies in the failure to recognize the 
importance of demand factors.8
According to the Keynesian approach, regional growth is demand driven, particularly 
by demand from outside the region, for a region’s exports are considered as the major 
autonomous demand factor.9 In the Keynesian approach, supply adjusts to demand, 
therefore labour and capital will migrate to those regions experiencing a high demand 
for its output.10 Thus, the movement of factors will not equalize growth across regions, 
rather fast growing regions will sustain their advantage due to increasing returns
7 P. Minford and P. Stoney, ‘Regional Policy and Market Forces: A Model and an Assessment’ in: A. 
Bowen and K. Mayhew (eds), Reducing Regional Inequalities (1991), pp. 137-143.
8 Armstrong and Taylor, Regional Economics, pp. 58-73.
9 N. Kaldor, ‘The Case for Regional Policies’, Scottish Journal o f  Political Economy, 17 (1970), pp. 
337-348.
10 A. P. Thirlwall, Macroeconomic Issues from a Keynesian perspective, vol. 2: Selected Essays ofA. 
P. Thirlwall (Cheltenham, 1997), p. 287.
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induced by growth.11
Spatial Keynesianism interprets the regional imbalances as due to structural 
deficiencies of demand correctable by the relocation of the industrial sector or by 
reducing wage costs by introducing labour subsidies. Government intervention might 
take place in three main forms: encouraging industry to move from non-assisted to 
assisted areas; stimulating the emergence of new firms and the growth of small firms; 
and investing in social overhead capital, and introducing subsidies to reduce wage 
costs.12
However, regional economic discrepancies are not sufficient in themselves to justify
the implementation of a regional policy. For such policies to be implemented, the
disparities should be serious enough to prevent the whole country from achieving its 
1 ^economic objectives. As an example, one of the main justifications for implementing 
the regional policy for the Italian Mezzogiomo in the 1950s, was that its backwardness 
affected the Italian balance of payments and reduced the international competitiveness 
of the whole country.14 Furthermore, backward regions are often affected by higher 
unemployment than the rest of the country. As unemployment is a waste of valuable 
resources, the reduction of unemployment in backward regions without losing jobs in 
more developed regions is a gain for the whole country. The hidden labour force once 
employed would produce output, with a corresponding reduction in the numbers of 
recipients of welfare benefits. In addition, a lower unemployment rate should reduce 
social tensions.
Severe regional imbalances are also unfavourable to fast-growing regions, which 
experience excess demand for social capital, in contrast to the backward regions, where 
such capital is invariably under-utilised. Governments are under great pressure to
11 R. Dixon and A. P. Thirlwall, ‘A Model of Regional Growth-rate Differences on Kaldorian Lines’, 
Oxford Economic Papers (New series), 27 (1975), p. 201.
12 Martin, ‘New Economics’, p. 28; Armstrong and Taylor, Regional Economics, pp. 200-201.
13 Armstrong and Taylor, Regional Economics, p. 191.
14 P. Saraceno, ‘Lo sviluppo industriale delle regioni meridionali e l’attivita della Cassa per il 
Mezzogiomo’, L ’Industria, Rivista di Economia Politico, 4 (1953), pp. 651-656; Confederazione 
generale dell’industria italiana, La politico di sviluppo economico del Mezzogiomo (Rome, 1970), pp. 
4-5. This point is addressed in more detail in Chapter III, section 3.1.2.
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relieve congestion in booming areas, to which they respond by increasing supply of 
social capital. However, if backward areas could be made economically more 
attractive, in the longer term the demand for social capital would be diverted away 
from congested areas.15 Furthermore, faster-growing areas represent an inflationary 
‘time bomb’.16 In the case of economic upturns, low unemployment areas run into 
skilled labour shortages, leading to wage-driven inflation as firms tend to increase 
wages because of the competition for skilled labour. Such inflation spills over on to 
other markets and to other regions through inter-plant agreements within firms and
17 • • • • •through national wage agreements. An example of this situation is the Italian crisis 
of 1962-3, which marked the end of the so-called ‘economic miracle’. Full male 
employment in the North brought about an increase in wages, which in turn called for a 
deflationary monetary policy by the Bank of Italy, a credit squeeze which damaged the 
economy to the extent that GNP growth fell from 5.9% in 1962 and 5.2% in 1963 to 
2.9% in 1964. Investment fell by 20.2% in 1964.18 A similar case occurred in Britain, 
where the business upturn of 1985-1988 brought inflationary pressure, which spread 
from the South East to the rest of the country. The government’s retaliatory 
deflationary policy brought about not only a sharp slow down in economic growth but 
ultimately recession.19 Such cases provide examples of the economic justification for 
the implementation of regional policies.
The debate surrounding regional policies and industrial policies in general is not 
confined to the implementation of such policies. The major part of the controversy and 
the case for regional policy, in the first place, revolves around the effectiveness of such 
policies, which in turn are only a specific feature of the government intervention in the 
economy.
15 Armstrong and Taylor, Regional Economics, pp. 194-195.
16 H.W. Armstrong, ‘Regional Problems and Policies’, in: N.F.R. Crafts and N. Woodward, The 
British Economy since 1945 (1991), p. 334.
17 Armstrong and Taylor, Regional Economics, p. 195.
18 K. Allen and A. Stevenson, An Introduction to the Italian Economy (1974), pp. 51, 170.
19 R. Martin, ‘Reviving the Economic Case for Regional Policy’, in: R.T. Harrison and M. Hart, 
Spatial Policy in a Divided Nation (1993), p. 275; P. Scott, ‘Regional Development and Policy’ draft 
chapter for R. Floud and P. Johnson (eds), The Cambridge Economic History o f Britain, Vol. 3 
(Cambridge, forthcoming 2003).
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Controversy surrounds regional incentives and in particular automatic grants. 
Investment incentives can have three distinct types of effects. They can promote 
investment that would not have taken place in the absence of incentives; they might 
divert to aided areas or sectors investment that would have otherwise taken place in 
other areas or sectors; and they might generate investment different in kind from that
Of)which would otherwise have taken place. However, incentives could also be used by 
recipient firms to undertake investment that would have gone ahead anyhow or to 
undertake a re-location that would have taken place anyhow.21 The reason why 
investment incentives should generate additional investment is that ‘the reduction in 
the cost of the investment will make more projects look profitable enough to be 
undertaken. Secondly the addition to companies’ cash flow may allow them to 
increase their investment expenditure’ 22
In the interventionist approach, the availability of subsidised credit for small firms has 
the effect of correcting the bias of the capital market towards large firms, which are 
considered by investors as less risky, whereas the free-market supporters claim that this 
bias is more assumed than real. The effects of this sort of intervention could be the 
sheltering of an uncompetitive sector or troubled firms 24 Furthermore, subsidised 
public credit might have opposite effects on private bank credit. The government 
might act as the initial lender to unseasoned firms and this might crowd in private 
creditors. Private creditors might crowd in because the government has already 
undertaken monitoring costs, or because the longer term of the public credit will 
provide a ‘senior’ status to private banks.25 However, governments financing fixed
investment might simply underbid private lenders to secure the best clients, thus the
0(\provision of subsidised credit might crowd out private credit.
20 J. Marquand, Measuring the Effects and Costs o f  Regional Incentives, Government Economic 
Service Working Papers no. 32 (1980), p. 32
21 K. Allen, H. Begg, S. McDowell and G.Walker, Regional Incentives and the Investment Decision o f  
the Firm (1986), p. 3.
22 Marquand, Measuring, p. 32.
23 G. Hall (ed.), European Industrial Policy (1986), pp. 3-4.
24 C.W. Calomiris and C.P. Himmelberg, ‘Government Credit Policy and Industrial Performance 
(Japanese Machine Tool Producers, 1963-91)’, The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper n. 
1434 (Washington, 1995), p. 4.
25 Ibid., p. 4.
26 Ibid., p. 24.
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2.2 The assessment of regional policies
Estimating the effectiveness of an industrial policy is a particularly complex task. It 
can focus upon three main issues: changes in employment levels, the performance of 
investment in the targeted areas or sectors, and the relocation of industry from fast 
growing to backward areas. An analysis of any regional policy should start from the 
stated objectives of the policy. Ideally, regional policies should not only set clear 
targets but should also quantify them, and should specify the time span in which the 
targets are to be achieved, and should prioritise the various objectives.27 However, the 
objectives are usually expressed in much less precise terms, such as the reduction of 
unemployment, increasing levels of employment, or in the Italian case the reduction of 
imports to the South, and sometimes in even broader terms such as the advancement of 
a regional economy. In the case of the UK, a Regional Development Programme 
submitted to the European Development Fund in 1977 states that ‘The primary 
objective of United Kingdom regional policy is to bring the supply and demand for 
labour in the Assisted Areas more closely into balance by safeguarding existing 
employment and creating new jobs in those areas’.28
When objectives are so broad, the only observable criterion by which such a policy can 
be assessed is changes in the level of unemployment in the target regions, taking into 
account other labour market forces 29 The effectiveness of a regional policy cannot be 
measured simply by considering whether the employment or investment gap between 
the region and the country as a whole has been reduced. For instance, in Italy as well 
as in Great Britain the unemployment gap has increased since industrial policies were 
implemented, but it would be incorrect to conclude that such policies have been a 
failure on this basis. Jobs created by the industrial policy have not necessarily been 
filled by the unemployed. New jobs may have been filled by workers made 
redundant in declining sectors, such as the extractive industry in the UK. Moreover, 
before producing any change in employment, a regional policy may have the effect of
27 Armstrong and Taylor, Regional Economics, p. 216.
28 Marquand, Measuring, p. 4.
19 Ibid., p. 4.
30 Armstrong, ‘Regional Problems’, pp. 328-330; for the unemployment gap in Italy see table II. 1 in
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increasing the activity rate and reducing outward migration.31 The last effect in 
particular would be interpreted as detrimental in the neo-classical perspective as it 
would reduce factor mobility and aggravate the regional problem. On the other hand, it 
cannot be excluded that if there had been no regional policy, unemployment in the 
depressed areas would have been worse.32 Thus assessing the effects of a regional 
policy requires measuring what would have happened if there had been no policy or if 
the policy had had a different intensity.33
The fundamental structure of the methodology for assessing the effects of a regional 
government policy are: identifying those variables that should be affected by the 
regional policy; measuring in a consistent way the changing strength of the policy; and 
explaining the changes in those variables as a response to the policy.34 The pioneering 
work in this field was the 1973 article by Moore and Rhodes, which tried to identify the 
effects of the UK’s government regional policy on employment in manufacturing 
between 1950 and 1971, with particular emphasis on the effects of the Regional 
Employment Premium (R.E.P., a labour subsidy paid to employers, introduced in 
1967).35 The nucleus of the Moore and Rhodes methodology can be summarised as 
follows: the estimate of the effects of the regional policy is to be found in the difference 
between what would have happened to manufacturing employment in absence of the 
policy and what actually happened. The main difficulty lies in establishing the 
hypothetical position - a counterfactual - because this has to take into account factors 
unrelated to the actual policy.
The first step of the Moore and Rhodes analysis has been to measure the intensity of 
post-war regional economic policies. Taking into consideration the various degrees of
this chapter.
31 B. Moore, J. Rhodes and P. Tyler, The effects o f  Government Regional Economic Policy (1986), p. 
13.
32 Armstrong, ‘Regional Problems’, p. 328.
33 B. Moore, B. and J. Rhodes, ‘Evaluating the Effects o f British Regional Economic Policy’, The 
Economic Journal, 83/329 (1973), p. 87.
34 Moore, Rhodes and Tyler, Effects, p. 13.
35 The REP was designed to compensate for the capital orientation of subsidies, and at the time of its 
introduction it was estimated to cover almost 8% o f the labour cost, see D. Yuill, ‘Regional Incentives 
in the United Kingdom’, in: D. Yuill, K. Allen and C. Hull, Regional Policy in the European 
Community {1980), p. 195.
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intensity of the regional policy is particularly important considering the variety of 
stages witnessed by the British regional policy. The 1950s are considered by the 
historiography as a period of ‘passive’ policy, in which subsidies to firms locating in
<3*7
development areas were available, but no form of location control was in place. The 
‘passive’ policy stage was followed by a transitional period in which the Local 
Employment Act was introduced, between 1959 and 1963. This led to the ‘active’ 
policy stage, the 1960s, during which interventionist measures were implemented, and 
incentives to investment became a right for both incoming and existing firms, resulting
• • *50m a six-fold increase of the regional policy per annum cost. Various indicators, such 
as discounted present values of incentives and expenditure on government factory 
buildings and grants and ‘expenditure on government factory buildings and grants’ in 
particular demonstrates the intensification of the industrial policy from 1963 onwards; 
the latter clearly shows a huge difference between the annual average expenditure for 
the 1955-1959 (£ 4.1m) and 1960-63 (£14.4m). After these years, the annual average 
expenditure on government factory buildings and grants kept increasing.39
Two series of employment data were constructed for development areas: actual 
employment and expected employment. Expected employment was calculated by 
applying the national rate of employment growth to employment in each industry in the 
development areas in 1963. The same calculations were repeated with other base 
years, and it was observed that the choice of the base year did not affect the outcome. 
Shipbuilding and metal manufactures were excluded from these calculations, because 
of special factors specific to these sectors, such as the nationalization of iron and steel 
groups and extensive financial assistance to individual shipyards from the 1960s 
onwards.40 The comparison of the two series reveals that the difference between the 
level of actual and expected employment increased during the period of active policy as
36 Moore, Rhodes and Tyler, Effects, p. 30.
37 S. Rosevear, ‘Regional Policy and the British Motor Vehicle Industry 1945 - 1964: a Study in 
Selective Intervention and the Economics of Industrial Location’ (Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, 
University of Bristol, 1999), pp. 116-117; for a discussion of the reasons behind the Conservative 
government’s rejection of an active regional policy between 1951-58, see P. Scott, ‘The Worst of 
Both Worlds: British Regional Policy, 1951-64’, Business History, 38 (1996), pp. 41-64.
38 Moore and Rhodes, ‘Evaluating’, p. 89; Rosevear, ‘Regional Policy’, pp. 142-143.
39 Moore and Rhodes, ‘Evaluating ’, pp. 104-108.
40Ibid., pp. 92-93.
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compared to periods of passive policy. The same calculations have been repeated for 
investment, where the comparison shows that in the years of passive policy the actual 
annual growth rate of investment in the development areas was lower than expected, 
whereas in the years of active policy it was higher.41
The authors argue that the difference between expected and actual employment and 
investment can be attributed to the strengthening of the industrial policy rather than to 
other factors. This interpretation was supported in various ways, i.e. each development 
area experienced the relative acceleration - as compared to the national average - in 
manufacturing activity after 1963, and Ireland (where grants were introduced in 1954) 
earlier on. The interpretation acquires further support from the comparison of the 
difference in actual and expected employment in manufacturing in the development 
areas and in two prosperous areas, the Midlands and the South-East. Development and 
depressed areas show opposite trends as far as the difference between expected and 
actual employment is concerned. Actual manufacturing employment in the prosperous 
regions grew more rapidly than expected from 1950 to 1963, after which the trend was 
reversed 42 The interpretation that the difference is the effect of the regional policy was 
further strengthened by showing that alternative interpretations were not convincing. 
For instance, a possible explanation of the relatively faster employment growth in 
development areas, after 1963, would be that these areas became more attractive on the 
grounds of their easier labour market situation. Moore and Rhodes maintain that if this 
had been the case, employment in assisted areas would have increased in periods of a 
tight labour market situation in non-assisted regions. However, unemployment in 
prosperous areas was lower in the 1950s than in the 1960s, particularly if compared to 
post-1967 period, therefore the availability of labour in development areas would have 
been less attractive to firms in the 1960s.43
Nevertheless, Moore and Rhodes admit that their approach has some imperfections, 
among which the most interesting is the time lag that should be taken into account 
when considering employment or investment induced by the strength of the industrial
41 Ibid., p. 94.
42 Ibid., pp. 96-97.
43 Ibid., pp. 100-101.
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policy in a certain year. In their article,, it is evident that the choice of the time lag 
affects the assessment of the effect of the REP, which is considerable (40,000 to 50,000 
jobs from 1964 to 1970 in the development areas) with a lag of 18 months, but far less 
impressive (less than half) with a lag of 2 or 3 years.44
The Moore and Rhodes work is considered a milestone in the field of evaluation of 
industrial policies and further improvements were introduced in subsequent versions of 
the methodology. The 1973 methodology takes into account industrial structural 
changes and effects of the industrial policy, but it does not consider any impact from 
national business cycles and time trends 45 In a later refinement, the methodology not 
only takes into account business cycles and time trends, but also estimates the impact 
of the policy as the difference between the trend of the actual (A) minus expected (E) 
employment series in the policy-off period (pre-1960) and the level of the A-E 
employment series in the policy-on period (post-1960).46 The 1986 study incorporates 
further refinements by distinguishing the contrasting employment patterns generated by 
indigenous and immigrant firms 47
The key point of the Moore et al. methodology, the policy-on/policy-off comparison, 
has been adopted by other scholars. Rees and Miall calculated the development 
region’s share in the national investment in a policy-off period and compared it with
A O
the same region’s share in a policy on period. They focused on investment because 
investment incentives have been one of the most important instruments of industrial 
policies in the UK. Furthermore, the availability of consistent series of data about 
investment and capital stock, by regions and by industry has made the analysis 
possible. This approach presents the shortcoming of a the relative measurement, for 
the increase in the relative weight of investment in assisted areas might also be due to 
decreasing investment in the rest of the country.
“ Ibid., pp. 101-102.
45 Moore, Rhodes and Tyler, Effects, p. 30.
46 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
47 Ibid., p. 34.
48 R.D. Rees and R.H.C. Miall, ‘The Effect of Regional Policy on Manufacturing Investment and 
Capital Stock within the U.K. between 1959 and 1978’, Regional Studies, 15 (1981), pp. 413-424.
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Incentives should affect investment for a number of reasons and in a number of ways. 
Investment projects might be diverted from non-assisted to assisted areas as they are 
more profitable if located in the latter, or while unprofitable in the non-assisted areas 
they might be profitable and go ahead in the assisted areas. Indigenous projects, 
unprofitable without subsidies and therefore not undertaken, might now be profitable 
and go ahead. Investment incentives might also attract internationally mobile projects 
into the assisted areas. Moreover, grants relax the financial constraints of recipient 
companies and may thus induce further investment. By affecting the relative price of 
factors, capital subsidies might induce some substitution of capital for labour. 
However, given that the regional policy in the UK included labour incentives, a 
balancing effect is possible.
If incentives affect investment in the above mentioned ways the following effects 
should be observable: 1) assisted areas should display a higher share of the national 
investment and capital stock than would otherwise be the case; 2) the policy should be 
more beneficial, the more capital intensive the sector; 3) industries in the assisted areas 
will become more capital-intensive than their counterparts located elsewhere.49 The 
first effect is studied through the shift-share analysis. The regional investment 
percentage of the national total during 1951-1958 was taken as the policy-off share, as 
although the UK regional policy was operative since 1934, during 1950-1958 very few 
funds were devoted to it, owing to cuts in public expenditure following the balance of 
payments crisis of 1947.50 From 1959 onwards, the actual share as been calculated and 
regarded as policy-on. The authors interpret the difference in shares as an effect of the 
industrial policy, not taking into account that other factors than the policy might have 
affected it. This analysis embodies the assumption that total national investment did 
not change as a consequence of the industrial policy, i.e. if the government had not 
stimulated investment through a regional policy, it would have done so in an alternative 
manner.51 The analysis shows that there has generally been a positive shift of 
investment towards the assisted areas, and the size of the share seems to be responsive
49 Ibid., pp. 414-415.
50 Armstrong, ‘Regional Problems’, pp. 313-314.
51 Rees and Miall, ‘Effect’, p. 415.
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to the changing intensity of the phases of the UK regional policies.52 However, the 
authors do not attempt to attribute a specific value to the effects of the policy, and also 
make clear that shifts observable in a certain year may be due to effects of regional 
policy in earlier periods (recalling the same time lag problem as in Moore and Rhodes).
The Rees and Miall methodology does not seem convincing. It seems simplistic to 
attribute the variation in aggregate investment share witnessed by a region to the 
industrial policy. Over 20 years a region’s share of aggregate investment might have 
changed for various reasons, such as the internal composition of the industrial sector. 
Different industrial sectors requiring different degrees of capitalization would entail a 
different regional participation in aggregate industrial investment. Furthermore, some 
areas such as the South East have experienced deindustrialization in favour of the 
service sector. Thus, other regions’ shares in the aggregate investment would have 
increased. Summarising, any other factor might have affected the ‘effect of the 
industrial policy’ calculated in this way. For instance, the authors warn that the 
negative shift witnessed by Wales in 1974-78 should not be considered a failure of the 
policy, because it was entirely due to the chemical industry, or that the positive shifts of 
1975 and 1976 in the assisted areas and the negative one in the following period are to 
be attributed to increasing investment in the chemical and metal industries. Obviously, 
investment in these industries had been influenced by North Sea-related developments 
and the investment policy of the British Steel Corporation.53 The shift-shares analysis 
has been used to estimate the effect of industrial policies on capital stock, and the 
results exhibit a similar pattern.54 In order to examine whether a policy was more 
beneficial to capital intensive industries, the results of the shift-share analysis have 
been studied by industry and regions. The results do not support the proposition. As 
far as the third hypothesis, on the effects of incentives on the capital intensiveness of 
industry, it has been observed that industry in the assisted areas was more capital- 
intensive from the outset of the industrial policy, and that the relative capital intensity 
did not increase during 1963-1973. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that
52 Ibid., p. 418.
52 Ibid., p. 419.
54 Ibid., p. 420.
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investment incentives had a labour substitution effect.55 Following the methodological 
approach by Moore and Rhodes and Rees and Miall, many researchers have applied 
some modified versions of the shift-share analysis to regional macroeconomic data.56 
However, the central problem of the approach - the difficulty of isolating the effect of 
the regional policy - has still not been overcome.
One application of the shift-share analysis was the 1980 work by Marquand for the 
Department of Trade and Industry. This estimated the effects of regional policy on 
labour and investment, with special emphasis on the latter, and calculated regional 
shift-shares of national investment from 1959 to 1976, taking 1951-1958 as the base 
period. In attributing the increase in the shares of investment taken by the development 
areas to the different intensity and packages of the regional policy, allowances are made 
for other factors of potential relevance, such as changes in the industrial structure. For 
instance, separate calculations both include and exclude the oil, chemical and metal 
industry in order to allow for the influence of extraneous factors such as North Sea oil.
The possibility that the shares of the Development Areas in the national investment 
increase as a consequence of disinvestment occurring in other areas of the country is 
not taken into account by either Marquand or any other study. The point of the 
Marquand study is whether the regional policy resulted in an improved use of resources 
and whether gains from the policy have outweighed its costs as the author seeks to 
ascertain. Costs are calculated as gross and net costs for the Treasury and as 
diversionary effects of the regional policy. The result of the cost benefit analysis 
highlights that in the short to medium-term investment incentives are more costly than 
reductions in diverted taxation. However, in the long term, when considering 
employment gains, and investment increases and any contribution to competitiveness,
c o
it appears that investment incentives represent an efficient use of resources. 
Marquand dismisses the notion of a potential misallocation of resources by showing 
that there were no significant differences in productivity in the assisted areas than
55 Ibid., pp. 421-423.
56 H. Begg and S. McDowall, ‘The Effect of Regional Investment Incentives on Company Decisions’, 
Regional Studies, 21 (1987), pp. 459-460.
57 Marquand, Measuring.
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anywhere else in the UK. Marquand’s approach improves upon previous studies by 
differentiating between the relative significance of the various sort of investment that 
incentives might generate i.e. additional investment and relocation of investment. 
However, she points out that in order to reach a more complete appraisal of the 
regional policy other factors that might facilitate or impede regional development (such 
as the structure of the regional industry and its organization) need to be investigated. 
The study concludes by calling for micro-economic works to examine the relative 
merits of different regional policy instruments.59
Further criticisms of the shift-share methodology were expressed by Begg and 
McDowall in 1987.60 They claimed that studies that intended to analyse the impact of 
incentives on investment through shift-share analysis simply demonstrate that regional 
investment is sensitive to changes in industrial policy, but offer no explanation of the 
effects of investment on the investment behaviour of companies.61 The most 
comprehensive micro-economic study addressing this issue is that of Allen, Begg,
f/)McDowall and Walker in 1986. This aimed to ascertain whether firms include 
incentives in the investment feasibility study, whether incentives either induce 
companies to make additional capital expenditure, or influence timing or scale of 
investment, and whether investment actually undertaken would not have occurred
•  f/Xwithout incentives.
These issues are investigated using interviews concerning 100 specific investment 
projects. This places certain limitations on the value of the study, as the assessment of 
the set of issues posed in the study relies entirely on the recollections of plant 
managers. Another shortcoming of the study was that it was plant-based whereas 
decisions are taken at company level. Thus many of the interviewees had not 
participated in the decision-making process. Respondents were asked to define 
incentives according a four-point scale ranging from ‘critical’ (i.e. the investment
Ibid., p. 110.
59 Ibid., pp. 110-111.
60 Begg and McDowall, ‘Effect’, pp. 459-470.
61 Ibid., p. 460.
62 Allen et al, Regional Incentives.
63 Ibid., p. 3.
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would have not been undertaken without the incentive) to ‘irrelevant’.64 43.9% of 
interviewees defined incentives as critical. 12% claimed that the incentives had no 
influence on their investment decision. These results have been studied by firm size, 
and it emerged that smaller firms (regardless of their ownership structure, of the project 
size and amount of the investment) systematically reported higher degrees of influence 
than medium-sized and large firms. It is interesting to note that the significance 
attributed to the incentives varied according to the degree of the assistance enjoyed by 
the areas. 47% of interviewees located in Special Development Areas (i.e. of greatest 
need and enjoying additional incentives such as rent-free premises and additional 
building grants) answered that incentives had been crucial to the investment decision. 
In Development Areas and Intermediate Areas, which enjoyed lower levels of 
assistance, only 29% and 18% considered incentives as crucial. Similarly, only 12% of 
companies in Special Development Areas claimed that financial incentives were not 
significant, compared to 29% in the less needy Development Areas and Intermediate 
Areas.65 These results remain open to a double interpretation. The first is that the 
higher the subsidies the more crucial is their role in the investment decision. 
Alternatively, one might argue that as to whether incentives are considered as crucial, 
is not necessarily related to their value but to the degree of development of the area, 
meaning that the less developed the area the greater the role plaid by subsidies in the 
investment decision.
Another study aiming to assess whether firms actually do consider grants in their 
investment appraisal and whether incentives generate additional investment is an 
earlier work by McDowell and Begg. This is particularly interesting in that it 
investigates the role played by regional financial assistance in the investment decision 
of local/indigenous firms located in areas affected by oil development. The study is 
conducted through personal interviews on a panel of 95 companies divided into four 
size categories (<50, 51-150, 151-300, >300), with 77% of the companies having less 
than 300 employees. The interview referred to investment decisions taken over the last 
ten years. 22% of the companies rated the incentives as crucial and 58% as important. 
More importantly, 14% of the companies interviewed stated that investment would
64 Ibid., p. 8.
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have been abandoned in the absence of incentives. 20% of companies regarded the 
incentive as ‘unimportant’,66 thus admitting that the investment would have been 
undertaken even without incentives.
The microeconomic studies reviewed suggest that the chief concern of the recent 
literature on the assessment of industrial policies is whether investment incentives have 
generated additional investment, i.e. whether incentives have been taken into account 
and revealed to be crucial in the final investment decision. An incentive extended to an 
investment project that would have been undertaken anyhow or to a firm that would 
have located in a development area in any case would be a misallocation of resources, 
and since 1984 there have been attempts in the British industrial policy to avoid such
67cases.
2.3 The Italian regional policy.
This section highlights the main issues in the debate concerning the Italian regional 
policy. It starts by giving an overview of the North/South economic divide. The 
second sub-section deals with the studies assessing the policy’s effectiveness. 
Particular attention is devoted to studies dealing with the policy’s impact on the growth 
of small firms in the South.
2.3.1 The regional problem
Southern Italy, also called the Mezzogiomo or Meridione, is an area covering 40% of 
the country, and comprising eight regions: Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia, 
Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia. As will be shown in Chapter IE, this was the 
area (together with peripheral districts of the Lazio and Marche regions) targeted by the 
so-called ‘Extraordinary Intervention for the South’, managed by the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiomo (hereafter Cassa).
65 Ibid., p. 33.
66 Begg and McDowall, ‘Effect’, p. 465.
67 Armstrong, ‘Regional Problems’, p. 323.
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Italian regions: 1 Piedmont; 2 Valle d ’Aosta; 3 Lombardy; 4 Trentino-Alto Adige; 5 Veneto; 6 Friuli 
Venezia Giulia; 7 Liguria; 8 Emilia Romagna; 9 Tuscany; 10 Umbria; 11 Marche; 12 Lazio; 13 Abruzzo; 
14 Molise; 15 Campania; 16 Puglia; 17 Basilicata; 18 Calabria; 19 Sicilia; 20 Sardegna.
The National Bureau of Statistics (henceforth Istat, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica) divides Italy into: 
North-West = 1 Piedmont; 2 Valle d ’Aosta; 3 Lombardy; 7 Liguria; North-East = 4 Trentino-Alto 
Adige; 5 Veneto; 6 Friuli Venezia Giulia; 8 Emilia Romagna; Centre = 9 Tuscany; 10 Umbria; 11 
Marche; 12 Lazio; South = 13 Abruzzo; 14 Molise; 15 Campania; 16 Puglia; 17 Basilicata; 18 Calabria; 
Islands = 19 Sicilia; 20 Sardegna.
The table below displays some indicators of the North-South economic divide starting 
from the 1950s.68
68 For a discussion of the origins of the Italian economic dualism see L. Cafagna, Dualismo e sviluppo 
nella Storia d ’ Italia (Venice, 1989), pp. 187-220, reprinted in english as L. Cafagna, ‘Discussion of 
the Origins of Italian Economic Dualism’ in C. Feinstein (ed.), The Economic Development o f  
Modern Europe since 1870, vol. 3, G. Federico (ed.), The Economic Development o f  Italy since 1870 
(Aldershot, 1994), pp. 634-653.
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Table HI South and Centre-North economic indicators (%), 1951-1990.
1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1990
Share o f South in Italian
Population 37.2 36.0 35.1 36.1 36.6
GDP per capita 54.5 56.6 58.6 58.2 56.7
Fixed investment 26.1 29.0 31.2 29.0 26.9
Investment/output
South: whole economy 22.4 25.6 26.0 24.5 22.0
South: industry 14.7 20.6 24.5 22.8 22.0
Centre-North: whole economy 20.3 20.0 18.2 19.7 19.6
Centre-North: industry 21.3 16.9 13.8 17.4 18.6
Unemployment
South 9.1 6.4 9.6 16.3 19.7
Centre-North 6.8 4.5 5.2 7.6 6.5
Source: R. Faini, G. Gallo and C. Giannini, ‘Finance and Development: the Case of Southern Italy’, 
in: A. Giovannini (ed.), Finance and Development: Issues and Experience (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 
159, data sources: Istat and Svimez.
Table n.l shows that in forty years of regional policy, the North-South gap was 
reduced only in terms of GDP per capita, and even there the reduction was 
insignificant. Scholars pointed out that the very fact that the South kept pace with the 
North when the latter experienced its fastest growth ever should be regarded as a 
considerable achievement. In years like 1975, the Southern GDP per head amounted to 
65% of the corresponding figure for the Centre and North, thus reducing the gap by 
10.5 percentage points as compared to 1951. The differential has been widening since 
that date, but overall from 1951 to 1983 the gap in terms of GDP per head decreased by 
eight percentage points.69 Moreover, by the end of the 1970s the South had become the 
location for a considerable economic and industrial power, which played an active role
7 0m the Italian economy.
In table H I, the economic indicator showing most dramatically the widening of the
69 S. Cafiero, Tradizione edAttualita del Meridionalismo (Bologna, 1989), p. 110; P. Sylos-Labini, P., 
L ’evoluzione economica del Mezzogiomo negli ultimi trent 'anni, Servizio Studi della Banca d’ltalia, 
Temi di discussione, 46 (1985), p. 4.
70 A. Graziani and E. Pugliese, Investimenti e Disoccupazione nel Mezzogiomo (Bologna, 1978).
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North-South divide since the 1970s is unemployment. The increase in unemployment 
is clearly related to the increase in the participation rate and the end of large outward 
migratory flows from the beginning of the 1970s. However, studies of this topic have 
pointed out other factors behind the high Southern unemployment. Graziani maintains 
that the policy’s failure in reducing unemployment is also due to the emphasis of the 
policy on increasing productivity rather than employment. From the early 1960s, 
increasingly more access to subsidies was granted to large private firms and state- 
owned enterprises in basic sectors. This reflected the aim to create a large and modem 
industrial base in the South and to ensure a release of labour required by the fast 
industrial growth in the North.71
Recent studies have placed much emphasis on a neo-classical explanation of 
unemployment in Southern Italy. In 1970, following the approval of the Workers’ 
Charter, it was adopted a single minimum national wage and a single cost-of-living 
adjustment, which replaced the previous system according to which the country was 
divided into 13 wage-areas. The adoption of a single minimum national wage led to an 
increase in labour costs in Southern Italy, which was not matched by an increase in 
productivity. As a result, the ratio of Southern Italian labour cost as a percentage of the 
national cost became higher than the ratio of Southern labour productivity as a 
percentage of national productivity. Therefore according to this explanation, the 
excessive regulation of the Southern labour market prevented the regional policy from
• 79yielding higher results.
A very critical view of the regional policy is taken by Padoa Schioppa Kostoris, who 
points out that despite the large amount of public resources devoted to the South, the
n 'y
Italian economic divide has not been reduced. This disappointing result can be 
attributed to various causes, ranging from the growth of criminal economy in the region
71 A. Graziani, ‘Introduzione’ in: Id. (ed.), L ’economia italiana: 1945-1970 (Bologna, 1972), pp. 64- 
69.
72 F. Siracusano, C. Tresoldi and G. Zen, Domanda di lavoro e trasformazione dell ’economia del 
Mezzogiomo, Servizio Studi Banca d’ltalia, Temi di discussione, 83 (1986); Padoa Schioppa Kostoris, 
Italy, pp. 91-101.
73 Padoa Schioppa Kostoris, Italy, pp. 74-113.
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to a very flawed allocation of subsidies.74 The allocation of soft loans and grants on a 
discretionary basis, entrusted to an inefficient bureaucracy, is considered as a waste of 
resources and as generating room for bribery. Moreover, as the procedure for 
allocating subsidies was not linked to the progress of the investment project, subsidies 
might have been used by recipient companies to increase their liquidity and undertake 
financial investment.75
The main point of this criticism of government intervention in the South lies in the 
composition of government expenditure. The following table displays disaggregate 
government expenditure by regions in 1988.
14Ibid., pp. 108-109.
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Table II.2 Regional distribution of government expenditure, 1988 (total in 000 bn
LI980)
DI IPD VA E LA Total
As a % of total expenditure in the area
Centre-North, excl. Lazio 43,2 11,3 7,9 6,7 30,9 203 (100)
Latium 47,1 8,0 5,6 6,4 32,9 39 (100)
Centre-North 43,8 10,8 7,5 6,6 31,2 243 (100)
South 46,5 4,7 6,6 5,8 36,5 129 (100)
Italy 44,8 8,6 7,2 6,3 33,1 371 (100)
Per capita (1988 bn lire)a
Centre-North, excl. Lazio 2,8 0,7 0,5 0,4 2,0 6,6 (32.8)c
Latium 3,6 0,6 0,4 0,5 2,5 7,7 (40.1)c
Centre-North 2,9 (65.5)b 0,7 0,5 0,4 2,1 6,7 (33.8)c
South 2,9 (116.4)b 0,3 0,4 0,4 2,3 6,2 (55.0)c
Italy 2,9 0,6 0,5 0,4 2,2 6,5 (39.0)°
Keys: DI= expenditure to support disposable income, including wages and pensions; IPD= interest on 
public debt; VA= expenditure with direct effect on value added, including purchase of goods and 
services, direct investment and the Cassa expenditure; E= total transfers to state-owned and private 
enterprises; LA= transfers to local authorities;a own calculation on the source below; b DI in 1985-1986 
as a percentage of the regional fiscal contribution in the same years, own calculations on the sources 
below;c Total government expenditure as a percentage of value added, own calculations on the source.
Source: Padoa Schioppa Kostoris, Italy, pp. 78-79 and 89; data sources: O. P. Attanasio and F. Padoa 
Schioppa, ‘Regional Inequalities, Migration and Mismatch in Italy, 1960-1986’, in F. Padoa Schioppa 
(ed.), Mismatch and Labour Mobility (Cambridge, 1991), pp.237-320; Senato della Repubblica, 
Relazione generale sulla situazione economica del Paese (Rome, 1989); I.Re.R, La distribuzione 
regionale della spesa dello Stato (Milan, 1986); ISTAT, unpublished data of the new regional accounts; 
F. Padoa Schioppa, ‘Evoluzione demografica, crisi e redistribuzione del sistema pensionistico’, in Ente 
per gli Studi Monetari, Bancari e Finanziari ‘Luigi Einaudi’ ed., 77 disavanzo pubblico in Italia: Natura 
strutturale epolitiche di rientro (Bologna, 1992) pp. 357-427.
Lazio, the region where Rome is located, has been isolated as it presents values higher 
than the average for various components of government expenditure. Lazio is an 
outlier as compared to the Centre, in terms of GDP and value added, also according to
nc
estimation of regional differentials referring to the beginning of the XXth century.
Table n.2 clearly shows that government expenditure in support to household
75 Padoa Schioppa Kostoris, Ibid., pp. 109-110
76 V. Zamagni, Industrializzazione e squilibri regionali in Italia (Bologna, 1978), pp. 198-199.
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disposable income is by far higher than subsidies with a direct effect on the growth of 
output, such as government direct investment and the Cassa expenditure, which are 
included in VA. Although government expenditure show a similar composition in the 
other regions, the bias towards supporting disposable income is held as a source of 
undesirable effects in the South. Such measures of income support have a smaller 
multiplier effect than funds directed to productive activity. Moreover, in an area like 
the South where the increase in disposable income is not matched by an increase in 
output, the increase in disposable income can cause an increase in the reservation
77wages.
Although Padoa Schioppa Kostoris raises a very important criticism of government 
intervention in the South, there seems to be room for some scepticism. Her argument 
of the government’s bias towards supporting disposable income is based on a rich data 
set, but referring to one year only, 1988. The limitation is understandable in the light of 
the admitted difficulties in collecting empirical evidence of the government’s effort to 
overcome the economic dualism, as mentioned in the Introduction. Nevertheless, such 
limitations should be bom in mind when making inferences from this evidence. 
Secondly, the similar composition of state expenditure across the country indicates that 
the high share of support for disposable income is a problem affecting the whole Italian 
economic policy, rather than merely the regional policy. Thirdly, undoubtedly the 
South was the net beneficiary of government expenditure, as shown by the expenditure 
to support disposable income as a percentage of fiscal contribution.
One surprising feature emerging from Padoa Schioppa Kostoris figures is the large 
amount of government expenditure in the Centre and North, particularly when 
considering expenditure with a direct impact on value added and government transfers 
to enterprises, which include also incentives. In this respect, the Centre and North 
benefited more than the South in absolute terms, but in per capita terms, the benefits 
were roughly equal. Therefore, the effectiveness of government expenditure in the 
South, for instance in stimulating investment from non-Southern firms, might have 
been reduced by the availability of government funds in the Centre and North, for what
77 Padoa Schioppa Kostoris, Italy, p. 107.
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would make a difference in determining the location of the firm in the South would not 
be the entire subsidy, but only the difference between the subsidy it would receive 
locating in the South as compared elsewhere in the country. Moreover, when assessing 
the growth of the South as compared to the rest of the country, it should be bom in 
mind that one is comparing the growth of an underdeveloped and subsidised region 
with the growth of a developed region in which some crucial government expenditure, 
like VA and E, were equally or even more important.
2.3.2 The assessment of the Italian regional policy
The methodology proposed by Moore and Rhodes has been applied by Del Monte to 
assess the effects of the Italian regional policy on Southern employment during the 
1970s.78 This study aimed to ‘quantify the impact of regional policy and separate it out 
from the other forces influencing the performance of assisted areas’.79 With this 
purpose he calculated the ‘difference function’ between actual and ‘expected 
employment’. Expected unemployment was calculated by applying the national 
employment growth rate for each year to each industry in the region. Actual 
employment exceeded ‘expected employment’ every year. However, as the author 
admits, this result might be affected by the process of de-industrialization occurring in
QA
the more advanced areas of the country. Therefore, the study intends to quantify the 
impact of regional policy in the 1970s on the employment difference function using 
econometric techniques. With this purpose Del Monte calculated several indicators of 
the intensity of the regional industrial policy: 1) grants and subsidised loans divided by 
value added in manufacturing; 2) the amount of investment in public and semi-public 
enterprises, added to grants and subsidised loans in the South divided by the 
corresponding national figures; 3) grants as percentage of investment; 4) investment in 
public and semi-public enterprises, plus subsidised loans and grants, plus public 
consumption and investment in public works, divided by the corresponding national 
figures; 5) public consumption plus investment in public and semi-public enterprises
78 A. Del Monte, ‘The Inpact of Italian Industrial Policy, 1960-1980’, in: G. Hall (ed.), European 
Industrial Policy (1986), pp. 128-164.
79 Ibid., p. 138.
i0 Ibid., p. 140.
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plus investment in public works.81 All these indicators, except the third, clearly show a 
peak from 1970-1 to 1973 and fall back to pre-1970 values in 1974 and 1975. From 
1976, indicators 1) and 2) show a clear weakening of the industrial policy, when 
figures halved suddenly. Thus, it seems that the trend of these indicators suggests that 
the regional industrial policy as a whole weakened after 1976/7. Lastly, Del Monte 
undertook a simple linear regression analysis, having as the dependent variable the 
difference between employment and expected employment and as explanatory 
variables indicators 2) and 3) above -  indicated respectively as IIP and IIPN in table 
n.3 below. The various equations used same year values for the dependent and 
explanatory variables, and also lagged the explanatory variables by one and two years. 
The most convincing result is provided by equation 5, obtained by using indicator 2) 
lagged by one year -expressed as IIPN1 in table n.3 below - where the coefficient, R 
and D-W statistics appear to be satisfactory. Equation 3 shows the highest explanatory 
power as well as the highest significant coefficient, however, the low D-W statistic 
suggests strong caution. In order to exclude the possibility of auto-correlation, the D- 
W value should be around 2. Therefore, apart from equation 5, none of the equations 
seems convincing. The table below displays the results.
Table n.3 Actual and expected employment in the Mezzogiomo, 1971-80.
Dependent variable: difference between actual and expected employment (T values in 
brackets, number of observations not specified).
Explanatory Constant Coefficient R2 DW
1 IIP 2.505 (0.45) 2.417(1.425) 0.20 1.19
2 DPI 3.937 (0.74) 3.479 (2.039) 0.34 1.84
3 IIP2 -5.403 (-1.24) 5.204 (3.948) 0.66 1.61
4 IIPN -1.665 (-0.24) 0.37(1.905) 0.31 1.28
5 IIPN1 -5.347 (-0.84) 0.463 (2.648) 0.46 2.05
Keys:
IIP= grants and subsidised loans divided by value added in manufacturing, in the South, indicator of the 
intensity of the policy 1); DP1= IIP lagged by 1 year; EP2= IIP lagged by 2 years; 
nPN=investement in public and semi-public enterprises plus grants and subsidised loans in the South 
divided by the corresponding national figures, indicator of the intensity of the regional industrial policy 
2); IIPN1= KPN lagged by 1 year.
Source: Del Monte, ‘The Inpact’, p. 144.
81 Ibid., pp. 142-143.
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The five equations were obtained using two explanatory variables IIP and IIPN, lagged
by 1 or 2 years. Therefore, the different values displayed by the coefficients in
regressions 4 and 5 as compared to 1, 2 and 3, can be due to different units of the
explanatory variables. What is puzzling is the different signs of the constants,
particularly in equation 3, which has been obtained using the same explanatory variable
2 ,
as equations 1 and 2. However, the constants have such a low R that no precise 
meaning can be attributed to their values. Although the results of the whole set of 
equations do not seem conclusive, they suggest a higher influence of the policy when 
allowing for a time lag.
The Moore and Rhodes methodology, in its simplest formulation (1973) was re-applied 
in 1997 by Del Monte and Giannola, to study the impact of the Cassa incentives on 
employment. According to the authors, employment is the main variable on which 
the effectiveness of the regional industrial policies should be assessed. The same 
exercise on investment would not be sufficient to assess industrial policies as increases 
in investment do not necessarily bring about increases in employment and value added, 
but could simply bring about an increase in the ratio of capital to output and capital per 
employee.83 However, the authors do not take into account that output and 
productivity growth could be valid alternative variables, which would enable them to 
avoid the problems connected with investment. Their reasoning relies on the 
assumption that the main objectives of regional industrial policies in general, and the 
one for Southern Italy in particular, are increases in employment and value added.
Del Monte and Giannola estimated the expected employment in manufacturing by 
sectors from 1951 to 1987. This is particularly interesting in that it offers an estimate 
by sectors and covers virtually the whole period of Cassa activity. The comparison 
expected - actual employment (E-A) by sectors shows that the most capital-intensive 
industries are the most sensitive to changes in the intensity of the regional industrial 
policy, and that the effects on employment of the industrial policy were particularly
82 A. Del Monte and A. Giannola, Istituzioni economiche e mezzogiomo. Analisi delle politiche di 
sviluppo (Rome, 1997).
83 Ibid., p. 311.
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evident in the 1970s.84 The same calculation is repeated on value added in industry as 
a whole. The difference function E-A value added shows a downward slope from 1951 
to 1962, and an upward one in the 1962-1980 period. In the 1980s, it decreased, 
probably as a result of the decreasing investment in the capital-intensive sectors.85 A 
number of reasons may have determined these results. The 1969-75 period was 
characterized by investment undertaken by State-owned enterprises in the South. The 
economic irrationality of these investments would demonstrate itself in at the end of 
the 1970s and in the 1980s. Another reason might be the loss of attractiveness of 
Southern locations due to an increase of the incentives available since the end of the 
1970s in the rest of the country. A further reason that contributed to the lowering of 
investment in the South since 1970s has been the restructuring of large plants in the 
North. The substitution of capital with labour and the subcontracting of stages of the 
production process once developed inside the large firm lessened rigidities in the 
labour market and the bargaining power of the labour supply in the North, thus making 
Southern locations less attractive as compared with those in the North and Centre. This 
process instead favoured North-Eastern industrialization via small-scale industry.86 
Thus, if on the one hand Del Monte and Giannola have not taken into account many 
factors in specifying their hypothetical employment, on the other hand they offer a 
variety of explanations to the ‘all-embracing’ employment differential they calculated. 
However, despite downplaying investment as the major determinant of success of a 
regional industrial policy, investment remains central to most of their interpretations.
In analysing Southern industrialization, commentators tend to concentrate on the role 
played by state-owned enterprises and non-Southem private companies, such as Fiat or 
Montedison. Consequently, Southern industrialization is usually regarded as ‘imported 
from outside’. Furthermore, the establishment of immigrant firms coincided with the
0 *7
crisis of local industry and business, rather than the spread of industrialization. The 
core point of this interpretation is that the industrial policy for the South failed to
u Ibid., p. 314.
85 Ibid., p. 322.
86 Ibid., pp. 327-329.
87 A. Del Monte and A. Giannola, IIMezzogiomo nell’Economia Italiana (Bologna, 1978), p. 257.
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stimulate small business enterprise and local entrepreneurship. In other words, it 
failed to promote a self-propelling industrial development similar to that taking place in 
the North-East and Centre, where various areas not only closed the gap between
O Q
themselves and the industrial triangle, but even outperformed the leading region.
The concept of a Southern industrialization characterized by large firms established by 
state-owned enterprises or non-Southem capital is not unanimously supported. Using 
the 1981 census, Pontarollo argues that the recent development of Southern Italy has 
been characterised by a growing number of small (<99 employees) and medium-sized 
firms (100-499 employees).90 From 1974 to 1979, employment in the South increased 
by 50,000, of which medium-sized and large enterprises accounted for only 15,000.91 
Other indicators allow comparisons between the performance of small and larger firms 
in the South and the rest of the country in the 1970s.
88 S.A. Castronuovo, ‘Mezzogiomo: the Theory of Growth and the Labour Market’ p. 346, Journal o f  
Regional Policy, 12/2 (1992), pp. 333-365.
89 Zamagni, Economic History, p. 370.
90 E. Pontarollo, Tendenze della Nuova Imprenditoria nel Mezzogiomo degli Anni '70 (Milan, 1982).
91 The authors do not specify the definition of small, medium-sized and large firms, but it appears they 
define small firms as those employing less than 20 workers. R. Faini and F. Schiantarelli, ‘Regional
Table II.4 Average annual rate of growth (%) of value added, employees and 
productivity in manufacturing industry (excluding construction).
Southern Italy 
All firms Firms with more
Northern Italy 
All firms Firms with more
than 20 workers than 20 workers
Value added
1970-79 4.4 4.7 3.5 3.5
1974-79 3.1 1.3 2.3 0.7
Employees
1970-79 1.9 2.1 0.3 -0.2
1974-79 1.0 0.6 -0.3 -1.4
Productivity output/employee 
1970-79 2.5 2.6 3.2 3.7
1974-79 2.1 0.7 2.6 2.1
Source: R. Faini and F. Schiantarelli, ‘Regional Implications of Industrial Policy’, Journal o f Public 
Policy, 3/1 (1983), p. 107; data source: Istat, Annuario di conatbilita' nazionale, 1981; Istat, Annuario di 
Statistiche Industriali, various years.
The table shows that in the 1970s value added, employment and productivity per 
employee grew more in firms with more than 20 employees. However, after the oil 
shock, the reverse was hue, suggesting a much stronger performance by small firms. 
The table also shows that indicators grew faster in the South than in the rest of the 
country, with the exception of output per employee.
It is often argued whether small firms benefited from the Cassa's industrial policy. 
According to Lizzeri, small firms developed independently from the system of
09incentives. On the other hand, Faini claims that the development of small firms in 
the South has not yet been explained. In particular, the relationship between the 
development of small-medium firms and financial and fiscal incentives has not been 
analysed. In other words, the Lizzeri thesis is not well demonstrated. The analysis of 
the relationship between the two factors would also be a relevant test for the
Implications of Industrial Policy’, Journal o f Public Policy, 3 (1983).
92 G. Lizzeri, Mezzogiomo Possibile. Datiper un Altro Sviluppo (Milan, 1983).
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• Q1effectiveness of the industrial policy.
In order to analyse the impact of the system of incentives on small and medium-sized 
firms, Faini explored whether smaller firms were discriminated against by the Cassa 
and made less use of its services. His analysis covered the 1970-1983 period, and takes 
into account only data referring to newly established firms. During that period, 
establishing firms received almost 50% of the subsidies extended by the Cassa.94
As far as the first point is concerned, indexes of financial subsidies per unit of 
investment accepted by firm size have been calculated. Financial subsidies included 
grants and subsidised loans, in order to have a single figure including the grants and the 
‘economic advantage’ that a subsidised loan provided, the implicit subsidy in a 
subsidised loan has been calculated in the following way: 95
S= L {1- [rA(l+rA)N/ (l+rA)N-l] [(l+rM)N-l/ rM(l+rM)N] }
where: L = loan; rM = market long-term interest rate; rA = subsidised interest rate; N =length of the loan
According to this formula the absolute amount of the implicit subsidy within a 
subsidised loan depends on the absolute amount of the loan, the differential between 
subsidised and market interest rates and the redemption period. However, the implicit 
subsidy as a percentage of the total subsidised loan is determined only by the 
differential between market and subsidised interest rates and the redemption period.
In order to measure the incentives, subsidies implicit in low interest loans and grants 
have been summed up across recipient firms by group size and divided by the amount 
of the investment approved by the Cassa by group size. This provides the so-called 
“coefficient of subsidies”.
93 R. Faini, ‘Incentivi e Piccole e Medie Imprese nel Mezzogiomo’, Ricerche Economiche, 39/3 
(1985), pp. 318-319.
94 Ibid., p. 321.
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Table IL5 Coefficient of subsidy by firm size, 1970-1983 
Firm size 1970-1973 1974-1979 1980-1983
A .22 .43 .56
B .22 .45 .58
C .20 .41 .56
D .19 .34 .46
E .24 .29 .42
Keys: A=0-20 employees; B=21-50 employees; C=51-100 employees; D=101-500 employees; E=500< 
employees;
Source: Faini, ‘Incentivi e Piccole’, p. 322, data provided by the Ministry of Industry.
The table shows that the largest firms received the highest levels of subsidies only 
during 1970-73. During subsequent periods, smaller firms fared better than their larger 
counterparts. This is even more significant given the consistent increases of the 
subsidy/admitted investment ratio over time. The table shows that small firms were 
not disadvantaged as far as the subsidised proportion of investment was concerned. 
However, it is possible that small firms had less access to financial incentives due to 
bureaucratic barriers or the lack of collateral, which could have reduced the approved 
investment thus making less meaningful the ratio calculated above. In order to assess 
this issue, investment undertaken by firms with more than 20 employees has been 
divided by total investment in Southern manufacturing. This ratio has been compared 
with that of investment submitted by firms with more than 20 employees approved by 
the Cassa and total investment approved by the Cassa. The same comparisons have 
been calculated for firms with more than 50 employees. Data on subsidised 
investments refer to newly established firms only.96
95 Ibid., p. 320.
96 Ibid., p. 324.
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Table H6 Investment and subsidised investment.
Year I>20/I S>20/S >50/1 S>50/S
1970 .83 .87 n.d. —
1971 .84 .79 n.d. —
1972 .86 .87 n.d. —
1973 .68 .91 .65 .83
1974 .58 .84 .56 .67
1975 .66 .87 .62 .74
1976 .70 .81 .64 .66
1977 .69 .85 .65 .75
1978 .83 .84 .60 .69
1979 .73 .58 .67 .29
1980 n.d. .70 n.d. .46
1981 n.d. .46 n.d. .22
1982 n.d. .56 n.d. .34
Keys:
I > 20 (50): investment by finns with more than 20 (50) employees.
I : total investment
S > 20 (50): investment submitted by firms with more than 20 (50) employees and approved by the 
Cassa.
S : investment in new firms/plants approved by the Cassa.
Source: R. Faini, ‘Incentivi e Piccole’, p. 322.
The higher values of column 2 as compared to column 1 show that firms with more 
than 20 employees made extensive use of subsidies. However, this tendency changed 
at the end of the 1970s. For firms with more than 50 employees, the trend is similar. 
Thus, the author concludes that firms with less than 20 employees used financial 
incentives to a small extent, but the medium-size firms used them extensively.
Although the percentage of incentives over investment was high, this does not exclude 
the possibility that small firms experienced difficulties accessing the system. Thus the 
available evidence does not prove or disprove the hypothesis that small firms in the
Q7South developed independently of the system of incentives at the end of the 1970s. 
However, it did not show any bias against small firms, so there is no a priori reason to
91 Ibid., v . 326.
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believe that the development of small firms was not fostered by the Cassa incentives.
A different approach to assessing the effectiveness of regional subsidies has been 
proposed in a recent study by Bagella and Caggese.98 Using a sample of more than 
3,000 manufacturing companies, the study assesses the effectiveness of regional 
subsidies by studying the profitability of subsidised firms as compared to non­
subsidised ones, from 1989 to 1991. The same comparison is conducted also for other 
areas of the country - the North-West, North-East and Centre - thus enabling a 
comparison of the performance of Southern subsidised companies with subsidised 
companies in the rest of the country. The analysis concludes that regional incentives 
were less effective than their national counterparts, as Southern subsidised companies 
are not only less profitable than non-subsidised Southern companies but also riskier. 
Subsidies extended in the framework of the national policy appear to be more effective, 
as subsidised companies in other areas of the country are less profitable than non­
subsidised companies, but at least are less risky.99
Conclusions
This chapter reviewed the theoretical and historical debate concerning the 
implementation and evaluation of regional policies. From a methodological 
perspective, the studies reviewed in this chapter show that the initial approach to the 
assessment of industrial policies has been a macro-economic one, the key point of 
which is the comparison of a hypothetical policy-off scenario with the actual policy-on 
situation. This counterfactual analysis proved to be the most intractable of the 
problems affecting the macro studies. Furthermore, studies based on regional data do 
not allow the study of the effects of individual policy instruments. The awareness of 
these limitations stimulated an interest in the micro-economic analysis of the same 
issue. These studies are based on information about decision making collected through 
questionnaires. Such works have various merits, particularly in enabling the analysis of 
specific policy instruments by area and by firm size. However, by relying entirely on 
questionnaires, the insight and analytical potential is somehow limited. The
98 Bagella and Caggese, ‘Struttura del capitale’, pp. 813-837.
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assessment of the importance of the subsidies was entrusted to the personal judgement 
and memory of some plant managers, and was not the result of a careful analysis.
The second section has reviewed the lively debate surrounding the Italian regional 
policy, and the numerous criticisms it has received. Indicators of the regional 
differentials show that the North-South gap was not reduced while the policy was 
implemented, an outcome that divided scholars. Critics of the policy have interpreted 
this as disappointing,100 whereas supporters consider it an achievement that the South 
did not fall further behind while the rest of the country was experiencing its fastest 
growth.101
Despite this, even supporters of the regional policy pointed out its flaws. The indicator 
that most dramatically shows the Italian regional diffential is unemployment, where the 
gap widened from the 1970s onwards. This has been interpreted as due to the policy’s 
emphasis on increasing productivity and value added in the South, rather than 
employment. In turn, this meant making it easier for large private and state-owned 
companies to access subsidies from the 1960s onwards.102 Other scholars hold the 
view that the excessive regulation of the Italian labour market prevented the policy 
from achieving better results in terms of unemployment.103
Padoa Schioppa Kostoris criticized government expenditure in the South as 
unbalanced, supporting disposable income rather than output and value added 
growth.104 However, her data also show that government expenditure with direct 
impact on added value in the South were slightly below the corresponding figure for 
the North and Centre, in per capita terms, and far below when considering the absolute 
figures. This is surprising considering that government expenditure in the South 
includes also funds transferred to the South within the framework of the regional 
policy. Therefore, on the basis of 1988 data, developed areas of the country were the
"ibid., pp. 828-830.
100 Padoa Schioppa Kostoris, Italy, pp. 74-113.
101 Cafiero, Tradizione, p. 110; Sylos-Labini, L'evoluzione, p. 4.
102 Graziani, L 'Economia, pp. 64-69.
103 Siracusano, Tresoldi and Zen, ‘Domanda di lavoro’.
104 Padoa Schioppa Kostoris, Italy, p. 107.
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target of government expenditure to a larger extent than the underdeveloped areas, 
which were entitled to additional funds through the regional policy. Financial 
subsidies, such as grants and subsidised loans are included within this group of 
expenditure, although no details are provided about their share. This point seems 
worth stressing, as the equal or even higher availability of subsidies in developed areas, 
might have reduced the effectiveness of regional subsidies in attracting investment to 
the South.
Among criticisms of the policy, the claimed inability of the policy to stimulate the 
growth of small firms features prominently. However, studies dealing specifically with 
the effects of the incentives on small firms have found no evidence of reduced access 
to subsidies by small firms, or of any Cassa discrimination against such firms. Studies 
dealing specifically with the effects of the incentives on small firms have ended up by 
demonstrating that small firms were not disadvantaged in accessing the incentives, 
although the significance of these policy instruments in fostering their growth has not 
been addressed.
Studies reviewed in this chapter show that the effectiveness of the Italian regional 
policy has been assessed in various ways. Del Monte and Del Monte and Giannola105 
adopted the Moore and Rhodes methodology and attempted to estimate the impact of 
the regional policy on employment, but they did not yield conclusive results. The 
authors admit that their estimate of the differential between actual and expected 
unemployment, can be due to various factors, and not only to the policy. Moreover, it 
seems more appropriate to estimate the impact of the policy on investment. As will be 
shown in detail in Chapter IE, promoting investment was the direct aim of incentives.
A new methodology to assess the effectiveness of incentives has been recently 
proposed by Bagella and Caggese, and is based on the comparison of the profitability 
of subsidised and non-subsidised firms. Their analysis seems to be particularly 
appropriate for the sources utilized in the micro-analysis (Chapters VI and VTI), can be 
extended to a comparison of the investment activity of subsidised and non-subsidised
105 Del Monte, ‘Impact’; Del Monte and Giannola, Istituzioni.
firms, and their methodology is explained in greater detail in section 7.1.
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CHAPTER III
National and regional incentives to industry, 1950 to 1991.
Introduction
The present chapter provides an overview of the system of incentives created by the 
industrial policy for the South and compares it with its national counterpart. Both 
the system of incentives implemented in the South and that available at the national 
level were so complex and convoluted, that the various schemes were later described 
as a ‘jungle of incentives’. Studying both systems in detail is necessary as it provides 
elements of the analysis that follows in the next chapters. Moreover, the major 
institutional changes and shifts in the system of incentives have been also 
investigated from an economic policy perspective.
The chapter is organised in two sections. The first introduces the institutions charged 
with the provision of finance to industry, and which became the channel of state 
subsidies within the framework of the national and regional industrial policy from 
the 1950s. The second traces the evolution of the various national and regional 
schemes to promote economic development by offering inducements to industry, 
with particular reference to the ‘extraordinary intervention in the South’, and its 
executive instrument, the Cassa per il Mezzogiomo (the Fund for the South). The 
section will outline each of the major schemes, and will offer a quantitative analysis 
of the main priorities and activities of the Cassa in order to single out the relative 
importance of the subsidies in the context of the regional policy.
3.1.1 The establishment of medium-term credit institutions
This section deals with the establishment of credit institutions specialising in 
subsidised and market medium-term credit to small and medium-sized firms, and 
their refinancing body the Mediocredito Centrale. This is part of a wider story, in 
which the history of the Italian banking system and the economic policy pursued in 
the 1950s come together.
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The establishment of the medium-term credit institutions, starting at the end of the 
1940s, stems from the reorganization of the Italian banking system1 following the 
banking crisis of 1931-1933,2 which culminated in the Banking Reform Law in 1936. 
This conferred upon the Bank of Italy (henceforth Bol) the power of shaping the 
banking sector in terms of market specialisation and territorial competence, which 
were in turn related to the legal status of the banks, and from 1975 to the size of their 
deposits (details concerning the legal status of banks and their territorial competence 
are provided in Appendix A).3 The Bol, by the powers conferred by the 1936 law,4 
divided the credit system into two branches, one comprising institutions entitled to take 
short-term savings and providing short-term finance - for working capital (henceforth 
ordinary banks) - the other consisting of institutions that take medium- and long-term 
savings and extend medium- and long-term finance and industrial credit (henceforth 
medium-term credit institutions, MTCIs).5
The distinction between short-, medium- and long-term for the collection of savings 
was as follows: short-term until 18 months, medium-term from 18 months to five 
years, long-term above five years. The corresponding distinction for loans, used by 
the Bank of Italy until the end of the 1940s was: short-term up to one year, medium -
1 The Italian banking system has undergone three major transitions: in 1893-95, from a credit mobilier 
to the mixed bank system; in 1931-36 with the end of the mixed bank system and establishment of a 
clear distinction between short and medium term credit; and the early 1990s when banks were again 
authorised to operate on the medium term market (in accordance with the second EU Banking 
Directive). A. Gigliobianco, G. Piluso and G. Toniolo, ‘II Rapporto banca-impresa in Italia negli anni 
cinquanta’, in: F. Cotula (ed.), Stabilita e sviluppo negli anni cinquanta, Vol. 3: Politica bancaria e 
struttura del sistema finanziario (Rome-Bari, 1999) p .229; Federico and Toniolo, ‘Italy’, p. 204; E. 
Gualandri ‘The Restructuring of Banking Groups in Italy: Major Issues’, in: J. Revell (ed.), The 
Recent Evolution o f Financial Systems (Basingstoke, 1997), p. 157.
2 For the causes of the early 1930s crisis with particular reference to Italy, among others see the recent 
works: G. Toniolo, ‘The Rise and Fall of the German-Type Bank in Italy, 1894-1934’, in: P. Klep and
E. Van Cauwenberghe (eds), Entrepreneurship and the Transformation o f the Economy (10th-20th 
Centuries). Essays in honour o f Herman van der Wee (Leuwen, 1994), pp. 429-440; G. Toniolo, 
‘Italian Banking, 1919-1936’, in C.H. Feinstein (ed.), Banking, Currency, and Finance in Europe 
between the Wars (Oxford, 1995), pp. 296-314; M. De Cecco and G. Ferri, Le Banche d ’Ajfari in 
Italia (Bologna, 1996); G. Conti, ‘Finanza d’Impresa e Capitale di Rischio in Italia (1870-1939)’, in 
Rivista di Storia Economica, N.S., 10/3 (1993), pp. 307-332.
3 S. Cassese, E ’ ancora attuale la legge bancaria del 1936? Stato, banche e impresepubbliche dagli 
anni '30 agli anni ‘80 (Rome, 1987), pp. 33-35 and 60-82.
4 For the role attributed to the Bank of Italy by the Banking Reform law, see S. Battilossi, L ’Italia nel 
Sistema Economico Intemazionale, II Management dell’Integrazione Finanza, Industria e Istituzioni 
1945-1955 (Milan, 1996), pp. 92-94 and bibliography therein.
5 L. Ceriani, ‘Italy’, in R.S. Sayers (ed.), Banking in Western Europe (1962), pp. 124 and 129-130.
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from one to five years and long-term above five years. In 1952, with the 
establishment of the Mediocredito Centrale (MCC), the definitions were changed: 
short-term credit up to one year and medium-term credit from one to ten years, 
except in Southern Italy (up to 15 years).6 Therefore, henceforth only the 
denomination ‘medium-term credit’ (MTC) will be used.
The establishment of two institutions, the Istituto Mobiliare Italiano (IMI) in 1931 
and the state-owned holding company Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) 
in 1933 paved the way to the Banking Reform Law of 1936.7 Both found their 
origins in the BoI’s rescue of the three major mixed banks (Banca Commerciale, 
Credito Italiano and Banco di Roma) in 1931 and their confinement to the short-term 
credit market. Both IMI and IRI were called to provide fresh capital to the industrial 
sector. The IMI was a public institution charged with the provision of long-term 
industrial finance, and IRI had the task of placing the industrial portfolio of the 
former three mixed banks on the market and financing industrial firms under its 
control.8
The separation between the short-term and medium-term credit markets should have 
ensured stability in the banking system, as it implied harmony between bank assets and 
liabilities. It also avoided the excessive freezing of capital that had characterized the
6 V. Pontolillo, ‘Aspetti del sistema di credito speciale con particolare riferimento all’intervento dello 
Stato’, Banca d’ltalia, Bollettino, 1971/1 (1971), p. 109 and footnote 3.
7 C. Pace and G. Morelli (eds), Origini ed identita del Credito Speciale (Milan, 1984), p. 13. For the 
crucial role played by IMI and IRI, and the other so-called Beneduce institutions - such as Istituto 
nazionale assicurazioni (1913), Consorzio di credito per le opere pubbliche (1919), Istituto di credito 
opere di pubblica utilita (1924) and Istituto di credito navale (1928) in collecting small savings and 
channelling them towards the financing of the economic development of the country, as well as the 
dirigist approach behind such institutions, see P.F. Asso and M. De Cecco, Storia del Crediop. Tra 
Credito Speciale e Finanza Pubblica 1920-1960 (Rome-Bari, 1994), pp. 19-22; M. De Cecco, 
‘Splendore e crisi del sistema Beneduce: note sulla struttura finanziaria ed industriale dell’Italia dagli 
anni venti agli anni sessanta’, in F. Barca (ed.), Storia del capitalismo italiano, dal dopoguerra a oggi 
(Rome, 1997), pp. 392-394.
8 P. Ciocca and G. Toniolo, ‘Industry and Finance in Italy, 1918-1940’, Journal o f European 
Economic History, special issue: Banks and Industry in the Interwar Period, 13/2 (1984), pp. 131- 
134. For a more detailed account of the role of the ERI, its tasks and its sources of finance, see G. 
Toniolo, ‘II profilo economico’, in: G. Guarino and G. Toniolo, La banca d ’ltalia e il sistema 
bancario, 1919-1936 (Rome-Bari, 1993), pp. 82-92. For a more detailed account of the rescue of the 
Banca Commerciale see G. Toniolo, L ’economia dell’Italia fascista (Rome-Bari, 1980), pp. 228-233. 
For the causes o f the early 1930s crisis with particular reference to Italy, see Toniolo, ‘Rise and Fall’; 
Toniolo, ‘Italian Banking’; De Cecco and Ferri, Le Banche d ’Ajfari; Conti, ‘Finanza d’Impresa’.
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mixed banks and their collapse,9 leading to huge losses for the depositors and political 
repercussions.10 However, if this had been the only aim, it would have sufficed to 
impose a clear equilibrium between medium-term assets and liabilities on the banks, 
and restricting the banks to the short-term credit market would have not been 
necessary. The decision, supported in particular by Menichella (director of the IRI 
1933-1944, director of the Bol 1946-1947 and governor of the Bol 1948-1960) and 
Beneduce (president of the IRI 1933-1939, president of several of the so-called 
Beneduce institutions, and senator from 1939 to his death in 1944) was more about 
reducing the role of banks in the Italian economy, as in the Thirties banks had risen to 
the head of industrial and financial groups and were determining the direction of the
country’s industrial development.11 Therefore, the ultimate aim of the distinction was
10to bnng the banking system within the realm of the state economic planning.
Menichella and Beneduce advocated the separation of short- and medium-term credit, 
as the latter required expertise such as knowledge of the borrowing company and of the 
production process to be financed. This in turn required specialized credit institutions 
on the medium-term market. Menichella felt the IMI to be appropriate to perform such 
tasks and it should endow itself with peripheral institutions, to which banks and saving 
banks in particular should contribute, to be able to provide also small and medium­
sized firms with their financial requirements.13 However, the colonialist experience 
and the outbreak of the Second World War interrupted the development of the new 
banking system and the void in the medium-term credit market was not filled either by 
the IMI or by other banks.14
The only exception was the establishment of the Isveimer (Istituto per lo sviluppo 
economico dellTtalia meridionale, Institute for the Economic Development of 
Southern Italy) on the initiative of the Bank of Naples. This exception is justified in
9 R. Banfi, ‘Gli Istituti di Credito Speciale e il Sistema del Credito Agevolato’, in Rivista Bancaria - 
Minerva Bancaria, 1981/1-2 (1981), pp. 30-31.
10 Gigliobianco, Piluso and Toniolo, ‘II rapporto banca-impresa’, p. 229.
11 Ibid., pp. 229-230; Toniolo, ‘II profllo economico’, p. 72.
12 M. De Cecco, ‘Note sugli sviluppi della struttura finanziaria nel dopoguerra’ in De Cecco, M., 
Saggi di politico monetaria (Milan, 1968), p. 42.
13 P.F. Asso and G. Raitano, ‘Trasformazione e sviluppo del credito mobiliare negli anni del 
govematorato Menichella’, in: F. Cotula (ed.), Stablita e sviluppo negli anni cinquanta, vol.3 Politico 
bancaria e struttura del sistema finanziario (Rome-Bari, 1999), pp. 312-314.
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the literature by the understanding that the Isveimer was established not only as a
O nci )
medium-term credit institution but also as a development bank, which was consistent 
with the programme of economic autarky pursued by the Fascist regime.15 According 
to its Statute, its aim was to promote and increase productive activities in continental 
Southern Italy and Sardinia, the regions under its competence (thus excluding Sicily, 
where the Bank of Sicily was operating). Among its specific tasks were the 
establishment, enlargement and financial and technical reorganisation of industrial 
firms, with particular attention to those utilising local resources and the local labour 
force.16 It was endowed and managed by the establishing bank and it is perceived that 
its poor endowment was a hindrance to the smooth functioning of both Isveimer and 
the entire medium-term credit activity managed by the Bank of Naples.17 Until 
Isveimer's reorganisation in 1953, the Bank of Naples remained its only source of 
finance, as the Banking Reform Law, in its original 1936 formulation, recognised the 
possibility of issuing bonds only to the IMI, as far as institutions involved in medium- 
term credit to industry were concerned. Only from 1946 would this financing 
technique be extended to the newly established institutions involved in the medium- 
term credit to industry. However even at that date the Isveimer was not authorised to
1 Rissue bonds. Only in 1953 when the Isveimer was re-organised with a new statute 
and it was no longer entitled to acquire direct participation in industrial firms and was 
transformed into a ‘classical* MTCI, was it authorised to finance itself on the market by 
issuing bonds. From this date the Isveimer was entitled to operate with the MCC, 
whereas at the end of 1952 it had already started operating with the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiomo and became one of the institutions handling financial subsidies made 
available by the regional and national industrial policies in the South.19
14Ibid., p. 321.
15 In turn the Isveimer was preceded by a Fund established in 1926 (Fondo per concorso a speciali 
opere di propulsione economica interessanti le provincie continentali e la Sardegna). P. Croce, ‘II 
credito industriale nel Mezzogiomo’, in: F. Cotula (ed.), Stabilita e sviluppo negli anni cinquanta, 
vol. 3: Politico bancaria e struttura del sistema finanziario (Rome-Bari, 1999), pp. 604-605; Asso 
and Raitano, ‘Trasformazione’, p. 321.
16 A.S. Camilleri, Industrial Medium-Term Financial Institutions in Italy (1966), p. 2.
17 The endowment fund of the Isveimer amounted to 50 million lire, together with an annual 
endowment amounting to a maximum of 20% of the Bank of Naples’ net profit. The 1926 fund was 
endowed with 50 million lire plus an annual endowment up to 25% of the net profit. Croce, ‘II 
credito’, p. 605.
18 Ibid., pp. 604-605.
19 Ibid., pp. 620-625. The coincidence between Isveimer's exclusion from direct participation in 
industrial concerns and its authorization to finance itself on the market is clear. However, the author 
believes that the former is not a sufficient explanation for the latter. Ibid, p. 610, fn 22.
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Despite Beneduce and Menichella’s original plan, formulated in the 1930s, to limit the 
proliferation of MTCIs, and as far as credit to industry was concerned to limit it to the 
IMI, by the end of the 1950s there were 30 institutions specializing in MTC to industry, 
including Departments for Industrial Credit (DICs, Sezioni di credito industriale) and 
MTCIs.20 The Beneduce and Menichella plan aimed to assure Bol control of the MTC 
to avoid leaving room for the interests of financial and industrial groups. However, 
from the second half of the 1940s strong pressures were put on the Bol to authorize the 
establishment of MTCIs from public as well as private banks 21 The rigid separation 
between medium-term savings and credit meant that ordinary banks could not access 
the medium-term market, and thus could not transfer surplus funds from short-term
99operations to the medium-term credit market. By establishing DICs and MTCIs, 
ordinary banks could transfer short-term deposits to the medium-term market, and 
provide firms with MTC. The transfer took place by acquiring DIC and MTCI 
bonds, which was a profitable investment in itself, considering these bonds paid 
higher yields than state securities and were risk free. A further source of profit for 
banks was the sale of such bonds to the public. Moreover, by establishing DICs and 
MTCIs, ordinary banks created an intermediary providing firms with assistance in 
placing their shares on the market.23
The earliest attempts to overcome the confinement to the short-term credit market were 
the institutions of the DICs. As already mentioned, these could finance themselves by 
issuing bonds, and came from the main public banks, as banks could finance the DICs 
in various ways, contributing to their paid-up capital and buying their bonds 24 The 
proliferation of DICs and MTCIs in the post-War period took place in connection with 
the process of economic growth and the availability of capital that it required. This is 
confirmed by the fact that the Bol nominated the DICs at the Southern Banks (Banks of 
Sicily and of Naples) and the Isveimer as the institutions in charge of financing the
20 Asso and Raitano, ‘Trasformazione’, pp. 317-321; V. Pontolillo, II sistema di credito speciale in 
Italia (Bologna, 1980), pp. 19-20.
21 Asso and Raitano, ‘Trasformazione’, pp. 321-324.
22 Banfi, ‘Gli istituti’, p. 33.
23 F. Camevali, 'British and Italian Banks and Small Firms: a Study of the Midlands and Piedmont, 
1945-1973' (Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of London, 1997), pp. 201, 205.
24 Asso and Raitano, ‘Trasformazione’, p. 331.
25 Pontolillo, ‘Aspetti’, p. 108.
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industrialization of the South.26 The Bank of Sicily was authorised to establish a DICs 
in 1949, and a similar body was set up by the Bank of Naples in 1946 (however, it is 
said to have been functioning from 1944). The DICs focused particularly on small and 
medium-sized Southern firms from 1947 when, with Decree 1419, they were endowed 
by the state, with the latter agreeing to guarantee up to 70% of possible losses. Yet 
another body of this type, the DIC at the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, was established 
on similar terms. These departments exploited the existing banking networks, and their 
operations could thus be diffused all over the country. Decree 1419/1947 did not offer 
a definition of a small or a medium-sized firm, but fixed the maximum loan at £15m. 
The maximum was increased to £50mill in 1954 and in 1960, the limit of advances was 
increased to the 20% of their paid up capital.27
Not only banks were interested in breaking their confinement to the short-term credit 
market. Pressure from business and financial circles led to the establishment of MTCIs, 
as exemplified by the case of the Banca di Credito Finanziario (Mediobanca). This 
was established in 1946 by the three former mixed banks and authorised to issue 
medium-term loans, and from 1949, it was also authorised to acquire direct 
participation in industrial firms, although within established limits.28 The banks were 
under IRI and thus State control. The Mediobanca remained the property of the three 
banks until the 1980s, when it was privatised. In the same year, the Centrobanca 
(Banca Centrale di Credito Popolare) was established with the capital of the 
cooperative banks. The purpose of the Centrobanca was to issue medium-term loans 
(also for agriculture) through the cooperative banks’ network. Other institutions 
established in 1949 with the purpose of providing medium term loans to industry were 
the Efibanca and the Interbanca. The Efibanca (Ente Finanziario Interbancario) was 
established by the Ordinary Credit Banks and the Interbanca by the Public Law 
Banks. This clearly demonstrates the heavy involvement of the Italian state m the
26 Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1948, p. 151.
27 Law no 445 o f 1950 fixed the maximum loan size at 50m for the regional MTCIs and law no 135 of 
1954 fixed the same amount for the Special Departments at BNL, Banco di Napoli and Banco di 
Sicilia; in 1960 the ICCS established the limit of advances for all the institutions as 20% of the paid- 
up capital. Associazione Bancaria Italiana (ABI), La Legislazione Italiana sul Credito Speciale 
all’Industria e al Commercio (Roma, 1963), pp. 179-180.
28 Battilossi, L ’Italia, pp. 124-133.
29 Zamagni, Economic History o f Italy, pp. 358-359.
30 Pergolesi, U credito, p. 22.
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banking system. As Zamagni noted, given that the Public Law institutions, which 
include the MTCIs and the three former mixed banks that were IRI property, “all the 
major national banks were owned by the State”. As in addition, savings and 
cooperative banks that were also run with non-private capital and were either non­
profit making or cooperative societies, the State held between 70% to 80 % of the bank 
assets.31
The Centrobanca, Efibanca and Mediobanca were authorised to issue medium-term 
loans throughout the country.32 These MTCIs were supposed to finance themselves by 
placing bonds and securities on the market, which were also bought up by the deposit 
banks.33 Only Mediobanca financed itself with time deposits (from 1 to 5 years) placed 
by the public at the three Banks of National Interest (BINs, Banca Commerciale 
Italiana, Credito Italiano, Banco di Roma) and could not issue bonds and securities. 
The peculiarity of the Mediobanca financing system was due to the peculiarity of the 
three BINs. These banks specialised in the highest segment of the deposits/credit 
market and Mediobanca was very selective in its choice of industrial projects to 
finance, particularly in the 1950s.34
This first stage in the creation of institutions dedicated to medium-term finance marks a 
decentralization of the provision of that type of credit and the progressive blurring of 
the distinction between short- and medium-term finance, particularly when considering 
that few of the departments for credit to industry were distinct from the establishing 
banks, from a legal point of view.35 In the second stage, the establishment of Regional 
medium-term credit institutions (henceforth RMTCIs, Mediocrediti Regionali), the 
issue of decentralization is combined with the issue of providing medium-term credit 
to small and medium-sized firms.36
31 Zamagni, Economic History, p. 363.
32 Pergolesi, 77 credito, p. 25.
33 Zamagni, Economic History, p. 359.
34 S. Battilossi, ‘L’eredita della Banca Mista. Sistema Creditizio, finanziamento industriale e ruolo 
strategico di Mediobanca 1946-1956’, L 'Italia Contemporanea, 185 (1991), pp. 625-654.
35 The distinction between short and medium-term credit has also been partly overcome by authorizing 
banks to increase their share of medium long-term operations. Pontolillo, 77 sistema, pp. 14-15.
36 G. Piluso, ‘Gli istituti di credito speciale’, Annali di Storia Einaudi, vol. 15: F. Amatori, D. Bigazzi, 
R. Giannetti and L. Segreto (eds), L ’industria (Turin, 1999), p. 517.
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The Bol was aware of the importance of small firms in the Italian economy, which 
also emerges clearly from a report commissioned by Menichella from the Bol Study 
Centre. The report shows that firms with less than 100 workers employed almost 
37% of the national workforce in 1947.38 Recent research has shown that both the 
Bank of Italy and the Association of Industrialists (Confindustria) considered small 
firms were at a disadvantage in accessing finance. However, the solutions envisaged 
by the two institutions were very different. Since 1937, Menichella had indicated 
that the IMI should establish regional medium-term credit institutions (henceforth 
RMTCIs) with the cooperation of banks, and saving banks in particular. The 
association of industrialists, led by Costa, saw the IMI as inadequate to perform such 
a task as its activity was geared towards large firms, particularly in the sectors of 
electricity and shipping. Only in the management of state subsidies was the IMI 
displaying a more open attitude towards small firms. However, the key point of the 
controversy was the role that state subsidies should have played in the financial 
activity of the RMTCIs. Costa was aware that the new institutions had to face fierce 
competition from the IMI and IRI on the bond market, in order to finance 
themselves, which would have not allowed them to offer finance at the lowest 
possible interest rate, which was presented as an indispensable step towards the 
country's industrial reconstruction. The fulfilment of this aim was seen as dependent 
on subsidies provided by the state and within the framework of the European 
Recovery Programme. Menichella was diffident toward the establishment of 
institutions that would have not been able to support themselves on the market and 
that would have needed state subsidies beyond specific and extraordinary
40circumstances.
37 Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1952, p. 289.
38 Asso and Raitano, ‘Trasformazione’, p. 464. On the perceived importance of small firms, 
particularly in the late 1950s, see G. Scimone, ‘The Italian Miracle’, in: J. Hennessy, V. Lutz and G. 
Scimone, Economic Miracles (Leavesden, 1964), pp. 179-182 and 218. The author considers the 
proliferation of small firms as one of the bases of the Italian economic miracle.
39 D. Menichella, ‘Memoria sottoposta dall’IRI all’ esame della Corporazione della previdenza e del 
credito’, (Rome, 1937) published in Cotula, F., C.O. Gelsomino and A. Gigliobianco, Donato 
Menichella. Stabilita e sviluppo dell’economia italiana 1946-1960, vol. I: Documenti e discorsi 
(Rome-Bari, 1997), pp. 128-152. Such perceptions are also clearly expressed by contemporary 
studies such as G. Dominici, ‘La fiinzione propulsiva del credito nell’industrializzazione del 
Mezzogiomo e delle Isole’, Bancaria, 11 (1955), p. 810; N.Garrone ‘II Credito Industriale in Italia’, 
Rassegna Economica, 4 (1956), pp. 616-617; Camilleri, Industrial Medium-Term, p. 2.
40A sso  and Raitano, ‘Trasformazione’, pp. 408-416.
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Law 445/50, establishing the first RMTCI in Piedmont, marked a compromise 
between the two stances, as the possibility that such institutions would receive 
subsidies was left open. The law opened the possibility for insurance companies to 
contribute to the establishment of the institutions, by increasing the ceiling on the 
RMTCIs’ loans from 15 to 50 million lire and allowing them to operate through the 
branches of their establishing banks.41 Although the establishment of the first 
regional term-credit institution was authorised in 1950, the proliferation of such 
institutions occurred from 1953 onwards in Northern and Central Italy. Only at a 
much later stage - the beginning of the 1980s - did the Interministerial Committee for 
Credit and Savings (henceforth ICCS) authorize the establishment of four RMTCIs 
in Southern Italy (in the regions of Puglia, Calabria, Basilicata and Sicily) to assist 
the existing MTCIs (Isveimer and Irfis) in their lending to small and medium-sized 
firms.42
The proliferation of RMTCIs in the North and Centre of Italy took place following 
the establishment of their financing institution - the MCC - in 1952, endowed both 
directly and indirectly by the Treasury.43 The MCC was deemed necessary by the 
Bol because the funds available to other RMTCIs were insufficient to allow adequate 
functioning and their ability to finance themselves by issuing bonds was 
questioned.44 Moreover, the monetary authorities considered the MCC necessary to 
avoid an excessive dependence of the RMTCIs on their establishing banks and to 
coordinate them.45
The MCC refinanced the regional institutions by discounting their bills, buying their 
medium and long-term bonds; by extending loans using returns from the issuing of 
its own bonds, and by grants to cover part of the financing to small and medium-
41 Ibid., pp. 416-421.
42 P. D’Onofrio and R. Pepe, ‘Le strutture creditizie nel Mezzogiomo’, in Banca d’ltalia, 77 sistema 
finanziario nel Mezzogiomo, Numero speciale dei Contributi a ll’analisi economica (Rome, 1990), p. 
235.
43 The endowment of the MCC amounted to 60bn current lire, out of which 15bn were provided 
directly by the Treasury. The remaining 45bn were provided by the repayments o f loans granted by 
the Treasury to industrial and agricultural enterprises in order to purchase equipment from the sterling 
area. Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1952, p. 290; Law 258/1950 published in ABI, La 
legislazione, pp. 89-90.
44 Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1952, p. 289.
45 G. Carli, ‘Le Origini del Mediocredito Centrale’, Credito Popolare, 1984/6 (1984), p. 261.
106
sized firms.46 The MCC was regulated by the ICCS, which fixed its rediscounting 
rate, the lending limit and the size of companies that would have been eligible for 
loans 47 These were defined as firms with less than 500 workers and fixed assets 
below 1.5bn lire. This was not applicable in the area covered by the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiomo, where the MCC applied the Cassa’s definition. The fact that the MCC 
was not placed under the control of the Bol, but under the ICCS, has been interpreted 
as a symptom that the MCC was conceived as an instrument of government 
intervention, which was placing small and medium-sized firms at the centre of its 
intervention in favour of industry 48
3.1.2 The establishment of the Cassa per il Mezzogiomo
The idea of a specific policy and institutions to tackle the underdevelopment of the 
South was bom at IRI, during the summer of 1943, when the end of the Fascist 
regime became clear.49 Menichella, Cenzato,50 Giordani,51 and the young IRI
C l
economist Saraceno together with Morandi the socialist Minister of Industry, 
established a brains trust called the Svimez (Associazione per lo sviluppo 
deH’industria nel Mezzogiomo - Association for the Development of Industry in
46 Banfi, ‘Gli Istituti’, p. 54.
47 G. Amato (ed.), II governo dell’industria in Italia (Bologna, 1972), p. 23.
48 Asso and Raitano, ‘Trasformazione’, pp. 427-432.
49 V. Negri Zamagni and M. Sanfilippo, ‘Introduzione’, in V. Negri Zamagni and M. Sanfilippo (eds), 
Nuovo meridionalismo e intervento straordinario. La Svimez dal 1946 al 1950 (Bologna, 1988), p. 
15.
50 Cenzato was, among other positions, president of the Compagnia Nazionale Imprese Elettriche 
(1938-1943), the Federazione nazionale fascista degli esercenti delle imprese elettriche (1940-1943), 
deputy president of the Confindustria (Association of Industrialists, 1953-1957) and president of the 
Svimez (1960-1969). M. Fatica, ‘Giuseppe Cenzato (1882-1969)’, in: A. Mortara (ed.), Iprotagonisti 
dell’interventopubblico in Italia (Milan, 1984), pp. 431-470.
51 Giordani became deputy director (1937-1939) and then director (1939-1943) of the IRI, the Italian 
executive director of the IBRD (1947-1950) and president of the Svimez (1950-1958). L. Scalpelli, 
‘Francesco Giordani (1896-1961)’ in: A. Mortara (ed.), I  protagonisti dell'intervento pubblico in 
Italia (Milan, 1984), pp. 471-499.
52 Pasquale Saraceno (1903-1991), an economist who was an academic (1933-1979) and from 1933 to 
1991 held various posts at the IRI, from director o f the inspectorate to general economic consultant. 
Saraceno also held various positions within the Svimez and became the its president from 1970 to 
1991.
http://www.iri.it/personaggi/saraceno.html.
53 Rodolfo Morandi (1902-1955), historian and philosopher, organized the resistance in some areas of 
Northern Italy. He was Minister of Industry (1946-1947) and until his death was an active member of 
the Socialist party. Biographical note in R. Morandi, Storia della grande industria in Italia (Turin, 
2nd. ed. 1966).
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Southern Italy) in 1946.54 The establishment of the Svimez was a reaction not only 
to the lack of interest in the development of Southern Italy but also to the debate on 
the future of the IRI. The current debate focused on two issues: on the one hand the 
liquidation of the IRI, considered as the embodiment of Fascist state interventionism, 
but on the other hand the IRI was still considered useful for various sectors of the 
Italian economy, including compensating for the lack of private investment in the 
South. The IRI economists within Svimez pointed out that the IRI’s resources were 
inadequate for such a task, and that its investment would suffer the same 
disadvantages as private investment. Therefore, they claimed that before the IRI 
could intervene, the government should create conditions for profitable investment in 
the South.55 They argued that state intervention in infrastructure and agriculture 
(land reclamation and reform) would create external economies in that they would 
increase income and demand for investment goods.56 At a later stage in this process, 
the establishment of industrial plants in the South would further increase income and 
consumption.57
They further argued that the whole country had an interest in the development of the 
South, as Southern underdevelopment would dampen the expansion of the national 
economy. In fact, the industrialised Northern regions would soon find themselves 
with a very small domestic market due to the limited purchasing power of the 
backward South. Increasing the market for already industrialised regions, in turn 
would mean expansion of their production, which was a precondition to the further 
development of their production process. Furthermore, the weakness of the Southern 
Italian industry provoked a reduction in the productivity of Italian industry as a 
whole. The increase in productivity of the Italian industry as a whole was a priority 
goal, in so far as economic policy implemented since the Reconstruction period was
54Around the original nucleus, several representatives of the business world soon gathered, from 
Confindustria to Fiat, the Bank of Naples and IMI. S. Cafiero, ‘Menichella meridionalista’, in: F. 
Cotula (ed.), Stabilita e sviluppo negli anni cinquanta, vol. 2: Problemi strutturali e politiche 
economiche (Rome-Bari, 1998), pp. 469-470.
55 P. Saraceno, ‘L’intervento dell’IRI per lo smobilizzo delle grandi banche, 1933-1936', in: AA. W .,  
Alberto Beneduce e iproblemi dell’economia italiana del suo tempo (Rome, 1985), pp. 125-126.
56 S. Cafiero, Storia dell'intervento straordinario nel Mezzogiomo (1950-1993), (Manduria-Bari- 
Rome, 2000), pp. 39-41.
57Associazione per lo Sviluppo dell’ Industria nel Mezzogiomo (Svimez), ‘Gli effetti moltiplicativi di 
un programma di investimenti pubblici nel Mezzogiomo’, in: V. Negri Zamagni and M. Sanfilippo
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to prepare the Italian economy to be part of an international context, in other words 
to be competitive as compared with foreign countries.58
Pescatore, director of the Cassa from 1954 to 1975, pointed out that the two main 
objectives of the Italian economic policy at the end of the 1940s and beginning of the 
1950s were the economic expansion of the country and a greater degree of 
harmonization of the Northern and Southern economies. Whereas as the middle of 
the twentieth century the Southern economy displayed the same rate of growth as 
during the previous century, the Northern economy had shot ahead in the meantime. 
The intervention of the State was considered as necessary in order to control the 
spontaneous process of self-accumulation in the North and start the self- 
accumulative process in the South.59 Furthermore, the underdevelopment of the 
South was damaging the Italian balance of payments. The South consumed more 
than it produced. Thus the industrialization of the South was necessary in order to be 
able to import raw materials rather than manufactured goods.60
The politicians also supported intervention in favour of the South. The ministerial 
report introducing the bill proposing the Cassa stressed the economic advantages. It 
pointed out that a developed South would offer a wider domestic market for Italian 
industry, and would help to avoid a heavy balance of payments deficit once the 
European Recovery Programme (ERP) came to an end. Furthermore, additional 
investment in the South would mean increased demand for capital goods produced 
throughout the country.61 Moreover, the programme for the South was an important 
part of the De Gasperi policies, as also demonstrated by the establishment of a 
permanent committee for Southern Italy in the Parliament. However, critics 
stressed that additional investment in the South might reduce investment in other
(eds), Nuovo meridionalismo et intervento straordinario. La Svimez dal 1946 al 1950 (Bologna, 
1988), p. 302.
58 P. Saraceno, P. ‘Lo Sviluppo Industriale delle Regioni Meridionali e l’Attivita della Cassa per il 
Mezzogiomo’, L ’Industria, Rivista di Economia Politico, 4 (1953), pp. 651-656; Confederazione 
generale dell’industria italiana, La politico di sviluppo economico del Mezzogiomo (Rome, 1970), pp. 
4-5.
59 G. Pescatore, D ied Anni di Esperienze della Cassa per il Mezzogiomo (Rome, 1961), p. 9.
60 Saraceno, ‘ Sviluppo Industriale’, p. 655.
61 S. Cafiero, ‘La nascita della « C a s s a » ’, in: M. Annesi, P. Baracci, G.G. Dell’Angelo (eds), Studi 
in Omore di Pasquale Saraceno (Milano, 1975), p. 187.
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areas of the country or create inflationary pressure,63and that the development of the 
South could be pursued only within the limits dictated by the national savings.64 
The important role played by the Svimez economists in the take-off stage of the 
regional policy presents analogies with the contemporary industrial environment, and 
particularly state-owned companies. In the 1950s and 1960s, state-owned enterprises 
played an important role in modernizing Italian industry, but this was not due to a 
coherent industrial policy but rather to the ingenuity and entrepreneurship of 
individual managers. A good example was Oscar Sinigaglia, the president of 
Finsider, the steel sub-holding of the IRI. Despite criticism from Marshall Plan 
advisors and Italian steel industrialists, he pushed through a plan for modernizing the 
steel sector. The cornerstone of this was the plant in Comigliano (Genoa), financed 
by Marshall aid, which turned out to be a success considering that it worked at full 
capacity and even exported. A similar story can be told about Enrico Mattei, 
president of Agip (the state-owned oil company) who after heated discussions 
secured exclusive rights to drill for gas in the fields of the Po Valley. In the 1950s, 
Agip ensured that the country had a cheap supply of energy.65 Similarly, as will be 
shown below, the Italian monetary policy in the late 1940s and 1950s was decided 
only by Menichella and the Treasury Minister Pella. It is not surprising to observe 
that important decisions in economic and industrial policy, both at the national and 
regional level, were taken by individuals in key positions, rather than being the result 
of government economic and industrial programmes. The Italian political instability 
might have played an important role in determining this situation, for fifteen different 
governments led the country between 1945 and 1960. The Christian Democratic 
party held a relative majority throughout the fifteen years, and from 1945 to 1953, De
62 L. D ’Antone, ‘«  Straordinarieta» e Stato ordinario’, in: F. Barca (ed.), Storia del capitalismo 
italiano dal dopoguerra ad oggi (Rome, 1997), pp. 596-597; Cafiero, ‘La nascita’, p. 180.
63 L. Magnani, ‘II finanziamento del piano decennale’ Informazioni Svimez, 1950/12 (1950), pp. 164- 
165.
64 C. Bresciani-Turroni, ‘II problema delle aree depresse e il finanziamento dello sviluppo 
economico’, Informazioni Svimez, 1950/13-14 (1950), pp. 194 -196.
65 G. Federico and R. Giannetti, ‘Italy: Stalling and Surpassing’, in: J. Foreman-Peck and G. Federico, 
European Industrial Policy. The Twentieth-Century Experience (Oxford, 1999), pp. 136-137. For 
Sinigaglia and the steel industry see R. Ranieri, ‘La grande siderurugia in Italia’, in G.L. Osti (ed.), 
L ’industria di stato dall'ascesa al degrado (Bologna, 1993), pp. 9-98; on Mattei and the ENI case see 
G. Sapelli and F. Camevale, Uno sviluppo tra politico e strategia: ENI 1953-1985 (Milan, 1992).
110
Gasperi was consistently the Prime Minister, but the ruling coalition changed with 
every single government.66
However, the decision to create the Cassa was not entirely internal, as a strong push 
had come from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). 
In 1948, the Italian government submitted to the IBRD a request for financing 11 
industrial projects (including the Comigliano steelworks and a steel plant for Fiat). 
Menichella and Francesco Giordano, then deputy executive director of the Italian 
section of the IBRD and member of the Svimez, appeared to convince the IBRD that 
such projects should rather be financed through the Marshall Plan, whereas the IBRD 
could finance a long-term plan of investment in the South, considered to be Italy’s 
main economic and social problem. The investment plan for Southern Italy, drafted 
at the Svimez in 1949, was well received by the economists at the IBRD, led by 
Rosestein Rodan, and in the same year Menichella prepared the bill for the 
establishment of the Cassa.67 By doing so Menichella was complying with an IBRD 
request, for this required that the plan be managed by a single institution, rather than 
several ministries.68
The IBRD’s support for the plan for Southern Italy was of great importance in 
reconciling disagreements concerning the financing of the plan. The Svimez was in 
favour of using the UNRRA counterpart fund, and later, supported by the 
parliamentary committee, it suggested using part of the ERP counterpart fund. 
However, since 1947 Menichella had made it very clear that the American aid would 
be used to finance the balance of payment deficit, which that year was expected to 
grow to $600m. A similar use of Marshall Aid - to rebuild the monetary reserves of 
the country, and to pursue a deflationary policy, even after the stabilization of 194769
66 For the succession of governments from 1946 to 1964 see D. Fausto, ‘L’intervento pubblico in Italia 
(1846-1964)’, in: AA. W . Stabilita e sviluppo negli anni cinquanta, vol. 2: Problemi strutturali e 
politiche economiche (Rome-Bari, 1998), pp. 558-559.
67 D ’Antone, ‘«Straordinarieta»‘, pp. 598-600.
68 S. Cafiero, Storia dell’Intervento Straordinario nel Mezzogiomo (1950-1993) (Manduria-Bari- 
Rome, 2000), pp. 25-26.
69 For the 1947 stabilization see C.O. Gelsomino, ‘Moneta e sviluppo nel dopoguerra. La politica 
monetaria italiana negli anni Cinquanta (1946-1964)’, in: AA. W . Stabilita e sviluppo negli anni 
Cinquanta, vol. 2: Problemi strutturali e politiche economiche (Rome-Bari, 1998), pp. 272-283; F. 
Lutz and V. Lutz, Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy in Italy (Princeton, 1950); P. Baffi,
I l l
- earned Menichella and Pella harsh criticism both at home and in the European
• 7 0Cooperation Administration’s Country Study.
By 1949, a wave of strikes and occupation of farmland in the South put further 
pressure on the recently elected (1948) Christian Democratic government, which 
feared that the South, with its vast number of peasants, labourers, unemployed 
intellectuals and underemployed city proletariat offered a fertile breeding ground for 
left-wing extremism, while the region’s petit bourgeois was perceived by politicians
71as still displaying leanings towards fascism.
3.1.3 The ‘pre-industrial’ period 1950-57
During the first years of its existence, the Cassa was more concerned with 
infrastructure and agriculture than with industrial development. This subsection will 
chart this ‘pre-industrial’ stage, and outline the debate that led to the change of 
emphasis in 1957.
In 1950 the Cassa was established as a public executive body, to elaborate, fund and 
execute specific plans based on a general 10-year plan formulated by several 
Government Ministries (Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, Public Works, and 
Social Security). The General Plan was to be implemented from 1950 in an area 
including the South and some provinces in Central Italy.72 Although the geographical
‘L’evoluzione monetaria in Italia dall’economia di guerra alia convertibility (1935-1958)’, in: P. Baffi, 
Studi sulla moneta (Milano, 1965), pp. 225-315.
70 For criticisms o f the Menichella policy see M. De Cecco, ‘Sulla politica di stabilizzazione del 1947’ 
in: M. De Cecco, Saggi di Politica Monetaria (Milano, 1968), p. 173; B. Bottiglieri, La Politica 
Economica dell’Italia centrista (1948-1958) (Milano, 1984), pp.35-39 and 68-70. For a recent re- 
interpration of the policy see A. Fazio, ‘Introduzione’ pp.14-17, in F. Cotula, C. O. Gelsomino and A. 
Gigliobianco, Donato Menichella. Stabilita e sviluppo dell’economia italiana 1946-1960, vol I: 
Documenti e discorsi (Rome-Bari, 1997), pp. 7-30; C. Spagnolo, ‘Le polemiche sul «Country 
Study», il fondo lire e il Piano Marshall’, pp.l 11-126 and passim, in: A A .W . Italia, Europa, 
America. L’integrazione intemazionale dell’economia italiana (1945-1963), Studi Storici, numero 
speciale, 37/1 (1996), pp. 111-126; Battilossi, L ’Italia, pp. 118-120.
71 K. Allen and M.C. MacLennan, Regional Problems and Policies in Italy and France, (1970), p.45; 
L. Weiss, ‘Small Firms and the Christian Democratic Party’, (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of 
London, 1984), p. 125; Cafiero, ‘Menichella meridionalista’, pp. 485-486; R. Stefanelli, Lotte agrarie 
e modello di sviluppo 1947-1967 (Bari, 1975), pp. 21-22.
72 By 1955, the Cassa area included Abruzzo and Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, 
Sardegna; the provinces of Frosinone and Latina, including some municipalities in Rome province 
geographically belonging to die reclaimed area in Latina province; die islands of Elba, Giglio and
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limitation of the Cassa is often mentioned in the literature, no explanation is offered for 
the inclusion of areas in Central Italy.
Works on regional policies in the European community maintain that political 
pressures and the lack of a precise definition of backwardness played an important role 
in the identification of designated areas.73 However, in the Italian case these areas 
seem to present similar features to the South, as they were immediate targets for land 
reclamation and road construction.74 Moreover, the level of industrialization 
(expressed in terms of industrial income as a percentage of total income) of three 
central provinces (Latina, Rieti and Ascoli Piceno) was below the average of Central 
and even Southern Italy, with only one province (Frosinone) presenting a degree of 
industrialization above the Southern average, although below the Central average, in 
1951.75 Pressures to include depressed areas in the Centre and North in the Cassa 
programme, by establishing an independent department of the Cassa, were expressed in 
Parliament. The government rejected this proposal because the designated areas in the 
Centre-North were smaller and less backward than the South.76 Therefore, another bill 
was passed in the same period, dealing specially with the underdeveloped areas of the 
Centre and North.77
The Cassa del Mezzogiomo was originally endowed with 1,000 billion lire ($1.6bn) 
from the government, to cover a ten-year period. Such amount was to be provided 
partly by the Treasury and partly with the ERP counterpart fund. The IBRD committed
*70
itself to a contribution of $ 10m per year, which became available from 1952 onwards. 
In 1952, the Cassa’s period of activity was extended to 1962, and the government
Capraia; municipalities previously belonging to Cittaducale in the Rieti province and municipalities in the 
reclaimed area of the river Tronto, in the Ascoli Piceno province, see laws 646/1950, 13/1955, 
105/1955.
73 D.Yuill, K. Allen and C. Hull, Regional Policy in the European Community (1980), p. 215.
74 Cassa per il Mezzogiomo, Relazione alBilancio 1950-1951 (Rome, 1951), pp. 88-95.
75 G. Tagliacame, II reddito prodotto nelle province italiane nel 1973 (Milan, 1975), pp. 25-28 and 
Table 9.
76 The Svimez agreed with the government’s stance, but disagreed as to the justification, claiming that 
the nature of the problem was different, because underdeveloped areas in the Centre and North were 
located within a wider economic context where industry was already present and therefore differed 
considerably from the large agricultural and over-populated South. See Cafiero, ‘La nascita’, pp. 186- 
187.
77 Law 647/50; Cafiero, Storia, p. 42.
78 For more on the initial financing o f the Cassa see D ’Antone, ‘«Strordinarieta»’, pp. 601-602.
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endowment increased to 1,280 billion lire ($2.05bn). This increase, together with 
minor public contributions in the following years, brought the annual financial capacity 
of the Cassa to 190 billion per year, from the lOObn initially granted by the establishing 
law.79
The General Plan specified the spheres of activity of the Cassa, and the budget share it 
was to devote to each: 70% of its funds to agriculture and 30% to civil 
infrastructures.80 The plan clearly demonstrates that its priority was to endow Southern 
Italy with more social fixed capital (roads and railways, water mains, sewers and 
reclaimed land) in order to create external economies for investment in the South, 
and to increase income by improvements in agriculture and as a consequence of 
direct public expenditure and its multiplier effect.81 Moreover, according to a later 
interpretation, investment in infrastructure aimed to stimulate migration, as these 
programmes involved the release of labour (particularly unemployed and under­
employed) from agriculture and an increase in demand for industrial products in 
northern regions, thus increasing demand for labour in those regions.82
However, in 1953, Svimez economists announced that only 12% of private 
investment undertaken in 1952 was located in the South, where 60-70% of the Italian 
population increase was predicted to take place in the 1950s. By this time, it was 
suggested that the Cassa should expand its activities to the industrial sector. It was 
already clear by 1953, that investment in the traditional sector would not generate 
any significant capital accumulation because Southern agriculture was too backward 
to act as an engine of development.84 Furthermore, a Svimez economist, Pilloton, 
demonstrated that the Centre and North of Italy were benefiting from the multiplier 
effects of the Cassa investment in public overhead capital in the South. Due to the
79 The annual average financial capacity of the Cassa is calculated by Pescatore for the years 1950- 
1962. G. Pescatore, L ’Intervento Straordinario nel Mezzogiomo d ’ltalia (Milan, 1962), p. 6.
80 The precise shares were: social overhead capital in agriculture 37.3%, agrarian reform 21.9%, 
improvements in agriculture 10.2%, roads 9.0%, railways 5.9%, waters mains and sewers 13.8%, 
infrastructures for tourism 1.9%. S. Cafiero and G.E. Marciani, ‘Quarant’anni di intervento 
straordinario (1950-1989)’, Rivista Economica del Mezzogiomo, 5/2 (1991), p. 251.
81 G. Di Nardi, ‘I prowedimenti per il Mezzogiomo’, Economia e Storia: rivista italiana di storia 
economica e sociale, 7 (1960), pp. 494-495.
82 S. Petriccione, Politica industriale e Mezzogiomo (Bari, 1976), p. 8.
83 Vaccaro, Unita ’, p. 240.
84 P. Saraceno, L ’Unificazione Economica dell ’Italia e ’ Ancora Lontana (Bologna, 1988), p .9.
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lack of Southern firms able to provide capital goods as well as to carry out public 
works, the majority of contracts went to Northern firms. Therefore, the Cassa 
intervention in infrastructure was generating an increase in income, in demand for 
consumption goods, and in producers’ investment decisions in the North, but not in 
the South.85 It was suggested that the Cassa should not invest directly in industry, 
but should rather seek to enhance the potential profitability of private investment in 
industry in the South, which given the lack of Southern capital meant attracting
o r
private capital from the North.
In the same year, a law was passed to increase the availability of capital to industry, 
through the reorganisation of two Southern RMTCIs - Isveimer and Irfis (Regional 
Institute for the financing of small and medium-sized firms in Sicily) - and the 
creation of Cis (Institute for the Industrial Credit in Sardinia).
The issue of the provision of capital to Southern industry was not new. In 1947, the 
DICs at the Banks of Naples, Sicily and Sardinia were allowed to allocate 10 billion 
lire for credits to industrial concerns. The State covered up to 70% of their possible 
losses and provided a contribution on the interest credit of 4% for a maximum 10 
years, to enable the three special sections to extend loans on favourable terms. The 
money came directly from the central Government budget allocation, which, 
according to a later criticism from the Svimez, prevented the smooth functioning of 
the system and caused the Bank of Naples to be ineffective in stimulating 
investment.87 However, recent research claims that government allocations were paid 
very frequently and that the DIC of the Bank of Naples which received them was 
very active in financing industry. In contrast, the Isveimer, which was financed 
entirely by the Bank of Naples (see section 3.1.1), did not reach considerable levels
QO
of activity. In 1953, it was hoped that would be addressed on permanent basis.
85 F. Pilloton, ‘Effetti Moltiplicativi degli investimenti della Cassa per il Mezzogiomo nel periodo 
1951-55’, in Svimez , H Mezzogiomo nelle ricerche della Svimez 1947-1967 (Rome, 1968), pp.421- 
435.
86 Saraceno, ‘Sviluppo Industriale’, p. 664.
87 Svimez, Gli Investimenti Industriali Agevolati nel Mezzogiomo (Rome, 1972), p. 3.
88 In turn, the reason why government allocations were concentrated in the Department of Industrial 
Credit of the Bank of Naples rests with the Bank of Naples, which despite pressures from the Bank of 
Italy, the Treasury and the Isveimer itself to change the denomination and statute of the Isveimer and 
transform it in a department o f credit to industry, decided that the Isveimer should keep its aim of
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The choice was either the complete restructuring of the three DIC or the 
reorganization of Isveimer and Irfis, and the creation of Cis. The solution finally 
adopted was a compromise, because the banks of Naples, Sicily and Sardinia joined 
the Cassa and the Southern ordinary banks in contributing to the endowment to the 
Isveimer, Irfis and Cis. Thus, the South was provided with institutions able to 
generate their own funding via the issuing of bonds rather than depend upon
on
Government budget allocations.
By the middle of the 1950s, the widespread understanding that the extraordinary 
intervention in the South had achieved some results only in the sphere of public 
infrastructure further strengthened the opinion that Cassa direct intervention in the 
industrial sector was necessary.90 This belief was boosted by the Vanoni scheme 
(Schema di sviluppo dell’occupazione e del reddito in Italia nel decennio 1955-64) 
presented to Parliament in 1954, which although never implemented had a strong 
influence on the economic policy making.91 The scheme addressed the issue of state 
intervention in order to increase national income and reduce the high level of 
unemployment in the country. According to the plan, the national income should 
have increased at an annual rate of 5% in order to reduce unemployment to the level 
of frictional unemployment. Although, the largest part of the employment 
opportunities should have been created by directly productive investment, the 
government should have invested in ‘propulsive’ sectors: agriculture, public utilities 
(electricity, railways, telephones) public works (such as roads, school, airports), and 
residential housing. The plan recommended that 50% of such investment should
promoting the economic development in the Southern mainland also through the acquisition of 
participation, whereas for the management of government allocation - aimed mainly at the 
reconstruction of industry - the Bank of Naples considered more appropriate to establish a separate 
department for credit to industry, allowed to issue bonds. Croce, ‘II credito’, pp. 606-612.
89 Confederazione generale dell’industria italiana, La Politica, pp. 12-13.
90 Ufficio Studi del Banco di Napoli, ‘L’intervento straordinario nel Mezzogiomo: l’evoluzione 
legislativa’, Rassegna Economica 49/4 (1985) p. 767.
91 Petriccione, Politica industriale, p. 10. It is widely accepted that it was only a preliminary 
programme that should have been refined to become a realisable plan. For the various interpretations, 
ranging from political to economic, as to why the plan was never implemented see F. Sullo, ‘II 
dibattito sulla programmazione economica in Italia dal 1945 al I960’, Economia e Storia, 7/3 (1960), 
pp. 383-443.
92 E. Vanoni, ‘Schema di sviluppo dell’occupazione e del reddito in Italia nel decennio 1955-1964’, 
in: Ministero del Bilancio, La programmazione economica in Italia, vol. 1 (Rome, 1967), pp.l 17-118;
F. Vicarelli, ‘Note in tenia di accumulazione di capitale in Italia (1947-63)’, in: G. Lunghini (ed.), 
Scelte politiche e teorie economiche in Italia 1945-1978 (Turin, 1981), p. 39; R. Balducci and M.
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have been concentrated in the South over the following ten years, which implied a 
higher per capita share in the South, in order to reduce the North-South gap in social 
overhead capital.93 However, as also stressed in the literature, investment in fixed 
social capital alone could not be a powerful engine for Southern economic 
development, and the Vanoni plan made it clear that investment in infrastructure 
needed to be integrated with investment in directly productive activity, as only the 
latter would be a source of income and employment.94
The plan did not seem to address whether investment in directly productive activities 
was to be undertaken by the state or by private entrepreneurs, although other works 
have interpreted the plan as concentrating state investment only in the ‘propulsive 
sectors’ and residential housing.95 However, the scheme does make it clear that the 
state could undertake investment not only in the ‘propulsive sectors’ but also in 
industry with the purpose of 1) locating additional industry in ‘certain regions’; 2) 
increasing the production in basic sectors; 3) furthering the development of state- 
owned sectors.96 Therefore, the plan seems to leave open the option of state 
intervention mainly in capital-intensive sectors, but as according to Vanoni, capital 
was the missing factor of production, investment in labour-intensive sectors was to 
be preferred, as it would generate the highest increase in employment with minimum 
capital requirements.97
However, the expansion of the Cassa programme to include direct intervention in 
industry was not universally welcomed, as witnessed by the wide support given to 
stinging criticism of the policy published shortly afterwards.98 This work claimed 
that the industrial policy for the South had been disappointing as the income gap had
Marconi, ‘L’accumulazione del capitale nella visione del govemo, della Banca d’ltalia e della 
Confederazione generate dell’industria’, in: G. Lunghini ed., Scelte politiche e teorie economiche in 
Italia 1945-1978 (Turin, 1981), pp. 73-74.
93 Vanoni, ‘Schema’, p. 171.
94 Ibid., p. 171; Confederazione generate dell’industria italiana, La Politica, p. 19.
95 Vicarelli, ‘Note’, p. 39.
96 Vanoni, ‘Schema', p. 118.
97 Petriccione, Politica industriale, p. 10.
98 Lutz, ‘Italy as a Study’, mentioned for instance in Confederazione generate dell’industria italiana, 
La Politica, p. 44.
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not been reduced," for Southern Italian income was increasing even less than in the 
rest of the country, as table ELI below shows.
Table ELI Percentage increase in per-capita income
Centre-North South Italy
1951-57 0.328 0231 0.305
1957-62 0.368 0.269 0.352
Source: Calculations from data in Comitato dei Ministri per il Mezzogiomo, Relazione sull’attivita ’ di 
coordinamento, 1965, Vol.2, p.47.
Lutz questioned how the industrial policy for the South, relying on public investment 
in industry and infrastructure, was going to create a market for industrial output. 
Supporters of the policy claimed that large industrial units in leading sectors would 
have stimulated private investment in smaller plants in a wide range of industries. 
Consequently, the policy had introduced financial incentives to remove capital 
constraints hampering private investment. It was believed rising incomes, would 
create a market for Southern industry. This approach neglected a relevant factor, 
notably the low consumption of high-quality foodstuffs by the Southern population. 
Disagreeing with the dominant view, Lutz thought that rising incomes in the 
Southern population would translate into demand for higher quality foodstuffs rather 
than for TV sets and motor scooters. It was thus the lack of demand for industrial 
products that made the industrialization of Southern Italy such a difficult task. She 
proposed increasing per capita income by encouraging large-scale internal migration. 
Remittances from emigrants as well as reduction of population pressure on 
agriculture resources would help to achieve the increase in per capita income. This 
‘policy’ was to be implemented in conjunction with the removal of disincentives 
(arising from the structure of taxation and labour costs) which were preventing 
Northern industry from fulfilling its full potential. Mass migration would allow the 
North to exploit its locational advantages, and to expand industrial exports, which 
Lutz regarded as essential if the Southern population was to be able to improve its 
consumption of foodstuffs.100
99 Ibid., p. 41.
100 Lutz, ‘Italy as a Study’, p. 44.
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Other reasons offered in the literature as justification for the expansion of the Cassa’s 
activity include the inadequacy of the various ministerial programmes in the South 
and the insufficient cooperation between the Ministries and the Cassa.101 These were 
supposed to coordinate their investment plans in the South.102 As already mentioned 
the Intemiinisterial Committee for the South had to formulate a general ten-year 
programme of investment. The Cassa broke down this programme into annual plans,
i  m  • • •and was entrusted with their financing and implementation. In addition, Ministries 
were entitled to include in their annual budgets “extraordinary” investments, i.e. 
complementary to the activities of the Cassa. This potential division of 
responsibilities made coordination between the Ministeries and the Cassa essential, 
but this was not guarantee by the law as both the Cassa and the Ministries had full 
autonomy in drafting their plans.104 Coordination should have occurred because the 
Cassa had to integrate its own activity into the ten year plan formulated by the 
Interministerial Committee, which was constituted by the same Ministries allowed to 
plan “extraordinary” investment. A further reason why co-ordination should have 
occurred was that the Interministerial Committee was empowered to modify the 
Cassa’s programme once the Ministerial and Cassa programmes had already been 
approved. However, this meant that effective co-ordination could be attempted only 
a posteriori and that only the Cassa’s programmes could be modified.105 A 
broadening of the Cassa’s sphere of responsibilities and activities was seen as an 
effective way to overcome such a clearly unsatisfactory situation.106
3.2 National and regional industrial policies and their instruments.
This section will describe the plethora of incentive schemes devised between 1957 
and 1991, at regional and national level, and is broken down into chronological 
subsections in order to highlight the most notable policy shifts. Moreover, the
101 E. Colombo, Linee di una Politica Industriale (1959-1962) (Bologna, 1963), pp. 288-289.
102 Cafiero and Marciani, ‘Quarant’anni’, p. 251.
103 L. Ammannati, Cassa per il Mezzogiomo ed Intervento Straordinario (Naples, 1981) p. 31.
104 Cafiero, ‘La Nascita’, p. 189.
105 Ammannati, Cassa, p. 32.
106 Colombo, Linee, p. 380.
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section includes the study of the significance of Cassa incentives to industry, within 
the wider framework of the regional policy.
I) 1957-65
The Cassa involvement with Southern industrialization started in 1957, with a law 
(634/1957) expanding and extending its activities until 1965. From 1957, the Cassa 
was able to offer incentives to the industrial sector, craft-based manufacturing and
107fisheries, and to assist with the building of schools and with professional training.
1 ORIts endowment was increased up to 12,000 billion lire (1980 prices). The Cassa’s 
endowment per year in the period 1957-65 was thus 1,333.3 billion lire, a slight 
increase from the 1,266.6 billion during 1952-1962 (both figures expressed in 1980 
prices).
The same law compelled State-owned enterprises to undertake 60% of their 
investment in new plants in the South, so that a minimum 40% of their total 
investment would be located in the South by 1964/65.109 The inclusion of state- 
owned enterprises in the industrial policy for the South was also a consequence of 
the necessity of developing both an energy industry and the production of 
intermediate goods by the public sector, in order to allow the private industrial sector 
to successfully exploit the opportunities offered by the expansion in international 
trade following the formation of the EEC in 1957.110 Therefore what this 
interpretation seems to suggest is that the two aims of industrializing Southern Italy 
and increasing investment by state holding companies in sectors producing energy, 
chemicals, steel, and so on, were linked by compelling state-owned enterprises to 
undertake 40% of their investment in the South. On the other hand, linking the two 
aims meant that state-owned enterprises became recipients of subsidies, thus 
diverting finance from the private sector. Dunford claims that after 1957, the 
industrial policy for the South was strongly oriented towards the financing of large
107 Cafiero and Marciani, ‘Quarant’anni’, p. 252.
108 M.F. Dunford, Capital, the State and Development (1988), p. 147.
109 Cafiero and Marciani, ‘Quarant’anni’, p. 252.
110 Dunford, Capital, pp. 145, 147. The State's direct intervention in industry was interpreted as an 
attempt to remove bottlenecks in strategic sectors such as metallurgy, energy, oil and chemical, in 
order to promote national industrial growth. Cer-Irs, Quale Strategia per Vlndustria? (Bologna, 
1986), p. 143.
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plants in the energy and intermediate goods sectors, concentrated in a small number 
of industrial zones, such as: 1) Napoli-Caserta; 2) the Bari-Brindisi-Taranto triangle; 
3) the Catania-Siracusa axis in Sicily; 4) the Ottana-Porto Torres zone in Sardinia.111
The Cassa involvement in industrial development took the form of fiscal incentives, 
financial incentives and the establishment of industrial areas and nuclei. Six types of 
fiscal incentives for Southern firms were introduced, among which the most relevant 
was a 10-year exemption from tax on industrial income, (which in 1970 ranged from 
28% to 36% depending on income). Southern firms were also exempted from 
customs duties on material and machinery required for constructing and equipping 
the plant (before 1957, these duties had amounted to an average 15% of the value of 
imported materials and machinery, though this had subsequently decreased). These 
goods were also exempted from the equalization tax amounting to 4% of their price. 
Industrial concerns in the South were partially exempted from the turnover tax on 
material not imported but produced in Italy (amounting to 3.3% of the purchase 
price). The law also provided minor exemptions such as: exemption from fees on 
registration and mortgages, which amounted to about 1% of the value of assets 
involved.112
In order to explain the system of financial incentives envisaged by law 634/1957, it is 
necessary to mention another instrument of the industrial policy introduced by the 
same law: areas of industrial development and nuclei of industrialization. The 
former were to be composed of a number of localities with a combined population of 
more than 200,000 inhabitants and with more than one industrial estate. The latter 
were to be composed of one or two localities, with fewer than 75,000 inhabitants, 
and with a single industrial estate. The establishment of areas or nuclei was up to 
local bodies (Chamber of Commerce, Municipalities, etc.), once they had organized 
themselves in “consortia” which had to be approved by the Committee of Ministers 
for Mezzogiomo. The consortia were responsible for drawing up plans for the 
infrastructural investment to be realised in the area or nucleus in order to attract and 
favour a concentration of new plants. The Cassa could award grants to the consortia
111 Dunford, Capital, p. 146.
112 Allen and MacLennan, Regional Problems, p. 54.
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covering up to 50% of the costs of the infrastructure projects; the percentage was 
increased to 85% in 1961. In addition, the Cassa could extend grants and soft loans 
to firms establishing in industrial areas and nuclei, covering a percentage of the 
necessary investment. The percentage covered by the Cassa was higher for firms 
establishing in areas and nuclei than for firms establishing outside, as will be 
explained below. Thus the industrial policy for the South aimed at creating a limited 
number of areas in which investment in general infrastructure as well as specific 
infrastructure for industry were to be concentrated, in order to create the pre­
conditions for industrialization. The system of incentives aimed to facilitate
investment in such areas. In particular, the aim was that of attracting complementary
• 11^industries in the same neighbourhood, in order to develop external economies. 
The attempt to concentrate investment in a limited number of areas would have also 
allowed a more efficient use of limited funds,114as nuclei and areas were planned in 
locations thought to have marked development potential.115 The literature 
acknowledges in the early industrial policy for the South the attempt to apply a 
growth centre policy derived from the theory of unbalanced growth and ‘on a 
geographical interpretation of the concept of the growth pole or development 
centre’.116
The growth pole theory claims that economic growth originates in certain industries 
or in certain zones and proceeds with unequal intensity, as each step in the ideal 
pattern of development is generated by a previous disequilibrium and will induce a 
new disequilibrium which will generate a further leap. This contrasts with the 
balanced growth theory, which holds that development takes place simultaneously in 
many sectors. The simultaneity argument is based on both demand and supply side 
considerations. The simultaneous development of many activities would be able to 
create a market for new goods. On the other hand, the development of secondary 
industries generates an increased demand for raw materials needed by machines and 
food needed by workers. If any of the items for which demand increases is imported,
113 Dunford, Capital, p. 147.
114 Allen and MacLennan, Regional Problems, p. 61.
115 S. Ronzani, ‘Regional Incentives in Italy’, in: D. Yuill, K. Allen and C. Hull (eds), Regional Policy 
in the European Community (1980), p. 138; Cer-Irs, Quale strategia, p. 143.
116 Dunford, Capital, p. 147.
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an increase in exports will be necessary.117 The argument of unbalanced growth is 
based on external economies generated by the expansion of an industry that are 
appropriable by another industry, which in turn will create new external economies 
to be exploited by other industries.118 The Perroux formulation of the growth pole 
theory, the concept of ‘pole de croissance’ was applied mainly to industry but also to 
geographical areas. The concentration of inter-related key industries generates 
expansive forces. For industrial growth poles, which can be defined as an 
agglomeration of human and fixed capital, generate collective needs that call for 
services and other industries. Industrial agglomerates modify their neighbourhood, 
and an industrial pole brings into existence a further one. Important industrial 
centres affect the entire national economy.119
Law 634/1957 established financial grants and subsidised interest credits for small 
and medium-sized firms locating or expanding in the South. The definition of small 
and medium-sized firms, and thus eligibility for Cassa assistance underwent changes 
over time, as shown in table III.2. The original 1957 definition specified upper limits 
for both employment and asset size of the firm. In 1959, the employment limit was 
abolished, but the limit on asset size underwent the first of several adjustments. The 
1961 changes ensured that any firm of any size could benefit from Cassa grants, 
provided the investment could be distributed among individual plants with the fixed 
assets of each not exceeding 6 billion lire. The redefinition in terms of plant size 
rather then firm size had already opened up Cassa funds to large state-owned or 
private enterprises, but the process was made even easier in 1962 with the 
elimination of any limit on circulating or fixed assets.120
117 A.O. Hirshman, The Strategy o f Economic Development (Boulder, 3rd ed., 1988), p. 62.
m  Ibid., p. 67.
1,9 Perroux, F., ‘Note sur la Notion de « P o le  de Croissance», Economie Appliquee, 8/1-2 (1955), 
pp. 317-318.
120 Dunford, Capital, p. 149.
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Table III.2 Criteria for eligibility for Cassa assistance.
Employees Value of fixed capital (bn lire)
1957 <500 <3 per firm
1959 n/a <6 per firm
1961 n/a <6 per plant
1962 n/a grants awarded on first 6 bn of investment for firms of any size
Key: n/a = not applicable.
Source: Dunford, Capital, p. 149.
It has been stressed how the laws of 1961-62 twisted the incentive system from its 
original intention of developing an organic network of small and medium-sized 
firms. The diversion from the original idea of limiting incentives only to small and 
medium-sized firms has been interpreted as due to the need to attract modem 
industries to the South, and investment by large Northern companies.121 Dunford 
maintains that the diversion also aimed at releasing labour to promote Northern 
industrial development,122 thus assuming that a network of small and medium-sized 
firms would have employed more labour than large plants, which is not obvious.
However, the lifting of the size limit for recipient firms was also supported by the 
Svimez activist, Saraceno, who in the 1960s was the deputy president of the National 
Commission for Economic Planning. In his report he maintained that although small 
and medium-sized firms create job opportunities, the establishment of capital- 
intensive plants was necessary to increase Southern labour productivity to European 
levels. Therefore, not only did large private investment need to be attracted to the 
South but also state-owned enterprises should locate all their new investment in the 
South.123
121 Ibid., p. 149; S. Conti, 'Industrialization in a Backward Region: the Italian Mezzogiomo, 
(Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1979), p. 126; Federico and Giannetti, ‘Italy’, pp. 
139-140.
122 Dunford, Capital, p. 149.
123 P. Saraceno, ‘Rapporto del vicepresidente della Cominissione nazionale per la Programmazione 
Economica’, in: Ministero del Bilancio, La programmazione economica in Italia, vol. 2 (Rome, 
1967), pp. 175-176. See also Petriccione, Politica industriale, pp. 21-29.
124
The percentage of construction expenditure, defined as including supply roads, 
sewers and water systems, covered by the grant was determined according to 
industrial sector, size of the enterprise, investment per employee and location:
a) industrial sector and size of the enterprise. Industry was grouped in three 
categories: modem, intermediate and traditional. Industries such as aeronautics and 
electronic instruments were defined as the modem sector, with steel and cars as 
intermediate, while the traditional sector included textiles and wood products.124 
The actual percentage within the ranges of subsidies specified was determined by the 
size of the investment, i.e. the bigger the investment the higher the percentage. Thus, 
a firm in the first category would receive 22% if its investment was below 50 million 
lire, 23% for 50 - 200 million lire, 24% for 200 - 500 million lire and the maximum 
of 25 % above 500 million lire.125
Table III.3 Sectoral entitlement to Cassa subsidies




Source: Allen and MacLennan, Regional Problems, p.55-6.
b) Investment per employee. The percentage of the investment that could be covered 
by financial subsidies was inversely proportional to the investment per employee, 
thus displaying the aim of encouraging the development of labour intensive 
enterprises. The percentage of financial subsidy could range from 5% for an 
investment per employee beyond 12 million lire to 25% for investment below 4
1 *)f\million lire per employee. Such parameters clearly reflect the recommendation of 
the Vanoni Plan, in which reducing unemployment, despite the shortage of capital,
• 1 97  •was a priority. The emphasis on labour-intensive sectors might seem to contrast
124 Cassa per opere straordinarie di pubblico interesse nell’Italia meridionale, Tipologia industriale ed 
infrastruttura del territorio per una politica di sviluppo del Mezzogiorno (Rome, 1975), pp. 19.
125 Allen and MacLennan, Regional Problems, p. 55.
126 Ibid., p. 56.
127 The criteria of investment per employee and location are clearly priority criteria in law 634/57. 
Article 19 states that the Cassa contribution to the firm is going to be graded according to the 
employment opportunities it creates and its contribution to the economy of under-industrialized areas.
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with the aim of encouraging migration. However, as mentioned above, investment in 
infrastructure was seen as inductive to migration. Therefore, it seems plausible that 
encouraging migration and creating job opportunities in the South were two distinct 
strategies to tackle the problem of unemployment in the South.
c) Location. In accordance with the growth centre policy, the criterion of location 
aimed at granting higher financial subsidies to firms locating in industrial areas and 
nuclei, particularly in those less industrialised. It first assessed the degree of 
industrialization of the areas and nuclei by looking at the percentage of employees in 
firms with more than ten workers as a proportion of the resident population. In 
addition, the policy differentiated between the industrial core of each area and 
nucleus (designated the ‘industrial zone’) arid the remainder of each unit. For each
p o
permutation, a different set of points was awarded as shown in table IH.4.
Table m.4 Grants as % of investment for firms locating in areas or nuclei




Source: Allen and MacLennan, Regional Problems, p.56-57.
Key: “ = Percentage of employees in firms of more than ten employees as a proportion of the resident 
population (see previous paragraph).
Firms locating outside areas and nuclei could be awarded grants covering 10% of the 
admissible expenditures. The amount of the grant was the arithmetical average of 
points awarded under each head, and with the maximum grant being 25%. As an 
example, the maximum would be granted to a firm in the modem industrial sector 
(e.g. chemicals) investing more than 500 million lire, but with a low investment per 
employee (less than 4 million lire). The firm should also be located within the 
industrial zone of a relatively underdeveloped Area or Nuclei. The lowest grant - 8% 
- would be awarded to a firm with a traditional product (e.g. foodstuffs) undertaking
128 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
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an investment below 50 million lire, but with a high level of investment per
• • 1 9 0employee (over 12 million lire) and located outside an Area or Nuclei.
A further grant was introduced in order to cover expenditure for machinery and 
equipment. The grant could reach up to 20% in case of machinery and equipment 
purchased from Southern suppliers, but otherwise only up to 10%, if not already 
exempted from custom duties. The actual value of the grant was decided by the
iCassa and the MTCIs, following no specified criteria.
As far as soft loans were concerned, the law passed in 1957 released medium term 
credits at interest rates lower than those available in the open market. These loans 
were managed by the three MTCIs operating in the South: Isveimer, Irfis and Cis. 
The Cassa gave a contribution on interest.131
The subsidised interest rate to the borrowing firm was fixed by the appropriate law or 
by ad hoc decrees, whereas the Cassa or government contribution varied to cover the 
difference between the subsidised interest rate and the base rate. The base rate, 
defined on the basis of the cost (weighted average) incurred by the MTCIs in issuing 
bonds in the previous four months, was determined bimonthly by ICCS. Such a 
system was advantageous for firms, as they knew exactly the interest rate to be 
included in their investment appraisal, but it disburdened entirely on institutions the 
cost due to the variation of the market interest rate. This also implied that the 
amount of subsidised loan which could be made available with a given budget 
allocation was inversely proportional to the difference between subsidised and
1 9 9market interest rate.
The loan schemes established by 1957-59 laws are described in table III.5.
m  Ibid., p. 57.
130 Allen and MacLennan suggest that these criteria should be the same as those applied for grants. 
Ibid., p. 55.
131 Cassa per il Mezzogiomo, Relazione alBilancio 1959-1960 (Rome, 1960), p. 135.
132 Pontolillo, ‘Aspetti’, pp. 111-114; Pontolillo, U sistema, p. 103, fh 91.
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Table IE.5 Soft loan schemes, 1957-59
Interest rates Size and type of investment
3% < 1.5 bn (new plant)
<0.5 bn (expansion or modernization)
4% <6 bn (new plant or expansion)
5% >6 bn (new plant or expansion)
Source: Allen and MacLennan, Regional Problems, p. 58.
For all three types, the loans could cover a maximum 70% of the planned investment, 
while all loans were repayable over 15 years. Such loans could be obtained in 
addition to the grants mentioned above, with the provision that the combined grant 
and loan could not exceed 85% of the total investment.133
The provision of soft loans was not a peculiarity of the policy for the South. In the 
same period, subsidised medium-term credit was available in the whole country in 
addition to ordinary and commercial credit. In 1952, MTC was made available to 
small and medium sized industrial concerns in the whole country on a preferential 
basis through the network of RMTCIs. These were able to extend loans at lower 
interest rates because, as already mentioned, they could refinance themselves under 
favourable terms at the MCC. A further soft loan scheme in favour of small and 
medium-sized firms was approved in 1959, subsidised by the MI. Small and 
medium-sized firms were considered as needing support as they were supposed to 
hold disadvantages in accessing the financial market as well as a smaller bargaining 
power with banks. It was considered a matter of equity to support the weaker sectors 
of the economy. Political considerations, such as gaining the support of small 
entrepreneurs and avoiding concentrations of labour demand and supply, also played 
a significant role in the formulation of these schemes.134
Under the terms of law 949/1952, small and medium-sized firms could borrow up to 
50 million lire. The scheme was managed in the South by Isveimer and Irfis after 
1952, by Cis after 1953 and by the DICs of Banco di Napoli and Banco di Sicilia
133 Allen and MacLennan, Regional Problems, pp. 58-59.
134 Cer-Irs, Quale Strategia, p. 143.
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from 1954. Thus, Southern firms through the same institutions could access credit 
from the Cassa as well as the MCC. The only difference lay in the institution’s 
criteria for recipient firms. The MCC applied a more restrictive size criterion, 
allowing up to 1.5 bn lire investment and no more than 500 employees per plant in 
the North and Centre and 3 bn fixed capital and the same limit on employment in the 
South. In 1961, the MCC adopted the same size criterion as the Cassa, for Southern 
applicants.135 Moreover, the MCC was entitled to determine the interest rate on its
11Afinancial operations, which was to be approved by the ICCS. The scheme 
managed by the MI applied the same size criteria as the MCC and fixed the interest 
rates at no more than 3% for Southern firms and a maximum of 5% for firms located 
in any other area of the country. The maximum loans were 500 million lire for new 
plants (in exceptional cases up 1000 mill) and 250 million for expansion outside the 
South, compared with 1,000 and 500 million respectively for Southern firms (in 
exceptional cases 1,500 mill, for new plants). The loans were repayable over 15 
years in the South and over 10 years elsewhere in the country.137
In the same period, more soft loan schemes were introduced. In 1961, a fund was 
instituted at the IMI to finance small and medium-sized firms (including firms that 
had suspended trading, and thus were unable to secure funds from banks). This
1 38scheme (law 1470/1961) aimed to assist firms with restructuring or reconversion. 
According to later research, this scheme was passed to support wool manufacturers 
in Biella, who were experiencing difficulties from foreign competition, particularly
1 'XQfrom other European countries. In 1965, IMI was entrusted with a further fund to 
finance small and medium-sized firms hit by the economic crisis of 1964-5. This 
law raised the limit of medium firms to 6 billion fixed capital, to be applied to the 
plant in the South and to the firm in the rest of Italy.140 Law 1329/1965 sought to 
help the machine tool industry recover from the crisis. It subsidised the purchasing 
and leasing of domestically produced machines - a limitation later abolished in
135 Pergolesi, U credito, p. 45.
136 Law 949/52, article 26, published in ABI, La legislazione italiana, p. 187.
137 Ibid., pp. 193-194.
138 Pergolesi, II credito, p. 48.
139 E. Pontarollo, ‘Le politiche di ristrutturazione industriale in Italia dal 1961 al 1977’, L ’Industria: 
Rivista di Economia e Politico Industriale, Nuova Serie, 1 (1980), p. 372
140 Pergolesi, II Credito, p. 49.
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accordance with the EEC regulation - worth between 1 million lire to 3 billions and 
the scheme was managed by the MCC.141 Both the producer and the purchaser 
benefited from this scheme as producers could rediscount bills and purchasers could 
dilute the payment over five years at a subsidised interest rate.142 The proliferation 
of schemes, which was later called a ‘jungle of incentives’ in which the same firm 
could benefit from various schemes, is interpreted in the literature as a consequence 
of the lack of a coherent industrial policy. The absence of an all-embracing approach 
left room for pressures by economic and industrial groups which then brought about 
the formulation of schemes each of which addressing a specific and/or sectoral 
problem.143
The table below aims at displaying the relevance of the industrial policy in the 
context of the Cassa policy as a whole during 1957-1965:
141 Mediocredito Centrale, Osservatorio sulle Piccole e Medie Imprese, L ’efficacia degli incentivi di 
politico industriale: aspetti teorici ed evidenza empirica (Rome, 1997), pp. 16-17; G. Scanagatta, ‘Le 
leggi nazionali di incentivazione per le piccole e medie imprese industriali e il Mezzogiomo’, Rivista 
Economica del Mezzogiomo, 3/1 (1989), p. 79. The original lower limit was 500.000 lire and the 
scheme did not include any size limit on eligible companies, see law 28, November 1965, n.1329.
142 F. Momigliano (ed.), Le leggi della politico industriale in Italia (Bologna, 1986), pp. 175-176.
143 L. Barca and G. Manghetti, L ’Italia delle Banche (Rome, 1976), p. 187.
Table III.6 Annual average Cassa expenditure, 1957-65 (1980 billion lire)
Agr.
Infrastructures 












33.2 20.4 175.4 211.7 286.4 62 1102.
<
% 28.6 0.6 23.2 52.5 8.4 2.6 3 1.8 15.9 19.2 26.0 5.6 100
Source: Cassa per il Mezzogiomo, Relazione alBilancio, years 1957 to 1965.
Keys:
a = financial subsidies extended by the Cassa in the areas and nuclei of industrialization. 
b= contribution on interest against loans extended under the terms of law 623/1957.
°= subsidised loans extended directly by the Cassa.
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As the table shows, during 1957-1965 the Cassa provision of financial subsidies for 
industry was still a very small part of its programme. Grants extended to firms 
amounted to 2.6% of total expenditure, and contributions on interest extended to the 
medium term credit institutions amounted to a further 3% of the total. Thus 
incentives to industry amounted to just 5.6% of the whole, and the entire Cassa 
incentives programme, including other sectors (such as fisheries and handicrafts) 
represented just 15.9% of its total budget. Despite the emphasis placed in the 
literature on the Cassa involvement with industry,144 during the early period this was 
relatively insignificant compared with the Cassa involvement with infrastructure 
projects, which absorbed 52.5% of its total expenditure. However, 1.2% of the sums 
allocated to infrastructure project (or 0.6% of the whole) was devoted to industry, 
particularly the building of infrastructures in the areas and nuclei.
The perceived role played by the IBRD in establishing the Cassa has already been 
noted. IBRD funds helped finance the Cassa* s direct credit activity aimed at 
supporting the establishment of large plants in the South, for which borrowing 
requirements exceeded the 300 million lire - lending limit of the three Southern 
Institutes. Recipient firms included a cement plant in the Naples area (the largest in 
Europe at the time), a car manufacturing plant in the same area with a productive 
capacity of 30.000 vehicles a day, and electric power stations. Direct credit 
amounted to 26% of the total budget of the Cassa. Of this sum 73.9% (or 19.2% of 
the Cassa activity as a whole) was provided by foreign capital, namely that of the 
IBRD. This supports the claims of the important role played by the IBRD in the 
establishment of the Cassa.145
The publicising of the system of incentives available to firms willing to expand or 
establish in the South was entrusted to IASM (Institute for the Promotion of the 
Development of the South) established in 1961 and financed by the Cassa in 
collaboration with the three special credit institutions. The IASM provided firms 
with information on the full range of available incentives and advice on eligibility for
144 See for instance O. Castellino (ed.), La politico economica italiana dal 1946 al 1970 (Turin, 
1973), p. 206.
145 Cassa per il Mezzogiomo, Relazione al Bilancio, 1956-57 (Rome, 1957), pp. 84-91.
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various schemes. Advice was given on technical aspects of location and expansion, 
and on taxation issues. Assistance was also provided to the bodies responsible for 
creating and equipping industrial nuclei and areas (Chambers of Commerce, local 
authorities, etc.) to deal with unprecedented judicial, administrative and fiscal issues. 
The IASM’s broad task was to arouse interest of foreign and Italian industry in 
locating to the South via advertising and personal contacts.146
II) 1965-1970
In 1952, the Cassa’s functions had been extended to 1965. Law 717/1965 further 
extended the Cassa until 1980 and allocated it 1,640 billion lire (7,130.4 bn at 1980 
prices) for the period 1965-69. In late 1968 the Cassa’s programme, as defined in 
1965, was extended to 1970 to match up with the National Programme which was 
due to end in that year. In 1968, the Cassa was also endowed with a further 560 
billion lire (2,240 bn 1980 lire), which was to cover the extra year but also to boost 
the Cassa’s resources.147 Thus the Cassa was endowed with 9,370.4 billion lire 
(1980 prices) to cover the 1965-70 period, which calculated on an annual basis 
amounted to 1,561.7 billion, a slight increase compared with the 1957-1965 period, 
when the corresponding figure was 1,333.3 billion lire.
The table below displays the Cassa’s expenditure by sectors:
146Allen and MacLennan, Regional Problems, pp. 60-62.
147Ibid., p. 75.
Table III.7 Annual average Cassa expenditure, 1966-70 ( 1980 billion lire).
Infr Incent
Agric. Industry Others Total Agric. Industry Others Total
a/na Grants c/inb
bill 191.1 23.6 332.5 547.3 56 208.2 193.6 41 498.7
% 13 1.6 22.5 37.1 3.8 14.1 13.1 2.8 33.8
Source: Cassa per il Mezzogiomo, Relazione al Bilancio, years 1966 to 1970. 
a= financial subsidies extended by the Cassa in the areas and nuclei of industrialization 
b= contribution on interest against loans extended under die terms of law 623/1957.
Credit Various Total
Abroad Total
188 291.3 138.3 1475.5
12.7 19.7 9.4 100
u>
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During 1966-70, incentives to industry represented 27.2% of the annual average 
Cassa expenditure. This was a significant increase on the corresponding figure for 
the previous period (5.6%). Furthermore, among the assisted sectors (agriculture, 
industry, tourism, fisheries and handicrafts) industry replaced agriculture as the 
principal recipient. The Cassa’s involvement with infrastructure lost significance 
during 1966-70, when dropping to 37.1% of total expenditure, (compared with 
52.5% in 1957-65). The direct credit activity of the Cassa, (directed towards large 
investment such as electric power stations) represented 19.7% of total expenditure. 
Of this, 64.5% (or 12.7% of its total budget) was funded through loans from abroad. 
The role of foreign capital had decreased from the previous period, when the 
corresponding figures were 73.9% and 19.2%.
The increased share of the industrial incentives highlighted above demonstrates the 
increased importance of the industrial policy in the ‘extraordinary intervention’ for 
the South. This industrial policy developed the growth centre policy further. Indeed, 
firms were provided with more generous grants and loans if locating or expanding in 
Areas and Nuclei. A further and equally important objective of the policy was to 
attract more dynamic and modem industries to the South. This aim was pursued by 
reiterating the obligation of state-owned enterprises to undertake 40% of their new 
investment (or investment in new plants) in the South so that investment in the South 
would amount to 60% of their total investment.148 This policy arose from the 
perception that industrialization processes can start only through the establishment of 
capital-intensive plants. This was the period of large chemical, steel and 
metallurgical plants, which accounted for 60% of the investment made in those years 
in the South, whereas the same industrial sectors accounted for 26% of industrial 
investment in the rest of the country.149
The system of Cassa incentives underwent some changes during 1965-70. For small 
and medium firms with fixed capital not exceeding 6 billion lire, grants were graded 
as follows: the maximum percentage of grant to be awarded over the admissible 
expenditure (building costs, sewers and water systems, roads) was reduced from 25%
148 Castellino, La politico economica, p. 210.
149 Ufficio Studi Banco di Napoli, ‘L’Intervento’, pp. 768-769.
135
to 20%. The criteria for grant size as established in 1965 were location, sector and 
firm size, and the total amount was the sum of the percentage points for each 
criterion, in contrast with the previous period, when the total amount was the average 
of the percentage points for each criterion. The criterion of the investment per 
employee, introduced in 1957, was abolished in 1965.
a) Location. A firm could obtain between 0.5% and 6.5% of its admissible 
expenditure, depending on its choice of location, as shown in table DI.8. The 1965 
criteria thus abolished distinctions between individual nuclei and areas, based on 
their degree of industrialization. As mentioned in the previous section firms locating 
in less industrialised areas or nuclei were granted a higher percentage of their costs. 
Thus though the growth pole policy was still applied, the effort to push firms into the 
less industrialized areas of the South lost momentum.
Table ID. 8 Location criterion: grants as a percentage of the investment. 
Location percentage
Industrial zone of area and nucleus 6.5
Outside industrial zone of area and nucleus 3.5
Outside area or nucleus 0.5
Source: Allen and MacLennan, Regional Problems, p. 89.
b) Industrial sector. Industry was divided into three groups. The maximum 
percentage (6.5) was obtainable by firms belonging to the first group, i.e. firms in the 
food, chemical and engineering industries, and capital goods, which made heavy use 
of local resources. The second group included industries partially complying with 
those criteria; industries producing goods and services necessary for southern 
development; firms contributing to the modernization of declining industries in the 
South or elsewhere. Firms in this group could receive a grant amounting to 3.5% of 
their admissible expenditures. Firms considered not to fulfil the above conditions 
could receive a grant covering 0.5% of their expenditure.150 Thus apart from the 
engineering, chemicals and food sectors no other sector was clearly specified, which 
left room for arbitrary decisions.
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c) Size of the investment. Industries were divided into twelve technologically 
homogenous categories. In each of these three groups of investments were 
identified. The highest percentage of expenditure that could be covered by the grant 
(7%, the others were 4% and 1%) was secured by the lowest level of investment. 
These levels of investments differed between groups of industries. Table DI.9 gives 
the levels for two example groups, H, which included agricultural machinery, paint 
and chemicals, and G, which included the weaving of artificial fibres.151 Thus, the 
size criterion as established in 1965 aimed at favouring the smallest enterprises in 
each group, in sharp contrast to the previous size/sector criterion of 1957, which 
favoured large investments in modem industry.
Table DI.9 Percentage of grants by size of investment
Groups 7% 4% 1%
G < 1 bn 1 -2.5 bn > 2.5 bn
H <1.2 bn 1.2-3 bn >3 bn
Source: Allen and MacLennan, Regional Problems, pp. 88-89.
Grants were also available for larger firms. These did not have to fulfil the complex 
criteria outlined above, but were relatively less generous in their coverage of the 
planned investment, as table DI.10 demonstrates.152
Table DI.10 Grants for larger firms under the 1965 scheme.
Investment size Maximum grant as % of investment
First 6 bn 20
Subsequent 6-12 bn 10
> 12 bn 50% of grant extended on first 12 bn (until 1968)
12 (from 1968)
Source: Allen and MacLennan, Regional Problems, p. 88.
An additional grant could be awarded to cover 50% of the expenditure on machinery 
produced in the South. A double purpose is implicit in this grant: to stimulate firms
150 Allen and MacLennan, Regional Problems, p. 87.
151 Ibid., p. 88.
152 Ibid., p. 88.
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to locate in the South, and to purchase their equipment from Southern firms, thus
153expanding the market for both existing and planned southern enterprises.
Law 717/1965 also created a new soft loan scheme, with varying terms for different 
levels of investment as shown in table m i l .  The law also established that the loan 
size should be graded according to the same criteria used for grants, with the 
exception that the size criterion used for grants was inverted. Thus firms eligible for 
maximum grants would qualify for minimum loans, and vice versa, the rationale 
being that grants are more suitable for small firms which cannot be burdened with 
debts. Loans could cover from a minimum 15% to a maximum 70% of the planned 
investment, calculated according to criteria displayed in table HI. 12.154
Table m. 11 Soft loans under scheme 717/65
Investment size Interest rate Maximum coverage (% of investment)
< 6 bn 4 70
> 6 bn 5-6 70
< 12 bn 5-6 70
>12 bn 5-6 50% of loan granted on first 12 bn (until 1968) 
50 (from 1968)
Source: Allen and MacLennan, Regional Problems, pp. 85-86.
Table EL 12 Gradation of soft loans
Location Sector Size
25% Industrial zone (IZ) Modem3 Firms eligible for 1% grant*
15% Outside IZ Declining Firms eligible for 4% grant
5% Outside area/nucleus Others Firms eligible for 7% grant
a: includes chemicals, food processing and capital goods industries.
* Such firms were eligible for loans covering 20% of investment.
Source: Allen and MacLennan, Regional Problems, pp. 86-88.
The 1968 modifications, offering more generous subsidies to large firms, were 
subject to a range of conditions. Thus to be eligible, investment had to be 
undertaken in sectors poorly represented in the South, had to make significant direct
153 Ibid., p. 89.
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or indirect contribution to employment; had to be located in an industrial zone, or 
had to induce new complementary investment in the South.155 Allen points out that 
these conditions were very vague and that companies investing more than 12 billion 
surely had such bargaining power that the maximums became norms.156 Some 
literature interprets the 1968 modifications as the result of pressure by large private 
groups, attempting to match their expansion plans with the aims of the regional 
policy, and to increase their profit through public subsidies. The main example is 
the location of the Alfa-Sud plant (planned in 1967, when the Alfa Romeo was 
owned by the IRI) in the South. Without the 1968 increase in subsidies, the 
incentives available for this plant would have been very small and well below those, 
for instance, obtained by the British car firms moving from England to Scotland.158 
However, this interpretation overlooks the fact that the economic policy of the Moro 
and other centre-left governments intended to attract more large investment in the 
South from private and state-owned enterprises (particularly in the car industry, 
which was considered relatively more labour intensive and able to generate other 
industrial activity). The aim was not only to increase the growth of the Southern 
economy but also to put a brake on Southern migration to the North-west and 
particularly to the Turin area, which was unprepared for such a rapid increase of the 
population and where social tensions were increasing.159
In 1967 medium-term credit conditions for industrial concerns located in the whole 
country were made more favourable. Firms employing less than 100 workers and 
willing to borrow up to 300 million would pay only 5% on the first 70 million 
(instead of the previous 50 million), and only 5.75% on amounts between 200 
million and 300 (down from the previous 5.85%). Medium-sized and small firms 
willing to borrow more than 300 million could obtain loans at 5.85% (down from the 
previous 6%).160 In 1967, the size criteria to access soft loans under the scheme 
passed with law no 623/59 were changed. The Interministerial Committee for
154 Ibid., pp. 88-89.
155 Ibid., pp. 85-86.
156 Ibid., p. 86.
157 Del Monte and Giannola, II Mezzogiomo, pp. 293-294.
158 Ibid., p. 86.
159 V. Castronovo, Fiat 1899-1999, un secolo di storia italiana (Milan, 1999), pp. 1032-1036 and 
1166-1170.
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Economic Planning (CIPE) established that soft loans could be extended to new 
plants to a maximum of 70% of the investment, with fixed capital not exceeding 50 
million. Expanding and modernizing plants could borrow up to 150 million, with no 
limits on fixed capital. These limits were to be applied to plants located in the most 
industrialised area of the North-west, the Industrial Triangle, the area between Turin, 
Milan and Genoa. Broader borrowing limits were applied to the ‘depressed areas of 
the North-west’. New plants could borrow up to 150 million lire and expanding 
plants could borrow up to 250 million. In the rest of Northern and Central Italy, the 
maximum borrowing amount was decreased by 35% compared with the limits 
established by law 623/59. The maximum loan amount was decreased to 375 from 
500 million lire, though in exceptional circumstances this could be increased up to 
750m. Limits remained unchanged for the area under Cassa’s competence and in the 
neighbouring regions.161
m) 1971-75.
In 1971, law 853 changed the institutional framework for the southern policy by 
abolishing the Interministerial Committee for Extraordinary Activities in the South 
(Comitato Interministeriale per gli Interventi Straordinari nel Mezzogiomo), and by 
transferring the planning and the coordinating functions to the CIPE, in order to 
integrate programmes for the South into the wider framework of national economic 
planning and industrial policy. The Cassa retained its functions of implementing 
southern policy and of financing and co-ordinating the activities of its associated 
organs. Its endowment in this period amounted to 7,125 bn lire162 or 25,446 bn 1980 
lire, an average 5,089.2 bn per year, a considerable increase from the 1,561.7 bn 
(1980 lire) annual average during 1965-70.
The 1971 law also increased the percentage of investment which state-controlled 
enterprises (and agencies) were obliged to undertake in the South, from the previous 
60% to 80%, and could not be less than 60% of each firm’s total investment. State-
160 Mediocredito Centrale, Relazione al Bilancio, 1967 (Rome, 1967), pp. 14-15.
161 Delibera CIPE, 24 May 1967. Pergolesi, II credito, p. 75.
162 Dunford, Capital, pp. 153-154.
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owned firms and agencies were also bound to submit annually a five-year investment 
plan, specifying the amount of the investment, foreseen employment level, regions 
where new investments were going to be located and also the programmes relating to 
the transfer to Southern Italy of the administrative and sales managements of the 
groups and firms operating in the South.163 In 1971, the financing and 
implementation of the so-called Special Projects was entrusted to the Cassa. The 
Special Projects were divided into five main groups, including the development and 
distribution of water resources; agricultural-development projects; specific 
infrastructure for industry, etc. The projects were to be put forward by the newly 
created Regions (administrative units created in 1970), and had to be approved by the 
CIPE in order to be implemented by the Cassa.
163 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Latest Results and New 
Features o f Official Action in the Mezzogiomo (Italy) (Paris, 1973), p. 50.
Table 111.13 Annual Average Cassa Expenditures, 1971-1975, (bn lire 1980)
Infrastructure Incentives
Agr Ind Oth Tot Agr Ind Oth Tot
a/n6 Gr5 C M
Bill 285.3 189.6 585.3 1060.2 93.3 418.5 346.3 36.4 894.4
%T 10.8 7.2 22.3 40.3 3.5 15.9 13.2 1.4 34
Source: Cassa per il Mezzogiomo, Relazione al Bilancio, years 1971-1975. 
a: SP= Special Projects
b= financial subsidies extended by the Cassa in the areas and nuclei of industrialization 
c: Gr= Grants
d: C/In= Contribution on interests, on loans extended by the credit institutions.
Credit S Pa Var Total
Abr Tot
122.2 259.2 93 323.3 2630.2
4.6 9.9 3.5 12.3 100
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During 1971-1975, incentives to industry amounted to 29.1% of the Cassa’s 
expenditure, up from 27.2% in 1966-70. In real terms, the increase was much more 
significant, up to 764.8 billion from 401.8 billion in the previous period. The 
Cassa’s expenditure on incentives in 1971-1975 amounted to 34%, as in the 1966-70, 
which meant an increase in absolute terms, for in the latter period expenditure in 
incentives increased to 894.4 billion against 498.7 billion in the previous one. Cassa 
expenditure on infrastructure increased from 547.3 to 1060.2 billion in 1971-1975, 
and infrastructure for the industrial sector, since 1966 confined into areas and 
nucleus of industrialization, jumped from 23.6 billion in 1966-70 to 189.6 in 1971- 
1975. In contrast, the Cassa’s direct credit activity considerably decreased in 
percentage terms, from 19.7% to 9.9%, and slightly decreased in absolute terms, 
from 291.3 billion in 1966-1970 to 259.2 in 1971-1975. Loans from abroad lost 
significance, decreasing from 12.7% to 4.6% of expenditure, and in real terms from 
188 billion, in 1966-70, to 122.2 billion, in 1971-75. Expenditure on the Special 
Projects amounted to just 180 million per year in the first five years of their 
implementation.
During 1971-75 official priorities changed, with encouragement for investment in 
areas experiencing depopulation rather than in nuclei and areas of industrial growth. 
In the 1960s large inner areas within the ‘Mezzogiomo’ experienced international 
migration and two kinds of internal migration: from the South to the North, and from 
the rural hinterland to industrial agglomerations within the South.164 On the one 
hand the movement of population satisfied the demand for manpower of the large 
modem industrial complexes created in the South,165 on the other hand it was seen as 
creating economic and social costs of congestion in immigration areas and the further 
impoverishment of areas experiencing emigration.166
164 Ronzani, ‘Regional Incentives’, p. 139.
165 OECD, Latest Results, p. 9.
166 U. La Malfa, ‘Problemi e prospettive dello sviluppo economico italiano’, (also known as ‘Nota 
aggiuntiva’ alia ‘Relazione generale sulla situazione economica del Paese per il 1961’), in: Ministero 
del Bilancio, La programmazione economica in Italia, vol. 2 (Rome, 1967), p. 127. The so-called 
‘Nota aggiuntiva’ is considered the economic policy statement o f the centre-left government. G.M. 
Rey, ‘L’economia Italiana negli anni di Menichella’, in: F. Cotula (ed.), Stabilita e sviluppo negli anni 
Cinquanta, vol.2: Problemi strutturali e politiche economiche (Rome-Bari, 1998) p. 47.
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The objectives of the Cassa’s intervention for the years 1971-75 were expressed by 
the CIPE through deliberations in 1972. Priority was to be given to: (1) small and 
medium-sized firms; (2) firms linked with the production of large plants; (3) 
restructuring programmes in declining sectors so that employment levels could be 
maintained (these included food processing, shoes, paper, tobacco processing and 
domestic electric equipment); (4) investment in research centres in the South, and (5) 
high technology industries.167 The CIPE also redefined the system of incentives.
The new system divided firms into three large groups, as shown in table IE. 14. 
Additional inducement was made available for firms locating in areas experiencing 
depopulation, where the grant covered 45% of fixed investment, and the Cassa was 
able to award further grants to undertake small works connected with specific 
infrastructures, as well as for the training of manpower, up to a ceiling of 5 % of the 
fixed investments.168 The law itself did not specify the interest rate of the soft loan, 
but entrusted the task to the Treasury, under the advice of the friterministerial 
Committee for the Credit and Savings. However, the law established that interest 
rates for small industrial concerns had to be a third lower than those for large 
industrial concerns.
Table 111.14 Industrial incentives by firm/investment size, 1971-75.
Firm size Fixed Capital (£ bn) Grants3 Soft Loans3
Small 0.1-1.5 35% 35%
Medium 1.5-5 15-20% 35-50%
Large >5 7 -12% 30-50%
Source: OECD, Latest Results, p. 51.
Key=a as % of investment
Financial incentives available to medium sized firms were more complex, and 
included a range of possible grants and loans. Industry was divided into four groups. 
Group A, being the priority sector, had access to the highest grants and contributions. 
It included extractive and manufacturing firms connected with large plants located in 
the South, i.e. firms in the machine tool industry, the products of which were used as
167 M. Annesi, Nuove Tendenze dell 'Intervento Pubblico nel Mezzogiomo (Milan, 1973), pp. 66-68.
168 OECD, Latest Results, p. 51.
144
equipment in the Southern large plants; firms producing components and accessories 
for the products of large firms; and firms involved in the further processing of the 
products of large plants. Group A also included high technology firms involved in 
products of social utility (telephones etc.), firms involved in products useful to 
technological modernization and improvement of sectors in group D, etc. Group B 
included all industries not included in the other groups. Group C included capital 
intensive extractive and manufacturing firms, while group D included manufacturing 
and extractive sectors needing restructuring, including the manufacture of shoes and 
textiles. The gradation of the financial incentives was as follows:
Table EL 15 Incentives for medium sized firms, 1971-75
Groups New Plants Enlargement
Depopulated Areas Other Areas
loan" grant3 loan3 grant3 loan3 grant3
A 50% 20% 45% 20% 50% 20%
B 45% 20% 40% 20% 45% 20%
C 35% 15% 35% 15% 45% 15%
D 35% 15% 35% 15% 35% 15%
Key=a as a percentage of investment.









As demonstrated in table EL 15, incentives for medium-sized firms were tailored to 
three different circumstances: the opening of new plants, enlargement of existing 
ones and reopening & conversion, with different sizes of loan and grant available for 
each. The location of the plant was important only in the case of the opening of new 
plants, for firms included in groups A and B, and affected soft loans only. New firms 
in group C and D were not encouraged to establish in depopulated areas, as the 
percentage of subsidies did not increase in such circumstances. Generally speaking, 
groups benefiting from the highest percentage of contribution were groups A and B. 
It seems clear that grants were aimed at encouraging smaller firms, as medium-sized 
firms were supposed to be more able to bear debts, and were assisted primarily 
through loans.169 The gradation of the incentives shows the willingness to encourage 
industries in areas experiencing depopulation and to favour those firms connected 
with large plants, which meant hying to develop a virtuous circle around large plants. 
However, some inconsistencies are apparent. Until 1971 small and large firms had 
been encouraged to concentrate in the areas and nuclei, which given the 
concentration of industries had experienced population growth. Thus, firms 
producing services and semi-raw materials, or processing the output of large plants 
were encouraged to place themselves away from the large plants with which they 
were linked.
The system of financial incentives available to firms investing or reaching fixed 
capital above 5 billion lire was completely different. The CPE - on the basis of the 
sectoral promotional plans and in the framework of planned bargaining procedures 
(the so-called contrattazione programmata) -  could approve grants amounting to 
between 7% and 12%, and loans from 30% to 50% of the planned investment.170 
The bargaining procedures ensured that consultations between firms planning 
investment, particularly in the South, and a restricted group of Ministries (Budget 
and Economic Planning, Treasury, Labour and Industry) had to take place. The 
purpose of these consultations was to make firms aware of the public investment 
made and about to be made so that they could exploit it to the fullest, as well as to 
adjust future public investment to large companies’ needs. In addition, the Italian
169 Allen and MacLennan, Regional Problems, p. 89.
170 OECD, Latest Results, p. 51.
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government tried with the new law to gain more control over the investment made by 
large companies, in order to ensure that these investment projects were compatible 
with the directives of the national economic planning to limit new investment in 
areas suffering from congestion and labour shortages. However, as the Committee of 
the Ministries had no directional power over companies, the latter had a far stronger 
bargaining position.171 The attempt to gain more control over large private 
investment was pursued by establishing that any investment costing more than 7 
billion lire, as well as any investment made by a company with a share capital of not 
less than 5 billion, had to submit its investment plans to the CIPE for approval. It 
was intended that firms ignoring rules were to be penalised with a fine totalling 25% 
of the investment. However, as sanctions were not enforced, the attempt of the State 
to control large private capital proved to be ineffective.172
The Ministerial Decree of May 1972 fixed interest rates of 4% for small and 
medium-sized industrial projects (up to 5bn lire fixed investment) and 6% for 
investment above this figure. In addition, the Southern commercial sector could 
benefit from loans at the 3% interest rate. This measure aimed at helping the 
marketing structure for industrial, agricultural and local craft products.173
Two more bills were passed in 1971. Law 184/1971 established a fund at IMI to 
favour the restructuring and reconversion of firms, through soft loans or the 
acquisition of shares. No size limit was specified for recipient firms. The same law 
increased (by ten billion lire) the IMI fund established by law 1470/1961, which was 
aimed at assisting the restructuring of small firms. The fund thus reached 73 billion 
in 1971.174 In December of the same year, law 1101 authorized medium term credit 
institutions to extend soft loans at 4% to textile firms in order to undertake 
restructuring. Such loans could cover up to 70% of the first 500 million, 60% of the 
following 2.5 billions and 50% on the further 3 billion lire.175 In 1972, the subsidy 
was extended to firms with no more than 500 employees, regardless of sector. Based
171 Annesi, Nuove Tendenze, pp. 33-35.
172 Dunford, Capital, p .155.
173 OECD, Latest Results, p. 55.
174 Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1970, p. 170.
175 Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1971, pp. 169-170.
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on a restructuring/reconversion plan, firms could receive soft loans covering 70% of 
the first 500 million, 60% to cover the following 3 billion and 50% on the investment 
exceeding 3.5 billion lire.176 In 1973, the borrowing limits and the size of firms 
applying for loans under the Ministry of Industry scheme were partially modified. 
Borrowing limits applicable to firms located in the depressed areas of the Centre and 
North Italy were increased. The same firm size and borrowing limits were applicable 
to firms in all other areas of the country.177
IV) 1976-1980 and 1981-1986.
The main concern of the economic policy in the middle of the 1970s was to increase 
the productivity of Italian industry in order to make the Italian economy 
internationally competitive. The objective was to increase businesses’ profit margins 
without damaging their international competitiveness, which meant without incurring 
inflation. To this end, two paths were envisaged: increased availability of subsidised 
medium-long term credit to industry, reducing labour cost and consequently 
household purchasing power. However, the only viable strategy to reduce labour 
costs was to make public finances pay for the social costs of labour, and demand was 
restrained by increasing indirect taxation. As far as subsidised credit to industry was 
concerned, its relevance as tool of industrial policy was increased by the restrictive 
monetary policy, characterized by Central Bank’s high discount rate, high returns on 
Government bonds in order to finance the public debt and the subsequent high cost 
of credit. It was felt that in such a situation, credit to industry had to work as a 
balancing and corrective mechanism able to facilitate firms’ access to credit.178 
Furthermore, the rigidity of the labour market together with the increase in the oil 
price had produced a severe recession, which hit the North more dramatically in the
17 0short run and the South more dramatically in the longer run. Indeed m 1975, in 
the North-West investment in industry fell by 24.5% and by 22.2% in the South. In 
the North-West, investment increased again the following year, whereas the negative
176 Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1972, p. 168.
177 Comitato Interministeriale gestione 623/1959, seduta 22 Febbraio; Pergolesi, II credito, pp. 75-76.
178 F. Vassalli and G.Visentini (eds.), Legislazione Economica, Settembre 1976- Agosto 1977 (Milan, 
1978), pp. 27-30.
179 Faini and Schiantarelli, ‘Regional Implications’, p. 104.
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trend in the South lasted until 1978. However, the increase in investment was very 
small in the North-West until 1978 and the value stayed negative for the country as a 
whole.180 A further reason lying behind the systematic reorganization of financial 
incentives in the country was the awareness of the need to simplify what was called 
the ‘jungle’ of incentives created since the 1950s.181 Thus 1976-77 witnessed the 
usual five-year reorganization of the ‘extraordinary intervention in the South’, 
together with a reorganization of the subsidised credit to industry in the country as a 
whole and of the incentives to the industrial restructuring and reorientating 
production.
The reorganization of the Cassa activity and policy up to 1980, as well as of the 
incentives to Southern firms was provided by law 183, passed in 1976. This endowed 
the Cassa with 16,000 billion current lire of which 1,000 were to cover commitments 
taken before 1976. The endowment was increased with 2,080 billion current lire 
from the National Fund for subsidised credit to industry (Fondo Nazionale per il 
credito agevolato all’industria) established in 1976. The Fund amounted to 3,200bn 
lire (6,037.7 bn 1980 lire) of which 65% was passed on to the Cassa. Thus the 
Cassa’s endowment for the 1976-1980 years amounted to 18,080 bn current lire or 
34,113.2bn 1980 lire. Law 183 designated sectors and aims on which 8,843 billion 
current lire had to be spent, while the CIPE designated sectors and aims on which the 
remaining 9,237 billion lire had to be spent.182
Law 183/1976 introduced few changes in the organization of the extraordinary 
intervention in the South, in future Cassa involvement with infrastructure projects 
would be managed by regional local authorities and would be financed by central 
government.183 The Cassa retained responsibility only for infrastructure in the 
industrial sector, to be implemented exclusively in the areas and nuclei, and only 
general infrastructural plans approved before 1976. Law 183 reorganized the policy 
for the South for five years, up until 1980, when it was envisaged that the Cassa
180 Data from Pergolesi, 77 credito, p. 134, sources: Istat, Annuario di contabilita nazionale, Tomo III, 
1983; Istat, Notiziario di statistiche regionali, 1986.
181 Ronzani, ‘Regional incentives’, p. 140.
182 Ufficio Studi del Banco di Napoli, ‘L’Intervento, pp. 779-780.
183 Ibid., p. 776.
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would be disbanded. The Cassa had been established as a temporary institution 
supposed to last until 1980, but between 1980 and 1986,11 ministerial decrees were 
passed to prolong its activities. All political parties agreed to keep an additional flow 
of resources going to the South but there was disagreement concerning the 
institutional framework for the management of these funds. The 11 decrees left the 
institution in a state of uncertainty and precariousness, for each decree prolonged the 
Cassa’s life for a brief period only, sometimes as short as a year or even 6 or 3 
months.184 After 1976, the direct credit activity of the Cassa and credit from abroad 
disappear from the balance sheets.
184 Cafiero and Marciani, ‘ Quarant’ anni’, pp. 267-268.
Table IH.16 Annual Average Cassa expenditures 1976-80 (1980 bn lire)
SPa Industry Area Regional Competence Total
Total a/nb grants con/intc other Total Cap Formd Credit6 Others Total _______
Bill 1980 681.2 274.8 417 329.7 37.3 1058. 1250.3 75.4 7.1 1332. 3072.8
9 7
% Total 22.2 8.9 13.6 10.7 1.2 34.5_________40/7_______ 2.5 0.2 43.4______ 100
Sources: Cassa per il Mezzogiomo, Relazione al Bilancio, 1976-1980.
Keys:
a=Special Projects
b= expenditure in infrastructure in areas and nuclei of industrialization.
c= contribution on interest paid to Southern medium-term credit institutions: Isveimer, Irfis and Cis. 
d= capital formation in various sectors, among which more relevant were agriculture, water and road systems. 
e= credit to agriculture and tourism.
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A comparison of the average annual expenditure of the Cassa in the years 1971-75 
(table HI. 13) and 1976-80 (table IE. 16) shows that the expenditure increased in the 
later period. However, the analysis of the annual expenditure (see graph IV.2) shows 
that a decreasing trend started from 1976, coinciding with the reorganization of 
subsidised loans and grants, mentioned above.
Similar findings are presented by Cafiero and Marciani,185 who have analysed the 
Cassa expenditure from 1951 to 1989. This study shows that the trend of Cassa 
expenditure reached a peak of 9,400 bn (1989 lire) in 1975, and started decreasing 
afterwards, but the average annual expenditure remains lower in the 1971-75 period 
(6,700 bn 1989 lire) than in the 1976-80 period (7,900 bn 1989 lire). No further 
comparison can be made with this study as the Cafiero and Marciani analysis is 
much more aggregated than the one performed in this chapter, as they divide the 
Cassa expenditure into: a) direct investment (including investment in infrastructure 
in all sectors of Cassa intervention, from agriculture to railways); b) subsidies to 
private investment (including grants and contributions on soft loans in all sectors, 
from industry to tourism); c) others (including the direct credit activity of the Cassa 
and its working expenditure).186
As the table above shows, the traditional sectors the Cassa activity (social overhead 
capital, credit to agriculture, etc.) represented the largest share of the Cassa’s 
expenditure, i.e. 43.4%. In 1976, responsibility for these passed to the regional 
authorities. However, plans approved before 1976 were to be completed by the 
Cassa. Special projects absorbed 22.2% per cent of the Cassa’s annual average 
expenditure over the period 1976-80. Special projects had been introduced in 1971 
and consisted of inter-regional and inter-sectoral projects concerning civil 
infrastructure or infrastructure in agriculture, or in industry etc. The Cassa’s 
expenditure in industry (including financial incentives as well as infrastructure to be 
implemented in areas and nuclei of industrialization) represented 34.5% of its
185 Ibid.
186 Ibid,, pp. 272-273, sources: data provided by the Cassa per il Mezzogiomo from 1951 to 1980; 
Cassa per il Mezzogiomo, Relazione alBilancio, 1981 to 1986; Agenzia per il Mezzogiomo, 
Relazione al Bilancio, 1987-1989.
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expenditure over the years 1976-80, slightly less than the 36.3% of the previous 
period.
Since 1976, the Cassa’s direct credit activity implemented through credit from 
abroad is no longer recorded in the balance sheets or mentioned in the report. It 
seems plausible that it ceased. The Annual Report of 1976 still mentioned that the 
Cassa received loans from the IBRD as well as Morgan and Warburg, but unlike as 
in previous reports, it was specified that these loans were to be managed by the 
Southern Medium-Term Institutions to finance loan schemes to small and medium­
sized firms and industrial plans. In 1976, 13 industrial plans were financed for a 
total amount of 299.4 billion in 1980 lire.187 Thus from 1976 large industrial plans 
are financed from the MTCIs and no longer directly from the Cassa. Among foreign 
sources in 1976 is mentioned the European Regional Fund for Development. The 
Fund was established in 1975 and in 1976 approved 374 plans against which its 
contribution was going to be 127.6 billion lire (240.7 billions 1980 lire). To have an 
idea of the timing and procedure through which these funds were actually made 
available, it should be mentioned that, by the middle of 1977, 98.3 billion current lire 
had been accredited from the European Fund to the Treasury, and in turn the
1 SSTreasury had passed on to the Cassa just 43.3 billion lire.
187 Cassa per il Mezzogiomo, Relazione alBilancio 1976, p. 43.
188 Cassa per il Mezzogiomo, Relazione al Bilancio 1976, p. 57.
Table El. 17 Annual Cassa expenditures, 1981-1986 (1980 bn lire)
Special Industry Areas Regional Competence Total
Projects
total a/na grants cont/intb other total Capitformc Creditd Others total
Bill 1980 1344.9 164.7 337.1 146.9 54.6 703.3 485.2 6.4 17.7 509.3 2557.5
%tot 52.6 6.4 13.2 5.7 2.1 27.5 19 0.3 0.7 19.9 100
Sources: Cassa per il Mezzogiomo, Relazione alBilancio, 1981-1986.
Keys:
a= expenditure in infrastructure in areas and nuclei of industrialization. 
b= contribution on interest paid to Southern MTCIs: Isveimer, Irfis and Cis.
c= capital formation in various sectors among which more relevant were agriculture, water and road systems. 
d= credit to agriculture and tourism.
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The precariousness of the years 1981-1986 reflected itself in the concrete activity of 
the Cassa. From this period, the decline in Cassa expenditure is apparent also from 
the annual expenditure, which decreased by 16.8% compared to the previous period. 
It can be observed that special projects considerably increased their relevance in the 
uncertain period. They amounted to 52.6% of the total Cassa expenditure as 
compared to the 22.2% in 1976-1980 period, which meant that expenditure to 
finance special projects, in absolute terms, almost doubled in the last period. On the 
other hand expenditure in the industrial sector (infrastructures in nuclei and areas, 
grants and contribution on interest paid to the Southern medium term credit 
institution) decreased in absolute and relative terms. Particularly, subsidies on 
interest in the uncertain period amounted just to 146.9 billion, less than half than in 
the previous period. The 55.4% decrease meant a decreased availability of credit to 
Southern firms. Grants extended to industrial concerns decreased by 19.2%, whereas 
expenditure in infrastructure in areas and nuclei decreased by 40.1%. It can be 
observed that those sectors of the Cassa intervention which were transferred to the 
regional authorities decreased their relevance of 61.8% in 1981-1986 as compared to 
the previous period, and amounted just to 19.9% of the Cassa’s expenditure.
The new system of incentives managed by the Cassa and available to firms in the 
South was as described in table 111.18. Grants could be increased up to 1/5 for 
investment in depressed areas and up to a further 1/5 if in priority sectors as defined 
by the CIPE. However, these priority sectors were so numerous that almost all 
industry was included, and a large part of the area of Cassa’s competence was 
defined as depressed.189 The system of gradation of grants as defined by in 1976 
appears favourable to small firms. However, in 1979, it was redefined to be more 
favourable towards larger enterprises: the limit of 15 billion was eliminated and 
investment plans of more that 7 billion were entitled to receive grants covering 20% 
of the quota exceeding 7 billion.190
189 Pegolesi, U Credito, p. 61.
190 Ibid., p. 84.
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Table HI. 18 Grants by size of investment, 1976-86










a: until 1978 
b: from 1979
Source: S. Pergolesi, II Credito, p. 61.
Law 183/1976 entrusted the Government with the task of setting the terms of the soft 
loan scheme for Southern firms so that it could be coordinated with the national 
scheme. A few months later, Presidential Decree 902 reorganized subsidised credit 
for manufacturing and extractive industries in the country as well as in the South. 
This law represented the main tool of coordinating and simplifying the various soft 
loan schemes in the South and elsewhere in Italy as it replaced all previous soft loan 
schemes. More precisely, it abolished the soft loan schemes set up by laws 
623/1959, 614/1966, and 1427/1961. Law 949/1952, which authorized MTCIs to 
refinance themselves at the MCC, was not abolished, and applications for soft loans 
approved under the abolished schemes had to be honoured. Applications under the 
old schemes that had not yet been processed were to be examined under the new soft 
loan scheme term. Law 902/1976 established a national fund of 3,200 billion lire 
(6,037.7 billion 1980 lire), 65% of which was handed down as a contribution on 
interest against loans extended to Southern firms and 35% to firms in the rest of the 
country. As it will be shown below in more detail, this scheme linked subsidised 
interest rates to the reference rate, the government-determined base rate mentioned 
previously. This system introduced a more direct connection between the subsidised 
interest rate and the market and enabled the system of subsidised credit to work more 
smoothly.191 Italy was subdivided into four areas: 1) the South; 2) less developed 
areas in the Centre; 3) less developed areas in the North; 4) the Centre and North.192 
The details for each region are given in table EL 19. Grants and loans for Southern
191 Pontolillo, II sistema, p. 103.
192 Pergolesi, U credito, p. 63.
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firms could account for 70% of the total investment. In 1979, the size limit of the 
firm or of the investment was eliminated and the subsidisable quota limited to the 
first 30 billions of the investment.193 At the same time medium-term credit from 
MTCIs was available nationally, with maximum loans of 1.25 billion in the South, 1 
billion in the Centre and 0.75 billion in the North.194
Table 113.19 Soft loan scheme 902/76
Area Firm sizea Max. invest.. Coverage6 Period Interest (%
South 15 bn* 40% 15 30
Centre (underd) <5 bn 7 bn 60% 10 40
North (underd) <4 bn 3 bn 60% 10 40
Elsewhere <2 bn 4 bn 50% 10 60
Keys:
* abolished in 1977.
a: firm size expressed in fixed assets
b: coverage as percentage of investment.
c: Interest rate as percentage of the reference rate.
Sources: Pergolesi, U Credito, p. 63 (columns 1 to 4).
Ronzani, ‘Regional Incentives in Italy’, Yuill et al., Regional Policy, pp. 142-144 (columns 5 and 6).
Law 675/77 dealt specifically with the reorganization of loan schemes for firms 
undertaking restructuring or reorientating production. It established a fund of 2,630 
billion available nationwide either directly from the Fund or through institutions 
authorised to extend credit to industry.195 The terms of this scheme are shown in 
table 111.20. Restructuring was defined as the rationalization of production as well as 
the introduction of new technology, if it was achieved without decreasing the number 
of employees. Reorientation was defined as either shifting production to a different 
product, modifying the production line or replacing a plant in the country with one in 
the South of the same size.196
193 Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1978, p. 161.
194 Ronzani ‘Regional Incentives', p. 145.
195 Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1978, p. 163.
196 Pergolesi, II credito, pp. 81-82.
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Table 111.20 Scheme 657/77
Size invest Coverage (% inv) Period Interest*
South 70 15 15-30
Elsewhere:
Restructuring <2bn 60 10 30-60
>2bn 50
Reorientation 40
♦Interest rate as a percentage of the Reference Rate. The lower interest rate applied if borrowing from 
the Fund, the higher rate if borrowing from an intermediary.
Sources: Pergolesi, U Credito, p. 65 (columns 1 to 3). Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1978, p. 
163 (columns 4 and 5).
Scheme 675/77 is considered particularly important in economic and institutional 
terms. In economic terms, it placed emphasis on the restructuring of existing plants, 
rather than on the establishment of new ones. On the institutional side, its
• • 10 7  •importance lies in the fact that it replaced previous schemes and established the 
Interministerial Committee for Industrial Policy (CIPI). The CIPI was charged with 
drawing up specific sectoral plans to bring about a more selective industrial policy. 
However, by 1982 it had drawn up plans for as many as 15 sectors, spanning from 
fashion to chemicals and from food processing to car industry. The large number of 
sectoral plans designed by the CIPI is perceived as a failure to formulate a more
1 Qfiselective industrial policy.
Yet another scheme became operational in 1984. This was the Fund for 
Technological Innovation managed by the MI, set up by law 46 in 1982. It aimed to 
provide soft loans to firms of any size planning to undertake investment to introduce 
technologically more advanced production processes, either to improve the quality of 
the products or to reorientate production. Loans could cover up to 35% of the 
planned investment, or to 55% of ‘highly innovative programmes’ and up to 70% of 
programmes held relevant to the national economy.199 This scheme is considered 
today the pillar of the policy for technological innovation in the country. Its origin
197 It abolished previous laws: nos 1470/61,1101/71, 184/71 and 464/72. Pergolesi, II Credito, p. 79.
198 G. Pent Fomengo, ‘Le politiche di ristrutturazione e salvataggio’, in: F. Momigliano (ed.), Le leggi 
della politico industriale in Italia (Bologna, 1986), pp. 33-49.
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dates back to 1980, when an attempt had been made to make available 2,895.7 bn for 
firms in sectors relevant to the national economy and experiencing sectoral problems. 
In 1980, this clearly meant the car industry, which was undertaking massive 
restructuring of its production lines. The 1980 proposal was rejected by Parliament, 
but an ad hoc commission reformulated it under the guise of law 64/82, which was 
then accepted.200
The early 1980s also witnessed the introduction of grants for the purchase and 
leasing of high-tech equipment, for small and medium-sized firms located 
throughout the country (scheme 696/1983). Firms located in the South were entitled 
to grants covering up to 32% of the cost of the equipment and firms located 
elsewhere in the country up to 25%.201
Law 675/1977 also introduced a particular type of fiscal concession. Manufacturing 
and extractive firms of any size throughout the country were exempted from the 
payment of VAT, up to 4%, on the purchase of newly produced equipment. Law 
696/1983 increased the percentage of VAT exemption to 6% and restricted access to 
small firms only, consistently with the criterion that subsidies in order to be effective 
should be of such an amount as to affect firms’ investment decisions. This in turn 
required a stricter selection of beneficiaries on grounds of costs and careful 
screening, for such subsidies were not automatic, a feature considered partly 
responsible of their limited use, as is explained in more depth in chapter VI.202 
Although this thesis focuses on financial incentives, this specific type of fiscal 
subsidy has been included, as it is clearly an incentive to invest.
V) 1987-1991
The uncertainty of the 1980-1986 period was ended by law 64/1986, which 
reorganized the extraordinary intervention for the South. The CIPI (Comitato
199 M. Campus, Un ’ analisi del profilo delle imprese agevolate nel triennio1989-1991 (Rome, 1995), 
p. 36; Mediocredito Centrale, Osservatorio sulle piccole e medie imprese, Quademi di Politico 
Industriale.
200 Momigliano, Le Leggi, p. 104.
201 This provision was introduced on a temporary basis and renewed by a later scheme (399/87); see 
Campus, Un' analisi, pp. 40-41; Scanagatta, ‘Le leggi’, pp. 71-75.
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Interministeriale per la Politica Industriale) was given the task of programming and 
coordinating the policy. The Minister for the Extraordinary Intervention in the South 
together with the MI proposed the objectives to be reached in the South. The CIPI 
was to take into account the proposal of the two Ministers and include the targets to 
be reached in the South in the National Industrial Plan. These targets were to 
constitute the Triennial Plan. The CIPI had to coordinate the incentive policy for the 
South into the National Industrial Plan. The CIPI was also in charge of coordinating 
the incentives created in law 64 with those offered by other bodies such as the 
European Community, the Regions and the State.
The Triennial Plan was split up into annual implementation plans (the so-called 
piano annuale di attuazione), which defined the criteria and procedures for industrial 
incentives. These were: a) sectors to be subsidised; b) real services; c) gradation of 
subsidies; d) list of areas characterised by high unemployment; e) updating of groups 
of investment.203 The actual implementation of the CIPI plan was entrusted to the 
Agency for the Promotion of the Development in the South (Agenzia per la 
promozione dello sviluppo del Mezzogiomo, hereafter the Agency) which replaced 
the Cassa. Its task was the financial support and incentives to firms. The Agency 
had thus been stripped of its predecessor’s planning role. The 1986 law financed the 
Agency’s activity up until 1993.204
Law 64/1986 states the objectives of the Agency’s activity. Its responsibilities were 
defined in vague general language, but included the promotion of ‘new economic 
activities’, and the ‘strengthening of entrepreneurial structures’.205
The system of loans and grants created by law 64 is given in table DI.21. The 
gradation of grants took into account the amount of the investment, the development 
of the area and the industrial sector. Each Southern province was studied according 
to four criteria: industrial development, unemployment, emigration, and per-capita
202 M. Leccisotti, E. Pace and M. Sica, ‘Incentives in Favour of the South of Italy: a Quantitative 
Evaluation’, Journal o f Regional Policy, 5/4 (1985), p. 613; CER-IRS, Quale strategia, pp. 111-113.
203 Borrello, ‘Gli Incentivi', p. 1023.
204 Vaccaro, Unita, pp. 264-265.
205 Law no 84, 1 March 1986, article. 6.
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income. Thus, Southern Italy was subdivided into three groups of various stages of 
development. The most developed area (C) included the Southern provinces of 
Latium, Abruzzi and Taranto province in Puglia, and qualified for the lowest 
financial contributions. Area B, which included Barletta, contained areas defined as 
being of average development, and received identical subsidies as Area C until the 
end of 1987. Area A contained the least developed Southern areas including the 
inland provinces of Campania and Basilicata, the Calabria region, most of Sicily and 
few Sardinian provinces. This area received the highest incentives.
For the purpose of this law, priority sectors embraced selected categories from a wide 
range of industries, including chemicals, pharmaceuticals and toiletries; engineering, 
electronics industry; food processing, textiles, silk and synthetic fibre weaving, 
computer software, as well as toy production and fibre optics.207





(max.coverage as % of 
investment)
Soft Loans 
(as % of investment)
Area Aa Areas B and Ca Max coverage Int.
First 7bn 48*/56 40/48 40 36
7bn-30bn 36*/42 30/36 30 36
Above 30bn 18*/21 15/18 15 60
* (until 31.12.87)
Keys: a= the higher number refers to the grant available for investment in ‘priority’ sector; b= Interest 
rate as percentage of the Reference Rate.
Sources: Law 84,1 March 1986, art.7; Yuill et al., European Regional Incentives, p. 295 (column 5).
The following table displays the expenditure by sectors made by the Agency for the 
South in the years 1986-91:
206 CIPE, Deliberazione 29.12.1986, pp. 68-69.
207 D. Yuill, K. Allen, J. Bachtler and F.Wishlade (eds.), European Regional Incentives (1989), p. 
303.
Table 111.22 Annual Average Agency Expenditures, 1987-1991 (1980 bn lire)
Annual Plans of Implementation Areas of Regional Compet Various Total
Spec Proj a
Inf&Managb Incentives0 Research3 Various Total Total Total
bill 80 387.5 615.3 98.2 220.6 1321.6 668.1 942 93.3 2,356.9
% total 16.4 26.1 4.2 9.4 56.1 28.3 40 4 100
Keys:
a: Special Projects
b: Infrastructure and Management of Infrastructure
c: Incentives to Industry, including grants and contribution on interest.
d: Scientific Research
Source: Agenzia per la Promozione dello Sviluppo nel Mezzogiomo, Relazione al Bilancio, 1987-1991.
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The Agency’s average annual expenditure decreased in this period, as the Cassa’s 
had declined during the previous period. Thus, the extraordinary intervention in the 
South had undergone a steady decline since 1976 and in terms of average annual 
expenditure since 1981.
The bulk of the Agency’s expenditure was taken up by the annual plan of 
implementation, which absorbed up to 56.1% of the total. Incentives to industry, 
which were part of the annual plan, increased both in absolute and percentage terms 
as compared to the previous period. The second core activity of the Agency, 
designated the sphere of “regional competence’, included expenditure on investment 
projects soon to be handed over to local authorities. Such expenditure increased 
considerably compared with the corresponding sums allocated by the Cassa during 
the previous period, as in 1987 a further CIPE decision compelled the Agency to 
complete all projects where 80% of the investment had already been undertaken, and 
to transfer to regional authorities the remaining projects, which were to be completed 
with Agency funds.208 The so-called special projects, also to be transferred to the 
regions, were calculated separately. The Agency expenditure on such projects during 
1987-91 was just over half of the corresponding Cassa total during 1981-86, in both 
real and percentage terms.
Law 64/1986 refinanced the extraordinary intervention in the South until 1993. As 
that date approached, attempts to prolong funding failed because of domestic and 
external pressure. The Parliamentary debate coincided with growing resentment in 
the North about the levels of public expenditure in the South, and its harmful effects 
on Northern employment. Furthermore, critics pointed out that few tangible results 
had been achieved in 40 years of the Southern policies, which had been a drain on 
the economy of the North. In addition, there was growing antipathy towards the role 
of the public administration in the Italian economy and to the institutional structure 
operating the Mezzogiomo policy. These tensions were reflected in calls for a 
referendum on the Southern policy and in the considerable success of the Northern 
separatists. Apart from domestic pressures, the European Commission also
208 F. Moro ‘Le spese dell’Agenzia per il Mezzogiomo per categorie economiche e per regioni’, 
Rivista Economica del Mezzogiomo, 7/3 (1993), p. 707.
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influenced the course of events, by refusing to approve the 1992 bill to refinance the 
Agency. Taking into account the Commission’s opposition, in December 1992 the 
Italian Parliament decided to abolish the ‘Extraordinary intervention’ and its 
institutions, with the Southern policy to be replaced by a national programme of 
assistance for depressed areas.209
Conclusions
This chapter has provided a long-term overview of the regional and national system 
of incentives and isolated the weight of financial incentives to industry within the 
wider context of ‘Extraordinary intervention for the South’. An extensive literature 
is available, in particular on the regional policy and subsidies available within that 
framework. However, such literature focuses on specific periods, whereas this 
chapter has pieced together the evolution of the subsidies from their introduction 
almost to the end of the ‘Extraordinary intervention’, and compared them to those 
available in the framework of the national industrial policy. While this comparison 
is mainly based on secondary sources, the analysis of primary sources, the Cassa and 
Agency balance sheets, was necessary in order to assess the weigh of financial 
subsidies within the Cassa activity. Other works210 have addressed the same point, 
but either they have analysed more limited periods or their level of disaggregation of 
the Cassa expenditure was not suitable for this thesis.
The first section has introduced the institutions charged with the provision of 
subsidies, in the whole country and in the South, from the MTCIs to the Cassa, and 
explained the motives behind their establishment. Secondary sources stress that 
pressures from banks, financial and industrial circles led to the establishment of 
MTCIs, and that an economic rationale lied behind the implementation of the 
regional policy for the South, rather than considerations of social justice.
209 Yuill et al., European Regional Incentives, pp. 3 and 47-49.
210 Vaccaro, Unita, p. 283, covers the issue from 1950 to 1993, however her data are expressed in 
percentage terms only, and thus give no idea of the magnitude of the Cassa policy, and do not specify 
Cassa expenditure for contributions on soft loans; in addition, the periodisation does not suit the 
purposes of this thesis; Moro, ‘Le spese’, p. 694 and passim, where only the period 1985-1991 is 
covered and Cassa expenditures are aggregated according to different criteria as compared to this
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The establishment of the Cassa and the implementation of the ‘Extraordinary 
Intervention for the South’ also show similarities with the contemporary industrial 
environment. The regional policy for Southern Italy had no opponents in Parliament 
and was an important part of the De Gasperi policy. However, the literature 
demonstrates that those who designed and promoted the policy were the economists 
gathered at the Svimez rather than political forces or ministries. This episode is 
reminiscent of similar developments in the steel and energy sector in the 1950s, 
when key decisions for the Italian economy, such as the modernization of the steel 
sector and the exploitation of gas reserves in the Po valley, were based on the 
ingenuity of individual managers rather than on a coherent economic policy.
The comparison of incentives to industry available exclusively in the South with 
those available nationwide highlighted main features and significant changes in the 
two systems. In particular the regional policy presented a number of aims, 
sometimes in contrast among themselves, i.e. incentives to small and medium sized 
companies in traditional sectors aimed at creating job opportunities in loco, whereas 
public works sought to promote emigration. At the same time, the establishment of 
capital-intensive plants was considered as necessary in order to increase Southern 
labour productivity to European levels.
Throughout most of the period industrial policies, both regional and national 
appeared to be characterized by the so-called ‘jungle of incentives’. This 
proliferation of financial subsidies was due to the lack of any clear long-term 
strategy. In the absence of a coherent all-embracing policy, pressures from single 
industrial sectors and economic groups grew stronger and called for disorganic 
measures from the political front. In the middle of the 1970s, the system of 
industrial incentives underwent a process of reorganization and simplification, which 
implied the inclusion of the soft loan scheme for Southern firms in the national 
scheme. The process of reorganization is presented in the literature as due to the 
awareness of the necessity to simplify the system of incentives to industry.
chapter; Cafiero and Marciani, ‘Quarant’anni’, pp. 271-273, the limitations of their analysis have been 
described above.
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Moreover, its aim was to assist industrial recovery after the oil crisis and help Italian 
industry regain its international competitiveness.
Throughout its evolution, the system of subsidies not only displayed changing 
objectives as far as industrial sectors were concerned, but also as far as size of 
eligible companies was concerned. As early as 1962, the original aim of developing 
small and medium sized companies was abandoned in favour of the extension of 
subsidies to large companies. This tendency became more evident at the end of the 
1960s with the introduction of the planned bargaining procedure. However, primary 
sources show that the diversion was supported by the Svimez activists themselves, 
who meant to attract not only state-owned enterprises but also large private 
investment to the South.
The analysis of Cassa expenditure reveals a continuous increase of resources 
invested in the ‘extraordinary intervention in the South until 1976, with a steady 
decline thereafter. Thus, although the Southern policy lasted until 1992, it had 
increasingly lost momentum from that date onwards. Within total expenditure, 
incentives to industry rose dramatically from an annual average of slightly more than 
60bn lire (1980 constant) in 1957-65, to 400bn in 1966-70, to remain above 700bn 
throughout the 1970s. During the following decade expenditure on such incentives 
declined to 600bn, and never recovered to previous levels. This is consistent with 
the picture that emerges from total Cassa/Agency expenditures.
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CHAPTER IV
Subsidised and ordinary medium-term credit, 1953-1991 
Introduction
This chapter completes the study of the schemes presented in Chapter m. The first 
section compares interest rates on soft loans, available at regional and national levels, 
with the cost of ordinary credit, thus providing an initial assessment of the 
profitability of subsidies, as well as studying the indicators used in the empirical 
analysis (Chapter VI). The chapter moves on to provide a long-term analysis of the 
geographical distribution of subsidised and ordinary medium-term credit in the 
second section. The final section assesses to what extent the institutions managing 
subsidies within the framework of the regional and national industrial policy were 
able to satisfy applications for subsidised loans and grants.
4.1 Interest rates
The following comparison of interest rates on subsidised and market medium-term 
credit covers the period from 1953, when the first subsidised scheme (law 949/1952) 
became operational, to 1991. The analysis is broken into sub-periods reflecting the 
changes in regional policy, as explained in Chapter HI.
Various indicators of ordinary medium-term interest rates have been included in the 
comparison, though some of those were not available for the entire period. Yields on 
long-term government bonds are available throughout the period and have been used 
as an indicator of the cost of medium-term credit and of the opportunity cost of 
capital. OECD data on market interest rates on medium-term loans have been used 
from 1960 to 1980. From 1976 to 1991, the reference rate (based on the cost incurred 
by the MTCIs in issuing bonds, see section 3.2, I) has been taken as a proxy of 
interest rates on market medium-term credit. In Italy, the reference rate is fixed 
bimonthly by the ICCS, and from 1976 was used to determine the subsidised interest 
rate as well as the contribution on interest paid to banks by the State, the Cassa and
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the MI (e.g. in 1976 the interest rate on soft loans available in the South was fixed as 
30% of the reference rate and the public institutions covered the remaining 70%, see 
section 3.2, IV). Interest rates on short-term credit have been included in the 
comparison because of a certain degree of overlap between the two, resulting partly 
from the decisions of the ICCS to increase banks’ limits to allow them to operate in 
the medium-term market, and partly from the customary periodical renewal of 
formally short-term loans.1 As already explained in section 3.1., according to the 
definition applied by the Bol since the early 1950s, short-term or commercial credit 
is repayable in no more than one year, and medium-term in 10 years and 15 in the 
South. Short-term loans aim to furnish working capital and medium-term loans aim 
to provide capital for investment.
4.1.1 The fifties and sixties
The years between 1950 and 1969 saw stability in nominal interest rates, as shown in 
tables IV. 1 and IV.3, but not in real ex-post rates. The Bol's monetary policy had 
two main objectives: a) to contain internal demand in order to avoid a balance-of- 
payments deficit, which had been a priority since the stabilisation of the lira in 1947- 
48; b) to ensure a stable cost of capital, in order to reduce uncertainty m investment 
decisions, as capital formation was a priority in the period. However, a stable 
monetary policy obliged the Bol to recommend that consumption should be kept 
within the limits of internal formation of resources, to avoid inflationary pressures 
and a balance-of-payments deficit, to which the Bol would have had to react with a 
restrictive monetary policy, thus interrupting conditions favourable to capital
1 As an example, in 1972, popular and ordinary banks were authorized to use 8% of their deposits to 
operate on the medium-term market; see Pontolillo, Ilsistema, p. 14; Banfi, ‘Gli Istituti', p. 31.
2 A. Fazio, ‘La politica monetaria in Italia dal 1947 al 1978’, Moneta e Credito, 32 (1979), pp. 273. 
For the post-war inflation in Italy see P. Baffi ‘II Problema monetario Italiano sullo scorcio del 1944’ 
in Idem, Studi sulla moneta (Milan, 1965); P. Baffi, ‘II primo anno di Menichella alia direzione della 
Banca d’ltalia’ in: F. Cotula, C.O. Gelsomino and A. Gigliobianco (eds), Donato Menichella.
Stabilita e sviluppo dell’economia italiana 1946-1960, vol. 1: Documenti e Discorsi (Rome-Bari, 
1997), pp. 867-877; M. Omiccioli, ‘Einaudi e l’inflazione del 1946-47: unriesame’ in Rivista di 
Storia Economica, 16/1 (2000), pp. 37-63; for the stabilization see the recent work by E. Gaiotti, ‘La 
stabilizzazione del 1947: «effetti psicologici» e domanda di moneta’, in: F. Cotula (ed.), Stabilita e 
sviluppo negli anni cinquanta, vol. 1: L ‘Italia nel contesto intemazionale (Rome-Bari, 2000), pp. 
441-486, where previous works and interpretations are also discussed.
3 G.M. Rey, ‘L’economia italiana’, pp. 28-29; Vicarelli, ‘Note in tema’, pp. 42-51.
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formation.4 Monetary stability was in turn made possible by measures undertaken by 
the central bank between 1947 and 1949, such as the establishment of compulsory 
reserves (approximately 25% of deposits) to mop up excess liquidity, and restrictions 
on the Treasury's borrowing requirements, as regards to government expenditure.5 
Lastly by 1949, the accumulation of gold and foreign exchange was the main factor 
in broadening the credit base, and reserves were built up through Marshall Aid and 
increased exports due to a slightly undervalued lira and an overvalued pound.6 In the 
1950s, the monetary base and the banks were controlled through the issuing of 
government bonds and reserve requirements.7
Another factor enabling the Bol to pursue a stable monetary policy was the low cost 
of labour, particularly until 1963. Italian trade unions agreed to a policy in favour of 
industrialization and an increase in employment - the social contract. The rise in 
wages - between 1951 and 1958, wages in the private sector rose by an annual 
average of 7.6% in current lire and productivity by 4.9% - created only moderate 
inflationary pressures (the annual average increase in retail prices was 3.3%). This 
may in part have been the outcome of private consumption increasing less than GNP. 
In the 1950s, private consumption as a share of the GNP decreased from 63.1% to 
58.3%.8
I) 1953-1956 and 1957-1965
This first sub-section covers two sub-periods: 1953-1956 and 1957-1965. The 
former includes the years between the launch of the first soft loan scheme, available 
in the whole country and managed by the MCC (scheme 949/1952) and the launch of 
the first soft loan scheme for Southern firms in 1957. The second sub-period 
includes the years of the first stage of the industrial policy for the South. The two 
have been dealt with together as they present strong elements of continuity in terms 
of the country's economic history and monetary policy.
4 Vicarelli, ‘Note in tema’, p. 45; Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1967, p. 357.
5 P. Baffi, ‘Monetary Stabililty and Economic Development in Italy, 1946-1960’, Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro Quarterly Review, 14/56 (1961), p. 9.
6 Ibid., pp. 7-9.
7 Fazio, ‘La politica monetaria’, p. 274.
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Although the years under analysis were characterised by low inflation, inflationary 
pressures occurred in 1955 and 1956, and even more in the years between 1962-65, 
when real subsidised interest rates became negative. In 1955, the expansion of 
production increased the prices of raw materials, which together with an investment 
boom increased monetary pressures. The higher inflation of 1956 was due in the first 
half of the year to a bad harvest, which reflected on wages given the widespread use 
of wage indexation. In the last month of the year, inflationary pressures were fuelled 
by the Suez crisis, which caused an increase in wholesale prices. However, the Bol 
was not forced to impose a restrictive monetary policy, as in 1956 the formation of 
liquidity was reduced by the decrease in the budget deficit and the deterioration of 
the balance of payments.9
8 Rey, ‘L’economia italiana’, p. 29.
9 Baffi, ‘Monetary Stability’, pp. 25-28; Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1956, pp. 369-370.
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Table IV. 1 Ordinary interest rates, 1953-65 (ex-post real interest rates in brackets, 
percent)
Commercial credit MTCa YLTGBb
(BoI)c (OECD)d
1953 7.5 (5.5) 8.57 (6.57) 6.13 (4.13)
1954 7.5 (4.5) 8.56 (5.56) 6.22 (3.22)
1955 7.5 (4.5) 8.48 (5.48) 6.40 (3.40)
1956 7.5 (2.5) 8.53 (3.53) 6.93 (1.93)
1957 7.5 (5.5) 8.65 (6.65) 7.27 (5.27)
1958 7.2 (5.2) 8.65 (6.65) 6.19 (4.19)
1959 7 (5.0) 7.74 (5.74) 5.42 (3.42)
1960 7 (5.0) 8.23 (6.23) 7.14 (5.14) 5.26 (3.26)
1961 7 (5.0) 7.91 (5.91) 6.97 (4.97) 4.97 (2.97)
1962 7 (2.0) 7.69 (2.69) 7.08 (2.08) 5.05 (0.05)
1963 7 (0.0) 7.71 (0.71) 7.9 (0.9) 5.19 (-1.81)
1964 7 (1.0) 8.13 (2.13) 8.58 (2.58) 5.74 (-0.26)
1965 7 (3.0) 8.15 (4.15) 8.51 (4.51) 5.39 (1.39)
Keys:
a: MTC= Medium-Term Credit. The column displays ordinary interest rates on medium-term credit,
published by the Bank of Italy.
b: YLTGB = Yields on long-term government bonds.
c: interest rates charged by banks to borrowers as published by the Bank of Italy. These interest rates 
do not include any other commission charged by the bank on the borrowers and represent the 
minimum cartel interest rate, charged by banks under the terms of the Interbank Agreement. These 
rates are to be treated with caution as banks often disregarded the norms of the cartel.10 
d: ordinary effective interest rates published by the OECD, including all charges (i.e. taxes, stamp 
duty, registration duty on the contract, commissions, etc.).
Sources: column 2 : Banca d’ltalia, Bollettino, 1964, n 4, tav.12, and 1966, n.4, tav.12; column 3 : 
OECD, Financial Statistics, vol. 2, December 1970, pp. 228-229; columns 4 and 5: P. Garofalo and 
D. Colonna, ‘Gli anni cinquanta statistiche monetarie e creditizie’, Tav. 16 pp. 702-703 in: F. Cotula 
(ed.), Stabilita e sviluppo negli anni cinquanta, vol. 2: Problemi Strutturali e politiche economiche 
(Rome-Bari, 1998), sources Banca d’ltalia, Bollettino, various years and Banca d’ltalia, Base 
Informativa del Servizio Studi.
10 A.M. Biscaini, G. Carosio and T. Padoa Schioppa, ‘Borrowing and Lending Rates in an 
Oligopolistic Banking System’, Banca d’ltalia, Italian Credit Structure. Efficiency, Competition and 
Controls (1984), p. 69 and fh 23; Camevali, ‘British and Italian banks’, pp. 212-213; concerning the 
origin of the Interbank Agreement see V. Lutz, ‘The Central Bank and the System of Credit Control’, 
in R.S. Sayers (ed.), Banking in Western Europe (1962), pp. 154-173.
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1957 brought stagnation in investment, with the Bol reacting by allowing banks to 
borrow more from abroad. Thus from 1958 interest rates decreased and investment 
took off in the following year.11 The years between 1958 and 1962, the peak of the 
‘Economic Miracle’ (between 1958 and 1963, GDP grew at an average annual rate of 
6.3%)12 were years of an expansionary monetary policy, with low interest rates and 
low yields on government bonds. Throughout the 1950s until the first half of the 
1960s, the public sector borrowing requirements were the most moderate of the 
whole period under analysis.13 From 1961, medium-term interest rates and, from 
1962, commercial rates show an upward trend with a considerable increase in 1964. 
1963 marks the end of the ‘Economic Miracle’ - due to labour unrest and wage 
increases. The initial government reaction was to increase the availability of finance 
to allow growth to continue, by authorising banks to borrow abroad in October 1962. 
As inflation increased and trade deficits emerged, the Bol opted for a deflationary 
policy in 1963, introducing a credit squeeze by directing banks not to increase their 
foreign indebtedness. By doing so, the balance of payments showed a surplus in 
1964, but the economy suffered.14 The growth of real GNP fell from 5.9% in 1962 
and 5.2% in 1963 to a mere 2.9% in 1964.15 Investment fell by 20.2 % in 1964.16
11 Fazio, ‘La politica monetaria’, pp. 274-275.
12 N. Rossi and G. Toniolo, ‘Italy’, in: N. Crafts and G. Toniolo, Economic Growth in Europe since 
1945 (Cambridge, 1995), p. 442..
13 Rey, ‘L’economia italiana’, p. 43; Rossi and Toniolo, ‘Italy’, p. 442; P. Ganugi and G. Toniolo, ‘II 
debito pubblico italiano in prospettiva secolare (1876-1947)’ in Ente Einaudi, II disavanzo pubblico in 
Italia: natura strutturale e politiche di rientro, vol. II (Bologna, 1992).
14 Allen and Stevenson, Introduction, pp. 169-170.
15 Ibid., p. 51.
16 Ibid., p. 170.
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1956 6.5d (1.5) 6.5d (1.5)
1957 3-5 (1 to 3) n.a. n.a.
1958 3-5 (1 to 3) n.a. n.a.
1959 3-5 (1 to 3) n.a. n.a. 3 (1) 5 (2)
I960 3-5 (1 to 3) n.a. n.a. 3 (1) 5 (2)
1961 3-5 (1 to 3) n.a. n.a. 3 (1) 5 (2)
1962 3-5 (-2 to 0) 6.50(1.5) 6.50 (1.5) 3 (-2) 5 (0)
1963 3-5 (-4 to -2) 6.50 (-0.5) 6.50 (-0.5) 3 (-4) 5 (-2)
1964 3-5 (-3 to -1) n.a. n.a. 3 (-3) 4.68 (-1.32)
1965 3-5 (-1 to 1) 3-4 (-1 to 0) 6 (2) 3 (-1) 4.74 (0.74)
Keys:
a: Medio Credito Centrale operating under the terms of law 949/1952.
b: Fund Ministry of Industry. The terms of this national soft loan scheme were fixed by law 623/1959. 
c: hereafter in tables C/N means Centre and North of Italy, 
d: since November 1955.
Sources: column 2: Cassa per il Mezzogiomo, Relazione al Bilancio, various years; columns 3 and 4: 
Mediocredito Centrale, Relazione al Bilancio, 1955, p. 13; 1962, p. 25; 1963, p. 14; 1965, p. 17; 
columns 5 and 6: Pergolesi, 77 Credito, p. 45.
Subsidised medium-term credit (hereafter medium-term credit will be indicated as 
MTC and specified whether subsidised or ordinary) offered obvious advantages 
compared to ordinary MTC rates (table IV. 1, column 4). In 1961, the year of the 
lowest interest rates, the difference was 3.97 or 1.97 points according to the type of 
soft loan received. In 1964, the year of the highest ordinary MTC interest rates, the 
difference amounted to 5.58 and 3.58 points. Furthermore, MTC subsidised by the 
Cassa and the MI was more attractive to firms because the interest rates were fixed 
by law, thus sheltering firms from fluctuations in the money market.
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Columns 3 and 4 in table IV.2 display the interest rates of the MTC subsidised by the 
MCC under the terms of law 949/1952. As mentioned above, MTCIs could extend 
credit to industry at interest rates lower than those of the market, because they were 
allowed to rediscount a percentage of the loan extended. This percentage changed 
over time, from 63% until May 1964 to 67% from June to September of the same 
year. After September 1964, MTCIs could rediscount 80% of the loans extended or 
70% of the loan plus a contribution of 0.5% on interest.17 The increased contribution 
from Mediocredito Centrale allowed firms to borrow at 6% in the Centre and 
North.18 Southern MTCIs could rediscount 80%, and after 1965 could obtain a 
contribution on interest of 2.5%. The additional contribution introduced at the end of 
1964 allowed the Southern MTCIs to extend loans at 3%-4%, the same as those 
extended through the Cassa contribution.19 Given that the 1965 interest rates were 
the result of the additional contribution from the MCC, one would assume that in the 
previous period the interest rate had been higher. The most appealing rates of 
interest were those of the MTC subsidised by the MI (columns 5 and 6 in table IV.2), 
which could not be higher than 5% for the whole country and 3% for Southern firms. 
Thus the best options available to Southern firms seemed to be either a special loan 
subsidised by the Cassa or a medium-term loan subsidised by the MI. In the first 
case, a new firm could get up to 1050 million lire at 3%, repayable over 15 years, and 
350 million lire on the same terms if willing to renew. In the second case, a 
Southern new firm could borrow on the same terms up to 1000 million, or 500 
million if willing to expand.
17 Mediocredito Centrale, Relazione al Bilancio, 1965, p. 15.
18 Mediocredito Centrale, Relazione al Bilancio, 1966, p. 13.
19 Mediocredito Centrale, Relazione al Bilancio, 1965, p. 17.
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II) 1966-70
Table IV.3 Nominal and ex-post reala market interest rates 1966-70 (%).
Commercial credit M T Cb YLTGBC
Italy0 North-W6 North-E Centre South Islands Italy (IMF)
1966 7.87 8.16 6.54
(5.87) (6.16) (4.54)
1967 7.81 7.96 6.61
(6.81) (6.96) (5.61)
1968 7.80 7.89 6.7
(5.80) (5.89) (4.7)
1969 7.29 7.10 7.28 7.26 7.98 8.04 8.17 6.85
(4.29) (4.10) (4.28) (4.26) (4.98) (5.04) (5.17) (3.85)
1970 9.15 9.06 9.09 9.02 10.06 10.10 9.78 9.01
(5.15) (5.06) (5.09) (5.02) (6.06) (6.10) (5.78) (5.01)
Keys:
*: ex-post real interest rates in brackets.
b : MTC= interest rates on medium-term credit, published by the OECD. 
c : YLTGB= yields on long-term government bonds, published by the IMF.
d : ordinary effective interest rates published by the OECD, including all charges (i.e. taxes, stamp 
duty, registration duty on the contract, commissions, etc.)
e rcommercial interest rates by region are published by the Bank of Italy since 1969, quarterly 
observations.
Sources: OECD, Financial Statistics, vol. 2, December 1970, and vol. 3, June 1971; Banca d’ltalia, 
Relazione Annuale, 1969-1970; IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1996.
From table IV.3 it is evident that interest rates differed across various regions of the
country, being higher in the less developed areas -  a feature that was to remain 
constant throughout the period of analysis. Official sources explain the difference in 
terms of greater bank risks given the backwardness of certain areas and the small size 
of their industries. Furthermore, as small firms were more dependent upon external 
(bank) finance they had far less bargaining power.20 More recent works have 
analysed these factors in greater detail and have pointed out that Southern firms are 
riskier as they present a higher variability of profits, determining a higher risk 
(defined as bad loans as a percentage of total loans) for the lending institutions (these 
features are dealt with in Chapter VII).
20 Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale 1969, pp. 288-289.
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Not only higher risk and regional underdevelopment explain differentials in interest 
rates, but also a lower degree of competition in the Southern banking system.21 For 
instance, in 1951 each bank branch served more than twice (2.5) as many people in 
the South than in the Centre and North, and still 1.8 times as many as late as 1988. 
Moreover, the Southern banking system is polarised into very large and very small 
banks, whereas small and medium-sized banks have acquired increasing importance 
in the rest of the country.22 The polarization of the Southern banking system 
between several very small and few large banks does not generate competition, as the 
two groups specialize in different clients, strategies and locations.23 Furthermore, 
banking monopolies occur in a higher number of areas in Southern Italy. In 1987, of 
the 1,500 areas into which the country is divided, with each area including on 
average 5 municipalities,24 banking monopolies existed in 23% of Southern areas, as 
compared with only 8% in the rest of the country.
The higher interest rate might also be determined by the lower margin of profit of 
Southern banks. Due to a lower level of savings, credit institutions in the South 
make more use of inter-bank loans, which entails higher costs of the collection of 
funds. Also, Southern banks have higher operational costs, for the average 
transaction size is smaller, therefore the cost on each lira transacted is higher, and 
also value added per employee is lower and the labour cost is higher, as managers 
comprise a higher percentage of employees.26
21N. D ’Amico, G. Parigi and M. Trifilidis, ‘I tassi d’interesse e la rischiosita degli impieghi bancari 
nel Mezzogiomo’, in: Banca d’ltalia, Ilsistema finanziario nel Mezzogiomo, Numero speciale dei 
Contributi a ll’analisi economica (Rome, 1990), pp. 329-331 and 335-343.
22 D’Onofrio and Pepe, ‘Le strutture’, pp. 216-217 and 222-223.
23 G.Galli and M.Onado, ‘Dualismo territoriale e sistema finanziario’, in: Banca d’ltalia, II sistema 
finanziario nel Mezzogiomo, Numero speciale dei Contributi a ll’analisi economica (Rome, 1990) pp. 
35-36; D ’Onofrio and Pepe, ‘Le strutture’, pp. 222-223.
24 Banca d’ltalia, Composizione delle aree di gravitazione bancaria (Rome, 1985); Banca d’ltalia, 
Indicatori di concorrenza e produttivita delle aree di gravitazione bancaria (Rome, 1985).
25 D’Onofrio and Pepe, ‘Le strutture’, pp. 231-232.
26 P. Marullo Reedtz, ‘La redditivita delle aziende di credito. Un’analisi per aree geografiche’, in: 
Banca d’ltalia, Ilsistema finanziario nel Mezzogiomo, Numero speciale dei Contributi a ll’analisi 
economica (Rome, 1990), pp. 251-271. P. Sabbatini, ‘I conti economici degli istituti di credito 
speciale’, in: Banca d’ltalia, II sistema finanziario nel Mezzogiomo, Numero speciale dei Contributi 
a ll’analisi economica (Rome, 1990), pp. 292-295.
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During 1966-1968, ordinary interest rates decreased slightly. An increasing trend 
began in 1969 (not observable for commercial interest rate) and in 1970, ordinary 
short and medium-term interest rates increased considerably. During 1969, the 
country was hit by a major labour crisis, which resulted in the introduction of a rigid 
wage system and firing and hiring regulations favourable to workers. Furthermore, 
changes in labour organization became difficult to introduce as they needed to be 
negotiated at the shop-floor level.27 The crisis fuelled an inflationary circle as in 
1962 wage increases brought inflation, by provoking increases in costs and prices of 
Italian products. This meant increased imports and decreased exports, causing 
severe balance-of-payments problems worsened by capital outflows, due to 
increasing interest rates in foreign markets.29 In contrast to 1962, the Bank of Italy 
immediately opted fora deflationary policy. It limited its lending availability30 and 
increased the discount rate from 3.5% to 5% in July 1969 and to 5.5% in August of
•n i
the same year. Moreover, the Bank gradually withdrew its support for government 
bonds from August 1969 and suspended it in 1970. Therefore, yields on long-term 
government bonds aligned with foreign interest rates.32 Thus, the increase in interest 
rates to the public was the result of the banking system’s adjustment to the Bank of 
Italy’s monetary policy.
27 The workers' and trade unions’ bargaining power was later even strengthened by the approval of 
the Workers’ Charter in 1970, Rossi and Toniolo, ‘Italy’, p. 445.
28 G. Gualemi, Economia Aperta: Un Approccio Storico a ll’Economia e Politico Industriale in Italia, 
1860-1972 (Turin, 1991), p. 481.
29Allen and Stevenson, Introduction, p. 169; L. Capomassi, G. Cervone, F. Cotula and E. Sacerdoti, 
‘Le operazioni di mercato aperto’, in: F. Cotula and P. de’ Stefani, La politico monetaria in Italia: 
istituti e strumenti (Bologna, 1979), p. 513.
30 Banca d’ Italia, Annual Report, 1969, abridged English version, pp. 96-100.
31 OECD, FinanncialStatistics, 1970, vol.l, table I.B/12.
32 Capomassi et al., ‘Le operazioni’, p. 513.
33 Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1969, p.108.
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Table IV.4 Subsidised interest rates (%), 1966-70.
Cassa MCC MI
South C/N South C/N
1966 4-6 3-4 5-6 3 5
1967 4-6 3-4 5-5.85 3.7 a 00 w
1968 4-6 3-4 b b b
1969 4-6 3-4 5.4-6.25 b b
1970 4-6 4 6-6.90 3 4.68
Keys:
a= even though interest rates under the 623/1959 scheme were fixed by law at no more than 3% for 
the South and no more than 5%, for the North, in the 1967 Report by the Bank of Italy, these figures 
are mentioned thus showing that interest rates applied in the South were not exactly those established 
by the law.
b= no figures provided.
Sources: Cassa per il Mezzogiomo, Relazione al Bilancio, 1966-1970; Mediocredito Centrale, 
Relazione al Bilancio, 1966-1970; Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1966-1970.
As table IV.4 shows, interest rates available to Southern firms under the Cassa- 
subsidised scheme remained fixed through the whole period. Interest rates on soft 
loans rediscounted at the Medio Credito Centrale and available to Southern firms 
increased slightly only in 1970.
Interest rates on soft loans available from the MCC outside the South witnessed the 
same trend as ordinary rates, decreasing in 1966-67 and increasing in 1969-70. The 
1966-67 decrease was because the MCC increased its contribution on interest by an 
amount between 0.15%-1.50%.34 It is not specified whether the further contribution 
was extended to Southern MTCIs. However, given that the interest rate for the South 
in 1966 remained the same as in 1965, one would assume that the further 
contribution was limited to Northern and Central medium-term credit institutions, 
and went to reduce the gap between rediscounting facilities available to Southern and 
Northern medium-term credit institutions.
34 Mediocredito Centrale, Relazione al Bilancio, 1966, p. 13.
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4.1.2 The Seventies
When examining the fluctuations in interest rates in the 1970s, the distinctive feature 
of the Italian economy in that decade - high inflation - should be emphasised. While 
the output slowdown was a common feature to all industrialised countries, the 
inflation differential between Italy and the seven most industrialized countries 
reached its highest point, 4.5% as compared with 0.2% in the 1960s.35 In turn the 
high inflation had its roots in the explosion of the government deficit, monetized by 
an acquiescent monetary policy until 1976, when the Bol let the yields on long-term 
government bonds rise and the monetization ratio decreased.36
I) 1971-75
Table IV.5 Nominal and ex-post real3 ordinary interest rates, 1971-75
Commercial Credit M T C b YLTGBC
North-W North-E Centre South Islands Italy (IMF)
1971 8.82% 9.07% 8.91% 10.24% 10.59% 9.87 8.34
(3.82%) (4.07%) (3.91%) (5.24%) (5.59%) (4.87) (3.34%)
1972 7.51% 8.01% 7.65% 9.31% 10.23% 8.98 7.47
(1.51%) (2.01%) (1.65%) (3.31%) (4.23%) (2.98) (1.47%)
1973 8.10% 8.27% 8.15% 9.43% 10.36% 8.71 7.42
(-2.9%) (-2.73%) (-2.85%) (-1.57%) (-0.63%) (-2.29) (-3.58%)
1974 14.31% 14.32% 13.68% 14.87% 15.67% 11.1 9.87
(-3.69%) (-3.68%) (-4.32%) (-3.13%) (-2.33%) (-6.9) (-8.13)
1975 14.89% 15.11% 14.48% 16.84% 17.57% 12.8 11.54
(-2.11%) (-1.89%) (-2.52%) (-0.16%) (0.57%) (-4.2) (-5.46)
Keys:
a: ex-post real interest rates in brackets.
b: MTC= market interest rate on medium-term credit.
c: YLTGB = yields on long-term government bonds.
Source: Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1971-1975; OECD, Financial Statistics, 1972-1976. IMF, 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1996.
35 M. Fratianni and F. Spinelli, A Monetary History o f Italy (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 212-214, 279 and 
fial.
36 The monetisation ratio was 74% from 1970 to 1976, as compared to the long historical trend of 
50%. After 1977 the ratio fell below its historical trend. Ibid., pp. 213-217.
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1971 and particularly 1972 saw a considerable decrease in interest rates ranging from 
0.36 points in the Islands to 1.31 points in the North-West. Interest rates on MTC 
and government bonds kept decreasing until 1973. The decreasing trend of the yields 
on long-term government bonds created favourable conditions for medium-term 
credit institutions to place a considerable amount of bonds on the market, which 
determined the availability of medium-term credit (as shown in table 4.2.18) and 
therefore finance for investment.37 With respect to commercial interest rates, the 
decreasing trend was reversed in 1973, and for medium-term interest rates in the 
following year. The 1972-1974 period witnessed strong inflation - consumer price 
inflation rose from 6% in 1972 to 11% in 1973 and 19% in 1974.38 In 1972, a rapid 
growth of internal demand led to increased prices for imported primary products as 
well as labour costs, fuelling inflation. Increasing domestic demand was also 
reducing the potential for exports, worsening the balance of payments. In 1973 
inflation jumped from 6% to 11%, but the Italian monetary authorities kept pursuing 
expansionary policies. Nominal interest rates rose slightly, whereas real interest rates 
became negative. The low interest rate policy was pursued in order to assist the 
recovery of fixed investment, higher utilization of productive capacity and higher 
levels of employment, after the rigidity and strength gained by the labour force 
during the Hot Autumn of 1969.39
The increase in the demand for credit by the private sector was accompanied by a 
soaring government deficit. The increasing public sector deficit determined an 
increase in the offer of bonds, exceeding demand. The Bol intervened directly to 
limit the increase in the yields on government bonds introducing the obligation for 
banks to invest a quota of their reserves in government bonds (this obligation was 
part of the so-called portfolio obligation, see section 4.2, DI). However, the Bol 
gradually withdrew its support for bonds in the first half of 1974, in the face of an 
increasing deficit and inflation, thus letting the yields on long-term bonds increase. 
In 1975, due to an increasing demand for long-term bonds, in turn related to the
37 Fazio ‘La politico monetaria p. 289 ; Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annale, 1973, p. 33.
38 Own calculations on OECD, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1993, Table 136, pp. 432- 
433.
39 Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1973, p. 33.
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decreasing production activity, the Bol intervened by selling bonds in order to keep 
yields above short-term interest rates and channelling savings into the long-term 
market.40
At a moment in which monetary policies were still expansionary, the oil crisis hit the 
economy, with oil prices increasing fourfold between October and December 1973. 
This further worsened the terms of trade between imported raw materials and 
exported manufactured goods and accelerated price increases 41 The balance-of- 
payments deficit absorbed part of the monetary base, which caused a sensible 
decrease in bank liquidity causing a rise, particularly in 1974, of short-term interest 
rates, whereas the rate on MTC was kept deliberately low by the ICCS.42 The 
differential in rates between short and MTC determined the preference of banks in 
lending on the short-term market rather than buying the bonds of MTCIs, thus 
generating a shortage in the availability of MTC (as shown in section 4.2 HI).43
By 1975, the further worsening of the balance of payments forced the introduction of 
measures to contain credit expansion (to curb monetary base creation)44 and 
restrictive fiscal policies aiming at reducing imports.45 1975 saw a drastic reduction 
of the balance-of-payments deficit, from 5,212bn lire in 1974 to 361bn in 1975. 
However, the Bol pointed out that industrial investment as a whole was hit, whereas 
it would have been better to shelter sectors that could be internationally competitive. 
Italian competitiveness was very low in 1975 due to the highest increase in per-unit 
labour costs as compared to other European countries. In addition to this already 
considerable factor, Italy experienced a fall in productivity, as labour utilization 
could not be varied as quickly as production would require, due to the rigidity of the 
labour supply.46 These factors led to a fall in the Italian GDP by 3.5% in 1975,47 for
AO
the first time since the Great Depression and World War II.
40 Capomassi et al., ‘Le operazioni’, pp. 514-515; as for the causes of the increase of government 
deficit see Fratianni and Spinelli, A monetary history, pp. 215-217.
41 Banca d’ltalia, Annual Report, 1974, abridged English version, p. 101.
42 Ibid., pp. 147-148.
43 Fazio, ‘La politico monetaria’, pp. 291-292.
44 Banca d’ltalia, Annual Report, 1974, abridged English version, p. 101.
45 Ibid., pp. 27-28.
46 Banca d’ltalia, Annual Report, 1975, abridged English version, pp. 25-27.
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Despite the increase in ordinary interest rates since 1973, subsidised interest rates 
remained constant until 1974. The MCC interest rate even decreased by 0.35 points 
in 1972, and remained the same until 1974. In 1975, interest rates for all categories 
of loans rose, with the exception of those subsidised through IMI funds. The increase 
ranged from a minimum of 1-1.5 points in the case of the Cassa soft loans to a 
maximum of 2.35-4.45 points in the case of the MCC soft loans to Northern and 
Central firms. The adjustment of the soft-loan interest rates was affected by the 
delay with which the ICCS proceeded to the adjustment of the base rate on 
subsidised operations. The difference between the subsidised and the base rate was 
financed by the various bodies: the Cassa, the MI, IMI, and the MCC, which 
combined the rediscounting of loans with subsidies on interest. In the second half of 
1974, the base rate as well as subsidised rates were raised.49 The delays in adjusting 
the base rate resulted in a decreasing availability of subsidised as well as ordinary 
MTC, as will be explained in the last section.
47 Output in manufacturing decreased by -9.7% in the same year. Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 
1976, p. 4.
48 Rossi and Toniolo, ‘Italy’, p. 447.
49 Banca d’ltalia, Annual Report, 1974, pp. 147-148.
Table IV.6 Subsidised interest rates, 1971-75 (%).
Cassaa MCCb MF IMI Fundsd IMF IR*‘
South C\N South CVN South CVN
1971 4-6 4 6-6.90 3 4.68
1972 4-6 3.65 5.65-6.65 3 5
1973 4-6 3.65 5.65-6.65 3 5
1974 4-6 3.65 5.65-6.55 3 4-5 3 3 4-5 4
1975 5-7.50 5 8-10.10 4.55 6.10-7.60 3 3 4-5 6.10
Keys
a: interest rates subsidised by the Cassa under the terms of law 853/1971.
b: interest rates on loans subsidised and/or rediscounted at the Medio Credito Centrale under the terms of law 949/1952. 
c: soft loan scheme subsidised by the Ministry of Industry under the terms of law 623/1959. 
d: includes soft loan schemes introduced by laws 1470/1961 and 1089/1968. 
e: soft loan scheme under terms of law 184/1971.
f: subsidised loans available for industrial restructuring introduced by scheme 1101 in 1971.
Source: Banca d’ Italia, Relazione Annuale, 1971-1975.
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Thus in 1971, the difference between ordinary and subsidised interest rates ranged 
from a minimum of 4.24 points50 to a maximum of 7.59 points51 in the South, with 
the same difference ranging from a minimum of 1.92 points to 4.39 points in the 
rest of the country. In 1974, when ordinary interest rates had risen and the base and 
subsidised interest rate had not yet been adjusted, the corresponding differences 
ranged from 8.87 points to 12.67 points in the South and 7.13 points to 11.32 points 
in the rest of the country. In 1975, with the adjustment of the base and subsidised 
rate the difference in the South ranged from 9.34 points to 14.57 points, and from 
4.38 points to 12.11 points in the rest of the country.
II) 1976-80
For the 1976-1980 period, OECD data on market interest rates on medium-term 
credit and the Bol reference rate are available. The comparison shows that OECD 
figures are 0.4 to 0.5 points lower than the reference rate. The reference rate, fixed 
by the ICCS, was lower than the ordinary rate available in any area of the country 
through the whole period, and follows the trend of commercial interest rates. Both 
rates increased in 1977 and decreased in 1978, to increase again in 1980.
50 The difference between the ordinary rate in the Continental South (10.24%) minus the highest Cassa 
rate (6%).
51 The difference between the ordinary rate available in the islands (10.59%) and the lowest subsidised 
rate, available from the Ministry of Industry (3%).
52 The difference between ordinary rate in the North West (8.82%), and the highest subsidised rate 
(6.90%), available from Medio Credito.
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Table IV.7 Nominal and ex-post real3 ordinary interest rates (%), 1976-80.
Commercial Credit ' MTCb YLTGB0 RRa
North-W North-E Centre South Islands (OECD)
1976 17.20 17.08 17.04 19.02 19.16 14.156 13.08 14.55
(0.20) (0.08) (0.04) (2.02) (2.16) (-2.85) (-3.92) (-2.45)
1977 18.29 18.59 18.53 20.51 19.75 15.44 14.62 15.95
(0.29) (0.59) (0.53) (2.51) (1.75) (-2.56) (-3.38) (-2.05)
1978 15.62 16.06 16.02 18.21 17.46 14.9 13.70 15.50
(3.62) (4.06) (4.02) (6.21) (5.46) (2.9) (1.70) (3.5)
1979 15.08 15.45 15.29 17.28 16.87 14.35f 14.05 g
(0.08) (0.45) (0.29) (2.28) (1.87) (-0.65) (-0.95)
1980 19.00 19.53 19.43 21.04 20.17 15.7C 16.11 16.10
(-2) (-1.37) (-1.57) (0.04) (-0.83) (-5.3) (-0.89) (-4.90)
Keys:
a: ex-post real interest rates in brackets.
b: MTC= market interest rate on medium-term credit, published by the OECD, 
c: YLTGB = yields on long-term government bonds.
d: Reference Rate is taken as proxy of market interest on MTC, see p. 1 in this chapter, 
e: annual average based on three quarterly observations, 
f: annual average based on two quarterly observations, 
g: no observations available.
Source: Banca d’ltalia, Bollettino, 1976-80; OECD, Financial Statistics, 1976-79, and Monthly 
Financial Statistics, January 1981, December 1981.
1976 witnessed a considerable increase in ordinary commercial interest rates as 
compared to 1975 (table IV.5). The increase ranged from 1.59 points in the Islands 
to 2.56 points in the Centre. In the second half of 1975, the government attempted 
an expansionary monetary policy in order to allow the economy to recover. This 
manoeuvre triggered a rise in investment, particularly in industrial stocks. 
Furthermore, household consumption reached a high level in 1975, and remained 
high in the following year. This generated inflation, which on the one hand allowed 
firms to rebuild their profit margins even with increasing labour costs,54 and on the 
other hand generated a deficit in the balance of payments. Thus in 1976, the central 
bank intervened with a combination of measures. It devalued the lira by 21%,
53 The difference between ordinary interest rate in the North East (9.07%) and rate subsidised by the 
Ministry of Industry (4.68%), the lowest available in the country.
54 In 1975, wage indexation was made more rigid in favour of the labour force.
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leading to a faster increase of exports than of imports;55 it allowed the yields on long­
term government bonds to increase,56 and it imposed a deposit on purchases of 
foreign currencies (the advance-deposit scheme), thus controlling imports, improving 
the balance of payments and contracting the monetary base. The discount rate was
57increased in February and March, and in October reached an unprecedented 15%, 
thus absorbing excess liquidity and causing increases in interest rates. In the autumn 
of the same year, both inflation and the balance of payments improved, so that less 
drastic measures needed to be introduced in the following year. Thus in 1977, 
commercial interest rates kept increasing, but at a slower pace, whereas the reference 
rate increased considerably. The Bol kept a tighter control on banks’ reserves, and 
towards the end of the year the reserve on borrowings as well as the central bank 
discount rate were increased to control the expansion of credit. 1978 witnessed a 
relatively expansionary policy, for nominal interest rates decreased. However, real
C O
interest rates increased as inflation, together with investment, decreased. Between 
the end of 1978 and the beginning of 1979, the oil price doubled thus provoking an 
inflationary push. Controlling inflation became the priority of Italian monetary 
authorities,59 as the decision to enter the European Monetary System established in 
1978 meant stabilizing exchange rates.60 The EMS was an agreement supporting 
fixed but adjustable (through negotiation) exchange rates between the currencies of 
those EEC countries choosing to participate, with Italy joining in 1979, after 
managing to obtain a wider fluctuation band of +/- 6.61 Exchange rate stability was 
considered necessary both for the control of inflation and for the establishment of 
economic conditions favourable to industrial restructuring and productivity growth.62 
1980 saw a further increase in nominal interest rates, for the central bank intervened 
to control inflation, which had increased from 15% in 1979 to 21% in 1980. In 1980, 
internal demand increased as well as GDP (4%), and the balance of payments
55 S. Micossi, F. Trau, ‘ The Role of Monetary and Financial Policies in the Restructuring of Industry’, 
in: M. Baldassarri (ed.), The Italian Economy. Heaven or Hell? (1994), p. 90.
56 Capomassi et al., ‘Le operazioni’, p. 516.
57 Banca d’ltalia, Annual Report, 1976, abridged English version, p. 79.
58 Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1978, pp.59, 217.
59 Banca d’ Italia, Relazione Annuale, 1979, p. 363.
60 Micossi and Trau, ‘ The Role’, p. 90.
61 For the EMS see for instance M. Fratianni and J. von Hagen, The European Monetary System and 
European Monetary Union (Boulder, 1992); for the Italian negotiations to obtain the wider band see 
P. Baffi, ‘II negoziato sullo SME’, Bancaria, 45 (June, 1989), pp. 67-70.
62 Rossi and Toniolo, ‘Italy’, p. 447.
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plunged back into the red. The Bol intervened by increasing the discount rate and 
temporarily assigning bonds, thus absorbing excess liquidity.63 The strict monetary 
policy applied brought interest rates above inflation in 1981.64
As explained in the previous chapter, both the national industrial policy and the 
regional one were reorganised in 1976. The new soft loan scheme fixed the 
subsidised interest rates as a percentage of the reference rate, and previous schemes 
were abolished. The following table displays subsidised interest rates for expanding 
and establishing firms under the new scheme as well as the previous ones, as a period 
of overlapping occurred.
Table IV. 8 Subsidised interest rates8 on soft loan schemes for establishing and 
expanding firms (%), 1976-1980.
1976 Scheme Cassab Cassa0 MT1
Italy South South Italy South
1976 e e 5.5-8.25* 8.35 5.30
1977 6.40-9.608 4.80 5.5-8.25 8.35 5.30
1978 6.20-9.30 4.65 5.9-8.85 8.35 5.30
1979e
1980 6.45-9.70 4.85 5.9-8.85 8.35 5.30
Keys: a = interest rates displayed in the table refer to 30th April of each year; b = interest rates on 
credit subsidised by the Cassa under the 1976 scheme; c = interest rates on credit subsidised by the 
Cassa under previous schemes; d = soft loan subsidised by the Ministry o f Industry under the terms of 
law 623/1959; e = no data available; f  = various interest rates depending on the size of the firms; g = 
various interest rates depending on the area.
Sources: Banca d’ Italia, Relazione Annuale, 1975-79.
The interest rates on soft loans were fixed at 30% for firms expanding and locating in 
the South (table IV.8, column 3), 40% in the less developed areas of the North and 
Centre and 60% in the rest of the country (table IV.8, column 2). As the reference 
rate followed the fluctuations in the capital markets, interest rates under the new 
scheme changed accordingly. Thus they decreased in 1978 and increased in 1980. In 
the same period interest rates under the scheme managed by the MI remained stable,
63 Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1980, pp.49, 203.
64 Micossi and Trau, ‘ The Role’, p. 92.
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whereas interest rates under the 1965 scheme and managed by the Cassa increased in 
1978. For firms locating or expanding in the South and in depressed areas of the 
North and Centre, the new soft loan scheme offered lower interest rates than the 
previous schemes. In the rest of the country, the interest rates of the MI scheme 
remained more attractive.
As explained in the previous chapter, scheme 675/1977 made available soft loans for 
firms undertaking restructuring and reconverting their production. The following 
table displays interest rates on soft loans under such scheme.
Table IV. 9 Subsidised interest rates on loans available to converting and 
restructuring firms (%), 1976-1980.
1977 IR* IMIFunds1’
Scheme
Fund Instit. Fund Instit
C/N C/N South South
1976
1977
1978 3.10-4.65° 6.20-9.30 2.35 4.65
1979d
1980 3.25-4.85 6.45-9.70 2.45 4.85
Key:
a: Industrial Restructuring under the terms of law 1101 passed in 1971.
b: includes interest rates of loans extended under the schemes 1470/61 and 184/71.
c: two interest rates because the scheme envisaged different interest rates in case of restructuring and
reconverting production.
d: no data available.
Source: Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1975-79.
Interest rates equalled 20% of the reference rate for restructuring and 30% for 
reconverting production in the whole country, while in the South the interest rates 
equalled 15% for restructuring and reconverting loans. The percentages doubled if 
firms borrowed from institutions rather than from the fund. The 1977 scheme 







funds. The rates in this last scheme were fixed and remained constant (6.85%- 
8.35%) during the whole period. The highest rates were those on loans available 
under the scheme for Industrial Restructuring passed in 1971. These were stable in 
the years 1976-7 and increased in 1979 and 1980.
4.1.3 The Eighties
Overall, the period under analysis is characterised by an increase in real interest rates, 
with nominal interest rates decreasing less than inflation. The appreciation of real 
interest rates, rather than credit ceilings, was the Bol's preferred policy to squeeze 
inflation, in order to comply with the EMS exchange rate commitments and maintain 
a fixed lira/Deutschemark parity. The manoeuvre led to a considerable appreciation 
of the lira in real terms vis-a-vis the other six EMS members (e.g. appreciation of 
42% vis-a-vis the Deutschemark between 1979 and 1990) but also had a depressing 
effect on the economy in terms of growth and unemployment.65
I) 1981-1986
The 1981 jump in market rates (from the levels of the previous year; see table IV.7) 
was the result of a slower growth in the monetary base.66 Indeed, monetary policy, 
restrictive since the end of 1979, was further tightened in 1981. The beginning of the 
year saw accelerating inflation, exchange rate tensions and balance-of-payments 
deficits, against which the central bank set instruments such as an increased discount 
rate (rising from 15% to 19%, between the end of 1980 and the beginning of 1981) 
and an increase in the banks’ compulsory reserve ratio.67 Moreover, in July 1981, 
the Bol increased its degree of independence by abandoning the role of residual 
buyer of Treasury bills issued to finance the budget deficit.68
65 Fratianni and Spinelli, Monetary History, pp. 235-239 and 250-251.
66 Banca d’ltalia, Annual Report, 1981, abridged English version, p. 92.
61 Ibid., p. 91.
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Table IV. 10 Nominal and ex-post reala ordinary interest rates (%), 1981-1986.
Commercial Credit YLTGBb R R C
North-W North-E Centre South Islands IMF Italy
1981 21.38 22.21 22.15 23.22 22.67 20.56 17.85
(2.38) (3.21) (3.15) (4.22) (3.67) (1.56) (-1.15)
1982 21.07 22.21 21.64 23.18 23.36 20.90 21.3
(5.07) (6.21) (5.64) (7.18) (7.36) (4.90) (5.3)
1983 18.74 19.55 19.80 21.52 22.81 18.02 21.1
(3.74) (4.55) (4.80) (6.52) (7.81) (3.02) (6.1)
1984 19.09 19.37 19.50 20.77 21.51 14.95 19.9
(8.09) (8.37) (8.50) (9.77) (10.51) (3.95) (8.9)
1985 17-64 17.73 17.88 19.61 20.39 13.00 17.85
(8.64) (8.73) (8.88) (8.61) (11.39) (4.00) (8.85)
1986 15.34 15.55 15.92 17.72 18.16 10.52 16.8
(9.34) (9.55) (9.92) (11.72) (12.16) (4.52) (10.8)
Keys:
a : ex-post real interest rates in brackets.
b: YLTGB = yields on long term government bonds.
c: RR = Reference Rate taken as a proxy of market interest rate on MTC.
Source: Banca dTtalia, Bollettino, 1981-1983 and Bollettino Statistico, 1984-1986; IMF, 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1996.
1982 was a year of stagnating production, employment and slowdown in inflation.69 
The lowering of inflation made it possible for the central bank to decrease interest 
rates without causing faster growth of monetary aggregates. From the second half 
of 1983, production recovered and inflation decreased over the year, leading to a 
return to a balance-of-payments equilibrium. However, unemployment increased 
and industry kept suffering from large cost differentials compared with its
71competitors. The upturn in economic activity was accompanied by a recovery in 
bank credit. The central bank took a cautious stance, fearing that a growth in internal 
demand could undo the results obtained in restoring the balance-of-payments
68 D. Gressani, L. Guiso and I. Visco, ‘Disinflation in Italy: An Analysis with the Econometric Model 
of the Bank of Italy’, in: M. Baldassarri (ed.), The Italian Economy. Heaven or Hell? (New York, 
1994), p. 115.
69 Banca dTtalia, Annual Report, 1982, abridged English version, p. 26.
70 Ibid., p. 89.
71 Banca dTtalia, Annual Report, 1983, abridged English version, p. 21.
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equilibrium and curbing inflation. Consequently, around the middle of the year 
banks’ reserves were controlled more strictly.72 Overall, 1983 was a year 
characterised by an expansionary monetary policy, for the discount rate decreased by 
half a point and compulsory reserve regulations were made more permissive. In 
1984 nominal and real interest rates increased. After three years of stagnation and 
recession, the growth that had started in 1983 strengthened in 1984. Economic 
policies and a substantial increase in productivity led to a slowing of the increase in 
inflation.74 The growth in bank credit gained speed until the middle of 1984, with 
foreign lending as well as bank deposits increasing rapidly. It became clear that trade 
deficit was increasing. At the end of the summer, a series of measures was taken to 
counter these developments. The discount rate was raised by one point at the 
beginning of September, and the Bol launched a sale of securities. These measures 
were enough to contain the growth of credit aggregates as well as mop up excess 
liquidity, thus at the beginning of 1985 discount rate could be lowered.










1981 7.15-10.75 5.40 5.9-8.85 8.35 5.30
1982 10.25-15.35 7.70 5.9-8.85 8.35 5.30
1983 10.15-15.20 7.60 5.9-8.85 8.35 5.30
1984 9.60-14.35 7.20 5.9-8.85 8.35 5.30
1985 8.60-12.90 6.45 5.9-8.85 8.35 5.30
1986 8.10-12.10 6.05 6.05-10.10d 8.35 5.30
Keys:
a: interest rates on soft loans managed by the Cassa under the 1976 scheme 
b: interest rates on soft loans managed by the Cassa under previous schemes 
c: soft loan scheme subsidised by the Ministry of Industry under the terms of law 623 passed in 1959. 
d: including changes brought about by law no.64, 1st March 1986.
Source: Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1980-1985.
12 Ibid., p. 77.
73 Ibid., p. 79.
74 Banca d’ltalia, Annual Report, 1984, abridged English version, p. 23.
75 Ibid., pp. 78-79.
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Table IV. 11 displays the reference rate, the interest rates on loans available to 
establishing and expanding firms under the scheme approved in 1976 and under 
previous schemes.
Interest rates under the 1976 scheme rose considerably in 1982 because of the 
increase in the reference rate and the increased percentage of the reference rate that 
the borrowers were supposed to cover. Under the terms of the 46/1982 scheme, the 
interest rate on subsidised credit was fixed at 36% of the reference rate in the South, 
48% in the Centre and 72% in the North. From 1983 until 1986, subsidised interest 
rates under the new scheme decreased, following the trend of the market. In 1981- 
86, as well as in 1976-80, the new scheme offered Southern firms soft loans at lower 
interest rates than previously. Thus from 1981 to 1986, expanding or planned 
Southern industrial concerns could enjoy soft loans at rates ranging from a minimum 
of 5.9%-8.85% in 1981; to a maximum of 6.05%-10.10% in 1986. In the same 
period the ordinary rate in the South varied from a minimum of 17.72% (mainland) - 
18.16% (Islands) in 1986 to a maximum of 23.18% (mainland) - 23.36% (Islands) in 
1982. Thus the difference between ordinary interest rates and subsidised ones to 
Southern firms could reach a minimum of 8.87 points (calculated as the difference 
between the lowest ordinary interest rate in the period 17.72%, experienced in 1986 
in the South mainland and the highest subsidised interest rate in the year of lowest 
interest: 8.85% in 1978) to a maximum of 17.31 points (calculated as the difference 
between the highest ordinary interest rate in the period experienced in the Islands in 
1982, 23.36%, and the lowest of subsidised interest rates in the year of highest 
subsidised interest rate: 10.10% in 1986). Interest rates under the MI scheme 
remained stable over the period and from 1982 offered the cheapest rates to Northern 
firms. Interest rates under the 1965 scheme were stable until 1985.
The table below displays subsidised interest rates available to firms under the 1977 
scheme for restructuring and reorienting production. Subsidised interest rates under 
previous schemes, which had been abolished and replaced in 1977, are also 
displayed.






IRa IMI Fundsb Technology0 Ed
C/N C/N South South C/N South C/N South
1981 3.60-5.40 7.15-10.75 2.70 5.40 10.25 6.85-8.35 4.50-5.30
1982 4.30-6.40 8.55-12.80 3.20 6.40 13.70 6.85-8.35 4.50-5.30 15.35 15.35
1983 4.25-6.35 8.45-12.70 3.20 6.35 13.50 6.85-8.35 4.50-5.30 15.20 15.20
1984 4.00-6.00 8.00-12.00 3.00 6.00 12.30 6.85-8.35 4.50-5.30 12.0 10.95 9.0
1985 3.60-5.40 7.15-10.75 2.70 5.40 10.25 7.15-10.75 4.50-5.40 10.75 9.95 8.05
1986 3.40-5.05 6.75-10.10 2.55 5.05 9.20 6.75-10.10 4.50-5.05 N 10.1 9.25 7.60
S 6.05e
Keys:
a: scheme for industrial restructuring passed in 1971.
b: includes interest rates of loans extended under the schemes 1470/61 and 184/71. 
c: 1982 scheme for the introduction of technologically advanced production processes, 
d: scheme for the purchase of equipment passed in 1965.
e: N= North and S=South, in 1986 was introduced interest rates differentiated according to the area in which the firm was located. 
Source:Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1980-1985.
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In 1982, interest rates under the 1977 scheme for restructuring and reorienting 
production increased because of the technical adjustment of the reference rate 
mentioned above. From 1982 to 1985, interest rates under the 1977 scheme 
decreased following the trend in the money market. The same saw a drop in the 
interest rates of the 1971 Industrial Restructuring scheme (column 5), which offered 
loans for restructuring at the highest interest rate. Interest rates under this scheme 
were the same for the country as a whole and were not officially linked to the 
reference rate, ranging from a maximum of 64% in 1982 to a minimum of 55% in 
1986. From 1982, the Bol published rates of soft loans available under scheme 
1329, passed in 1965 and not replaced by any other scheme during 1976-7. Law 
1329 sought to assist the recovery of the machine tool industry by offering soft loans 
to firms Of any size for the purchase of equipment (see section 3.2,1). This scheme 
provided loans at an interest rate of 72% of the reference rate in 1983 and 1984. 
After 1984, it offered different rates for the North (55%) and South (45%). Rates 
under this scheme followed a decreasing trend from 1982 to 1986. A similar trend 
was also shown by the most recent scheme of 1982, designed to subsidise the 
introduction of technologically advanced production processes. Generally, the years 
1982-86 saw decreasing interest rates. The only scheme that showed stable interest 
rates until 1984, was the IMI Fund. However, during 1985-6 this scheme also saw a 
lowering of interest rates.
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II) 1987-91
Table IV.13 Nominal and Reala Market Interest Rates (%), 1987-1991.
Commercial credit YLTGBb R R C
North-W North-E Centre South Islands IMF Italy
1987 13.04 13.28 13.64 15.48 14.83 9.68 12.3
(8.04) (8.28) (8.64) (10.48) (9.83) (4.68) (7.3)
1988 13.11 13.36 13.77 15.44 15.26 10.16 14.15
(8.11) (8.36) (8.77) (10.44) (10.26) (5.16) (9.15)
1989d 13.90 14.12 14.67 15.95 16.01 10.72 14.8
(7.90) (8.12) (8.67) (9.95) (10.01) (4.72) (8.8)
1990 13.86 14.16 14.74 15.83 16.02 11.51 14.65
(7.86) (8.16) (8.74) (9.83) (10.02) (5.51) (8.65)
1991 13.72 13.91 14.62 15.59 15.86 13.18 14.55
(7.72) (7.91) (8.62) (9.59) (9.86) (7.18) (8.55)
Keys:
a: ex-post real interest rates in brackets.
b: YLTGB = yields on long term government bonds.
c: RR = Reference Rate taken as a proxy of market interest rate on MTC.
d: for 1989, the annual average has been calculated on three observations as the last quarterly 
observation is not available.
Source: Banca dTtalia, Relazione Annuale, 1986-1990; IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook, 1996, pp. 452-453.
The decrease that started in 1981 continued until 1987, when commercial rates fell 
by a minimum of 2.27 points (in the North-East) to a maximum of 3.33 points (in the 
Islands), while the reference rate was reduced by 4.5 points, whereas yields on long­
term government bonds fell by only 0.84 points. Both interest rates and inflation 
(1% in 1989) rose during 1988-1989. In this period, the Italian economy was 
expanding with GDP growing by 2.9% in 1986,76 3.1% in 1987 and 3.9% in 1988.77 
The increase in employment in 1988 caused an increase in internal demand and price 
rises.78 Rising inflation plunged the Italian currency into the lower band of the EMS. 
The central bank controlled inflation by increasing the discount rate, and market rates
76 Banca dTtalia, Annual Report, 1987, abridged English version, p. 28.
77 Banca dTtalia, Annual Report, 1988, abridged English version, p. 28.
78 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
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soon followed.79 In the following year, the lira entered the narrow band of the EMS 
(+/- 2.25), but GDP growth decreased: by 3% in 1989 and 2% in 1990.80
The table below displays the interest rates at which subsidised interest credit was 
available to small and medium-sized firms.
Table IV. 14 Subsidised interest rates available to establishing and expanding firms 
(%), 1987-91
1976 Scheme Agency3 MIb
Italy South Italy South
1987 4.95-7.40 4.45-7.40 8.35 5.30
1988 5.70-8.50 5.10-8.50 8.35 5.30
1989 5.95-8.90 5.35-8.90 8.35 5.30
1990 5.90-8.80 5.30-8.80 8.35 5.30
1991 5.85-8.75 5.25-8.75 8.75 5.25
Keys
a= interest rates on soft loans managed by the Cassa under the 1976 scheme.
b= soft loan scheme subsidised by the Ministry of Industry under the terms of law 623 passed in 1959. 
Source: Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1986-1990.
Under the 1976 scheme, soft loans were available to Southern firms at 36% or 60% 
of the reference rate, according to the size of the investment. Northern firms were 
entitled to borrow at rates equal to 40% if located in the less developed areas of the 
Centre and the North, and 60% if in the rest of the Centre and North, irrespectively 
of the size of the investment.81 Pegged to the reference rate, the subsidised rates 
followed the capital market closely, decreasing until 1987, increasing in 1989-90, 
and decreasing again in 1990-91. Interest rates of the MI scheme had remained stable 
from 1976, varying slightly in 1991. Interest rates to Northern firms went up 
slightly, thus matching those available to small firms located in the North and Centre 
outside undeveloped areas. Interest rates available to Southern firms slightly 
decreased thus matching interest rates available to Southern firms investing up to 30 
billions.
19 Ibid., p. 84.
80 Banca d’ltalia, Annual Report, 1990, abridged English version, pp. 26-27.
81 Yuill et al., European Regional Incentives, p. 310.
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The table below displays interest rates available to firms undertaking restructuring or 
reorienting production.




IRa DVD Funds” Technology0 Equipment
Italy Italy South South Italy South Italy South Italy South
1987 2.50-3.70 4.95-7.40 1.85 3.70 4.70 4.95-7.50 4.50-3.70 7.40 4.45 6.80 5.55
1988 2.85-4.25 5.70-8.50 2.15 4.25 6.55 4.50-8.50 4.25-4.50 8.50 5.10 7.80 6.40
1989 3.00-4.45 5.95-8.90 2.15 4.45 7.20 4.50-8.90 4.45-4.50 8.90 5.35 6.70 5.20
1990 2.95-4.40 5.85-8.80 2.20 4.40 7.05 4.50-8.80 4.40-4.50 8.80 5.25 9.65 6.65
1991 2.95-4.40 5.85-8.75 2.20 4.40 7.10 4.50-8.75 4.40-4.50 8.75 5.25 8.75 5.85
Keys:
a: Industrial Restructuring scheme passed in 1971.
b: IMI Funds includes scheme 1470/61 for the reconversion of industry; scheme 1089/68 for applied research; scheme 184/71 for the reconstruction of industry, 
c: 1982 scheme, subsidising the introduction of technologically advanced production processes, 
d: 1965 scheme, subsidising the purchasing of equipment.
Source: Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1986-1990.
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The rate of the 1977 scheme remained equal to 15% of the reference rate for 
Southern firms. Northern firms undertaking restructuring programmes could benefit 
from loans carrying rates of 20% and 30% if the loan was to be used to undertake a 
reconversion programme. Rates for Southern and Northern firms doubled if 
borrowing from medium-term credit Institutions rather than from the Fund. The 
1977 scheme was the cheapest available to Northern and Southern firms, cheaper 
than the schemes it was supposed to replace, such as that for the Industrial 
Restructuring (column 6) and IMI funds. Columns 9 and 10 display rates available 
to firms for the introduction of technological innovations in their production process. 
The 1982 scheme envisaged interest rates equal to 36% to firms located in the South 
and 60% of the reference rate to firms located in the rest of the country.
Rates under various schemes followed the same trend, decreasing until 1987, 
increasing in 1988-89 and slightly decreasing in 1990-91. The only exception was 
the 1965 scheme subsidising the purchasing of machines (columns 11 and 12). This 
scheme's rates decreased until 1987, increased in 1988 and decreased again in 1989, 
when other rates were still increasing. In 1990, its rates increased considerably while 
other subsidised and market rates were slightly decreasing. In 1991, its rates 
matched the general downward trend.
4.2 Geographical distribution of MTC.
This section studies the regional distribution of subsidised credit generated by soft 
loan schemes, within the framework of the regional and national industrial policies, 
and compares it with the distribution of market credit. It also provides an indication 
of the geographical distribution of subsidised credit to small and medium sized firms.
I) 1953-1956 and 1957-1965
The analysis starts from 1953, the year in which the MCC initiated the provision of 
subsidised credit to small and medium-sized firms throughout the country.
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Table IV.16 Geographical distribution of subsidised MTC, 1953-1956 (annual 
average, bn, 1980 lire)
1953-56 North-W North-E Centre South Italy
bn lire 48A 23J  2fr6 19^ 8 m 3
% Italy 40.8 20.0 22.5 16.7 100
Source: Mediocredito Centrale, Relazione alBilancio, 1962
Table IV.16 clearly shows that in the first half of the 1950s, when the only soft loan 
scheme was that subsidised by the MCC (scheme 949/1952), the North-West was the 
main recipient, whereas the South received the lowest share. The small amount of 
loans extended to the South is explained by the MCC in terms of the lack of interest 
from credit institutions in the South. The MCC scheme offered credit institutions the 
possibility of refinancing themselves at a lower interest rate, but Southern credit 
institutions could finance themselves using funds bearing no cost, such as their 
endowment funds and funds provided by the Cassa, which were also expected to 
increase in the following years.82
Table IV. 17 Geographical distribution of subsidised MTC, 1957-1965 (annual 
average, bn, 1980 lire)
North-W North-E Centre South Italy
bn lire 152.7 119.4 113.6 252.4 638.1
% Italy 23.9 18.7 17.8 39.6 100
Sources: Mediocredito Centrale, Relazione alBilancio, 1962; Pergolesi, II Credito, p. 302.
Table IV. 17 displays the annual average of soft loans extended by the MCC and by 
the MI (scheme 623/59). The only scheme operational in those years and not 
included in the table is the one managed by the Cassa.83
It is clear that with the introduction of the MI scheme, the South received the lion’s 
share of subsidised credit, which can be due to both a larger number of soft loans 
extended and larger sums granted. The scheme allowed Southern firms to borrow
82 Mediocredito Centrale, Bilancio, 1954, p. 7 and 1955, pp. 13-14.
201
twice as much as their Northern and Central counterparts. The Centre and the North- 
East benefited least from the MCC and MI schemes.
II) 1966-70
The following table displays the geographical distribution of loans subsidised under 
various schemes operational in the period under examination. It also includes figures 
referring to the ordinary MTC. Subsidised MTC includes sums awarded under all 
national schemes in operation, and for the South, all loans issued by the Cassa.
Table IV. 18 Geographical distribution of net subsidised and ordinary MTC to 
industry and public works,a 1966-70 (annual average, bn, 1980 lire)84
S O T S O T
Absolute amount % Italy
North-W 754 886 1,641 27.3 46.9 35.3
North-E 359 250 609 13.0 13.2 13.1
Centre 413 491 904 15.0 26.0 19.4
South 1,233 264 1,498 44.7 14.0 32.2
Italy 2,760 1,891 4,652 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1967-1971.
Keys: a: Net balance of credit transactions; S= Subsidised credit; 0 =  Ordinary credit; T= Total;
Whereas the North-West received the highest percentage of total MTC, the South 
secured the highest share of subsidised credit, which formed the overwhelming 
majority of MTC it received. The North-East benefited least from both forms of 
credit during this period.
83 Information on soft loans managed by the Cassa between 1957 and 1965 is included in tables IV.25 
and IV.26. It could not be included in table IV. 17 as it refers to soft loans approved by the Cassa in 
those years, whereas information on MCC and MI schemes refer to loans extended.
84 For this sub-period, the Bank of Italy published figures referring to credit extended by the end of 
the period; therefore, it was possible to calculate only the net balance of credit transactions.
Moreover, credit to industry is not separated from credit to public works. From 1974 onwards, the 
same source publishes more detailed information, not only for credit extended by the end of the period
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HI) 1971-75 and 1976-80
Given the peculiar nature of the 1971-75 period, it is more appropriate to analyse 
credit on an annual basis. For comparative purposes, this section also presents 
annual data for the 1976-80 period. As already mentioned, after 1974 the Bank of 
Italy published figures for both new credit extended and the net balance of credit 
transactions, and the following tables present both. It would be preferable to use 
only new credit extended for the years between 1974 to 1991, as these figures are not 
affected by changes in patterns of loan repayments and display consistently positive 
values. On the contrary, the net balance of credit transactions displays negative 
values from 1973 to the first half of the 1980s, when credit repaid exceeded new 
credit extended, which makes the interpretation of percentages cumbersome. 
However, the net balance of credit transactions has been included in the tables below 
in order to preserve the comparability with the years between 1966 and 1973, for 
which only this figure is available.
but also for credit extended in each period, with credit to industry separated from credit to public 
works. Thus from that year onwards it is possible to provide a more detailed analysis.
Table IV. 19 Geographical distribution of net subsidised and ordinary MTC, 1971-1975 (000 billion lire at 1980 prices).
North-W North-E Centre South Italy
000 bn 80 S O T S O T S O T S O T S O T
1971a 1.1 2.7 3.8 0.3 0.7 1.0 0.3 0.6 1.0 2.3 0.3 2.6 4.0 4.4 8.3
1972a 0.3 2.0 2.3 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.8 3.1 0.6 3.7 3.9 3.7 7.7
1973* -0.8 3.1 2.3 0.06 0.5 0.5 -0.2 0.8 0.6 -1.4 2.2 0.8 -2.3 6.5 4.2
1974a -1.3 -1.5 -2.8 -0.5 -0.5 -1.1 -0.4 -0.7 -1.1 -2.0 -0.4 -2.4 -4.2 -3.2 -7.4
1975a 0.3 -1.1 -0.8 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.02 -0.14 -0.16 0.5 -0.6 -0.1 0.6 -2.2 -1.6
1971-75 aaa -0.1 1.0 0.9 -0.02 0.2 0.2 0.01 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.4 1.8 2.2
% Area -8.4 108.4 100 -12.2 112.2 100 4.3 95.7 100 54.7 45.3 100 17.9 82.1 100
% Italy -19.8 56.0 42.4 -5.0 10.0 7.3 2.5 11.9 10.2 122.3 22.1 40.0 100 100 100
1974-75 aab 1.0 4.2 5.3 0.7 1.1 1.8 0.8 1.5 2.3 2.1 1.7 3.8 4.6 8.6 13.2
% Area 19.9 80.1 100 37.9 62.1 100 33.5 66.5 100 54.9 45.1 100 34.9 65.1 100
% Italy 22.8 49.0 39.9 15.2 13.3 14.0 16.7 17.7 17.4 45.3 19.9 28.8 100 100 100
Keys: a: Net balance of credit transactions; b: New credit extended; S= subsidised; 0=  ordinary; T= total; aa= annual average.
Note: From 1974 details on credit to public works are ayadahje, in the 1974-1975 period subsidised credit to public works amounted to 0.7% of the total new subsidised credit 
extended in the country and total credit to public work^8.7%^gf the total new credit extended.
Source: Banca d’ltalia, Bollettino, 1971-1976; Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1970.
Table IV.20 Territorial distribution of net subsidised and ordinary MTC to industry and public works3, 1976-1980, (000 billion lire, 1980 lire).











1976“ 0.4 -1.8 -1.4 0.23 -0.27 -0.05 0.1 -0.6 -0.5 -1.3 -0.4 -1.6 -0.6 -3.0 -3.6
1977a 0.4 -1.0 -0.6 0.03 -0.27 -0.24 -0.004 0.3 0.3 -1.4 0.0 -1.4 -1.0 -1.0 -2.0
1978a -0.2 0.8 0.6 -0.3 0.4 0.03 -0.1 0.3 0.2 -0.8 -0.3 -1.1 -1.4 1.2 -0.3
1979a -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.02 -0.2 -1.1 -0.5 -1.6 -1.7 -1.3 -3.0
1980a -0.3 -0.7 -1.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -1.3 -2.1 -1.4 -2.6 -4.0
1976-80 aaa -0.01 -0.7 -0.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -1.1 -0.5 -1.6 -1.2 -1.4 -2.6
% Area 1.58 98.4 100.0 39.9 60.1 100.0 57.5 42.5 100.0 67.9 32.1 100.0 47.7 52.3 100.0
% Italy 0.9 49.1 26.1 7.3 10.0 8.7 5.6 3.8 4.7 86.2 37.1 60.5 100.0 100.0 100.0
1976-80 aab 1.5 3.8 5.3 0.7 1.1 1.8 0.7 1.8 2.5 1.0 1.3 2.2 3.8 8.0 11.8
% Area 28.1 71.9 100.0 38.3 61.7 100.0 27.8 72.2 100.0 42.9 57.1 100.0 32.3 67.7 100.0
% Italy 39.0 47.7 44.9 17.7 13.6 14.9 18.4 22.9 21.4 25.0 15.9 18.8 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Banca d’ltalia, Bollettino, 1976-1980.
Keys as above




During 1971, the provision of credit increased throughout the country, reaching 
values well above the average for the previous period. In 1972, Southern Italy 
experienced an even more remarkable increase in the supply of MTC, mainly 
because 1972 was the first year in which credit envisaged by law 853 (approved at 
the end of 1971) was actually available. For 1970-1, the statistics on credit demand 
and supply are available. Loan applications in 1970 amounted to 4,200 bn lire and 
the credit extended amounted to 1,972.8 bn. In 1971, loan applications totalled 
13,200 bn lire whereas loans provided amounted to 3,594.7 bn (current prices). Thus 
in 1970, MTCIs were able to satisfy 46.9% of demand, but only 27.2% in 1971. The 
exceptional increase in demand for credit resulted from the exceptional quantity of 
industrial applications, mainly concerning plans for investment in the basic sector in
O f
the South. The huge increase of Southern demand together with the belated 
approval of the 1971-1975 programme helps to explain the fall of the percentage of 
credit demand which the MTCIs were able to satisfy.
From 1972, the overall availability of MTC decreased, except in the South. From 
1973, new issues of such credit were less than the repayments on previous issues, 
hence the negative figures until the early 1980s. Various factors are held responsible 
for this: funds allocated as contributions towards interest payments dried up in some 
sectors; difficulties developed in fund raising by the MTCIs, due to the drop in 
quotations on the bond market. This last factor, combined with the delay in adjusting 
the basic rates on subsidised operations, made medium-term lending unprofitable. 
Given the difference between short and long-term interest rates (as displayed in 
tables IV.5 and IV.6), banks preferred lending their liquid assets at higher interest 
rates, i.e. short term. Diverting resources from medium to short-term lending is 
technically possible because of close institutional and economic links existing 
between the special institutions and the banks.86 As explained in Chapter HI, the 
MTCIs had been created, under the terms of their charters, by ordinary banks, which 
contributed to the financing of MTCIs acquiring their bonds (for the establishment of 
MTCIs and the economic links between ordinary banks and MTCIs see Chapter IE).
85 Banca d’ltalia, Annual Report, 1971, abridged English version, pp. 132-134.
86 Banca d’ltalia, Annual Report, 1974, abridged English version, pp. 146-148.
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In order to redirect money into the medium-term market, preserving low interest 
rates, in June 1973 the Bol introduced the so-called ‘portfolio obligation’ (vincolo di 
portafoglio), which obliged banks to increase their investment in bonds, to reach a 
minimum of 6% of their deposits at the end of the previous year. Within this 
increase, a large share was represented by bonds issued by the MTCIs, ENI and 
private companies, whereas a minor share was allocated to government bonds. 
Banks had until the end of 1973 to comply with this requirement, which was then 
renewed and banks were obliged to invest up to 9% of their deposits by June 1974, 
when it was renewed once again, obliging banks to invest a further 3% of their 
deposits at the end of 1973. However, the investment in bonds should not have 
exceeded 50% of new deposits in the first six months of 1974. The portfolio 
obligation was periodically renewed until 1978, however, since 1975 the amount of
o<7
investment in percentage of new deposits was gradually decreased.
In the same years, 1973-1978, the Bol also introduced a ceiling on loans extended. 
Clients were divided into four groups, according to the size of their loans to the bank. 
For each of these groups, a ceiling on further loans was imposed, with the exception 
of the smallest group - clients with loans below 500m lire (current lire) - on which no 
ceiling was imposed if these were neither financial nor commercial enterprises. With 
this manoeuvre, the Bol was avoiding credit rationing towards small firms, which
OQ
were perceived as the most affected by a liquidity squeeze.
From 1975, MTC showed a slight recovery due to the Bol measures, the increase in 
the net value of securities issued by the institutions and the profitability of the
OQ
adjusted basic rate and interest rates on MTC. For although the net balance of 
credit transactions remained negative until the beginning of the 1980s, it never again 
reached the 1974 low.
87 Fazio, ‘La politica’, p. 292; D. Croff and F. Passacantando, ‘II controllo diretto del credito’, in: F. 
Cotula and P. de’ Stefani, La politica monetaria in Italia. Istituti e strumenti (Bologna, 1979), pp. 
578-582.
88 Croff and Passacantando, ‘II controllo’, pp. 575-578.
89 Banca d’ltalia, Annual Report, 1975, abridged English version, pp. 134-136.
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In the 1971-75 period, only 18% of MTC extended nationally was subsidised, against 
60% in the previous sub-period. The area worst hit by the decreased availability of 
subsidised loans was the North-West. At the opposite end of the spectrum was the 
South, which secured the lion’s share of subsidised and ordinary credit. However, 
from 1976, a major change took place in the direction of subsidised credit, for from 
1976 the North-West, not the South, was the main beneficiary, as also shown in 
graph IV. 1 below.
Graph IV. 1 Geographical distribution of subsidised MTC, 1974-1980: new credit 
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Source: Banca d’ltalia, Bollettino, 1975-1981.
In 1975, the Bol observed that consistently with the pattern of the previous year, 
subsidised credit was increasing more in the North and Centre than in the South, 
mainly because of an increase of credit to small and medium-sized firms.90 The 
increase did not occur in the North-West, where subsidised credit decreased by 4% in 
1975 as compared to the previous year. The increase took place in the North-East 
(26.5%) and Centre (6%), which easily outstripped the 1% increase in the South.91 
However, the amount of subsidised credit received by the North-East and Centre was
90 Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1975, p. 349.
91 Increase calculated from data reported in Banca d’ltalia, Bollettino, 1975 and 1976.
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much less than that received by the South before 1976-1977. Thus, a comparison of 
the percentage increase of these three regions is not very meaningful.
The Bol points out the dramatic loss of share of subsidised MTC experienced by the 
South in 197692and explains it as due to a tendency, already shown in the previous 
years, to leave almost entirely to the Cassa the financing of Southern firms, whereas 
national schemes concentrated in the North and Centre. In 1976, the disadvantage 
suffered by the South became evident due to the delay in the approval of the 1976 
scheme, whereas the previous scheme (law 853/1971) covered only the 1971-75 
period. The reduced access of Southern firms to national schemes is clearly bom 
out by table IV.24 below, which shows that from 1976 a smaller percentage of 
applications for subsidies coming from the South was accepted under the terms of 
the national scheme. Moreover, not only the access of Southern firms to national 
schemes was reduced, but also the Cassa expenditure on subsidies as well as its 
overall expenditure started a declining trend after 1976, as shown in graph IV.2 
below.
92 The Bol estimated the Southern share of subsidised MTC in 1976 as equal to 24.7%, against 43.1% 
in 1975 and approximately 50% in the previous decade. The estimation of the decrease in the 
Southern share changed in the following report, when the South was reported as benefiting from 
27.8% in 1977 as compared to 33.7% in 1976. The computations presented in tables IV.19, IV.20, 
and graph IV. 1, do not equal precisely the estimations of the Bol, but the values are very close and the 
computation of the Southern share in 1976 falls in betweeen the two values given by the Bol. Banca 
d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1976, pp. 328-330; Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1977, p. 330.
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Source: Cassa per il Mezzogiomo, Relazione al Bilancio, 1951-1993.
Establishing 1976 as the turning point is supported not only by the analysis of the 
total expenditure of the Cassa, but it also matches with the reorganisation of the 
system of subsidised credit (see chapter IQ). It seems plausible that following the fall 
in the Italian GDP in 1975, the boosting of the national economy by directing state 
resources into the most productive areas, and therefore the diversion of resources 
from the South to the North-West, became the new priority. A similar interpretation 
is proposed by Faini and Schiantarelli.94 The authors point out that the industrial 
policy legislation passed in 1976 and 1977 meant that ‘incentives that were once 
reserved to the South were extended on massive scale to the entire country’.95 In 
turn, this was caused by the end of cheap labour in 1969 and cheap energy in 1973. 
In the face of the changed economic conditions, the industrialization of Southern 
Italy began to be addressed within the context of the restructuring of industry in the 
whole country.96
93 Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1976, p. 330.
94 Faini and Schiantarelli, ‘Regional Implications’, pp. 97-117.
95 Ibid.,?. 105.
96 Ibid., p. 98.
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Previous authors have acknowledged this change in the direction of subsidies but the 
timing seems imprecise. Pergolesi identified it as starting from 1973-74, on the basis 
that from 1973 subsidised credit decreased in the South. This is correct: in the South 
subsidised credit decreased by 39.5% between 1973 and 1974, but the decrease was 
even more marked in the North-west, where the correspondent figure was 72.8%. 
Therefore at that date the South still seems to be ‘privileged’. This is certainly not 
the case after 1976, when subsidised credit continued to increase in the North-west 
and decreased in the South.
Del Monte and Giannola have calculated the ratio between the value of grants and 
contributions on interest awarded to the South, and the value of awards to the Centre 
and North.97 They point out a sudden decrease of the ratio after 1974, when it 
reached the highest level. By 1976, the ratio dropped to pre-1970 levels. The 
authors draw the conclusion that from the second half of the 1970s the Centre and 
North have been privileged by the system of incentives and that the comparative 
advantage to invest in the South decreased after that date.98 Therefore, the re­
analysis of the distribution of subsidised credit presented in this chapter confirms the 
timing identified by Del Monte and Giannola on a different set of data. However, the 
two authors do not associate the change in geographical priorities with any 
institutional change, and in particular with the one taking place exactly in 1976.
On the contrary, the 1976 institutional change concerning the Italian regional policy 
is noticed by D. Yuill et al.,99 who point out similar changes in the Netherlands and 
in the UK in 1979. A distinct hostility towards regional policy in the Western 
European countries followed the oil crisis of 1973-74. The changed economic 
conditions, characterized by ‘widespread high unemployment, inflation, industrial 
over-capacity, low levels of investment, increasing competition from low-labour-cost 
countries and public expenditure curtailment' were 'clearly not at all favourable to 
regional policy’.100 In addition, the previous fear of congestion in the major cities 
due to migratory flows from poorer areas of the countries had receded, the lack of
97 Del Monte and Giannola, Istituzioni economiche, pp. 271-275.
98 Ibid., pp. 272.
99 Yuill et al., Regional Policy, pp. 220-224.
m  Ibid., p. 220.
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expansion of manufacturing industry meant that government had very little control 
over its location, and the rapid growth of incentive schemes available at the national
level automatically decreased the profitability of investing in less developed
_  ■ _  101 regions.
The analysis conducted in chapter IE and in this chapter, brings together the 
institutional and economic side studied by different authors and points out that the 
1976 institutional change was associated with a change in the direction of subsidies 
in favour of the most industrialised areas of the country. Other authors attribute the 
decrease of subsidies to Southern Italy in the 1970s and 1980s as due to the change 
in priorities of the industrial policy in the whole country. This now became focused 
more on the restructuring of existing plants (in particular law 675/77, mentioned in 
chapter IQ) than on the establishment of new plants. As plants were mainly 
concentrated in the North and Centre of the country, these were the areas that 
benefited most from subsidies.102 However, this can hardly explain the whole shift 
of subsidies from the South to the North-West, particularly as the 675 scheme was 
passed in 1977 and preliminary measures to extend subsidies under this scheme were 
undertaken in December 1978.103 The shift of subsidised loans had already become 
clear in 1976, when not only the financing of Southern firms was left almost entirely 
to the Cassa, following a pattern observed by the Bol in the previous years, but also 
the expenditure of the Cassa start to decrease (as shown in Graph IV.2 above). 
Moreover, until 1984, 44% of investment approved under scheme 675/77 was 
located in the South,104 therefore it seems unlikely that the scheme was the major 
cause of the shift of subsidised loans away from the South.
101 Ibid., pp. 220-224.
102 Jossa/B^‘Credit and economic development in Southern Italy’, Review o f Economic Conditions in 
Italy, 1995/2 (1995), pp. 192-196.
103 Measures such as the definition o f sectoral programmes which indicated the sectors benefitting
from subsidies under the 675/77 scheme, Pent Fomengo, ‘Le politiche’, p. 38.
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IV) 1981-86 and 1987-91
This section analyses the geographical distribution of MTC in the sub-periods 1976- 
81 and 1986-91.
mIbid., p. 44.












aa* 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.05 0.01 0.07 -0.003 0.7 0.7 -0.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 1.3 1.2
%Area 39.1 60.9 100 78.9 21.1 100 -0.4 100.4 100 254.2 -154.2 100 -9.5 109.5 100
% Italy -197.4 26.6 47.9 -45.5 1.1 5.5 2.4 54.4 59.4 340.6 17.9 -12.7 100 100 100
aab 1.6 5.4 6.9 0.7 1.3 2.1 0.7 3.7 4.4 0.8 1.7 2.5 3.8 12.1 15.9
% Area 22.4 77.6 100 35.2 64.8 100 15.1 84.9 100 32.6 67.4 100 23.6 76.4 100
% Italy 41.5 44.5 43.7 19.3 11.0 13.0 17.7 30.8 27.7 21.5 13.8 15.6 100 100 100
Source: Banca d’ltalia, Bollettino, 1981-1983, and Bollettino Statistico, 1984-1987.
Keys: aa: annual average; a: net balance of credit transactions; b: new credit extended.
Note: Subsidised credit to public works amounted to 0.8% of the total new subsidised credit extended in the country and total credit to public works 9.1% of the total new 
credit extended.












aaa 0.2 1.2 1.4 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.2 2.6 2.8 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.8 5.1 5.8
% Area 11.5 88.5 100 30.3 69.7 100 8.1 91.9 100 16.9 83.1 100 13.2 86.8 100
% Italy 20.8 24.3 23.8 31.4 11.0 13.6 29.8 51.4 48.5 18.0 13.4 14.0 100 100 100
aab 1.7 6.6 8.3 0.8 1.7 2.6 0.9 5.8 6.7 1.0 2.2 3.2 4.4 16.4 20.8
% Area 20.4 79.6 100 32.9 67.1 100 13.8 86.2 100 30.3 69.7 100 21.4 78.6 100
% Italy 38.1 40.5 40.0 19.0 10.5 12.3 20.9 35.4 32.3 21.9 13.7 15.4 100 100 100
Source: Banca d’ltalia, Bollettino Statistico, 1987-1992.
Note: Information on credit extended in 1990 refer only to credit extended during the period October-December 1990, as only those are published by the Bol.
Keys as above.
Note: Subsidised credit to public works amounted to 1.9% of the total new subsidised credit extended in the country and total credit to public works 7.5% of the total new 
credit extended.
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Tables IV.21 and IV.22 show that the recovery of subsidised and market MTC in 
terms of the net balance of credit transactions took place in the first half of the 1980s, 
apart from the South, and only to a smaller extent in the Centre, where the net 
balance of subsidised credit did not return to positive values until the 1987-91 sub­
period.
During both sub-periods, the North-West continued to be the major recipient of both 
types of MTC, obtaining approximately 40% of the national total of soft loans, while 
the South remained the second most important destination for such loans. The 
Southern share in the national total continued to decline, as did the importance of 
subsidised credit as a percentage of all MTC in the South. The North- East 
continued to receive the least amount of MTC as it had since 1976, and its share in 
the national total declined even further. The Centre had experienced continual 
gradual increases in the total amount of credit received since 1976.
The analysis developed so far has assessed to what extent the various regions 
benefited from subsidised loans, and which regions were the main beneficiaries of 
such schemes. The clear conclusion is that the South was the main beneficiary until 
1976 and its share considerably decreased by the end of the period, and the North­
east was consistently the region that least benefited from subsidised loans. These 
conclusions are drawn based on the regional distribution of subsidised medium-term 
credit as a whole. As the following chapters (chapters V and VI) will evaluate the 
importance of subsidies for small and medium-sized firms within IDs, it seems 
appropriate to focus as far as possible on subsidised credit to small and medium­
sized firms.
Scheme 623/1959 financed by the MI was specifically designed for small and 
medium-sized firms in the whole country (as explained in Chapter III). Based on 
original data provided by the MI (the MI data set is described more in details in 
section 4.3) and from 1971 on the basis of information published by the Bol, it was 
possible to gain some insights into the regional distribution of the above-mentioned 
scheme. The results are displayed in table IV.23.
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Table IV.23 Geographical distribution of soft loans to small and medium-sized firms 
(Scheme MI, 000 bn 1980 lire, and as a percentage of total subsidised credit to the 
area in brackets)
North-W North-E Centre South Italy
1962-65 aaa 0.18 0.16 0.22 0.54 1.09
1966-70 aaa 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.71 1.75
1971-75 aab 0.01 0.01 0.002 -0.27 -0.24
1974-75 aaa 0.06(11.4) 0.14(43) 0.11 (28.8) 0.13 (12.8) 0.4(19.6)
1976-80 aaa 0.03 (10.1) 0.03 (23) 0.02(16.4) 0.02 (11.8) 0.1 (13.9)
Source: data provided by the Ministry of Industry; Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1967-1971 and 
Bollettino, 1971-1981.
Keys: a = New credit extended; b = Net balance of credit transactions.
Note: It was not possible to calculate the scheme MI as a percentage of total subsidised credit for the 
period 1962-65, as figures of total subsidised credit available do not include the Cassa subsidies (as 
for table 4.2.2, see fii 85), and thus the percentages for the Centre and South would have been 
misleading. For 1966-70, total subsidised credit is available only as net balance of credit transactions, 
whereas the data provided by the MI refer to new credit extended. For the 1971-75 period information 
on the MI scheme and total subsidised credit are published by the Bol as net balance of credit 
transactions, however due to negative numbers it was preferred not to express MI as a percentage of 
total subsidised credit. From 1974 to 1980, when the scheme ended, figures for the MI scheme and 
total subsidised credit are provided by the Bol as new credit extended.
From table IV.23, it is clear that the South was the main recipient of this scheme in 
the 1960s. The North-East also received significant amounts, particularly in the 
1970s. This is broadly in line with the already mentioned Bol reports, which in 1975 
pointed out an increase in subsidised credit to small and medium-sized firms in the 
North and Centre (as shown in graph IV. I).105 This contrasts with the geographical 
distribution of subsidised credit as a whole, where the North-East, together with the 
Centre received the smallest shares (tables IV.16-IV.22).
When considering only the MI scheme, specifically targeting small and medium­
sized firms, the North-East, although not consistently the main beneficiary, fares 
much better in comparison with other areas, unlike when considering subsidised 
credit as a whole (see tables IV.16-1V.22). On the one hand, this result reflects the 
importance of small firms in the regional economy, an issue addressed in previous 
chapters of this thesis. On the other hand, the result indicates that subsidised loans to
105 Banca d’ltalia, Relazione Annuale, 1975, p. 349.
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small and medium-sized North-Eastern firms might turn out to be more important 
than initially suggested by the regional distribution of subsidised MTC as a whole, a 
point that the analysis of the two samples, in chapters V and VI, will help clarify.
4.3 Requests for and availability of subsidies
The analysis conducted in the previous section has shown to what extent the various 
regions benefited from subsidies. However, whether such a distribution was 
determined by the applications for, or availability of, subsidised loans has not been 
explained. Table IV.24 below addresses this issue based on original data provided 
by the Ministry of Industry.
The Ministry of Industry data set includes information on applications and extension 
of soft loans under the above-mentioned MI scheme (scheme 623/1959, see section 
3.2,1) and on the soft loan scheme DPR 902 introduced in 1976 (see section 3.2, IV). 
These two schemes are particularly interesting as the former specifically targeted 
small firms and the latter marked the reorganisation of soft loan schemes throughout 
the whole country. Information on these two schemes include, for each year and 
region, the number of applications received by the central institutions, investment 
proposed and the value of subsidised loans applied for. Corresponding statistics are 
provided for approved applications, by year and region, specifying their number, the 
value of the approved investment and amount of the subsidised loan granted. These 
figures refer to the ‘second stage’ of the selection. The initial assessment of the 
investment project was performed by the credit institutions authorised to extend 
subsidised credit. However, these were under great pressure to accept a wide number 
of projects.106
106 F. Ventriglia, ‘II credito a medio termine’, in Rassegna Economica, 44 (1980), pp. 903-970; F. 
Ventriglia, ‘La responsabilita del banchiere a medio termine’ in Rassegna Economica, 45 (1981), pp. 
609-657.
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1953-55 MTCI 100 d 100d 87.6d 92.6d 82.4d 98.7d 88.4d n.a.
1957-65 MI n.a. 48e n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a n.a n.a.
1966-70 MI 50 n.a 100 100 99.6 99.7 99.8 99.9
1971-75 MI 28 46 95.8 96.6 97 95.8 96.3 97
1976-80 MI 14 39 83.7 78.2 79.13 83.1 81 85.8
DPR 902f 3f 14f 56.4f 69.9f 72.5f g 66.3f 65.5
1981-86 DPR 902 9 44 89.3 81 83.5 75.3 82.3 86
1987-91 DPR 902 3.2 17 88.3 90.9 94 51 81 87
K eys:
a: Scheme as % o f total subsidised credit, 
b: Scheme as % o f subsidised credit to investment.
c: Value o f investment approved as % o f investment projects submitted, national average, 
d: from 1953 to 1955, as only for those years information on applications is provided
e: as a percentage o f subsidised and non-subsidised medium term credit to industry (1961-1964), as these are the 
only figures published by the Bank o f Italy in these years appropriate for comparison, 
f: 1978-80 only, as the scheme DPR 902/76, became operational in 1978. 
g: no requests for loans were reported from the South.
Sources: Mediocredito Centrale, Bilancio , 1955 (MTCI scheme); data obtained from the Ministry o f Industry (for 
MI and DPR 902 schemes); Banca d’ltalia, Bollettino  and B ollettino Statistico, various years, for total subsidised 
credit and subsidised credit to investment. All data were calculated into constant 1980 lire before the 
percentages were calculated.
Columns 3 and 4 in table IV.24 show the percentage of total subsidised credit (tsc) 
and subsidised credit to investment (sci) represented by the MI and DPR 902 
schemes. For the period up to 1975 and from 1981 to 1986, the schemes for which 
data were available represent a high share of the subsidised credit to industry for 
investment purposes, therefore the results are most reliable for those periods. The 
table indicates the degree to which the national institutions in charge of subsidised 
credit responded to applications for loans. It is clear that a very high share of the 
applications for subsidised loans was successful, suggesting that areas benefiting less 
from such schemes - like the North-East - were those where less subsidised credit 
had been sought, with the exception of Southern Italy from 1976 onwards, where far 
stricter selection criteria were applied after that date.
Figures in table IV.24 indicate the ability of Southern firms to access only national 
soft loan schemes. Southern firms and firms expanding in the South were eligible 
also for soft loans and grants managed by the Cassa. Figures on Cassa subsidies in 
tables IV.25 and IV.26 refer to grants and soft loans approved by the Cassa in a given 
year, rather than those actually awarded. The Cassa was legally permitted to grant
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incentives beyond its current financial means, and could thus award sums out of 
funds that were expected to be available in years to come.107 Tables IV.25 and IV.26 
demonstrate the trends in both availability of, and applications for, Cassa assistance 
from 1957 onwards. These tables are based on a further data set provided by the MI, 
specifying the number of applications, value of the investment represented by 
applications, number of applications accepted and investment represented by 
successful applications. Moreover, the data set includes the value of grants and 
subsidised loans approved by the Cassa, but it does not include information on the 
amount of subsidies requested by applicants. This information is provided by years 
and by regions, therefore it has been possible to separate the South from the areas in 
Central Italy included in the Cassa territories.
Table IV.25 Cassa subsidies to Southern Italy, bn lire 1980.
AR VR AA VA G L VA%VR MSD
1957-65 9,000 10,216 4,035 2,602 376 880 25.47 14.46
1966-70 5,363 10,582 5,216 7,749 1,262 1,867 73.23 34.79
1971-75 13,561 40,334 6,095 15,837 2,742 2,919 39.26 16.51
1976-80 10,084 12,280 7,786 8,366 2,179 2,243 68.13 51.45
1981-86 16,575 13,084 10,469 5,765 2,005 1,658 44.06 40.00
1987-91 25,349 22,773 9,729 7,437 2,592 1,806 32.66 27.59
Source: Calculations on data provided by the Ministry of Industry.
Keys: AR= Applications for subsidies received by the Cassa; VR =Value of the investments 
represented by the applications; AA =Applications accepted by the Cassa; VA=Value o f investments 
represented by successful applications; G = Grants given by the Cassa; L = Loans extended by the 
Institutions.
MSD= Maximum satisfied demand, calculated as (G+L)/0.85VR until 1975 and as (G+L)/0.7VR after 
1976.
Table IV.25 demonstrates the trends in both supply of, and demand for, Cassa (and 
later, Agency) assistance from 1957 onwards. It is possible to calculate how much of 
the demand was actually satisfied by Cassa subsidies in terms of investment 
approved as a percentage of investment plans submitted (VA%VR). Moreover, 
given that the Cassa incentives allowed for assistance (loan and grant together) 
amounting to a maximum of 85% of the value of the intended investment (70% after 
1975), the maximum demand for subsidies can be estimated as 85% (70% after
107 Vaccaro, Unita, p. 237.
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1975) of the submitted investment (VR). Therefore, the maximum satisfied demand 
can be calculated as explained in the table keys.
The VA%VR and MSD percentage varied considerably, mainly due to fluctuations in 
the demand (VR) rather than in supply (G and L). Demand grew rapidly in the first 
half of the 1970s, and from the previous sub-period, the average investment size (VR 
divided by AR) increased considerably. As explained in the previous chapter, in 
these years the policy tried to promote large investment in capital-intensive sectors 
by obliging state-owned companies to undertake a percentage of investment in the 
South, and by increasing subsidies for private investment within the framework of 
the ‘planned bargaining’ procedure (see section 3.2 II). The increase in demand 
dragged down VA%VR and MSD in the first half of the 1970s, despite the increase 
in the availability of G and L in real terms. During the early 1980s, the collapse of 
demand pushed VA%VR and MSD up to the highest level, despite a relative drop in 
Cassa assistance, the sharp decrease in the average size of investment matches with 
the decrease in large investment undertaken by state-owned enterprises and big 
companies.108 During the final period of the Agency, a substantial relative increase 
in application for subsidies, coupled with a small increase in the availability of 
subsidies led to a reduction of VA%VR and MSD.
Table IV.26 Cassa subsidies to areas in Central Italy (bn 1980 lire)
AR VR AA VA G L VA%VR MSD
1957-65 1,119 1,710 523 619 88 345 36.18 29.78
1966-70 835 1,460 702 1,250 191 366 85.58 44.84
1971-75 2,136 4,558 965 1,971 440 733 43.25 30.27
1976-80 2,028 3,399 1,340 1,700 542 361 50.03 37.93
1981-86 3,018 3,769 1,866 1,457 498 475 38.66 36.88
1987-91 4,063 6,716 3,168 4,517 1,478 1,341 67.25 59.97
Source and keys as above.
Comparing tables IV.26 with table IV.25, it clearly emerges the disproportionate 
extension of subsidised loans and grants to small areas in Central Italy, which 
accounted for only 6.3% of the population included in the designated area of Cassa
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intervention.109 This was due not only to a high demand but also to a higher 
percentage of satisfied demand in the Central areas, with the only exception of the 
1976-1986 period. The percentage of satisfied demand in Central areas shows the 
same trend as the Southern Italian counterparts, with the exception of the Agency 
period, 1987-1991, when despite the increase in demand, the supply of grants and 
subsidised loans was so high that the percentage of accepted investment and satisfied 
demand increased.
A more disaggregated analysis clarified that the area of Southern Latium was the 
main recipient of subsidies in Central Italy. It is obvious that ‘the intervention areas 
close to the boundaries experienced a remarkable concentration of industrial 
activity’, resulting from the availability of subsidies and the possibility to locate 
plants as close as possible to Central Italy and in the case of Southern Latium to the 
market of Rome.110 A famous example of investment in Southern Latium is the Fiat 
plant in Cassino in 1972, and in the late 1980s, electronic and telecommunication 
industries.111 Moreover, the area also witnessed a relocation of industry moving 
away from the congested metropolitan area of Rome and at the same time benefiting 
from subsidies.112 The industrial development in the Central areas was such that by 
the end of the 1980s, they presented very few features common to the South and 
therefore a redefinition of the designated areas to exclude these areas in Central Italy 
was recommended.113
The value of grants as displayed in tables IV.25 and IV.26 is much more consistent, 
throughout the whole period, than the value of grants as displayed in the tables 
showing Cassa expenditure in Chapter HI. One possible reason for this considerable 
discrepancy is that the latter tables report grants actually extended in a period, where
108 Castronovo, ‘Mezzogiomo', p. 346.
109 Moro, ‘Gli investimenti', pp. 148-150.
110 S. Conti, ‘Industrialization in a Backward Region: the Italian Mezzogiomo’ (Unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis, University o f London, 1979), pp. 249-250.
111 M. Samek and F. Silva, ‘Gli investimenti delle imprese non meridionali nel Mezzogiomo. 
Un’analisi sul campo’, F. Silva and G. Viesti (eds), II difficile sviluppo dell’industria nel Mezzogiomo 
(Milan, 1989), p. 95.
112 Conti, ‘Industrialization', pp.249-250.
113 G. Viesti, ‘Alcune considerazioni sull’industria dellTtalia meridionale nella seconda meta degli 
anni ottanta, in: F. Silva and G. Viesti (eds), H difficile sviluppo dell’industria nel Mezzogiomo 
(Milan, 1989), p. 56.
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tables IV.25 and IV.26 include grants secured by, but not necessarily extended to, 
firms during the same period, a result of the Cassa's ability to undertake 
commitments in excess of its current financial means.114
Grants extended by the Cassa were not the only ones available in the country. As 
explained in Chapter IE, scheme 696 in 1983 (replaced by the similar scheme 399 in 
1987) provided grants for the purchase and/or leasing of high technology 
equipment.115 Similarly to the data sets on the MI and DPR 902 schemes, as well as 
on the Cassa subsidies, the data set concerning the two grant schemes was provided 
by the MI and contains information by region and year on the number of applications 
submitted, specifying the amount of the investment and the grant requested and the 
number of applications approved with the same detail on investment and grant. This 
makes it possible to study the regional distribution of grants available nationwide and 
whether the distribution was due to the interest of applicants or availability of 
subsidies. The results are displayed in table IV.27 below.
Table IV.27 Requests for and availability of grants (schemes 696/1983 and 
399/1987), 1984-1991a (bn lire 1980)
AR IR GR %AA %IA %GA
North-West 10,706 1,023 250 88.5 91.7 91.8
North-East 6,748 590 145 87.5 90.8 91.3
Centre 3,113 232 57 85.1 88.7 88.7
South 248 25 8 68.7 70.6 71.5
Italy 20,815 1,870 460 87.3 90.7 90.8
Source: Calculations on data provided by the Ministry of Industry.
Keys: a= The usual division into sub-periods has not been adopted for this scheme due to the small 
number of years reported in the table; AR= Applications for subsidies; IR =Value o f the investments 
represented by the applications; GR= Value of the grant applied for; %AA=Applications accepted as a 
percentage of AR; %IA= investments represented by successful applications as a percentage of IR; 
%GA= Grants extended as a percentage o f GR.
It is clear that the South benefited less from these schemes. Previous works116 have 
pointed out that Northern regions were by far the main beneficiary of these schemes
114 Vaccaro, Unita\ p. 237.
115 Campus, Un ’ analisi, pp. 40-41; Scanagatta, ‘Le leggi', pp. 71-75.
116 Campus, Un ’analisi, p .41; Scanagatta, ‘Le leggi’, p. 73.
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and have explained it because of the high technology content of the investment 
required by the scheme. However, it is also pointed out that a large part (more than 
50%) of these grants went to finance the purchasing or leasing of numerically- 
controlled machines and computer-controlled machines, rather than more 
sophisticated cad-cam systems (for the integration of design and production) or for 
the computer-aided management of stocks. Therefore, it seems that firms used this 
scheme to finance in the large part for investments, such as numeric or computer- 
controlled machines, that by the 1980s cannot be considered cutting-edge 
technology. It is then difficult to believe that the whole explanation of the regional 
differential in the distribution of grants lies in the lack of interest and/or the inability 
of Southern small or medium-sized firms to undertake such investment.
It seems likely that other factors, both on the institutional side and on the firms' side, 
are part of the explanation of the geographical distribution of grants. The two 
previously mentioned works dealing with this issue do not rely on consistent 
information on the number and value of applications. The MI data set provides such 
information and reveals not only that a smaller number of applications was received 
from the South, although those represented bigger investments and grants, but also 
that a smaller percentage of applications was approved.
The sectoral composition of recipient firms also helps to explain the geographical 
contribution of grants. The sector most benefiting from the grant schemes was 
engineering, receiving an average 44% of grants between 1984 and 1987, a sector
11 7poorly represented in the South as table IV.28 below shows.
117 The sectors that benefited most from these grant schemes, after engineering were textiles (13%) 
and printing (7%). See Scanagatta, ‘Le leggi’, pp. 74-75.
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Table IV.28 Regional distribution of employees in engineering industry, Italy, 1982.
North-W North-E Centre South Italy
% of national total 55.4 19.5 11.6 13.4 100
% employment in industry 37.9 24.3 16.7 14.0 25.5
Source: Istat, Annuario di Contabilita Nazionale, 1982, vol. II.
Moreover, alternative grant schemes to finance investment were managed by the 
Cassa and those were only available to Southern firms from 1957, therefore it is 
possible that only part of the Southern demand for grants was directed to a much 
more recent scheme.
Conclusions
This chapter has analysed the differentials between market and subsidised interest 
rates, thus providing a first assessment of the profitability of subsidised MTC and 
completing the study of the various schemes developed in Chapter IE. It has also 
compared the interest rates on short-term and market MTC, pointing out a 
particularly marked differential between 1974 and 1981. In those years, short-term 
interest rates were considerably higher than medium-term interest rates, thus 
channelling finance from the medium to the short-term market and causing a 
shortage of medium-term finance. This shortage is particularly visible in the regional 
distribution of market MTC in those years, but also of the subsidised counterpart.
The analysis of the geographical distribution of medium-term loans from 1953 to 
1991 has shown that the areas benefiting most from such credit have been the North- 
West followed by the South. The picture changes when differentiating between 
subsidised and ordinary MTC. The South secured the largest share of subsidised 
credit (which included the Cassa soft loans) until the first half of the 1970s, but after 
that, the North-West was consistently the biggest beneficiary of subsidised loans. 
The North-East, where the San Mauro Pascoli ID is located, invariably received the 
smallest amount of subsidised credit throughout the period under review. However, 
this result is not confirmed by a more detailed analysis of the MI scheme specifically 
designed for small and medium-sized firms. Particularly in the 1970s, the North-
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East was among the main recipients of the scheme. Therefore, the possibility that 
state subsidies were not a negligible source of finance for firms within North-Eastern 
IDs cannot be ruled out.
The reorganization of the system of subsidies in the whole country and the 
harmonization of soft loan schemes available in the South with those available in the 
rest of the country in 1976 has been illustrated in chapter EL The study of the 
regional distribution of subsidised loans clearly shows that the institutional change 
meant a redirection of subsidised credit from the South towards the most productive 
area of the country, the North West. This turning point is confirmed by the 
comparison between applications for subsidies submitted and approved, showing that 
after 1976 far stricter selection criteria were applied to applications from Southern 
firms. The identification of 1976 as the turning point coincides also with the 
beginning of a declining trend of Cassa expenditure, shown in graph IV.2, and 
contradicts previous studies, which saw 1973-74 as the period when subsidised credit 
was redirected from the South to the North-West.
This chapter offers a contribution to the understanding of subsidies, by addressing for 
the first time the issue of as to whether the regional distribution of subsidies was 
determined by the requests for, or the availability of subsidies. This analysis was 
performed on original data provided by the MI and referring to two grant schemes 
and two subsidised loans scheme. It showed that overall the distribution of subsidies 
was driven by applications, with the notable exception of Southern Italy where the 
share of accepted applications decreased after 1976.
The regional distribution of subsidies and the comparison of applications for and the 
availability of subsidies redefine the common perception of a heavily-subsidised 
South. The analysis showed that the North-West employed the highest amounts of 
subsidised MTC in the years after 1976, precisely at the time when the South was 
experiencing a drastic reduction. Even when considering grants to the South, the total 
subsidies going to the Mezzogiomo after 1976 were less than those going to the 
North-West. Furthermore, the small areas in Central Italy benefited to a larger 
extent, in relative terms, from Cassa subsidies and Southern firms had much less
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access to grants available throughout the whole country. These elements belie the 
common assumption that the ‘Extraordinary intervention for Southern Italy’ had been 
a drain on Northern resources, an assumption that contributed strongly to the 
decision to abolish the Agency for the South.
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CHAPTER V
Case studies: Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli Industrial Districts.
Introduction
Chapters ID and IV studied the system of subsidies from the institutional perspective. 
This chapter opens the section of the thesis (comprising chapters V, VI and VII) that 
assesses the importance and effectiveness of subsidies for recipient companies. The 
chapter introduces the two case studies: the Southern ID of Barletta and its North- 
Eastern comparative example -  the San Mauro Pascoli ID. It explains the choice and 
establishes their comparability in the first section. The second section outlines the 
economic importance of the two IDs.
5.1 The choice of Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli
The literature survey presented in Chapter I has shown the great academic interest 
raised by IDs, but it was clear that far less attention has been devoted to Southern 
Italian IDs, the existence of which was not even acknowledged until recently. The 
second section of this thesis focuses primarily on the Southern ID of Barletta, as the 
study of a Southern example might offer new insights in the broader topic of the IDs 
and their features. Further interest in a Southern example arises from the 
interpretation of IDs as a process of industrialization. Thus, by analysing the features 
of the Barletta ID, located within an under-industrialized region, one may enhance an 
understanding of the process of industrialization in the South.
The comparative example, the North-Eastern ID of San Mauro Pascoli, has been 
chosen on the basis of a survey of IDs and/or system areas across the country.1 The 
study identifies IDs/system areas on the basis of Local Labour Market Areas 
(henceforth LLMAs) singled out by the Italian National Bureau of Statistics (Istat). 
The Istat work divides the country in 955 LLMAs, defined as areas including a
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varying number of municipalities, which are relatively self-contained in terms of 
labour force. In the LLMAs, the largest part of the population can find or change jobs 
within the same LLMA where they live, conversely employers recruit their employees 
mainly within the LLMA.2 Clearly, starting from the LLMAs in order to identify IDs 
implicitly refers to the interdisciplinary approach to the topic (see Chapter I), which 
considers an ID as a socio-territorial as well as an economic concept.3
Out of the 955 LLMAs, Garavini, Calistri and Cilona identified 99 IDs and/or system 
areas, singled out on the basis of local knowledge provided by territorial units of trade 
unions and indicators of industrialization, which are not specified in the study.4 The 
San Mauro Pascoli ID has been selected from these 99 by applying three criteria: 
location, product similar to the Barletta ID and same period of emergence.
a) Location. This thesis is concerned with the sources of finance of firms within IDs 
and seeks to ascertain whether IDs can develop against the background of state 
intervention in the South, and through private sources of finance in the classical area 
of IDs, the North-East also called Third Italy. This suggests the desirability of a 
comparative example from the North-East, where the ID of San Mauro Pascoli is 
located.
b) Similar products. Both the Barletta and the San Mauro Pascoli IDs are specialized 
in the production of footwear and clothes. However, the former specialises in sports 
shoes, whereas the latter specializes in leather shoes.5
c) Period of emergence. It was logical to choose two IDs that had emerged during the 
same chronological period, in order to compare the importance attained by each
1 The study does not aim at assessing whether the identified areas present the features o f Marshallian 
IDs, therefore a more generic terminology is adopted. See Garavini, Calistri and Cilona, La Quarta.
2 Istat - Irpet, I  mercati locali del lavoro in Italia (Rome, 1986), p. 13.
3 Becattini, ‘The Marshallian Industrial District’, pp. 37-51.
4 Garavini, Calistri and Cilona, La Quarta, pp. 13-14.
5 Viesti, ‘Lo sviluppo’, pp. 119 -140; Garavini, Calistri and Cilona, La quarta, p. 239.
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during the period under review. Both San Mauro Pascoli and Barletta are said to have 
emerged during the 1950s.6
5.2 The geographical identification of the Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli IDs.
In order to compare the Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli (henceforth SMP) IDs it is 
necessary to identify their geographical extension. According to the study by 
Garavini, Calistri and Cilona, the Barletta ID expands over a very broad area although 
the study indicates that the towns of Barletta and Trani are the centre of the ID, 
whereas the same study points out only the core of the SMP ID.7 This difference 
makes it necessary to identify the extent of the two IDs. The first sub-section 
discusses the methodologies available to identify IDs, and in the second sub-section 
the most recent methodology is adapted to define the borders of the two IDs.
5.2.1 Methodology
Specific studies have been conducted in order to develop a methodology to single out 
IDs. In 1987, Sforzi developed a two-stage analysis.8 Starting from the 955 LLMAs 
identified by the Istat, the work considers eligible for consideration as IDs those 
LLMAs presenting specific socio-economic features. The socio-economic features 
are: entrepreneurs and workforce in small manufacturing firms, with a high proportion 
of younger workers and married women in the labour force, with a high prevalence of 
extended families.9 Just 161 of the 955 LLMAs presented those features and 
therefore were eligible to be defined as IDs. It seems possible to find the theoretical 
background to these socio-economic criteria in an approach that locates the origin of 
this industrial pattern in the extended family - which allowed a concentration of 
house-holding savings - and in the shifting of the whole family from the primary 
sector to the handicraft-industrial one, as the whole family became an entrepreneurial
6 Garavini, Calistri and Cilona, La quarta, pp. 239, 354.
7 Ibid., pp. 239, 354.
8 F. Sforzi, ‘L'identificazione spaziale dei distretti industrial ’, in: G. Becattini (ed.), Mercato e Forze 
Locali: ilDistretto Industriale (Bologna, 1987), pp. 143-167.
9 Ibid., p. 81.
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unit.10 This first stage seems to be of particular importance as the Becattini and 
Sforzi approach stresses a strong interdependence between the social structure and the 
systems of firms in the area.11 It is at this first stage that well known IDs such as 
Biella (textiles) in Piedmont, Cantu (furniture) and Vigevano (footwear and 
mechanical) in Lombardy and Solofra (tanning) in Campania, were not recognised as 
IDs. In fact these areas were characterised by ‘managerial and white-collar workers, 
by employment in services, although industrial employment is significant and there 
are consistent numbers of working wives. The real difference lies in the social status 
of the small industrial entrepreneur and the type of family he lives in’.12
Finally, the economic structure of the 161 LLMAs (i.e. those which passed the first 
stage) was analysed according to the sectoral characteristics of their firms, selecting 
those areas characterised by a dominant manufacturing specialization. The analysis 
pointed out the existence of 61 Marshallian IDs located in North-eastern and Central 
Italy, and to a lesser extent in the North-West of the country.13 Because none of the 
Southern LLMAs presented the required socio-economic features, there were no 
examples from this region.
There are various reasons for rejecting this methodology:
- it fails to identify developed and well known IDs such as Biella, Cantu', Vigevano 
and Solofra. This failure seems significant enough in itself to cast doubts upon the 
methodology and body of literature to which it refers.
- it clearly places much emphasis on the social features and social values supposed to 
be necessary requirements for the development and growth of an ID,14 whereas this
10 Bagnasco, Tre Italie; Bull and Comer, From Peasant’, Bull, Pitt and Szarka, Entrepreneurial Textile 
Communities,
11 G. Becattini, ‘The Developement of Light Industry in Tuscany: An Interpretation’, Economic Notes, 
7/2-3 (1978) pp. 107-123.
12 F. Sforzi , ‘The Geography of Industrial Districts’, in E.Goodman and J.Bamford with P.Saynor 
(eds), Small Firms and Industrial Districts in Italy (1989), p. 161.
13 Ibid., p. 80.
14 Becattini, ‘The Marshallian Industrial District’, p. 39.
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thesis approaches the ID as a model of business organization, and focuses on one 
specific economic aspect, their sources of finance.
- it refers to an explanation of ID creation (the importance of the extended family and 
the share-cropping system as a source of household savings) that is so far 
unconvincing as it excludes a priori any impact of external sources of finance, and in 
particular of finance made available on preferential basis to small and medium-sized 
firms since the early 1950s.
- When investigating the economic characteristics of the area, this methodology 
examines only whether there is any dominant sector in manufacturing. This indicator 
of specialization considered in isolation has very little significance. A LLMA might 
have a small manufacturing sector -  as compared to other industrial sectors, 
agriculture and services - concentrated in one or two industries such as textiles, 
footwear and clothing, wood and furniture, etc. Therefore, although specialized, a 
LLMA might have only a small number of workers in the industries of specialization. 
On the contrary, another LLMA less specialized but with a larger manufacturing 
sector might include a larger number of workers in the industries of specialization. 
This possibility is exemplified at the municipality level by towns like Andria and 
Molfetta in table V.l below. Andria presents an indicator of specialization lower than 
Molfetta. Nevertheless, Andria includes 1,700 workers in footwear and clothing, 
whereas Molfetta only has 800. Thus, this methodology might identify LLMAs of 
negligible economic importance as IDs, whereas it might miss more important 
examples.
The 1986 methdology has been refined by the same author in 1996. As before, the 
starting point is the identification of the LLMAs. In the 1996 elaboration an increased 
commuting distance is taken into account, and therefore the whole country is divided 
in 784 LLMAs. Out of these, those areas where the following conditions were 
observed could be considered as IDs:
1) workers in manufacturing as a percentage of total workers in industry and services - 
thus excluding workers in agriculture - higher than the national average
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W M llma% W llma >  W M n% W n
where W M Llma=  workers in manufacturing within the LLMA; W llma = total workers in industry and 
services within the LLMA; WMN = workers in manufacturing, national total; WN = workers in 
manufacturing and service, national total.
2) the percentage of manufacturing workers employed in firms with less than 250 
employees should be higher than the national counterpart.
3) in at least one manufacturing industry the following condition should be met: 
workers in that industry as a percentage of manufacturing workers should be higher 
than the national figure
WspLLMA% W M llMA >  W spN%  W M n
where W spllma = workers in sectors of specialization in the LLMA; W M Llma=  workers in 
manufacturing within the LLMA; WspN = workers in the sectors of specialization, national total; WMN 
= workers in manufacturing, national total.
4) in that manufacturing industry, the percentage of workers in firms with less than 
250 employees should be higher than the national average.15
The 1996 methodology represents a substantial improvement on the previous 
formulation. The social characteristics of the LLMAs - the first stage of selection in 
the 1986 methodology - are no longer taken into account, whereas more attention is 
devoted to the industrial characteristics of the areas. Moreover, the combination of 
the indicator of industrialization in stage 1) with the indicator of specialization in 
stage 3) seems to be of particular importance. The requirement that LLMAs 
qualifying as IDs should have a higher than average percentage of the non-agricultural 
workforce ensures that in eligible LLMAs there is a higher than average concentration 
of workers in manufacturing. Once LLMAs have been selected on the basis of 
‘concentration* in manufacturing, the indicator of specialization can be considered and 
it will not capture secondary examples and miss more important ones, as in the 
previous formulation. Moreover, the size selection criteria in stages 2) and 4) ensure 
that the eligible LLMA is characterized by the presence of a larger number of small 
and medium-sized firms than the national average, in manufacturing and industries of
15 Istat, Rapporto annuale. La situazione del Paese nel 1995 (Rome, 1996).
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specialization. The methodology defines as small firms those employing less than 50 
workers and medium-sized firms those with less than 250.16
Applying the concept of concentration in the empirical analysis is important also from 
a theoretical perspective. The neo-classical approach considers the ID as a model of 
business organization and considers the ‘concentration of firms’ as the key point to 
explain its competitiveness. In the Marshall analysis, external economies arise from 
the concentration of many small businesses of a similar character in particular 
localities; firms of moderate size can enjoy economies of division of labour and of 
production on a large scale by aggregating into one district.
5.2.2 The geographical identification of the Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli IDs.
This section establishes the extent of the Barletta and SMP IDs. The identification of 
the towns to be included in the IDs is particularly important in the case of the Barletta 
ID. Some authors include several municipalities within the ID,17 but it is probable that 
many of these towns contribute little to the economy of the ID. Therefore all towns 
included by the literature in the Barletta ID have been studied following the criteria 
proposed by the 1996 methodology discussed in the previous sub-section.
Table V.l presents the indicators of specialization (Ws%Wm), concentration of labour 
force in manufacturing (Wm%Ap) and indicators of average firm size in the industries 
of specialization - footwear and clothing - and manufacturing for the towns allegedly 
constituting the Barletta ID. For comparative purposes the same indicators are 
presented for the region in which those towns are located, Puglia, and for the whole of 
Italy. It was not possible to study the percentage of workers in firms with less than 
250 employees, as the necessary information is not provided at the municipality level 
in the Censuses of Industry. The only information available at the municipality level 
is the number of workers, firms and plants by sectors and industries, therefore it was 
possible to calculate only the average firm size.
16 The definitions of small and medium-sized firms are those applied by Istat, which are in turn
consistent with those applied in the EU legislation regulating subsidies to small and medium sized 
firms. Brusco and Paba, ‘Per una storia’, p. 275.
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Table V.l Barletta, surrounding municipalities and Puglia, 1981.
Ws Wm Ap Ws%Wm Wm%Ap S size M siz
(000) (000) (000)
Barletta 4.8 6.9 28.3 69.1 24.4 8.6 7.9
Trani 1.8 2.9 15.2 62.7 19.1 6.0 5.4
Bisceglie 1.4 2.1 15.7 68.3 13.4 7.9 6.3
Andria 1.7 3.6 27.5 47.0 13.2 4.5 3.9
Molfetta 0.8 1.6 20.9 48.6 7.6 4.8 4.0
Canosa 0.2 0.5 10.6 43.7 4.9 3.3 2.7
Minervino 0.2 0.4 4.1 48.0 9.7 5.8 4.7
Trinitapoli 0.06 0.2 4.3 26.2 5.6 3.3 3.1
Margherita 0.04 0.2 3.9 24.1 4.3 2.5 3.9
S. Ferdinando 0.03 0.3 4.6 9.2 7.3 1.6 3.7
Puglia 48 149 1,418 32 10.5 5.4 5.8
Italy 1,452 4,942 22,550 29.4 21.9 7.8 8.9
Keys: WS= workers in industries of specialization 43) textiles, 44) leather, 45) shoes and clothing, and 
48) rubber, absolute figures; Wm= workers in manufacturing, absolute figures; Ap= active population, 
absolute figures; S size= average firm size in terms of employees in the sectors of specialization; M 
size= average firm size in terms of employees in manufacturing.
Note: Percentages have been calculated on non-rounded absolute figures.
Source: Istat, Censimento dell’Indus tria, 1981 and Censimento della Popolazione, 1981.
Apart from the towns of Barletta and Trani, Bisceglie and Andria have indicators of 
concentration in manufacturing and specialization higher than the regional figures. In 
comparison with the national figures they all have far higher indicators of 
specialization but only Barletta has a higher indicator of concentration in 
manufacturing. This clearly points out the specialized nature of these 4 towns, but 
also reflects the underdevelopment of the South, with 18% of the total labour force 
employed in agriculture, as compared to 8.4% in the Centre and North.18 Moreover, 
by definition the active population includes people in employment and people seeking
17 Garavini, Calistri and Cilona, La quarta, p. 354.
18 Figures from R. Faini, G. Galli and C. Giannini, ‘Finance and Development: the Case of Southern 
Italy’, in: A. Giovannini (ed.), Finance and Development: Issues and Experience (Cambridge, 1992), p. 
159; data source: Istat and Svimez.
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their first job. In the case of Puglia people seeking their first job were 15% of the 
active population, whereas the national average is 10%.19
Following the selective criteria of the 1996 methodology in the previous section, only 
the municipality of Barletta presents the feature of an ID. However, the towns of 
Trani, Bisceglie and Andria present indicators of specialization and concentration of 
labour force in manfacturing significantly higher than the regional average. In other 
words, these towns present the statistical characteristics of an ID when compared to 
their regional economic context. Therefore, in the following chapters, the Barletta ID 
will be considered as constituted by the towns of Barletta, Trani, Bisceglie and 
Andria.
As already mentioned, table V.l also shows that the indicator of specialization alone 
is not effective in identifying the towns that contribute more significantly to the 
economy of the Barletta ID. According to such indicators towns like Canosa 
Minervino and Molfetta should be included as they present an indicator of 
specialization above the regional average. However, the absolute figures clearly show 
that these towns contribute very little, in terms of labour force, to the economy of the 
ID. On the contrary, the indicator of concentration of the workforce in manufacturing 
isolates those towns that contribute more significantly to the economy of the ID.
The same indicators used to identify the extent of the Barletta ID have been calculated 
for Savignano and Gatteo, municipalities surrounding the town of San Mauro Pascoli. 
These three towns are presented in the literature as the core of the San Mauro Pascoli 
ID. The corresponding indicators for the region where the SMP ID is located, Emilia 
Romagna, and for the whole of Italy have been included for comparative purposes.
19 Calculations based on Istat, Censimento della Popolazione, 1981.
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Table V.2 San Mauro Pascoli, surrounding municipalities and Emilia Romagna, 1981.
Ws Wm Ap Ws%Wm Wm% Ap S size M size
(000) (000) (000)
S Mauro Pascoli 2.0 2.3 3.4 89.5 67.9 10.2 8.7
Rimini 1.4 7.2 52.3 20.1 13.8 4.2 6.1
Savignano 1.0 1.5 5.7 65 26.4 9.3 7.4
Gatteo 0.4 0.7 2.6 60.3 26.3 9.5 7.7
Santarcangelo 0.3 1.2 7..0 22.8 17.3 5.0 6.8
Cesenatico 0.1 0.6 8.6 21.3 7.0 2.4 2.6
Gambettola 0.1 0.4 4.1 31.6 8.7 2.5 2.8
Longiano 0.1 1.1 2.1 5.7 52.1 4.2 14.7
Bellaria 0.1 0.3 5.4 44.5 6.3 4.2 3.3
Emilia Romagna 117 466 1,789 25.1 26 5.0 7.3
Italy 1,451 4,941 22,550 29.4 21.9 7.8 8.9
Keys and sources as for Table V.l
In the case of the SMP ID, the towns presenting a concentration of labour force in 
manufacturing and in the industries of specialization above the regional and national 
average, coincide with the core of the ID mentioned in the Garavini, Calistri and 
Cilona study.20 The case of the city of Rimini seems controversial. Following the 
Sforzi methodologies, Rimini should be excluded from the SMP ID, as its indicators 
of specialization and concentration are below the regional average. However, 
considering the absolute figures of the labour force in the sectors of specialization, 
Rimini is second only to the town of San Mauro Pascoli, whereas in terms of 
manufacturing it would rank as first. Therefore, it seems appropriate to include the 
town of Rimini in the SMP ID on the grounds that having such a high number of 
workers in the sectors of specialization, it is likely to contribute to a great extent to the 
economy of the ID. The small size of the manufacturing and specialization industries, 
in relative terms, is easily understandable considering that Rimini, as well as 
Cesenatico, are famous tourist resorts and the dominant sectors in these cities are 
services and commerce. Therefore, in this thesis, the towns of San Mauro Pascoli,
20 Garavini, Calistri and Cilona, La quarta, p. 239.
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Rimini, Savignano and Gatteo will be considered as belonging to the SMP ID. Also 
in the case of the SMP ID, the condition of an average firm size below the regional 
average is met only by one town, Rimini. However, for the reasons already explained 
discussing the extent of the Barletta ID, not meeting this condition is not considered a 
sufficient reason for exclusion.
The Barletta ID, including the towns of Barletta, Trani, Andria and Biscglie, and the 
SMP ID, including San Manuro Pascoli, Rimini, Savignano and Gatteo, compare in 
1981 as shown in table V.3.
Table V.3 The Barletta and SMP IDs, 1981
Ws Wm Ap Ws%Wm Wm%Ap S size M size
(000) (000) (000)
Barletta ID 10 16 87 62.7 17.9 6.8 5.8
SMP ED 5 12 64 41.9 18.2 7.1 6.7
Keys as for table V. 1.
The Barletta ED is clearly larger in terms of active population and workers in the 
industries of specialization - textile, leather, footwear and clothes, and rubber - and in 
manufacturing. However, while a very similar proportion of the active population of 
both IDs is employed in manufacturing, a considerably smaller proportion is employed 
in the industries of specialization in the North-Eastern case study, thus the SMP ED is 
less specialized than the Southern ED. As shown in the next section, the lower degree 
of specialization of the North-eastern ED is due to the presence of the engineering 
industry.
5.2.3 A comparison of the Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli IDs.
Having identified the territorial extent of the two IDs, this section compares the 
development and the size each has attained since the early 1950s.
As already mentioned, the emergence of both EDs is dated in the literature to the 
beginning of the 1950s. In both areas, the pre-existent handicraft tradition provided a
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nucleus of skilled labour for the emerging industry. The presence of artisans in the 
footwear industry in Barletta dates back to the end of the 19th century. Local 
production of stocking soles and slippers with recycled materials and women’s shoes 
developed in the inter-war period.21 A similar presence of shoemaking artisans is 
mentioned also for the SMP ID. However, while in the North-Eastern ID the shift 
from artisan to industrial production took place through the initiative of local 
entrepreneurs, in the Barletta ID, the industrial production started via subcontracting 
work from large firms outside the region such as Adidas, Dunlop and Pirelli-Superga 
(sports shoes). Only in the 1960s did local entrepreneurs begin independent 
production.22 A further difference in the emergence of the two IDs is that in the SMP 
ID, the shift from artisan to industrial production is said to have been gradual and it 
took place by using local capital made available through the strong links between the 
artisan and the agricultural sector.23 Firms in the Barletta ID are said to have 
benefited from the Cassa subsidies, particularly grants extended to companies in the 
start-up stage, although self-financing remained the main type of finance used by 
those firms.24
Graphs V.l and V.2 below compare the size and development of the two IDs in terms 
of labour force since 1951. In addition to the industries of specialization the graphs 
include the engineering industry, as from 1981 this employed more workers than the 
footwear and clothing industries in the SMP ID.
21 Unioncamere, Imprese ed istituzioni nei distretti industriali che cambiano (Milan, 1995), p. 287.
22 Calistri, Garavini and Cilona, La quarta, p. 354.
23 Ibid., p. 240.
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Graph V. 1 Workers by sectors, Barletta ID, 1951 -1991.
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Keys : Ws = sectors of specialization 43) textiles, 44) leather, 45) shoes and clothing and 48) rubber, 
absolute figures; Wme = workers in the engineering industry; Wm = workers in manufacturing, absolute 
figures; Wi = workers in industry; absolute figures; Wes = workers in commerce and services, absolute 
figures.
Source: Istat, I censimenti delle attivita’ produttive dal 1951 al 1991. Dati comunali. CD-ROM 
(Rome, 1998).
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Keys and source as for graph V. 1
24 Ibid., p. 357.
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Consistently with the figures presented in table V.3, graphs V.l and V.2 show that the 
Barletta ID has a higher number of workers in industry, manufacturing and industries 
of specialization, whereas the SMP ID has since 1951, a higher number of workers in 
services, mainly in the city of Rimini. In the industries of specialization, the SMP ID 
presented since 1951 a smaller number of workers -1,116 as compared to 1,465 in the 
Barletta ID. Employment in the two IDs increased at a similar rate in the 1950s and 
1960s - in Barletta, it grew by 104% in the 1950s and 44% in the 1960s, while the 
corresponding figures for the SMP ID were 111% and 41%. On the contrary, a very 
dissimilar growth took place in the 1970s and 1980s, when a restructuring of the 
footwear sector took place in the SMP ID, which also coincided with an increasing 
growth rate in the engineering during the 1970s. Moreover, while the former lost 
employment in the 1980s the latter kept increasing the number of workers.
The development of the SMP ID reflects the crisis that affected the Italian footwear 
and clothing sectors. This had its roots in the increased cost of labour since the Hot 
Autumn in 1969 and the fourfold increase of the oil price and raw materials in 1973.25 
To these factors, others soon followed, such as the decrease in the European growth 
rate of consumption and the competition with the cheaper products of Far-Eastern 
countries, which in the 1980s moved towards the higher segments of the market by 
improving the quality of the raw material and manufacturing. In the EU, imports from 
the Far East in textiles, footwear and clothes represented 15% of total consumption in 
1982, but rose to 30% by 1991.26 Moreover, from 1979, when Italy joined the EMS, 
exporting companies could no longer rely on the devaluation of the lira to make their 
exports more competitive.27
In the second half of the 1970s and in the 1980s, a restructuring of the footwear and 
clothing industries took place in the SMP ID. Firms involved in the production of 
low-medium quality shoes either failed or reduced their labour force, whereas firms
25 Segreto, ‘La storia’, p. 388.
26 P. Crestanello, ‘La trasformazione in 10 distretti industriali durante gli anni ‘80’, in: R. Varaldo and 
L. Ferrucci, II distretto industriale tra logiche di impresa e Iogiche di sistema (Milan, 1997), p. 246; 
data from CEE, Panorama dell'industria comunitaria Europea (Bruxells, 1993).
27 Rinaldi, Distretti, p. 176.
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involved in the production of medium-high products emerged as the leaders in the 
sector. The crisis in the industries of specialization was such that from a situation of 
full employment until the early 1970s, the area witnessed unemployment in the late 
1970s and 1980s, which particularly hit mature unskilled workers.28
Other works have noticed the loss of employment in the specialization industries 
within IDs located throughout the country during the 1980s, and pointed out that this 
does not imply a deterioration of the performance of these IDs in terms of 
production.29 Various explanations have been proposed for the general decreasing 
trend in the 1980s. In those IDs where the fragmentation of the production process 
had already taken place in the 1960s and 1970s, the establishment of new firms 
decreased in the following decade. In other cases, like Sassuolo (producing ceramic 
tiles in Emilia Romagna) and Montebelluna (producing sky boots in the Dolomites) 
technological innovation led to a rationalization of the production process and to a 
decrease in employment growth.30 In particular, the loss of employment was 
experienced by older IDs that sub-contracted the less complex stages of the production 
process outside the area where the cost of labour was lower. Mainly, Southern IDs in 
footwear and clothing are held to have benefited from this process, which might also 
help explaining the growth of labour force in the Barletta ID in the 1980s.31 The 
labour force dynamics in the SMP ID, particularly the decreasing trend in footwear 
and clothing and the increasing trend in the engineering industry seem to confirm that 
IDs might develop more than one specialization, as observed by other works. An 
appropriate point in case is the Vigevano ID (footwear and engineering, in Lombardy), 
where alongside the original production of footwear, engineering firms developed in 
the 1970s, specializing in the production of equipment for the footwear industry.32
The crisis of the footwear and clothing sectors had repercussions also in the Barletta 
ID. It was in this period that the largest firms of the area emerged as leaders and 
spearheaded a general increase in the quality of the local output. This was made
28 Garavini, Calistri and Cilona, La quarta, pp. 240, 242.
29 Brusco and Paba, ‘Per una storia’, pp. 288-290; Crestanello, ‘La trasformazione’, pp. 247-250.
30 Crestanello, ‘La trasformazione’, pp. 250-258.
31 Brusco and Paba, ‘Per una storia’, p. 290.
32 Crestanello, ‘La trasformazione’, p. 253.
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possible also by the introduction of new materials and equipment in the production 
process, such as the polyurethane and the ‘giostra’ (merry-go-around).33 The largest 
expansion of the Barletta ID took place from the second half of the 1970s to the end of 
the 1980s, when leading companies expanded their range of products from sport shoes 
(mainly tennis and training shoes) to shoes for trekking and a broader range of casual 
footwear. Moreover, at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the ID 
experienced a period of high entrepreneurial spin-offs, with members of the family or 
former employees starting their own companies. The proliferation of firms in those 
years was also related to the progressive fragmentation of the production process, due 
not only to considerations of increasing productivity and cutting costs, but also to the 
limited managerial skills of entrepreneurs in Barletta, who were badly equipped to 
deal with a centralised production process and high volumes of production.34
Moreover, the growth of employment in the Barletta ID reflects a much wider trend. 
A study has concentrated on the geographical location of the production of ‘Made in 
Italy’ including in this definition textiles, leather, footwear and clothing, and 
furniture.35 The study shows that in the 1980s, employment in these sectors decreased 
throughout the country with the exception of the South, where there were fewer 
workers in these sectors, in absolute numbers, but where the sectors kept expanding in 
the 1980s. Moreover, a more geographically detailed analysis shows that the region 
where the increase in the 1980s was by far larger than everywhere else is Puglia, 
where the Barletta ID is located.36 Graph V.3 below shows the size of the ‘Made in 
Italy* in Emilia Romagna and Puglia.
33 Garavini, Calistri and Cilona, La quarta, p. 356.
34 Unioncamere, Imprese ed istituzioni nei distretti, pp. 288-290.
35 Viesti, Come nascono.
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Source: Viesti, Come nascono, p. 51, data source Istat.
Graph V.3 does not show the employment trend in the 1980s, but it seems clear that 
the trend observed in the two IDs in the specialization industries is similar to the one 
taking place in their regions.
The table below compares the industrial development of the Barletta and SMP IDs 
with their respective macro-regions - the South and North-East.
36 Ibid., pp. 49-55.
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Table V.4 Degree of industrialization of the Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli IDs,
1951-1991.
Barletta ID South SMP ID North-East Italy
151 0.21 0.20 0.34 0.30 0.33
161 0.37 0.27 0.54 0.48 0.46
171 0.40 0.34 0.60 0.61 0.55
181 0.51 0.39 0.69 0.69 0.59
191 0.45 0.37 0.62 0.69 0.56
M51 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.17
M61 0.16 0.09 0.19 0.22 0.22
M71 0.19 0.12 0.20 0.30 0.27
M81 0.23 0.14 0.21 0.33 0.27
M91 0.24 0.13 0.22 0.32 0.24
Keys: 1= total industrial workforce/active population; M= workforce in manufacturing/active 
population; North-Eastern Italy includes the following regions: Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli 
Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna; Southern Italy: Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, 
Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna.
Source : Istat, Censimento dell’Industria, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991 and Censimento della 
Popolazione, 1951,1961,1971,1981,1991.
Throughout the whole period, the Barletta ID is less industrialized than its North- 
Eastern counterpart. However, when placed in the Southern economic context, the 
Barletta ID emerges as an area of higher industrialization, despite starting from the 
general level of industrialization in 1951. However, throughout the whole period it 
remained below the national average, reaching the national value of industrialization 
only in manufacturing in 1991.
On the contrary, the SMP ID does not stand out from the North-Eastern economic 
context. The ID shows a degree of industrialization very close to the regional average, 
which in turn means above the national average from 1961. The picture changes 
when looking at the manufacturing sector, where the SMP ID is below the North- 
Eastern and national average, indicating that other industrial sectors have greater 
weight in the SMP ID than in the North-East.
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Conclusions
This chapter introduced the Barletta ID as the case study of the thesis, with a further 
consideration of the SMP ID for comparative purposes.
The first issue that needed to be addressed was the identification of the territorial 
extent of the two IDs. This exercise also offered a test for the two methodologies 
available and showed that the concept and indicator of specialization, if used by itself 
might be misleading in the identification of IDs. The combination of the indicator of 
specialization with that of concentration of the labour force in manufacturing, seems 
to be more effective and based on a theoretical solid ground. However, also the more 
recent methodology seems to be of limited use, as it does not capture exactly the 
municipalities that contribute to a greater extent to the economies of the SMP ID.
Although the emergence of the two IDs dates to the same period, the 1950s, 
throughout the period of analysis they attained diverse sizes, particularly in the 
industries of specialization. The development of the two IDs, in terms of labour force, 
differed considerably in the 1970s and 1980s, when a combination of factors made 
Italian exports in textiles, clothing and footwear less competitive. This situation led to 
a rationalization in the sectors of specialization in the SMP ID which also meant a 
lower growth of the labour force in those sectors in the 1970s and a net decrease in the 
1980s. A similar process did not take place in the Barletta ID, where the second half 
of the 1970s and the 1980s are considered the years of fastest growth in terms of 
labour force.
The different development of the two IDs in the 1970s and 1980s reflects the varying 
geography of their industries of specialization, meaning the increasing employment in 
those industries in the South and the decreasing trend in the rest of the country. 
Although the growth of employment in these traditional industries is surely to be 
welcomed in an area heavily affected by unemployment like Southern Italy, it is 
possible that the expansion of labour force in the ‘Made in Italy* and its contraction in 
the rest of the country, is yet another indicator of the Southern backwardness. The 
decrease in the labour force in these sectors might indicate a more efficient
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organization of the production process, as suggested by those North-Eastern IDs that 
reduced their labour force without reducing their production.37 Moreover, the 
competition from the Far East might have made the footwear and clothing sectors less 
profitable, particularly for those firms that were not able to rebuild their profit margins 
by reducing costs. These firms might have preferred moving to more profitable 
sectors rather than lowering their profits, which seems a possible rationale behind the 
faster growth of the engineering industry in the SMP ID. Therefore, the fiercer 
competition in the sectors of specialization and the wider choice of business 
opportunities might be behind the decrease of employment in the industries of 
specialization in the SMP ID, and in the North and Centre of the country.
In the South, the lower cost of labour and fewer alternative business opportunities 
might determine a situation whereby even companies facing declining profits prefer to 
remain in the same sector. In other words, entrepreneurs in the Barletta ID, and in the 
South, might not abandon traditional sectors even when facing declining profits 
because their opportunity costs are lower than for their colleagues located in the North 
and Centre of Italy.
The following chapters will focus on the sources of finance of companies within IDs, 
but the analysis of the companies in the two IDs might also offer insights into the 
different pattern of development of the two areas. In particular, the comparison of the 
performance of the companies in the two samples, on the basis of other information 
than mere employment, might provide a more accurate interpretation of the expansion 
of these traditional sectors within the Southern ID.
37 Crestanello, ‘La trasformazione’, pp. 250-258.
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CHAPTER VI
The Importance of the National and Regional Industrial Policies for the Barletta and 
San Mauro Pascoli Industrial Districts: an empirical analysis, 1951-1991.
Introduction
This chapter investigates the role of public sources of finance for the Southern ID of 
Barletta and the North-Eastern ID of San Mauro Pascoli (henceforth SMP). In 
particular, it assesses the quantitative importance of subsidies (soft loans, grants and 
fiscal subsidies) as compared with market finance and internal funds (internally 
generated funds and finance provided by partners). The study of the capital structure 
of companies within the two IDs seeks to disprove the general assumption that 
sources of finance alone were significant for the growth of small and medium-sized 
firms within IDs.1
The hypothesis - that IDs can develop against the background of state subsidies as 
well as private sources of finance - has so far been analysed from the institutional 
perspective (chapters IE and IV). The regional distribution of subsidies and market 
capital has shown that in the South, subsidies were a far larger source of finance than 
the market, whereas the opposite was the case in the North-East. This area 
consistently benefited least from subsidies to firms of any size, though not for soft 
loan schemes specifically targeting small and medium-sized firms.
After introducing the two case studies in chapter V, the present and the following 
chapters add the recipient perspective to the analysis conducted so far. The chapters 
are based on two samples of companies located in the Southern ID of Barletta and 
the North-Eastern ID of San Mauro Pascoli and seek to ascertain whether firms in the 
two areas developed through different sources of finance, i.e. public in the South and 
private in the Northeast.
1 As already pointed out in the survey of the literature in chapter I, the importance o f self-financing is 
often implicit in the mainstream literature on the emergence o f IDs, such as Fua and Zacchia, 
Industrializzazione; Bagnasco, Tre Italie; and is explained in full in Paci, La struttura, p. 118; Saba, II
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This distinction is not only indicated by the regional distribution of state and market 
finance but is supported by historical and contemporary studies on finance and 
industrialization, discussed in the first chapter. These studies show that in backward 
areas the low levels of savings and the high risk might render private banking 
unviable. In this situation, the supply of capital requires the intervention of the State. 
On the contrary, in moderately backward areas where capital is scarce and diffused, 
market financial institutions that collect this capital and make it available to industry 
are of crucial importance to industrialization.
The chapter is structured in the following way. The first section presents the two 
samples, the size of the companies and the size of subsidies received by the 
companies. Within this context, particular attention is devoted to estimating the 
value of implicit subsidies within soft loans. The second section analyses the capital 
structure of the companies in the two samples thus addressing the key issue of the 
thesis, namely the importance of the public sources of finance as compared to private 
and internally generated finance.
Although the analysis developed in this chapter is based on a relatively small sample 
of companies (54 overall), it is, nevertheless, worthwhile. In the first place, it is a 
necessary complement to the macro analysis of the sources of finance, based on data 
published by the Bank of Italy and provided by the Ministry of Industry, which do 
not offer information on the size of recipient companies. The study of these two 
samples aims at focusing on the sources of finance of small and medium-sized firms. 
In the second place, the records of these companies enable us to address issues that 
other works based on much larger samples cannot tackle, thus making useful and 
interesting observations, never done before.
modello, p. 132.
2 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness', Goldsmith, Financial Structure’, Cameron, Banking and 
Economic Development', C.W. Calomiris and C.P. Himmelberg, ‘Directed Credit Programs for 
Agriculture and Industry. Arguments from Theory and Facts’, in: Proceedings o f the World Bank 
Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1993 (Washington, 1994), pp. 113-137; Calomiris 
and Himmelberg, ‘Government Credit Policy’.
3 F. Siracusano and C. Tresoldi, ‘Le piccole imprese manifatturiere nel Mezzogiomo: diseconomie 
esteme, incentivi, equilibri gestionali e finanziari’, in: Banca d’ltalia, U sistema finanziario nel 
Mezzogiomo, Contributi a ll’Analisi Economica (Rome, 1990), pp. 103-143; Bagella and Caggese, 
‘Struttura’, Bagella, Becchetti and Caggese, ‘Financial constraints’.
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The analysis presented in this chapter is based on companies’ raw balance sheets, 
reclassified on purpose. Therefore, it has been possible to single out soft loans, and 
the implicit subsidy within those, from long-term borrowed finance as well as grants 
and fiscal subsidies from reserves. These distinctions are not possible for scholars 
working on reclassified balance sheets, made available by the institutions, because 
these do not provide such details. Moreover, the precise identification of subsidies 
allows the unveiling of new aspects such as the size of subsidies received and the 
frequency with which such subsidies were received.
Due to the limited number of companies in the sample, the results of the analysis are 
to be interpreted as indicative only. However, the comparison of the two ID samples 
with a larger sample analysed by a Bank of Italy study validates the main features 
and the differences bom out by the two ID samples. This demonstrates that the two 
ID samples reveal - and enable the analysis of - important aspects of the Italian 
North-South divide.
6.1 Company samples
At various points in time, the first sample includes 32 manufacturing companies 
located in the Barletta ID in the South of Italy and the second sample includes 21 
manufacturing companies located in the SMP ED in the North-East. The two samples 
provide a total of 680 observations -  annual balance sheets -  over time. 460 refer to 
Southern companies, with 221 for the North-Eastern sample. The Southern sample 
includes 12 companies involved in footwear production, nine in clothing, four in 
textiles, three in wood processing and production of parquet floors and furniture, 
three in food processing, particularly wine and flour and one in plastic and resins. 
The North-Eastern sample includes 10 companies involved in the production of 
footwear, three in clothing, two in leather items such as handbags, belts, wallets etc., 
one in the production of equipment for footwear plants, one producing paper and 
card boxes, one in the production of packaging and heels and one in the production 
of metallic chairs and furniture. For a detailed description of the samples see 
Appendix B.
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The initial intention was to collect a random sample of at least 30 companies for each 
ID, starting with companies in the sectors in which the two areas are specialised 
namely footwear and leather goods, clothing and textiles (henceforth sp=sectors of 
specialisation), and within this group moving from the oldest companies and 
progressively expanding to the youngest. If 30 companies such could not be found, 
the samples would have been expanded to include companies in other manufacturing 
sectors (henceforth man l)4, starting with companies established at the earliest time 
and expanding to younger companies, to reach a number of 30 companies at least.
However, the scantiness of data was such that it was possible to collect the balance 
sheets of only 32 companies in the Barletta ID, held at the Chamber of Commerce in 
Bari, and only 21 companies in the SMP ID, held at the Chamber of Commerce in 
Forli. The main problem is that these companies did not have public status or were 
not trading during the whole 1951-1991 period, as most were established as public or 
went public in the second half of the 1970s (in the Barletta sample) and in the 1980s 
in the SMP sample. The two samples were compiled collecting all available records 
of companies in the manufacturing sectors mentioned, the records of which started 
before 1984 in the case of Barletta, and before 1988 for SMP, as companies with 
records available after that date would offer too short a period of analysis.5
The North-Eastern sample is smaller because the SMP ID is smaller than its 
Southern counterpart, as table VI. 1 below demonstrates. Moreover, it was not 
possible to collect data on companies located in the city of Rimini, as when these 
data were collected, Rimini had became an independent province and thus the 
records were moved from Forli to Rimini itself.
Data referring to companies located in Rimini have been sought from the Centrale 
dei Bilanci, which provided data from four more companies (the maximum for
4 Including food processing, wood, furniture, paper, publishing, photography and rubber. Sectors such 
as metal and mineral processing, oil refining and construction have not been included.
5 The different closing dates for the collection of data are due to the availability of records. Having 
collected records of 32 companies in the Barletta ID it seemed unnecessary to collect records starting 
after 1984, which would offer only seven years of analysis. The smaller number of records available 
for the San Mauro Pascoli ID suggested the extension of the closing date to 1988.
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external users), from 1984, when their database starts. However, these records have 
limited use. These balance sheets are not raw, having been reclassified by the 
Centrale dei Bilanci. Many details are thus not available, such as the distinction 
between subsidised and market long-term loans, between grants and fiscal subsidies 
and other reserves. Furthermore, the Centrale dei Bilanci does not collect the reports 
to the balance sheets, material that is important for the interpretation of the 
quantitative records. In addition, the Mediobanca was contacted in an attempt to 
expand the samples and in particular to cover the city of Rimini. Their database 
includes medium-sized and large companies with records starting from the 1960s. 
However, external users do not have access to their data.
Fewer observations are available for the Barletta ID in the 1950s and 1960s because 
fewer companies were trading in the ID in those years, but also because of technical 
reasons. The records of some companies that ended their trading activity before the 
mid-1970s are placed in an old repository closed for administrative reasons. This 
limitation could have been overcome by using the so-called ‘Foglio Annunci Legali’ 
(Fal), in which companies’ balance sheets were published before 1973. After that 
date, public companies’ balance sheets were published in the ‘Bollettino Ufficiale 
Societa per Azioni e Responsabilita Limitata’. The Fal was a quarterly publication, 
held at provincial and regional offices of the Ministry of Interior. The Bari office 
had a very scanty collection of the Fal for the 1950s and 1960s, so it was impossible 
to collect continuous records of any company. The same attempt for records in the 
San Mauro Pascoli area has not been done, as there was no problem in accessing old 
material at the Chamber of Commerce in Forli’.
When companies are set up, they are entered into the so-called Register of 
Companies (Registro Societa), which records their date of establishment, sector and 
legal status. Each company receives a unique archive number at the time of 
registration. These books were used to identify and locate the companies. At the 
Chamber of Commerce in Forli the Register of Companies had been computerised 
thus making the identification faster and less prone to mistakes.
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Table VI. 1 compares the number of the companies in the two samples with the 
number of companies in the two IDs.
Table VI. 1 Number of observations by periods of analysis, as compared to the total number 
of companies within the two IDs (average number of employees by plant in brackets).
Barletta San MauroPascoli
Sample Census* Sample Census* Sample Census* Sample Census*
Sp Sp Manlb Man lb Sp Sp Man lb Man l b
1951-56 830 (1.8) 1 1,727(2.6) l c 564 (2) 944 (2.3)
1957-65 1 1,044 (2.9) 2 2021 (3.7) 2 472 (5) 1016 (5)
1966-70 1 5 l d
1971-75 11 1,182 (3.6) 17 2090(4.1) 1 436 (8) 3 948 (6.8)
1976-80 19 25 5 7
1981-86 24 1,469 (6.5) 30 2552(5.8) 15 693 (7) 17 1408 (5.9)
1987-91 21 2,039 (6.9) 25 6,393 (3) 14 657 (7) 16 1595 (5.4)
Keys: Sp= sectors of specialization= footwear and leather goods, clothing and textiles; Man 1= 
including food processing, wood, furniture, paper, publishing, photography and rubber. Sectors such 
as metal and mineral processing, oil refining and construction have not been included; a= Census data 
has been included where the census year falls within the relevant sub-period; b= including companies 
in sp; c= company NLa started its activity in 1956; d= 1966-67 only, as after that date company NDe 
went bankrupt.
Source: Company records and Istat, Censimento dell’ Industria, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991.
Table VI. 1 shows that the two IDs contain a large number of companies, most of 
which are very small. A precise comparison based on the number of employees is 
not feasible, as companies in the sample give only occasional information about their 
workforce.
The paucity of available records is due to the small number of public companies 
(limited liability and public share), the only ones bound by law to deposit their 
balance sheets at the local Chamber of Commerce. The censuses of industry provide 
details of the legal status of companies only by province, not by towns. Therefore 
tables VI.2 and VI.3 display public companies in the province as a percentage of all 
companies and companies in the two IDs as a percentage of the provincial total.
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Table VI.2 Public companies in Bari province and the Barletta ID
% of public companies in the province ID % province
Sp Man 1 Sp Man 1
Firms* Employees1* Firms* Employees1* Firms® Employees*1 Firms0 Employees'
1951 0.60* 10.4e 17.2 17 16.8 16.1
1961 0.2 7.4 0.53 9.8 19.1 22.5 18 20.5
1971 0.44 19.1 1 19.2 18.3 21.9 18.2 20.3
1981 2.8 14.45 3.3 21.2 29.2 38.5 25 28.1
1991 8.9 29.6 7.7 29.9 43.4 46.7 56.2 31.3
Keys: a= Public companies as % of total companies in the sector; b= Workforce employed in public 
companies as % o f total workforce in the sector; c= Firms in the Barletta ID as % of firms in the 
province; d= Workforce employed in the Barletta ID as % percentage of provincial workforce; e= 
Manufacturing as a whole. Other keys as for table 6.1.1.
Source: Istat, Censimento dell’Industria, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991.
Table VI.3 Public companies in Forli province and the San Mauro Pascoli ID
% o f public companies in the province ID % province
Sp Man 1 Sp Man 1
Comp* Employees1* Comp* Employees1* Comp0 Employees*1 Comp0 Employees'
1951 1.2° 13.9° 20.5 20.9 19.8 17.9
1961 0.33 15.3 1.1 19.5 19.1 26.6 19.2 20.9
1971 0.98 20.2 2.2 20.5 22.2 30.9 19.4 23.4
1981 2.7 30.7 3.1 25.4 28 33 23.1 23.5
1991 6.2 39.3 5.9 31.1 30.5 34.7 23.9 23.2
Source and keys as for table VI.2.
Tables VI.2 and VI.3 demonstrate that public companies were a minority in the two 
provinces particularly until 1971, but are clearly very important in terms of 
employment. Thus, the samples should also capture a larger portion of the ID 
workforce than the sheer number of companies suggests.
The inclusion of public companies alone introduces some biases into the sample, 
particularly as regards capital structure. As figures in tables VI.2 and VI.3 imply, 
public companies are larger than the average, in terms of employment, in both 
provinces. Their larger size and their legal status might give them easier access to 
market capital and access to a wider range of types of finance, such as bonds, which 
can only be issued by public companies. Thus, market finance is likely to be higher 
for the sample companies than it would be for small and medium-sized companies as
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a whole in the two IDs. This bias can be magnified by the computation of weighted 
averages, rather than a simple average. Nevertheless, weighted averages have been 
preferred in the analysis of the capital structure (tables VI.8 -  V.10 and VI. 13 -  
VI. 15) as the purpose of the capital structure analysis is to offer a broader picture of 
the IDs. It thus seemed correct to allocate greater weight to the sources of finance of 
larger companies than, for instance, to those of a small start-up company.
The samples contain a further bias. Far more records in the Southern sample refer to 
the 1970s than in the North-Eastern counterpart, where more records refer to the 
1980s. Considering that the 1980s saw more stable economic growth than the 1970s, 
the different extent to which the two decades are represented by the samples might 
affect the differences emerging from the comparison of the two samples. This is 
likely to happen when the comparison is not broken into sub-periods, as in table 
VT.4, which compares size and turnover of the two samples, and in the analysis 
presented in the following chapter. This bias does not affect the comparison of the 
capital structure and performance of the two samples in tables VI.9 -  VI. 10 and 
VI. 13 -  VI. 15, as in those tables the overall period of analysis is broken into sub­
periods reflecting changes in the regional policy, e.g. 1971-75, 1976-80, 1981-86, 
etc.
The table below shows the size, in terms of net capital stock, and the turnover of the 
companies in the two samples.
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Table VI.4 Net capital stock and turnover of all firms in the samples, 1951-91 (m
1980 lire)
Net Capital Stock Turnover
Barletta SMP Barletta SMP
Range 12-1,849 8-1,646 55-13,680 49-11,058
Average 464 307 1,788 3,101
Median 285 155 580 1,967
St deviation 478 418 2,895 3,350
Source: Company balance sheets.
Capital stock has been transformed into constant prices by using the index of annual gross investment 
in R. Golinelli and M. Monterastelli, Un Metodo per la Ricostruzione di Serie Storiche Compatibili 
con la Nuova Contabilita Nazionale, (Rome, 1990); for 1990 and 1991, the index of annual gross 
investment Istat, Conti Economici Nazionali, Anni 1970-97, (Rome, 1998); turnover deflated by using 
consumer price index, Istat, Indice dei Prezzi al Consumo (Rome, 1999).
Despite the larger dimension of the Southern companies in terms of fixed net capital, 
they are considerably smaller in terms of turnover. The largest Southern company, in 
terms of assets, also determines the upper limit of turnover. Without this company, 
the upper limit of turnover for Southern companies would amount to 8.5 bn. The 
lower limit of turnover in the SMP sample derives from one company that traded for 
4 years, after which it went bankrupt. Excluding this company, the lower limit 
would be 236m lire.
Table VI.4 indicates issues that will be studied in detail in the following of the 
chapter, such as fixed assets representing a larger share of total assets in Southern 
companies. Furthermore, the smaller turnover values of the Southern companies also 
suggest lower productivity of capital, which is analysed with the appropriate 
indicators in the third section.
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Table VI.5 Amount and Frequency of Subsidies, Barletta sample, 1959-91 (m 1980
lire)________________________________________________________
SL IS* Gr FS
Range 535.5 - 0.7 255 .5-0 .4 616.2-1 .5 28.3 -  0.04
Average 156.6 83.1 105.2 3.6
Median 110.9 62 50.5 2
St dev 129.2 69.8 127.8 5.5
Frequencyb 10.3 10.3 6.5 10.9
Keys: SL= subsidised loans; IS= implicit subsidy; Gr= grants; FS= fiscal subsidy; ;
value of implicit subsidies in subsidised loans, computed applying Faini’s formula, S= L {1- 
[rA(l+rA)N/ (l+rA)N-l] [(l+rM)N-l/  rM(l+rM)N] }, where: L= loan; Tm= market long-term interest rate; 
rA= subsidised interest rate; N= length of the loan, see chapter II, p. 19; b= years of activity of 
companies divided by number of new subsidies received 
Source: Company balance sheets.
Table VI.6 Amount and Frequency of Subsidies, SMP sample, 1974-91 (m 1980 
lire)...............................................................................................................................
SL IS* Gr FS
Range 250-7.3 138.3-2.4 20.3- 0.9 5.1- 0.2
Average 60.7 30.5 8.4 1.7
Median 39.6 15.5 9.3 1.1
St dev 62.6 35.1 7.1 1.7
Frequency1* 16.3 16.3 42.4 35.3
Keys and source as for table VI.5.
Tables VI.5 and VI.6 display the total amount of subsidised loans and the 
approximate value of implicit subsidies, grants and fiscal subsidies received by the 
companies in the two samples. The starting dates are different and are dictated by 
the year in which companies in the two samples began reporting subsidies in their 
balance sheets.
The tables clearly show the considerable difference between subsidies received by 
firms in the Southern and North-Eastern sample during their trading life as public 
companies, not only in terms of size but also of the frequency with which such 
subsidies were extended, particularly in the case of grants. Grant schemes channelled 
far more funds to the South than to other areas of the country in the entire period of 
analysis, as shown in chapter IV.
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The calculation of implicit subsidies, displayed in table VI.5 and VI.6, as well as in 
other tables below, entails a certain degree of approximation. In Faini’s formula the 
implicit subsidy in soft loans is a function of the loan size, the redemption period and 
the market and subsidised interest rates. The size of the soft loan was clearly 
specified in the balance sheets, and the redemption period throughout the whole 
period of analysis remained constant, 15 years in the South and 10 years in the rest of 
the country (see Chapter ID, section 3.2). The approximation arises from the values 
of market and subsidised interest rates used in the computation.
Various soft loan schemes carried different interest rates as shown in chapter IV, 
section 4.1, but company balance sheets rarely specify under which scheme they 
were receiving subsidised loans. Therefore, the subsidised interest rate used in the 
computation was calculated as an average subsidised interest rate for the region in 
each year.
In Chapter IV, section 4.1, three indicators of the market cost of long-term capital 
have been used: the interest rate on market medium-term credit, published by the 
OECD and available from 1966 to 1980;6 the reference rate, published by the Bank 
of Italy from 1976 to 1991; and yields on long-term government bonds published by 
the IMF for the whole period of analysis.8 The approximation in the calculation of 
the implicit subsidy arises from the fact that none of these indicators is available at 
the regional level, for it is likely that the market interest rate on medium-term credit 
was higher in the South, as in the case of short-term credit. Therefore, the use of any 
of the three indicators above is likely to underestimate the value of the implicit 
subsidy in soft loans to the Southern sample. Due to the continuous availability of 
the data, yields on long-term government bonds have been used in the computation 
of the implicit subsidy. Graph VI.3 below displays the trend of yields on long-term 
government bonds and the average subsidised interest rates of schemes available to 
Southern firms and firms in the North and Centre, for the overall period.
6 OECD, Financial Statistics, various years.
7 Banca d’ltalia, Bollettino, various years. For the definition of the reference rate see section 3.2 ,1.
8 IMF, International Financial Statistics, various years.
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The percentage of implicit subsidies (the average implicit subsidy as a percentage of 
average subsidised loans in tables VI.5 and VI.6) in the two samples is very similar, 
amounting to 53% of the average subsidised loan in the South and 50% in the North- 
Eastern counterpart. The difference might be reduced by the use of yields on long­
term government bonds, as mentioned above. However, it is also due to the 
distribution across time of subsidies in the two samples, displayed in the graphs VI. 1 
and VI.2 below.















O) CD O -r-
8 8 8 fe £
CO£  <2 
at at fc £Ol o> 1 8
h  I Total subsidised loans (mill £ 1980) Interest rate differential (percentage points)
Key: interest rate differential = difference between national market interest rate on medium-term credit 
and average subsidised interest rate in the South, as displayed in graph VI.3 below.
Source: Company balance sheets and tables IV. 1-IV. 15.
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Key: interest rate differential =  difference betw een national market interest rate on medium-term credit 
and average subsidised interest rate in the Centre and North, as displayed in graph V I.3 below .
Source as for graph VI. 1.
Graphs V.l and VI.2 show that while subsidised loans to the Southern sample are 
more spread across time, subsidised loans in the North-Eastern sample are 
particularly concentrated in 1980, a year in which the differential between the market 
interest rate and the subsidised interest rate in the North and Centre was very high. 
Therefore, when calculating the implicit subsidy within total subsidised loans 
received by the companies over the whole period of analysis, the percentage is high 
in the North-Eastern sample due to the relative weight of soft loans and the implicit 
subsidy in 1980. The effect of the concentration of soft loans in 1980 is instead 
annulled when studying implicit subsidies by sub-periods, as in tables VI.9, VI. 13 
and VI. 14.
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Table VI.7 Amount and Frequency of Subsidies, Barletta sample, 1976-91 (m 1980
lire)________________________________________________________
SL IS* Gr FS
Range 423.6 -  0.7 248 .8-0 .5 616.2-1 .5 28.3 -  0.04
Average 147 84.2 98.2 3.7
Median 111 68.1 42.3 1.8
St dev 114 65.2 126.4 5.6
Frequency** 11.1 11.1 5.5 8
Keys and sources as for table VI.5.
Comparing the overall period figures for the Southern sample with those referring to 
the 1976-91 period, in table VI.7 it is clear that the amount and frequency of 
subsidised loans slightly decreased, thus reflecting the 1976 turning point in the 
regional distribution of soft loans analysed in Chapter IV. However, when looking at 
the approximate value of the implicit subsidy it is clear that the percentage of 
implicit subsidy (the average implicit subsidy as a percentage of average subsidised 
loans in table VI.7) increased in the South, reaching 57%, due to the higher 
differential between market and subsidised interest rates after 1976 (see graphs VI. 1 
and VI.3). A similar comparison for the North-Eastern sample was not considered 
necessary as companies in that sample began receiving subsidies only in 1974.
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Keys: Y LY G B = yields on long-term government bonds; A v SIRS =  average subsidised interest rate 
in Southern Italy; A v SIRC/N =  average subsidised interest rate in the Centre and North.
Source: Tables IV. 1 -  IV .15.
The size of grants extended to Southern companies decreased in the 1976-91 period, 
but they become more frequent. Fiscal subsidies remain of equal size but they are 
more frequently extended to companies in the later period, clearly indicating that 
these subsidies were entirely or mainly concentrated in the 1976-91 period.
6.2 Analysis of the capital structure.
This section assesses the relative importance of the various sources of finance for 
companies in the two samples. In particular it compares the importance of subsidies 
and private sources of finance (market finance and internally generated funds). The 
section is divided into three sub-sections. The first describes the balance sheet 
indicators used in the analysis. The second provides an overview of the capital 
structure of the two ID samples and compares it with the capital structure of a sample 
of small manufacturing companies analysed by the Bank of Italy. The last sub­
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section focuses on the difference in the capital structure of subsidised, non­
subsidised and failed companies in the two ID samples.
6.2.1 Balance sheet indicators.
The analysis of the capital structure presented in tables VI.8, VL9 and VI. 10 aims to 
establish how the existing capital stock was financed.9 These tables include only 
those components of the balance sheets (tables VI.8 and VI.9) and financial ratios 
(table VI. 10) that are important for the analysis conducted in the chapter. A more 
detailed capital structure analysis and description of the various sources of finance is 
included in Appendix B.3.
Long-term borrowed capital (including subsidised loans, long-term bank loans, 
bonds, leasing and long-term loans from partners, but not including contingency 
reserves, as explained in the Appendix) and equity are key elements of the analysis of 
the capital structure. These are the types of finance (long-term finance) that, 
according to conventional financial criteria, should be used to finance the purchase of 
fixed assets. Assets and liabilities should be kept in equilibrium according to their 
duration, as it would be risky to finance a long-term investment by a bank overdraft, 
which might have to be repaid at short notice.10 Moreover, these are the components 
of the balance sheet directly affected by subsidies, as soft loans belong to long-term 
borrowed capital, and grants and fiscal subsidies are included in the reserves, which 
in turn belong to equity. These components of the balance sheets will allow the 
analysis of the shortage of long-term capital in the South from a micro perspective. 
The shortage of long-term capital is one of the characteristics of underdeveloped 
areas that the regional policy, via incentives, intended to tackle, as it caused low 
investment in the South and represented one of the disadvantages of investing in the 
South.11
9 S. Bond and T. Jenkinson, ‘The Assessment: Investment Performance and Policy’, Oxford Review o f  
Economic Policy, 12/2 (1996), p. 12.
10 J. Hamold, T. Hope and A. Southworth, Financial Accounting (1985), p. 200.
11 Siracusano and Tresoldi, ‘Le piccole’, p. 137.
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Among current liabilities, short-term debts to banks and commercial debts have been 
taken into account. Short-term debts to banks should be used to finance assets with 
short-term life, according to conventional financial criteria, nevertheless they are of 
particular interest to this analysis as the literature points out that small companies are 
more reliant on short-term bank loans and overdrafts than large companies.12 
Moreover, due to the above-mentioned lack of long-term capital in underdeveloped 
areas, companies in the Southern sample might show an even higher reliance on 
short-term capital. For instance, some companies in the Barletta ID sample clearly 
state in their reports that short-term bank capital was used to finance investment, 
which happened particularly when their application for subsidies had already been 
approved but the subsidised loans and/or grants had not yet been extended. Thus, 
short-term bank capital was used to bridge the gap.13
Commercial debts, or accounts payable, are debts towards suppliers of goods and 
services. The transaction between a firm and its suppliers generates commercial 
debts, as services and goods purchased are paid after a certain period - an average 61 
days in the EU, and 83 days in Italy. Thus, the size of commercial debts reflects the 
suppliers’ credit policy and firms’ business operations.14 In market practice, 
commercial debts are not considered proper debts as they do not bear any interest, 
but they have been included in the following tables as they represent a large share of 
the companies’ liabilities in the samples.
In tables VI.8 and VI.9 equity capital has been broken down into its components - 
reserves and paid-up capital - as reserves are internally generated funds and represent 
a company’s ability to self-finance, whereas paid-up capital includes finance 
provided by partners.
12 Ibid., p. 136; A. Cosh and A. Hughes, ‘Size, Financial Structure and Profitability: UK Companies in 
the 1980s’, in: A. Hughes and D.J. Storey (eds), Finance and the Small Firms (1994), p. 36.
13 Chamber of Commerce in Bari (hendeforth CCB), company SRo, Report 1984; company SBi, 
Report 1974 and 1979.
14 L.M. Fraser and A. Ormiston, Understanding Financial Statements (5th ed., Upper Saddle River, 
1998), p. 62; Astolfi and Negri, Ragioneria applicata e professionale (Milan, 1998) p. 150.
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In the following tables, finance provided by partners (apart from paid-up capital) 
such as loans from partners and funds from partners (see Appendix B.3) have been 
reported as aggregated, for purely presentational reasons. As a key point in this 
analysis is to separate the various types of finance according to their origins (e.g. 
government, internally generated funds, market, etc.) it has been preferred to present 
loans and funds provided by partners in this way. However, loans from partners 
belong to long-term borrowed capital and funds to equity, which is where they have 
been included when computing long-term borrowed capital and equity. Detail on 
loans and funds separately are provided in the more detailed capital structure 
presented in the Appendix (tables B.3.1-B.3.7)
The analysis of the capital structure includes some ratios: equity capital divided by 
fixed net assets (E/FNA, where FNA is computed as total fixed assets minus total 
depreciation funds) and long-term capital divided by fixed net assets (LTC/FNA), to 
assess whether the company is in financial equilibrium. These ratios indicate the 
ability of companies to cover their fixed assets with owned capital and long-term 
capital respectively.15 Ideally, E/FNA - expressed as a percentage - should be well 
above 100%, as this would indicate that the company has financed its fixed assets 
with its own capital and more owned capital is available to finance further 
investment or to cover losses should these occur. The same applies to LTC/FNA, 
which should also be well above 100%, as if it was below this it would mean that the 
company has taken risks in financing its investment with short-term capital.16 
Moreover, as these ratios are used in other empirical works17 they allow for ready 
comparisons.
The analysis also presents the ratio of fixed net assets to total net assets (FNA/TNA 
where TNA is defined as total assets minus total depreciation funds), used here as a 
proxy for capital intensity. The standard definition of capital intensity is the ratio of 
the amount of capital to the amount of labour, but as the records of companies in the
15 Siracusano, Tresoldi, ‘Le piccole’, p. 133.
16 E. Astolfi and L. Negri, Ragioneria applicata, pp. 242-243; Hamold, Hope and Southworth, 
Financial Accounting, p. 200.
17 Siracusano and Tresoldi, ‘Le piccole’; Bagella, Becchetti and Caggese, ‘Financial constraints’.
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two ID samples provide scanty information about employment the ratio FNA/TNA 
has been adopted. This ratio is used together with the standard definition in other 
studies as measure of capital intensity18 and has been included in the analysis of the 
capital structure in order to address the controversial issue of the impact of subsidies 
on the capital intensity of Southern industry.
The relative importance of the various types of finance analysed in this chapter is 
assessed on the basis of company balance sheets. The use of such sources requires 
caution. Information disclosed in balance sheets and annual reports is directed to 
various parties such as shareholders, investors, government regulatory agencies and 
many others including employees and managers whose contracts might include 
incentives. Balance sheets as well as other information that companies might 
disclose are not necessarily unbiased and impartial as compared to information 
available to internal parties.19
Working on balance sheets of 54 companies spanning from 1951 to 1991 brought 
problems of standardisation of the records across companies and across time. The 
major change in the compilation of balance sheets occurred in 1975, when 
companies were given the legal possibility of revaluing their assets, until then
0C\recorded at their historical cost in the assets account. The difference between the 
historical value of assets and their re-estimated value was to be recorded in a specific 
fund included in the depreciation funds. All companies in the samples adopted this 
new accounting method, but while the new accounting method affected the value of 
gross fixed assets, which is not used in the tables, it does not affect the computation 
of fixed net assets used in the analysis, as fixed net assets are defined as gross fixed 
assets (as recorded in the assets statement) minus depreciation funds, and investment 
as an annual increase in fixed net assets.
18 Siracusano and Tresoldi, ‘Le piccole’, pp. 121-124.
19 G. Foster, Financial Statement Analysis (2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, 1986), pp. 2, 24.
20 The re-estimated value was equal to the historical cost of the capital multiplied by 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 
depending on the year of the purchase of the equipment Law 576/1975.
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The reclassification of the balance sheets according to financial criteria was a 
fundamental stage in the process of rendering records comparable and examples are 
reported in Appendix B.2. The main problem in the standardisation of records across 
companies was represented by the accounting treatment of grants and government 
contributions towards the cost of equipment leased, which were simply another type 
of grants.21
There are two different approaches to the accounting treatment of government grants. 
According to the first, grants should be included in the profit and loss account as 
revenue, to match those expenditures to which they contribute. The second approach 
maintains that grants should be considered as a source of finance provided by the 
government, hence they should be included in the balance sheet as a non- 
distributable reserve.22 In Italy, both types of accounting treatment are allowed once 
the company has received the official approval of its grant application, but grants are 
taken mto account for fiscal purposes only once they are actually received. The 
majority of companies included in the samples retained their grants in the 
shareholders’ equity as reserve, with a few cases (5 companies in one or two years 
each) in which they are credited to the profit account. In these cases they have been 
moved from the profit account and included in the equities as grant reserves. This 
choice seems to be more methodologically correct as grants represent capital 
invested in long-term assets and thus belong to long-term capital and more precisely 
to reserves as there is no obligation of repayment.
A similar problem of accounting treatment occurs with contributions on leasing, 
although these were a far less significant source of finance than grants (see 
Appendix, table B.3.7). Contributions on leasing are generally credited to profits and 
in a few cases considered as reserves. Like grants, these represent capital invested in
21 Contributions towards leasing were extended under scheme 1329/65 (see section 3.2, I). Grants 
together with subsidised loans were the main instruments of the regional policy for Southern Italy, and 
the various schemes that made them available are reviewed in Chapter III.
22 R. Lewis and D. Pendrill, Advanced Financial Accounting, (4th ed., 1994), pp. 89-90.
23 Astolfi and Negri, Ragioneria applicata, pp. 166-167. This clear distinction between the 
accounting and fiscal treatment of grants clearly suggests that the delay between the approval of the 
application and the extension of the grant of it was well known and official.
266
fixed assets, and have therefore been included under reserves and designated as 
‘ estimated reserves ’.
The choice of including grants and contributions on leasing in profits rather than 
constituting reserves might seem difficult to explain considering that profit is taxed, 
whereas reserves constituted by subsidies are taxed only if distributed to partners, 
because in this case they would represent an income. However, the inclusion of 
subsidies in profits can be explained because if those companies had not done so, 
they would have incurred losses or much smaller profits, which could endanger their 
image as reliable and well performing companies, particularly with banks, but also 
with clients and suppliers.
6.2.2 Capital structure and capital intensity: an overview
The analysis of the capital structure covers the overall period 1951-91. It has been 
broken into sub-periods dictated by the changes in the industrial policy for the South, 
analysed in chapter IE. The reason of this fragmentation lies in the attempt to 
identify possible changes in the capital structure of these companies, and particularly 
in the relative importance of subsidies, in relation to changes in the policy. 
Moreover, as not all 54 companies in the two samples traded or remained public 
from 1951 to 1991, this choice allows a clear identification of the number of 
observations available in each sub-period.
The analysis of the capital structure presents the weighted average of the various 
sources of finance. As explained above, calculating a weighted average has been 
preferred in order to give a broad picture of the overall capital structure of the two ID 
samples. The share in total liability of each source of finance (short-term bank loans, 
commercial debts, long-term borrowed capital, equity, loans and contributions by 
partners, paid-up capital) has been computed for each district in each sub-period 
using the following formula:24
24 J. Edwards and K. Fisher, Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany (Cambridge, 1994), p. 60. 
The authors use constant prices by adopting the capital goods price index, as their analysis covers the 
years 1950 to 1989 and is broken down into decades. As in this case the analysis is broken down into
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t=1956 t=1956
e.g. 1951-56: S iJ t / L /,
t=1951 t= 1951
n
Where i t denotes the amount of finance of type j  in year t, It= S i11
j=l
(there are n different types of finance).
As mentioned above, data for the first two decades are very scant, particularly for the 
North-Eastern ID. The following table shows some data from the companies in the 
Barletta sample from 1951 to 1970, as they display features that are confirmed by the 
analysis of the following years.
Table VI.8 Barletta sample, balance sheet indicators, 1951-70 (%)
Companies STB CD LTBC° IS3 E/FNA LTC/FNA
Subs* NSb
1951-56 1 58.1 1.7 0 24.5 24.5
1957-65 1 1 56.4 12.8 8.1 (8.07) 1.90(23.5) 47.1 70.9
1966-70 4 1 43.1 8.4 12.6(12.63) 5.42(43) 75 103.9
Keys: a= Number of subsidised companies; b= Number of unsubsidised companies; c= of which 
subsidised loans in brackets; d= as a percentage of subsidised loans in brackets; E/FNA= Equities as a 
percentage of fixed net assets; LTC/FNA= Long-term capital (E+LTBC) as a percentage of fixed net 
assets, all other indicators as a percentage of total liabilities; STB= short-term bank loans; CD= 
commercial debts; LTBC= long-term borrowed capital; IS= implicit subsidy, approximate value 
computed as explained in keys to table VI.5.
Source: Company balance sheets
These selected data show that firms were highly indebted on the short-term credit 
market and considerably undercapitalized in financial terms. Their coverage of fixed 
net assets with internally generated funds (E/FNA) is very poor and they only 
manage to cover fixed net assets with long-term capital (LTC/FNA) in the last sub­
period, with the substantial help of subsidised loans. Clearly, these firms were 
accessing the system of incentives, as four companies out of five received subsidised 
loans in the 1966-70 period. However, not one received grants in this period, for 
table IV.25 shows that from 1957 to 1965 regional grants were not as important as
shorter periods, the use of constant prices was not considered necessary, moreover the deflation o f  
some components of the balance sheet such as long-term loans seemed far from straightforward.
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they later became. Similarly, regional subsidised loans were not yet extensive, but 
there were national schemes alongside the regional one and it has already been 
shown that a very high share of Southern applications was accepted in these years 
(table IV.24). Table VI.8 shows that the implicit subsidy as a percentage of 
subsidised loans was much lower in the 1957-65 sub-period (when it amounted to 
23.5% of subsidised loans) as compared to the 1966-70 sub-period (43%). This is 
because the differential between subsidised and market interest rate in the South was 
lower in the 1957-65 than in the 1966-70 sub-period (see graph VI.3 above). 
Moreover, the largest amount of subsidised loans was received in 1970, the year of 
highest interest rate differential in the two sub-periods (see graph VI. 1).
The two companies available for the San Mauro Pascoli ID for those years were not 
subsidised.
However, the use of current prices creates a bias during years of high inflation.
Table VL9 Barletta and SMP samples, balance sheet indicators, 1970-1991 (%).
Companies STB CD LTBCC ISd Reserves* Partners Paid-up
Barletta sample Subs* NSb
1971-75 7 11 28.0 19.9 7.7 (7.74) 3.90 (50.4) 4.5 (3.3)f 6.2 22.3
1976-80 21 3 22.7 22.1 6.3 (3.16) 1.94 (61.4) 13.2 (7.9)f (0.1 )g 6.0 20.1
1981-86 23 6 15.4 33.4 5.6 (4.26) 2.30 (54) 17.3 (6.3)f (0.4)g 5.7 12.2
1987-91 19 6 14.4 37.3 7.8 (3.95) 2.12(53.7) 20.5 (8.3)f (0.7)g (0.1)b 2.2 8.1
SMP sample
Subs NS
1971-75 1 2 15.8 24.4 1.8 (0.62) 0.30 (48.4) 3.3 3.1 24.78
1976-80 3 4 13.5 27.5 2.1 (1.61) 0.84 (52.2) 4.6 (0.01)8 2.2 17.72
1981-86 9 8 6.3 25 5.7 (0.87) 0.38 (43.7) 14.6 (0.015)f (0.01)g 3 17.43
1987-91 5 12 6.3 23.5 5.8 (0.18) 0.07 (38.9) 24 (0.1/ (0.02)g 3.2 14.72
Keys: e= of which reserves built with subsidies in brackets; f= grants; g= fiscal subsidies; h= contribution on leasing (estimated reserve); other keys as for table VI.8.
Source as for table VI.8.
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Table VL9 demonstrates the greater reliance of companies in the Barletta sample on 
subsidies. Grants appear for the first time during 1971-75, a period when the Cassa 
doubled its expenditure on grants. It is also clear that subsidised loans decreased 
from 1976 whereas grants became increasingly important, broadly in line with the 
relative share of Cassa subsidies analysed in previous chapters (see table IV.25).
Southern firms display higher shares of long-term debts, mostly consisting of 
subsidised loans, whereas market long-term credit is a more important source of 
finance for companies in the North-Eastern sample. Therefore, it seems clear that 
companies in the Southern sample reach shares of long-term capital comparable to 
the North-Eastern sample only with the substantial help of subsidies, consistently 
with the regional policy’s aim of increasing the availability of long-term capital in 
the South.
Throughout the 1971-91 period, the approximate value of the implicit subsidy within 
subsidised loans is, in percentage terms, higher in the South than in the North-East. 
This reflects the higher differential between the medium-term market interest rate 
and the average subsidised interest rate in the South, than in the Centre and North, 
(see Graph VI.3) and the longer redemption period.
The variation in the implicit subsidy percentage within each sample and across sub­
periods is not affected by the redemption period, which remained constant 
throughout the whole period of analysis. The variations in the percentage closely 
reflect the fluctuations in the differential between market and average subsidised 
interest rates in the South and in the Centre and North, and the distribution across 
time of soft loans. For instance, the highest interest rate differential fell in the 1981- 
86 both in the South, and Centre and North of the country (see graphs VI. 1 and VI.2), 
therefore 1981-86 should be the period characterized by the highest percentage of 
implicit subsidy. However, only a portion of soft loans was received by the 
companies in the two ID samples, in 1981 and 1982 when the differential peaked. A 
large part of soft loans was concentrated in the years between 1983 and 1985, when 
the differential was far smaller than in the 1976-80 period. Thus, the percentage of 
implicit subsidy in table VI.9 is lower in 1981-86 than in the 1976-80 sub-period.
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Reserves are a key element in this analysis for two reasons. Firstly, reserves include 
grants, and secondly, they are built up with undistributed profits, hence reserves 
represent the company’s ability to self-finance that is so strongly stressed in the 
literature about the emergence and development of industrial districts. For the 1971- 
75 and 1976-80 periods, companies in the North-Eastern sample show a low weight 
of reserves. This is due to the presence of start-up companies in these periods (two 
in 1971-75 and two in 1976-80). Moreover, the reserves of the largest company in 
each period were sharply decreasing while their fixed net assets were increasing, 
indicating that both were using reserves to finance investment. For the later periods, 
the higher percentage of reserves and the higher rates of return in the North-Eastern 
sample demonstrate a greater ability to self-finance by reinvesting profits, whereas 
Southern companies reached comparable percentages of reserves only with the 
considerable help of grants.
As mentioned previously in this chapter, commercial debts represent the single 
largest component of companies’ liabilities. This is not surprising considering the 
long period over which companies can pay their suppliers. Between 1985 and 1987 
Southern firms paid their suppliers after a period varying from a minimum of 60 days 
for the food processing sector, to 150 and 200 days respectively in clothing/textiles 
and the engineering sectors. In the same years, firms in the same sectors in the 
Centre and North paid their suppliers after 62, 130 and 190 days.25 Therefore, the 
balance sheets of companies in the clothing/textile sector, which are relatively 
numerous in the Southern sample, include goods and services bought in the last five 
months.
25 Siracusano and Tresoldi, ‘Le piccole’, p. 136.
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Table VI. 10 Barletta and SMP samples, balance sheet ratios (%)
Companies FNA/TNA E/FNA LTC/FNA RR
Barletta sample Subsa NSb
1971-75 7 11 53.0 63.0 80.9 -0.7
1976-80 21 3 39.5 95.1 114.3 5.5
1981-86 23 6 31.3 105.7 129.7 2.8
1987-91 19 6 29.8 100.4 130.0 3.6
SMP sample
Subs8 NSb
1971-75 1 2 49.6 104.55 122.79 7.8
1976-80 3 4 19.0 140.02 158.76 5.6
1.981-86 9 8 13.7 227.15 282.46 12.8
1987-91 5 12 18.2 203.86 251.36 9.3
Keys: FNA/TNA= fixed net assets divided by total net assets; RR= rate of return on long-term capital 
calculated dividing net profit by long-term capital, where long-term capital include long-term 
borrowed capital and equity. Other keys as for table VI.8.
Source: Company balance sheets.
The rate of return on long-term capital clearly shows the lower profitability of 
Southern companies in the sample (particularly low during 1971-75, mainly due to a 
large number of start-up companies), which can be explained in both micro- and 
macroeconomic terms. Southern small firms (20-100 employees) show a slower 
turnover of inventories (for the textile and footwear sectors -108 days in the South 
and 68 in the rest of the country) and a lower utilization of production capacity - a 
consequence of the more limited market in the South and smaller export 
opportunities. Southern industry was thus unable to exploit scale economies 
internal and external to the firm, whereas firms located in more developed areas of 
the country enjoyed a better potential to exploit such economies.27 In addition, 
Southern companies did not exploit economies of specialization, as the Southern 
manufacturing sector relied far less on the division of the production process 
between various firms.28 This makes firms less profitable as the various stages of a
26 Ibid., pp. 113-119 and 125-127.
27 Rossi and Toniolo, ‘Italy’, p. 430.
28 A. Giannola, ‘Mezzogiomo, Industrializzazione e Imprese’, in: Banca d’ltalia, ‘II Sistema 
Finanziario nel Mezzogiomo’, special issue of the Contributi a ll’Analisi Economica (Rome, 1990), p. 
181.
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90production process are unlikely to be uniformly efficient. Furthermore, the 
possibility that the lower productivity of Southern companies could be due also to 
the use of more obsolete equipment cannot be ruled out, contrary to the claims of 
some authors. Graph VI.4 below clearly shows that in the 1980s, North-Eastern 
companies in the sample -which were then enjoying particularly high rates of return - 
were replacing their equipment more quickly than their Southern counterparts.










1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Years
I Southern sam ple-*-Northeastern samplel
Source: Company balance sheets.
The comparison between the two IDs in table VI.9 demonstrates that Southern 
companies have a high share of short-term debts and a much lower share of long­
term debts, represented mainly by subsidised credit. Considering the lower ratio of 
long-term capital to fixed net assets in table VI. 10, and considering the lower interest 
rate on long-term loans (see section 4.1), the heavier reliance on short-term credit 
seems to indicate an ‘unsatisfactory’ availability of long-term credit.
29 The theoretical foundations of this argument are in Stigler, ‘Division of Labour’; and A. 
LeijonhufVud, ‘Capital and the Factory System’ in: R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, Firms, Markets 
and Economic Change. A Dynamic Theory o f  Business Institutions (1995), pp. 203-223.
30 Siracusano and Tresoldi, ‘Le piccole’, p. 110.
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If the level of savings in the South represented the main constraint to the availability 
of credit, there should be shortages of both short-term and long-term credit. From 
the mid-1950s levels of savings increased considerably in the South, due to public 
transfers and remittances from migrants, to the extent that from 1965 the Southern 
balance of payments was close to equilibrium (from 1951 to 1964 the deficit reached 
10% of the Southern GDP).31
Studies of the 1962-1980 period have shown that on the long-term market there were 
periods of both capital outflow from and inflow to the South between 1962 and 1972, 
whereas from 1974 to 1980 (with the sole exception of 1977), there was a growing
^9outflow of long-term capital from the South towards other areas of the country. 
The Southern economy is riskier for the banking system and even though the Italian 
banking system is fragmented in both geographical and market terms,33 there are no 
limitations to the circulation of capital, therefore savings collected in the South can 
be more safely invested in the rest of the country.34 This phenomenon is less 
pronounced on the short-term credit market, as local banks possess a much better 
knowledge of local companies. The entrepreneur is also a depositor at the local bank 
and has a continuing business relationship with it. Instead the contact between small 
or medium-sized firms and medium-term credit institutions (henceforth MTCIs) is 
occasional, with the institution assessing the project having little knowledge of the
o r
company. Moreover, the higher level of fixed assets might make the long-term 
lending institutions sceptical as to the profitability of new investment in fixed assets. 
On the other hand, despite the difference in interest rate small companies might
31 A. Fazio, ‘Credito ed attivita produttiva nel Mezzogiomo’, Banca d’ltalia, Bollettino Economico, n. 
5 (1985), p. 28.
32 F. Marzano and A. Murolo, ‘The Role of the Credit System in the Development of Southern Italy: a 
Few Critical Observations’, Journal o f  Regional Policy, 5/1 (1985), pp. 52-53.
33 As explained in section 3.1.1 and Appendix A, from the Bank Reform Law of 1936 until the wave 
of privatisation started in 1992-93, the Italian banking system was fragmented geographically, 
meaning that banks could operate on a smaller or wider territory according to the size of their 
deposits. It was also fragmented in market terms as banks could collect and lend money on the short­
term market only (less than 1 year) and MTCIs, could collect and lend money on the medium/long­
term market only (more than 5 years). The two markets are closely connected, as banks are among the 
establishing partners of the MTCIs and finance them by purchasing MTCIs bonds.
34 D’Amico, Parigi and Trifilidis, ‘I tassi’.
35 Faini, Galli and Giannini, ‘Finance’, pp. 199-200.
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prefer an overdraft from the local banks rather than a medium-term loan from 
institutions as the second option involves collaterals and bureaucratic procedures.
The balance sheet ratios of the two samples highlight a key issue: fixed net assets 
represent a higher percentage of total net assets for companies in the Southern 
sample (FNA/TNA). Therefore, although they reach a comparable level of long-term 
capital, their ‘need* for long-term capital is not satisfied, and companies in the 
Southern sample remain in an extremely fragile financial equilibrium (1980s) or even 
undercapitalised (1970s). This is shown by the equities and long-term capital as a 
percentage of fixed net assets (E/FNA and LTC/FNA).
These results can be compared with those of a 1987 Bank of Italy study of a sample 
of 9,000 small manufacturing companies.36 This sample includes 650 companies 
located in the South of Italy and 8,350 in the rest of the country. As the Bank of Italy 
study presents simple averages the figures of the two IDs samples have been 
recalculated in the same way. It is possible to compare only some figures because 
the Bank of Italy study presents a less detailed capital structure of companies. In 
particular, it does not separate grants from reserves and paid-up capital, therefore 
only the total figure of equities could be compared, and it does not separate 
subsidised loans from market medium-term credit. Therefore, the same figure (LT 
loans = subsidised + market long-term loan) has been calculated for the two samples.
36 Ibid., pp. 103-167.
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Table VI. 11 Comparison between the Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli samples 
(1987-91) and Bank of Italy sample, 1987 (simple average)
Barletta sample SMP sample Bank of Italy
Average Median Average Median South North/Centre
FNA/TNA 33.2 33.5 21.7 15.1 35.7 25.5
STB 17.1 14.4 10.6 6.2 16.3 15.5
Bonds 0.45 0 1.5 0 0.8 2.5
LT loans 4.73 3.06 9.6 5.6
LTBC 10.4 6.4 10.4 3.3 13.3 10.5
E 35.2 32.6 32.3 27.4 34.7 27.3
LTC/FNA 218 135 234 270 163.4 200.7
Keys: a= Includes Bonds, LT loans, leasing and loans from partners, other keys as above.
Source: Company balance sheets and Siracusaho and Tresoldi, ‘Le piccole imprese’, pp. 155-156.
The Bank of Italy study confirms the overall picture presented by the two ID 
samples. In particular, two key issues consistently displayed by the small samples 
are validated: the higher percentage of fixed net assets to total net assets and the 
smaller coverage of fixed net assets with long-term capital displayed by the Barletta 
sample. The values presented by the ID samples obviously differ from those of the 
national study, but what seems to be more important is that differences between the 
ID samples are confirmed by the Bank of Italy sample. This demonstrates that such 
differences are not accidental, and that the two ID samples, though small, highlight 
key issues in the study of the North-South divide.
If the percentage of fixed net assets to total assets is considered as a proxy for capital 
intensity, both the two ID samples and the Bank of Italy sample indicate that 
Southern small firms are more capital intensive. The Bank of Italy data allows the 
verification of this point on the basis of the appropriate indicator, i.e. fixed assets 
divided by number of employees.
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Table VI. 12 Capital Intensity in Small Firms, 1985 and 1987.
South North/Centre
1985 1987 1985 1987
Basic industry (metal 108.7 136.3 81 100.6
processing and chemicals) 
Mineral processing 105.8 128.6 81.6 95.7
Mechanic industry 61.4 72.3 48.6 58.7
Automotive Vehicles 59.7 95.6 53 61.4
Food processing 107.2 138.2 94.1 109.4
Textile 77.4 97.8 58.8 73.8
Clothing, leather and footwear 29.7 32.8 25 31.6
Wood and wooden furniture 72.6 75.2 50 60.8
Paper and publishing 80 87.4 67 83.2
Rubber and plastic material 93.4 116.4 66.7 85.3
Total 71.9 85.4 54.5 66.6
Note: Capital intensity defined as gross fixed assets divided by number of employees; small firms 
defined as those employing 20 to 100 workers.
Source: Siracusano and Tresoldi, ‘Le piccole imprese’, pp. 127,159; data from Centrale dei Bilanci.
The higher capital intensity is a well known feature of Southern industry and is 
usually interpreted as a result of the dominance of capital-intensive industry, 
determined by private large companies and state-owned enterprises in sectors such as 
steel, chemical and oil refining. In turn, this interpretation maintains that subsidies 
to capital (financial incentives) were beneficial to large companies rather than to 
small firms.38 The higher capital intensity of small, traditional firms, suggested by 
the two ID samples and demonstrated by the Bank of Italy sample (table VI. 11), 
belies the common perception and casts doubts on the allegedly minor impact of 
subsidies on the capital of small firms.
The higher percentage of fixed net assets displayed by Southern small firms is 
interpreted by supporters of the regional policy as a consequence of 
underdevelopment, as more resources are needed to produce the same amount of
37 See for instance V. Castronovo, Storia Economica d ’Italia (Turin, 1995), p. 433.
38 Siracusano and Tresoldi, ‘Le Piccole’, p. 125.
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0^output. Therefore, incentives to invest have allowed Southern companies to endow 
themselves with the required level of fixed assets, beyond the level that their own 
capital would have allowed, which is in line with the purpose of the policy.
Critics of the regional policy interpret the higher level of fixed assets as a distortion 
caused by financial incentives, which lowered the relative cost of capital.40 
Supporters claim that this distortion has been mitigated by subsidies aiming to reduce 
the cost of labour, introduced from 1968,41 and estimate that labour subsidies 
reduced the cost of labour by 15%-20%, compared with a reduction of 40% caused 
by subsidies to capital.42 This estimate is very general, with no specific reference to 
period, sector or size of recipient firms. Moreover, it does not seem to strengthen the 
supporters’ point as the difference in the reduction of the cost of factors seems 
considerably in favour of capital.
The overview presented in tables VI.9, VI. 10 and VI. 11 has pointed to some 
important differences in the capital structure of companies within the Southern and 
North-Eastern samples. Firstly, subsidies represent a more important source of 
finance for the former, both in relative and absolute terms. Secondly, companies in 
the Southern sample have a larger share of their total assets frozen in fixed assets. 
Thirdly, companies in the Southern sample have a lower coverage of their fixed 
assets with long-term capital.
6.2.3 Subsidised, non-subsidised and failed companies: differences in the capital 
structure.
The previous section provided a broad view of the capital structure of the two 
samples. In this section, each sample has been divided into three groups - 
subsidised, non-subsidised and failed companies. This is in order to analyse whether 
the capital structure of subsidised companies differs in any significant way from the
39 Del Monte and Giannola, Istituzioni Economiche, p. 286.
40 Siracusano and Tresoldi, ‘Le piccole’, p. 112.
41 Subsidies to labour consisted of relief from social security taxes, for details see Leccisotti, Pace and 
Sica, ‘Incentives’.
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other two groups, and whether subsidised firms attain higher levels of capitalization 
in financial terms, not only because of the direct effect of subsidies but also because 
these might have a crowding in effect on market capital.
Whether or not subsidies facilitate the access to market capital is an important issue 
not only for companies located in underdeveloped areas, where the shortage of 
capital is a factor hampering growth, but also for firms located in developed areas, 
where due to capital market imperfections firms might be experiencing difficulties in 
accessing it. Due to asymmetric information - meaning when borrowers have better 
information than lenders - it might be difficult for investors to identify good projects 
as well as control lenders’ deceptive behaviour, therefore bad investments might 
receive financing and good ones might not, or credit could be mispriced and rationed. 
In this environment the wealth of the borrower, i.e. the firms’ ability to self-finance 
makes a considerable difference. If a company finances its own investment project it 
increases the confidence of outside borrowers and reduces the cost of external 
finance.43
As briefly mentioned in section 2.1, government credit can be an effective 
mechanism for correcting capital market failures. In developing countries or regions, 
tax-financed banks can address the problem of insufficient concentration of capital, 
which renders private sector banking unviable.44 In industrialised countries or 
regions, the government can work as an ‘initial lender’, which could crowd in private 
funds as the government would assume the cost of monitoring, and the longer 
redemption period of government credit would provide a ‘senior’ status to private
42 Del Monte and Giannola, Istituzioni Economiche, p. 285.
43 Calomiris and Himmelberg, ‘Directed Credit Programs’, p. 114.
** Ibid., pp. 122-123.
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credit.45 On the other hand, soft loan schemes may crowd out private credit if they 
target the best borrowers thus simply underbidding market credit46
45 Calomiris and Himmelberg, ‘Government Credit Policy’, p. 4.
“ ibid., p. 24.
Table VI. 13 Barletta sample, 1971-91: balance sheet indicators
Comp STB Cd LTBCa ISb Reserves0 Partners Paid-up
Subsidised
1971-75 7 24.9 16.0 12.4 (12.39) 6.25 (50.4) 6.2 (5.3)d 7.7 21.8
1976-80 19 22.7 21.1 7.2 (3.64) 2.24(61.5) 14.3 (9)d (0.2)e 4.7 21
1981-86 22 14.9 34.7 6.1 (4.58) 2.47 (53.9) 18 (6.9)d (0.4)e 5.4 12.1
1987-91 17 14.3 37.5 8.4 (4.41) 2.37 (53.7) 22.2 (9.4)d (0.8)e (0.2)f 2.2 7.2
Non- subs
1971-75 13 35.1 26.2 0.1 1.6 3.8 22.6
1976-80 12 24.6 27 0 5.2 12.6 15.6
1981-86 8 15 29.6 0 11.6 3.3 13.3
1987-91 6 13.2 37.9 3.1 8.3 2 14.7
Failed
1971-75 1 14.2 27.2 0 3.6 0 27.5
1976-80 4 (IB) 10.5 39.3 0 13 (7.6)d 21.3 10.1
1981-86 7(3B) 22 20.4 3.5 (3.35) 1.78 (53.1) 12.3 (2.2)d 11.7 12.7
1987-91 4 (IB) 31.8 13.3 6.9 (6.87) 3.48 (50.6) 4.5 10.9 16.6
Keys: a= of which subsidised loans in brackets; b= as a percentage of subsidised loans in brackets; c= of which reserves built with subsidies in brackets; d= grants; e= fiscal 
subsidies; f== contribution on leasing (estimated reserve); STB= short-term bank loans; CD= commercial debts; LTBC= long-term borrowed capital; IS= approximate value of 
implicit subsidy computed as explained in keys to table VL6; Failed: includes figures referring to the last five years of activity of bankrupt and liquidated companies. The 
number of bankrupt companies is given in brackets.
Source: Company balance sheets
Table VI. 14 San Mauro Pascoli sample, 1971-91: balance sheet indicators.
Comp STB Cd LTBCa IS Reservesb Partners Paid-up
Subsidised
1971-75 1 28.4 27 1.9(1.92) 0.93 (48.4) 8.7 2.2
1976-80 4 13.2 32.2 2.8 (2.14) 1.12(52.3) 3.4 (0.01)d 1.7 21.7
1981-86 8 3.9 24.2 7.9(1.25) 0.54 (43.2) 11.2 (0.02)c (0.02)d 2.9 22.1
1987-91 5 2.8 27.5 9.8 (0.60) 0.24 (40) 19.8 (0.3)c (0.07)d 17.9
Non- subs
1971-75 3 9.8 23.2 1.8 0.7 4.5 35.5
1976-80 4 13.6 30.1 0 13.6 9.2 12.2
1981-86 10 7.6 25.9 2.3 20.9 2.5 11.5
1987-91 10 7.9 21.7 4.1 26.1 4.7 13.2
Failed
1971-75 ------ ------ ----------- ------ -------
1976-80 1(B) 14.8 60.1 0 0 0 0.5
1981-86 4 (2B) 21.7 29.0 1.3 (1.33) 0.53 (39.8) 17.5 5.2 10.1
1987-91 3 (IB) 6.9 27.2 0 17.6 3.9 34.2
Keys and source as for table VI. 13
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In the present case, subsidies appear to have a crowding-in effect as both samples 
show that subsidised companies access long-term market finance to a greater extent 
than the non-subsidised ones (indicator LTBC). The more detailed analysis of the 
capital structure, presented in Appendix B, tables B.3.4-B.3.7, shows that long-term 
market capital is mainly represented by bonds and to a smaller degree by long-term 
bank credit.
As tables VI. 13 and VI. 14 show, failed companies in both samples display some 
subsidies. In particular two companies in the Southern sample (Ser and Sal) had 
received grants and two (Ser and Sil) had received soft loans, whereas only one 
company in the North-East (Nvi) has a soft loan in its liabilities. The lower 
percentage value of the implicit subsidy in the case of failed companies does not 
imply a selection against companies about to fail, as the lower value is simply due to 
the fluctuations of the interest rate differential. For example, the implicit subsidy of 
failed companies in the North-Eastern sample in the sub-period 1981-86 represents 
only 39.8% of the subsidised loans whereas the percentage displayed by the 
subsidised group is 43.2%. The difference is due to the fact that failed companies 
were subsidised only in the years 1983 and 1985, whereas firms in the subsidised 
group received soft loans also in 1981, when the interest rate differential was 
considerably higher than in 1983 and 1985 (see graph VI.2). A similar explanation 
applies to the differences in the percentage of implicit subsidies between failed and 
subsidised companies in the Barletta sample.
It is surprising that companies about to close their activity could still benefit from 
soft loans and grants. In the case of the North-Eastern company it is not possible to 
assess whether such soft loans were old loans or whether they had been extended a 
few years before the bankruptcy as the records available for the subsidised company 
Nvi only cover the last five years of its activity.47 In the case of Southern companies 
it has been possible to assess that soft loans and grants had been received before the 
last five years of activity, nevertheless this raises some questions. The three
47 Chamber of Commerce in Forli (henceforth CCF), Company Nvi, Sentenza di Fallimento del 
Tribunale di Forli, 28/5/87; the company became public in 1983 and went bankrupt in 1987. For full
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companies that benefited from soft loans and grants (Ser, Sil and Sal) had been 
performing extremely poorly long before than their last five years of activity. Ser 
traded from 1969 until 1985 and made modest profits in three years only: in 1969 
(0.3m lire), 1973 (2m) and 1978 (2m), while in the remaining years it made equally 
modest losses, with the exception of 1982-85 when it made considerable losses that 
led to bankruptcy in 1986. This story is very similar to that of the other two 
subsidised companies. The three companies cannot be said to have received 
subsidies when they were performing well and their liquidation or bankruptcy would 
have been unpredictable.
Of course, examples like these cast serious doubts on the management of the 
subsidies, particularly as to whether they were used to bail out troubled firms, which 
was not the official purpose of the policy. On the companies’ side the possibility of 
accessing subsidies even when performing badly might have encouraged the choice 
of keeping the company trading even though it was no longer profitable, particularly 
if this option was coupled with low opportunity costs, meaning a scarcity of job 
alternatives and business opportunities.
Failed companies also present a high percentage of short-term bank capital, 
particularly in the Southern sample. This is not surprising considering that failed 
companies generally present higher levels of leverage48 and the inability to meet their 
financial commitments is one of the causes of failure. This situation on the 
borrower’s side corresponds to a high-risk situation on the lender’s side. Research 
has shown that in 1988, Southern short-term banks, which lent 80% of their credit in
archival reference to all company records quoted in this thesis see the list o f primary sources in the 
bibliography.
48 W.H. Beaver, ‘Financial Ratios as Predictors o f Failure’, Journal o f Accounting Research, 4: 
Supplement, Empirical Research in Accounting: Selected Studies in 1966 (1966), p. 82.
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the region, faced a risk (bad loans as a percentage of total loans) as high as 11.3%, 
whereas banks in the Centre and North of the country faced a risk of only 6.6%.49
49 D ’Amico, Parigi and Trifilidis, ‘I tassi’, p. 331.
Table VI. 15 Barletta and SMP samples, 1971-91: balance sheet ratios.
Barletta sample SMP sample
Comp FNA/TNA E/FNA LTC/FNA RR Comp FNA/TNA E/FNA LTC/FNA RR
Subsidised
1971-75 7 62.2 57.8 81.2 -0.9 1 37.2 62.6 73.6 18.1
1976-80 19 40.6 95 113.7 5.8 4 20.3 128.9 142.2 7.3
1981-86 22 30.1 111 136.3 4.3 8 16.2 196.2 253.3 11.1
1987-91 17 30 102.3 133.1 4.2 5 18.8 194.6 245.3 6.6
Non- subs
1971-75 13 36.2 75.8 79.1 0.04 3 54.4 115.7 135.8 6.2
1976-80 12 28.5 113.4 117 6.6 4 8.2 355.8 483.6 -4.12
1981-86 8 33.1 85.5 85.7 1.1 10 9.9 306.7 352.2 19.5
1987-91 6 27.2 86.3 103.5 3 10 18 208.1 254.5 10.6
Failed
1971-75 1 56 89.3 89.3 -72 (-9.9)* ------ -------- --------
1976-80 4 (IB) 49.6 49.6 95.4 -9.4 (-1.4)* 1(B) 0.8 91.7 91.7 -5,713.6 (-390.6)*
1981-86 7(3B) 46.1 69.7 95.1 -15 (-13.8)* 4 (2B) 7.8 358.9 438.2 0.33 (1)*
1987-91 4 (IB) 42.2 67.8 113 -43.2 (-43.2)* 3 (IB) 27.7 201.4 201.9 5.8 (10.7)*
Keys: FNA/TNA= Fixed net assets as a percentage of total net assets; E/FNA=Equities as a percentage of fixed net assets; LTC/FNA=Long-term capital (E+LTBC) 
as a percentage of fixed net assets; RR= Rate of return on long-term capital, calculated as profit or loss divided by long-term capital; * = RR calculated considering 
the whole trading life of failed companies.





Despite receiving subsidies, which by definition increase a company’s long-term 
capital, subsidised companies in the two samples do not reach values of 
capitalization, in financial terms, consistently higher than non-subsidised companies 
(indicators E/FNA and LTC/FNA in table VL15). The higher value of capitalization 
reached by North-Eastern non-subsidised companies is due to the high percentage of 
reserves and contribution by partners. In the Southern sample, the relationship 
between subsidies and financial capitalization is less clear. Overall, subsidised firms 
are more capitalized than non-subsidised, with the exception of the second half of the 
1970s, in which considerable contributions were provided by partners, and the first 
half of the 1970s when neither subsidised nor non-subsidised companies managed to 
cover their fixed assets with long-term capital. However, although it could be argued 
that the Southern sample suggests that subsidies made firms more financially 
capitalised, it is evident that even subsidised companies in the Southern sample are 
considerably distant from the degree of capitalisation reached by their North-Eastern 
counterparts.
In both samples subsidised companies present higher values of fixed net assets as a 
percentage of total net assets, thus indicating that in both areas subsidies are 
associated with a higher level of fixed capital, even though this is much more 
pronounced in the Southern sample. The key difference is that a higher percentage 
of fixed net assets coupled with shortage of long-term capital determine 
undercapitalization in the Southern sample, whereas due to the availability of long­
term capital for companies, particularly reserves, in the North-Eastern sample, this 
does not generate undercapitalization.
Failed companies in the Southern sample differ strikingly from their North-Eastern 
counterparts. The former are financially distressed, as they present very high losses 
and very high levels of undercapitalization. This is not the case for North-Eastern 
failed companies, with the only exception of the 1976-80 sub-period, for these were 
still overcapitalized and making profits.
Clearly, Southern companies cease their activity only after a long period of losses, as 
shown by the rate of return on long-term capital calculated for the whole trading life.
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They find themselves in this situation for various reasons, either because of an 
excessive number of employees that cannot be reduced because of the opposition of 
trade unions to the restructuring plan,50 or because their use of fixed assets is 
inefficient, and thus their production cost is so high that they cannot achieve good 
profit margins. In order to achieve a good margin of profits they should sell their 
goods at a price that would be too high for the market.51
At the opposite end, North-Eastern companies decide to close as soon as their 
turnover and profits are decreasing and the footwear market does not seem to be 
offering better opportunities in the foreseeable future.52 The rate of return on long­
term capital calculated for the whole trading life of failed companies supports the 
qualitative evidence, with the sole exception of the 1976-80 period in which the 
records available refer to only one company, which was declared bankrupt m 1981.
The comparison of the Barletta and SMP IDs in chapter V pointed out the very 
dissimilar growth of the two IDs in the 1980s, when the Barletta ID kept expanding 
its labour force in the industries of specialization whereas the SMP contracted it. It 
was argued that one possible explanation might be that Southern companies would 
not abandon the sector even when experiencing decreasing profits due to the lack of 
business alternatives, whereas firms in the SMP might be facing higher opportunity 
costs, and would shift to more profitable industries. The difference between the 
distressed conditions in which firms in the Southern sample cease their activity, as 
opposite to the profitability, although low, displayed by their North-Eastern 
counterparts seems to support this interpretation.
This key difference should be reflected in a higher number of companies going 
bankrupt in the Southern sample, which does not happen. Out of the nine Southern 
companies ceasing their activity, only three went bankrupt and six liquidated their 
activity deliberately, whereas out of the six companies ceasing their activity in the
50 CCB, Company Ser, Report to the balance sheet 1984 and 1985.
51 CCB, Company Smo, Report to the balance sheet 1979 and 1980.
52 CCF, Company Nro, Report to the balance sheet 1986; Company Nel, Report to the balance sheet 
1992.
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North-Eastern sample three went bankrupt. It seems plausible that in order to avoid 
the legal procedure of bankruptcy, which would lead to financial and possibly legal 
consequences, partners refinanced the company with ‘contributions’ immediately 
before starting the procedure of liquidation, as the considerable share of funds 
provided by partners in table VI. 13 suggests. The ‘apparent’ exception of the 1971- 
75 sub-period is due to one company (Sma). This started the liquidation procedure in 
1977 and as late as 1976, partners had financed the company (the contribution by 
partners was 95m current lire, representing 20% of the total liabilities of the 
company and equal to 70% of the company’s equities).
Conclusions
The empirical analysis conducted in this chapter has pointed out the considerable 
number of small and medium-sized companies that benefited from subsidies both in 
the Southern and North-Eastern sample: 26 out of 32 in the South, and 11 out of 21 
in the North-East. These figures contrast with studies claiming that the raising of the 
size limit for eligibility for incentives in the South in 1962 diverted the system of 
incentives from its original purpose of developing small and medium-sized 
companies in the South.54 Consistently with this claim, other works maintain that 
Southern small and medium-sized companies developed independently from the 
system of incentives.55 On the contrary, the high number of subsidised companies in 
the Southern sample is consistent with studies supporting that there is no evidence 
that small and medium-sized firms in the South were disadvantaged in accessing the 
system of incentives. 56
The capital structure of the two ID sample clearly indicate that the established 
understanding of the sources of finance within IDs is severely limited and state 
subsidies cannot be neglected in explaining the development of IDs in the whole 
country. Consistently with the regional distribution of subsidies (Chapter IV) these
53 CCF, Sentenza di Fallimento del Tribunale di Forli, 9/4/1981.
54 Dunford, Capital, p. 149; Conti, ‘Industrialization’, p. 126.
55 Lizzeri, Mezzogiomo.
56 Faini, ‘Incentivi’, pp. 321-326.
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represent a far larger source of finance for companies in the Southern ID than for 
their North-Eastern counterparts, which is due to various factors. Subsidised loans, 
grants and fiscal subsidies extended to companies in the Southern sample were not 
only extended more frequently, but were also larger in absolute terms, for the various 
subsidised schemes, reviewed in Chapter m, consistently gave more generous 
subsidies to Southern firms. Moreover, subsidies have a larger relative weight in the 
Southern companies’ capital structure as the other components are smaller, as 
compared to the North-Eastern counterparts.
The capital structure of companies in the North-Eastern ID confirms only partly the 
received wisdom that such companies finance themselves exclusively with private 
finance. Internally generated funds and finance provided by partners represent a 
larger source of finance in the 1980s, but North-Eastern companies made also use of 
market finance and subsidies, although to a smaller extent.
The comparison of the two ID samples highlighted interesting differences between 
Southern and North-Eastern companies, and these differences are confirmed by the 
larger Bank of Italy sample. In particular, the two ID samples and the Bank of Italy 
sample reveal that Southern small firms in traditional sectors, are more capital 
intensive than similar firms located elsewhere in the country. The higher capital 
intensity of Southern small firms has passed unnoticed in the general literature on the 
Italian economic history, which highlights the higher capital intensity of Southern 
industry as a whole, interpreting it as due to the greater relative weight of large state- 
owned plants in capital-intensive sectors.
The higher capital intensity of Southern small companies, interpreted in specialized 
works either as an achievement of, or a distortion caused by, subsidies, indicates a 
non-negligible impact of subsidies on the capital of small firms. However, the two 
ID samples show that the higher endowment with fixed capital generates greater 
financial requirements for Southern firms, requirements that are not met. This means 
lower levels of capitalization in financial terms. Subsidised companies in the North- 
Eastern sample present a larger share of fixed assets as compared to non-subsidised, 
but they are not undercapitalized due in particular to the availability of reserves.
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Further achievements and failures of the system of incentives were indicated by the 
two ID samples, where subsidised firms display larger shares of market credit in their 
liabilities. If the suggested crowding-in effect can be accredited to the successes of 
the policies, that is not the case for subsidies extended to companies on the verge of 
failure, which cast doubts on the management of subsidies, particularly in the South.
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CHAPTER VII
The effectiveness of the national and regional industrial policies for the Barletta and 
San Mauro Pascoli Industrial Districts, 1951-1991.
Introduction
This chapter investigates the role of public subsidies in the investment activity and 
overall performance of the recipient companies. The previous chapter showed the 
greater importance of subsidies, as a source of finance for the companies in the 
Southern sample. However, nothing has been said so far on the effectiveness of 
subsidies on the overall performance of recipient companies and on their investment 
activity, for promoting investment was the direct aim of the subsidies in the 
framework of the regional and national industrial policy.
The analysis conducted so far has highlighted positive effects of the subsidies and 
casts doubts on their management, but offers no firm ground to make inferences 
about the effectiveness of the policy. The possibility that the policy was ineffective 
cannot be ruled out. If subsidised firms seem to enjoy no particular benefits in 
comparison with non-subsidised firms, it could be inferred that the policy was 
ineffective. In the case of better financial indicators displayed by subsidised firms, it 
might be argued that the policy generated dependency and that firms could perform 
well only when subsidised. This would be an undesirable outcome, resulting from 
subsidies breaking the nexus between the firms’ performance and efficiency, which 
in turn entails the permanent capture of government funds and in extreme cases the 
bailing out of troubled firms.1 Moreover, dividing the companies into just two 
groups - subsidised and non-subsidised - can hide some interesting differences. After 
all, the non-subsidised group includes companies that were not subsidised in the 
specific sub-period but were subsidised a few years later, companies that had been 
subsidised in previous years, and companies that were never subsidised.
1 Calomiris and Himmelberg, ‘Government Credit’, p. 5.
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In this chapter, the effectiveness of subsidies is assessed by analysing companies at 
various stages of their life cycle, i.e. before receiving subsidies, while being 
subsidised and after receiving subsidies, and comparing them to companies that were 
never subsidised. This analysis, although suggested in the literature, has never been 
undertaken as published studies are based on large number of records referring to 
two or three years only, and the only information available about subsidies is whether
*y
or not any individual company was subsidised in those two or three years. 
Therefore, it is not possible to compare companies’ performance at various stages of 
their life. The two ID samples have been constructed with companies’ raw records 
across time, therefore it has been possible to identify the precise time when subsidies 
were received and divide the trading life of recipient companies accordingly, thus 
revealing new insights in the effects of subsidies on recipient companies.
The chapter is structured in the following way: the first section ascertains whether 
there is a correspondence between subsidies on one side and investment and 
performance of the firms on the other side, by looking at various indicators. The 
second section assesses whether government subsidies were ‘crucial’ to these firms, 
i.e. whether they made profitable investment/companies that otherwise would have 
been unprofitable, by looking at the rate of return of such companies.
7.1 The effectiveness of subsidies
This section examines the effectiveness of subsidies for the development of firms in 
the two samples. The first sub-section presents three studies that have addressed 
similar issues, using two different methodologies. Two studies adopt econometric 
techniques, but their analysis has not yielded clear results.3 The second methodology 
focuses on the effects of subsidies on the profitability of recipient companies.4 This 
methodology is more appropriate to the quality of the data used in this chapter, and 
allows the analysis of not only whether subsidised firms were more profitable but 
also whether the profitability of recipient firms depended upon such subsidies.
2 Bagella and Caggese, ‘Strattura’.
3 Faini, ‘Incentivi’; Faini, Galli and Giannini, ‘Finance’.
4 Bagella and Caggese, ‘Strattura’, pp. 813-837.
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The second sub-section deals with the assessment of the effectiveness of the 
subsidies on companies in the two ID samples. It applies the second methodology 
and broadens the focus of the analysis to include the investment activity of the firms, 
their profitability (as subsidies lowering the investment cost should increase 
companies’ profits), and two other issues highlighted by the analysis of the capital 
structure, namely capital intensity and financial capitalisation.
7.1.1 The literature on the effectiveness of subsidies.
Previous works have addressed the issue of the effectiveness of subsidies in 
stimulating investment in Southern Italy by using econometric tools. A work by 
Faini uses data provided by the Cassa per il Mezzogiomo, referring to subsidies 
extended to and investment undertaken by Southern Italian companies employing 
more than 20 employees, between 1970 and 1979. The number of observations in 
the data set is not specified and data deals only with investment projects involving 
the establishment of new plants, excluding those involving the expansion of existing 
plants. 5
The model used to estimate the impact of subsidies on investment decisions is based 
on the assumption that companies operate in a regime of imperfect competition, i.e. 
monopolistic competition and oligopoly6 and using a putty-clay technology.7 The 
approach adopted by the study, assuming that the desired level of capital depends on 
the output, cost of capital and the user’s cost of capital, stems from the neo-classical
o
tradition. The equation estimated is based on the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, where output is determined by inputs of labour and capital:
5 Faini, ‘Incentivi’, pp. 320-321.
6 R.G. Lipsey, An Introduction to Positive Economics (7th ed, 1989), pp. 234, 237.
7 Putty-clay technology means that the ratio o f capital to labour is determined by the initial investment 
and cannot be significantly varied. Lipsey, Introduction, p. 620.
8 D.W. Jorgenson and C.D. Siebert, ‘Comparison o f Alternative Theories of Investment Behaviour’, 
American Economic Review, 58 (1968), pp. 696-697.
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In I(t) = ao + ai [ In Y(t-1, t) -In Y (t-2, t-1)] + a2 In Y(t-2, t-1) + a3 In (QE (t-1)/ W(t- 
1)) + a4 [ p (t-1) - y (t-1) ] + a5 1 + ui (t)
where [InY (t-1, t) -  InY (t-2, t-1)] is the desired output at time t based on the 
expectations at time t-1 [Y(t-1, t)] minus the output capacity already existing at time 
t-1 [Y (t-2, t-1)], which was in turn based on the expectations at time t-2. The desired 
level of output has been previously estimated as the function of the expected cost of 
factors and demand, as expected in the previous year. The one-year lag is 
consistently taken into account in the estimations to allow for the time gap between 
the investment decision and the beginning of production with the new equipment. 
(Qe (t-l)AV(t-l)) is the cost of capital discounted by subsidies divided by the cost of 
labour; p (t-1) - y (t-1) is the real interest rate obtained as difference between p, 
nominal interest rate, and y wage inflation, t is the time trend.9 The cost of capital 
has been discounted by subsidies dividing the cost of the investment by the 
coefficient of subsidies. In turn, the coefficient of subsidies was computed by 
summing up the implicit subsidy in subsidised loans and grants received by the 
companies, and dividing the sum by the amount of the investment approved by the 
Cassa, as explained in chapter IV. The equation was estimated using the fixed effect 
model and gave the results displayed in table VII. 1 below.
Table VH.1 Output, relative cost of factors and investment, 1970-1979.
Fixed effect, dependent variable: In Invt
lnY(t-l, t) -In Y (t-2, t-1) lnY(t-2,t-l) In (QE (t-1)/W(t-l)) t ccms 
Coefficient .50 .60 -.39 -.10 -.55
T statistics (4.3) (1.6) (1.6) (3.7) (1.9)
_____
Note: The author does not specify the number of observations and discarded the real interest rate as 
not statistically significant. Faini controlled for variations between industries with the use of industrial 
sectors dummies. Therefore, for each industrial sector Faini’s model estimated separate intercept 
terms. Because the author does not specify the definition of each dummy, i.e. which dummy relates to 
which industry, the intercept terms have not been reported here.
Source: Faini, ‘Incentivi’, p. 330; dataset provided by the Cassa per il Mezzogiomo.
Clearly the explanatory power of the equation is extremely limited and the key 
variable - the relative cost of capital, discounted by subsidies, and labour - displays
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the correct sign but is not significant at the 5% confidence interval. Therefore, this 
analysis indicates that the reduction in the cost of capital caused by the subsidies has 
a very weak effect on companies’ investment decisions, and there is insufficient 
evidence to infer either a positive or a negative effect as regards the issue of the 
effectiveness of subsidies in promoting investment.10
Another recent work concentrated on the relationship between sources of finance, 
cash flow in particular, and investment in small firms located in Southern Italy.11 
These firms being riskier than their counterparts located elsewhere in the country are 
supposed to be at a disadvantage for long-term and short-term credits, therefore their 
investment depends on their ability to self-finance. Moreover, the risk-taking 
attitudes of Southern firms may be exacerbated by the availability of subsidies 
bringing about a cautious attitude by local banks.12
The work is based on a sample of 149 small Southern firms (where firms are defined 
as small if their sales amounted to 1-10 billion lire in 1982), a subset of a sample of 
2,132 located in the whole country and covering the years 1982-1987. It estimates an 
equation based on an unrestricted investment function using as explanatory variables 
output growth, the real cost of capital, the availability of cash-flow and debts.13 
Clearly, this study is merging the neo-classical approach with the liquidity approach 
to investment, in which the desired level of capital is a proportion of the flow of 
internal funds.14 It wants to test whether cash-flow effects on investment are more 
significant for riskier firms, meaning Southern firms, thus applying the recent stream 
of works on financial constraints, cash flow and their effects on investment to the 
study of the Italian regional issue.15
9 Faini, ‘Incentivi’, p. 327.
10 Ibid., p. 335.
11 Faini, Galli and Giannini, ‘Finance’, pp. 158-214.
12 Ibid., p. 194.
13 Ibid., p. 195.
14 Jorgenson and Siebert, ‘A comparison’, pp. 694-695.
15 The milestone work of such approach is S.M. Fazzari, R.G. Hubbard and B.C. Petersen, ‘Financing 
Constraints and Corporate Investment’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1988), no. 1, pp. 
141-195.
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Table VH.2 Cash flow and Investment (149 Southern small firms), 1982-1987. 
Dependent variable I/Y
(I/Y)t.i Y* (B/Y)t_i (KAOm (CF/Y)m
Coefficients 05 ~Th2 02  -0.007 -0.334 05
T statistics 2.5 -1.3 3.4 -1.8 -4.3 1.8
Wald X2 = 30.82 (6) Sargan X2= 11.1 (11)
Keys: 1= investment; B= financial debts; Y (Y’)= sales (growth rate); CF= cash flow*DUMR; ccap= 
cost of capital; DUMR= dummy variable for high-risk firms; K= capital stock. Number in parenthesis 
after X2 tests are degrees of freedom.
Source: Faini, Galli, Giovannini, ‘Finance and Development’, p. 195. Data source: Company 
Accounts Data Service.
From this evidence, the authors conclude that cash flow affects riskier firms’ 
investment to a greater extent. Such projects should be characterised by high returns, 
otherwise the firm would not be willing to finance them internally, and therefore it is 
likely that despite having profitable investment projects, Southern firms cannot 
undertake them for the lack of self-financing capability.16
This conclusion is puzzling, as it is not clear whether by ‘riskier’ firms they mean 
Southern firms as a whole as compared to those located elsewhere in the country, or 
‘riskier’ firms within their Southern sample. If the first were true, the work would 
fall short of a comparison with companies located elsewhere in the country. In the 
second case, the table does not display the variables necessary to assess such a point: 
the dummy variable for high-risk firms, and cash flow not multiplied by the dummy. 
The impact of cash flow for high-risk firms should be read as the difference in the 
coefficient of cash flow multiplied by the dummy (CF*DUMR) and the coefficient of 
cash flow for all firms (meaning CF not multiplied by DUMR) .17 The conclusions 
that the authors draw could stand if both the dummy variable for high-risk firms, and 
cash flow not multiplied by the dummy were not statistically significant and had 
been discarded by the authors, which should have been made clear. However, even 
in this case, their conclusion does not seem well supported as the t value of the 
(CF/Y)t-i variable (where CF is defined as CF*DUMR) is not significant at the 5% 
confidence interval.
16 Faini, Galli and Giannini, ‘Finance’, p. 195.
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The interesting point of the analysis is that financial debts, in which subsidised loans 
are included, do not appear to be significant. However, not much weight can be 
attached to this result, because the definition of the variables raises some scepticism 
in so far as they are normalised by sales, which is a very volatile component of the 
balance sheet, and the authors do not provide any explanation for this choice. It 
seems more appropriate to normalise the variables using capital stock. Moreover, 
while the Wald and Sargan tests allow the readers to assess whether the regression is 
statistically significant, no information is provided on its explanatory power.
The two econometric studies presented above have not provided an answer to the 
issue. However, the model used by Faini, Galli and Giovannini seemed to be 
adaptable to the issue of this thesis. Therefore, it has been applied in order to assess 
the impact of state subsidies and other sources of company finance on investment 
undertaken by the two ID samples and the results are presented in Appendix C. As 
explained in the Appendix, the econometric analysis could only be performed on a 
limited number of companies and only from 1981 to 1991, thus leaving out a 
considerable number of company records.
The analysis conducted in this chapter takes a different approach and follows a new 
methodology presented but not undertaken by Bagella and Caggese,19 which allows 
the full usage of the sources collected. Their study compares the profitability and 
risk of subsidised and non-subsidised companies in the country as a whole and by 
regions, but admittedly leaves open another issue, namely whether subsidies had a 
positive affect on the recipient firms' ability to stay on the market, once they were no 
longer subsidised.
Subsidies should increase the profitability of the recipient firms, meaning moving the 
recipient company from position (1) in the graph below, characterised by low and 
highly variable profit, to position (2), with higher and less variable profit. Subsidised
17 C. Dougherty, Introduction to Econometrics (New York, 1992), pp. 261-278.
18 As for instance in A. Cristini, ‘Real and Financial Aspects o f the Finns’ Investment Decisions. A 
Study Using a Panel of Italian Finns’, Giomale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, Nuova Serie, 
52/1-3 (1993), p. 98; and Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, ‘Financing constraintspassim.
19 Bagella and Caggese, ‘Strattura’, pp. 813-837.
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companies should move from positions (1) to position (2) in the graph as subsidies 
increase the recipient companies’ profits and decrease the variability of profits, by 
providing an additional fixed component to their profits. However, in order to assess 
the effectiveness of subsidies it is crucial to study the position occupied by the 
company in the post-subsidy stage.20
Graph VELl Profitability and risk of subsidised and non-subsidised firms: the ideal 
scenario.




Source: B agella, C aggese, ‘Struttura del Capitale’, p. 836.
For companies in the post-subsidy stage to return to position 1 would mean all the 
undesired outcomes mentioned in the introduction. Their profitability could be 
improved only by constant subsidies, which would entail a permanent capture of 
funds, the breaking of the link between firms’ performance and their efficiency, and 
in extreme cases the bailing out of troubled firms. Therefore, for subsidies to be 
considered effective, it is crucial that companies not only move from position 1 to 
position 2 when subsidised, but also that companies in the post-subsidy stage at least
20 Ibid., p. 836.
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remain in position 2 , or preferably, move even further to the right on the graph, 
closer to the ideal position of ‘competitive firm’. This should happen because as the 
firm is a learning organization,21 the recipient company should learn how to conduct 
its business better while in the subsidised stage. Moreover, focusing on the financial 
constraint issue as Bagella and Caggese do, if the profitability of a company in the 
post-subsidy stage goes back to position 1, the company will be perceived by banks 
as a ‘bad company’ and therefore will be credit rationed, whereas if it remains in 
position 2 or moves to the ‘competitive firm’ position it should not experience credit 
rationing again.22
The authors were unable to perform that analysis. Although their source includes 
balance sheet indicators and qualitative information on 3,852 manufacturing firms, 
trading between 1989 and 1991, the only information about subsidies is whether or 
not the company has been subsidised in the period, and from which scheme it 
benefited. Thus on the basis of that source it is not possible to isolate companies 
that had been subsidised in the years prior to the survey.
The two authors have compared profitability and risk of subsidised and non­
subsidised companies located in the various regions of the country. The overall 
results are displayed in table VH.3 below. This shows that overall, subsidised firms 
are less profitable (lower values of ROE and ROI) than non-subsidised ones, despite 
having more access to credit (indicated by a higher degree of leverage) and lower 
costs of credit, due to the lower interest rate on subsidised credit. On the basis of the 
standard deviation of the ROE, the researchers conclude that overall, subsidised 
companies are not only less profitable but also riskier, which is not consistent with 
the capital asset pricing model.24 The key concept of the CAPM is that expected 
return on investment varies in direct proportion with its risk, in other words that the
21 This aspect of a firm is captured by works on learning by doing. See for instance N.R. Lamoureaux, 
D. M.G. Raff and P. Temin (eds), Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms and Countries (Chicago, 
1999).
22 Bagella and Caggese, ‘Stmttura’, p. 836.
23 Mediocredito Centrale Osservatorio sulle Piccole e Medie Imprese, Indagine sulle Imprese 
Manifatturiere (Rome, 1995).
24 Bagella and Caggese, ‘Stmttura’, pp. 825, 834.
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expected risk premium varies in proportion with its p, which is the standard
n r
deviation of the investment’s return.
Table VII.3 Profitability and standard deviation of subsidised (S) and non-subsidised 
(NS) companies, 1989-1991.
Sample North-West North-East Centre South
S NS S NS S NS S NS
Observations 3275 830 665 607 465 222 209 166 111
Size 319 564 375 271 119 365 108 210 89
Leverage (%) 18.5 18 15.7 21.6 19.6 18.5 18.9 19.1 15.9
CD (%) 7 6.5 6.2 6.6 6.7 6.9 7.4 6.2 6.8
ROE (%) 10 8.6 10.3 9.4 15.3 7.7 8.6 7.2 14.4
ROI (%) 10.1 9.5 10.9 9.7 11 11 10.3 8.5 9.4
St dev (%) 45 32 51 51 45 50 43 44 35
Keys: Observations= number of companies; Size= average size of the companies in terms of 
employees; Leverage= average leverage, defined as (short term debts+ long term debts+ bonds)/total 
assets; CD= average cost of debt, defined as total cost of debt divided by total debts; ROE= Net 
income divided by equities; ROI= Income before tax and interest divided by equities plus total debt; 
St dev. = standard deviation of ROE.
Source: Bagella and Caggese, ‘Struttura’, p. 825; data source: Mediocredito Centrale, Indagine sulle 
Imprese.
However, their analysis raises some scepticism. The standard deviation of the ROE 
does not seem an appropriate indicator to make inferences about the degree of risk of 
the companies in the various sub-samples. The average ROE differs in the various 
sub-samples, and therefore a measure of dispersion in units is not appropriate to 
compare the dispersion of the various distributions around their respective mean. 
The coefficient of variation, being a relative measure of dispersion (standard 
deviation divided by the mean) is a better indicator to compare the dispersion of 
various distributions -  in this case sub-samples -around their respective means.
25 R.A. Brealey and S.C. Myers, Principles o f Corporate Finance (5th ed., New York, 1996), p. 180.
26 P. Hudson, History by Numbers (2000), p. 96.
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Table VIL4 Companies’ profitability and risk, 1989-91 (percentages)
Companies ROE ROI ROE st deviation
North-West
Subs High Tech 430 8.4 9.3 30
NS High Tec 331 9.9 10.9 46
Subs Traditional 400 8.7 9.6 34
NS Traditional 334 10.7 11 55
North-East
Subs High Tech 310 8.8 10.1 66
NS High Tec 190 17.1 12.1 44
Subs Traditional 297 10.1 9.4 30
NS Traditional 275 14.1 10.3 45
Centre
Subs High Tech 93 4.5 11.6 70
NS High Tec 63 5.4 9 31
Subs Traditional 129 10.1 10.5 27
NS Traditional 146 9.9 10.8 48
South
Subs High Tech 60 7.1 8.2 15
NS High Tec 40 8.2 10.9 16
Subs Traditional 106 7.3 8.7 54
NS Traditional 71 17.8 8.6 42
Keys as above.
Source: Bagella and Caggese, ‘Struttura del Capitale’, p. 829, data source as above.
On the basis of the results displayed in table VII.4 the authors conclude that subsidies 
to the North did not increase the profitability of recipient companies (as the ROE and 
ROI of subsidised companies are consistently lower than those of non-subsidised 
ones), but at least subsidised companies were less risky. As before, they 
inappropriately interpret the standard deviation of the ROE as an indicator of risk. In 
the South, subsidies lowered the risk and profitability of hi-tech companies and made 
traditional companies much less profitable (by 10%) and riskier.27 Therefore, 
schemes such as those managed by the RMTCIs, which mainly benefited Northern
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firms, have yielded good results, as they have reduced the risk of recipient 
companies. On the contrary, schemes like the one for Southern Italy managed by the 
Cassa have produced disappointing results, due to a poorer performance of the 
recipient companies and the inadequate selective criteria used by the scheme.
However, figures referring to the profitability of traditional non-subsidised firms 
located in the South do not seem plausible, as there is a huge difference between ROI 
and ROE, for which the articles offers no explanation. Surely the ROE, rather than 
the ROI, is more likely to be incorrect. If the ROE were to be taken entirely as 
correct, it would mean that non-subsidised traditional companies in the South are the 
most profitable group in the whole country, comparable only to non-subsidised hi- 
tech companies in the North-east. With such a result it would be more appropriate to 
study why the regional policy was implemented rather than whether it has been 
effective!
Bagella and Caggese conclude that subsidies can generate two types of effects: the 
first encouraging companies to undertake high-profit and high-risk investment 
because it decreases their probability of failure; and the second encouraging 
companies to undertake low-profit and low-risk investment to maximize ‘the 
probability of continuing activity in the future, and to receive other subsidies’. The 
prevailing effect depends upon the characteristics of the subsidies, the industrial
9 0sector and area in which companies are located. However, these conclusions do 
not seem well supported by their analysis. In the first place, they cannot make any 
inference about risk on the basis of the standard deviation of the ROE, and in the 
second place neither tables VII.3 and VR4, nor other evidence presented in the 
article show that subsidised companies undertook high-profit, high-risk investment, 
regardless of their location.
27 Bagella and Caggese, ‘Stmttura’, pp. 828, 830.
28 Ibid., pp. 827, 834.
19 Ibid., p. 813.
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7.2 The effectiveness of subsidies for the Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli samples.
The two small samples used in this analysis allow not only the replication of the 
Bagella and Caggese comparison of subsidised and non-subsidised companies over a 
longer period of time, but also to address the issue of the positions occupied by 
companies in the post-subsidy stage in the graph above. The samples have been 
constructed with companies’ raw records, therefore it has been possible to identify 
the subsidies and their timing, and divide accordingly the companies’ life into stages, 
i.e. before receiving subsidies, while subsidised and after receiving subsidies, and 
separate them from companies that were never subsidised. This subdivision reduces 
considerably the number of observations available for each group, and therefore the 
division of observations into sub-periods, applied in the previous chapter, has been 
abandoned and the observations have been aggregated for the overall period 1951-91. 
However, in the interpretation of the results it should be kept in mind that these data 
refer mainly to the 1970s and 1980s for the Southern sample and 1980s for the 
North-Eastern sample.30 Due to the small size of the samples, the results of this 
analysis should be considered as merely indicative, nevertheless it seemed 
worthwhile to throw some light on a hitherto unexplored issue.
Table VII.5 below replicates the Bagella and Caggese analysis. The sub-period 
1989-91 has been isolated in order to compare the results of the two ID samples with 
those of their sample displayed in table VH.4. Only the ROE could be calculated for 
the two ID samples, as many companies do not provide the information required to 
calculate the ROI in the same way as Bagella and Caggese do - profit before tax and 
interest divided by equities plus total debts (see keys to table VII.3). In particular, 
some companies include interest rates within the wider category of bank expenditure 
(oneri bancari), which also includes bank commissions. Other companies do not 
separate taxes from contributions to social insurance. Considering that both ROI and
30 The analysis has been replicated for the 1976-1991 period, in order to observe possible variations in 
response to the 1976 institutional change. The results for the shorter period confirm the results for the 
whole 1951-1991 period. This is not surprising considering that the main bulk of observations refers 
to the 1970s and 1980s.
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ROE are indicators of profitability and that the ROI could not be calculated precisely, 
the following table VQ.5 presents only the ROE.
The particularly low value of the ROE simple average of subsidised companies in the 
Barletta sample is due mainly to one company (Sec), which in the years between 
1989 and 1991 was consistently making losses. Excluding those years the values of 
the ROE would be those displayed in brackets. The considerable differences between 
weighted and simple averages clearly indicate that in both groups of the Southern 
sample, small companies have much lower profitability than large companies, 
whereas the opposite applies to non-subsidised North-Eastern companies.
Table VII.5 Profitability and risk, Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli samples, 1989-91.
N comp ROE wa ROE Simp aver ROE st dev1 ROE coeff of varb
Barletta
Subs 15 4.7 (6.45) -9.2 (2.3) 20.6 (8.6) 1.7 (1.7)
NS 7 2.8 1.3 7.6 1.1
San Mauro Pascoli
Subs 5 9 7.8 6.3 0.9
NS 10 7.8 15.7 11.3 0.55
Keys: a= average value of companies’ standard deviation; b= average value of companies’ coefficient 
of variation defined as |st dev| /mean.
Source: company balance sheets.
Table VII.5 shows that the Barletta sample includes a larger number of subsidised 
companies than non-subsidised ones, which is consistent with the results of the 
Bagella and Caggese sample displayed in table VII.4. The large Bagella and Caggese 
sample shows that also in the North-East there were more subsidised companies than 
non-subsidised ones. This is not reflected by the SMP sample, which shows that in 
1989-91, there was twice as many non-subsidised as subsidised companies. 
However, when considering the overall period 1951-1991, there are 11 subsidised 
companies in the North-eastern ID sample against 10 non-subsidised.
By looking at the ROE simple average and the standard deviation of the ROE, the 
two ID samples reflect the Bagella and Caggese results for traditional companies in 
the South and the North-East. The comparison with traditional Southern companies
306
in the large sample is irksome due to the doubts cast by the high value of the ROE of 
non-subsidised companies. However, Bagella and Caggese interpret their results by 
saying that traditional subsidised companies in the South are less profitable and 
riskier than non-subsidised. The Barletta sample confirms these results also on the 
basis of the appropriate indicator of risk, the coefficient of variation of the ROE.
The SMP sample confirms the results for traditional North-Eastern companies in the 
large sample only to some extent. Bagella and Caggese found that subsidised 
companies are less profitable and less risky than non-subsidised ones. Subsidised 
companies in the SMP sample display a lower value of the ROE simple average and 
a lower standard deviation. However, the calculation of the coefficient of variation 
of the ROE reveals that subsidised companies in the North-Eastern ID sample are 
riskier, despite displaying a lower standard deviation. Similarly, the Bagella and 
Caggese claim that subsidised companies in the North-east are less risky, which is 
interpreted as an achievement of the national policy, might be disproved by the use 
of the appropriate indicator of risk.
Therefore, the two ID samples suggest that both Southern and North-Eastern firms 
performed better when non-subsidised. However, the application of the untested part 
of the Bagella and Caggese methodology will clarify these results and the apparent 
ineffectiveness of the policies in both samples.
Table VII.6 below provides general information about the sub-samples into which 
the two ID samples have been divided.
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Table VH.6 Sub-samples, 1951-91
Pre-subsidy Subsidised Post-subsidy Never subsidised0
Barletta
N comp 16 26 6 6
Failed 3 2 4
BS av siza 985 1,658.1 767.2 318.9
BS st devb 806.5 1,800 827.4 243.1
Age 7.2 12.6 16.7 7.8
San Mauro Pascoli
N comp 4 11 4 9
Failed 2 4
BS siza 255.8 2,472.9 4,843.2 555.8
BS st devb 280.3 2,269.4 2,718.5 529.3
Age 6.7 17.7 19.6 7.5
a= balance sheet average size (m 1980 lire); b= balance sheet size (m 1980 lire) standard deviation; c= 
‘never subsidised’ companies excluding the last year of activity of failed companies;
Source: company balance sheets.
The three sub-samples - pre-subsidy, subsidised and post-subsidy - portray a 
hypothetical life cycle of companies in the two samples, from smaller and younger 
when unsubsidised to larger and older in the subsidised stage. However, while 
companies in the North-Eastern sample continue to grow, as measured by the balance 
sheet size, in the post-subsidy stage, companies in the Southern samples become 
smaller. As table VTI.7 below shows, this is due to two factors: Southern companies 
in the post-subsidy stage were only slightly larger than the average while in the 
subsidised group, in terms of balance sheet size. In addition to this, the size of their 
balance sheets decreases considerably in the post-subsidy stage also due to the rapid 
decrease in size of the two companies that are failing while in this stage. In contrast,
o 1
three out of the four North-Eastern companies in the post-subsidy stage were not 
only well above the average for the subsidy-stage companies, but also the size of 
their balance sheet kept increasing in the post-subsidy stage. The fourth North- 
Eastern company32 follows a pattern closer to that described for the Southern post­
subsidy companies.
31 CCF, Companies Nros, Nca and Npo.
32 CCF, Company Nrot.
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Table VTL7 Balance sheet size of companies in the post-subsidy stage (simple 
average, bn 1980 lire)
Last 5 years subsidy Post-subsidy
Barletta 1.8 0.77
SMP 4.4 (5) 4.8 (5.9)
Key: numbers in brackets show the averages obtained after excluding the fourth North-Eastern 
company (Nrot).
Source: company balance sheets.
The three North-eastern companies that saw continued balance-sheet growth left the 
subsidised stage because they exceeded the upper limit of eligibility for subsidies 
(2bn lire, see section 3.2, IV) 1976-80 and 1981-86). Two of these (Nros and Nca) 
started issuing bonds immediately after leaving the subsidy stage. In 1981, Nros 
issued bonds worth 0.5bn lire at an interest rate of 20% ,33 and in 1982, Nca issued 
bonds worth 1.5bn lire at a interest rate of 18%.34 Considering that the interest rate 
on soft loans from the Regional Medium-term Credit Institutions was between 7.1% 
and 10.7% in 1981 and 10.2% and 15.3% in 1982, and the rate on market medium- 
term credit was 17.8% in 1981 and 21.3% in 1982 (see table IV.10), these companies 
managed to secure sums far larger than the soft loans received by companies in the 
same sample (see table VI.6) at an interest rate slightly cheaper than the market one.
As for explaining the reason why other companies in the sample abandoned the 
system of subsidies or never entered it, it was not possible to make inferences in 
specific cases. Therefore, it is only possible to refer to the explanation provided in 
the macro-analysis, which shows that a certain percentage of applications was 
rejected (see section 4.3). Moreover, according to a 1989-91 survey of 5,000 
manufacturing companies in the whole country, 35% did not apply for subsidies 
despite being aware of them. Firms were discouraged by the delays in the extension 
of subsidies, the limited availability of funds and the complexity of the application 
procedure, with the last reason being particularly discouraging for small firms.35
33 CCF, Company Nros, Annual Report 1981.
34 CCF, Company Nca, Verbale Assemblea Straordinaria 13/12/1982.
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The younger age of companies in the pre-subsidy stage is supported by previous 
research. Using interviews and questionnaires, this demonstrated that out of 124 
enterprises located in the South only 34 received subsidies in the start-up stage, 
whereas nearly all were subsidised during their trading life.36 The difficulty of 
securing subsidies in the early stage has been explained by the involvement of the 
credit institutions, which are much more cautious in extending loans to new
^7businesses rather than to companies with a proven track record. Therefore, 
subsidies in which credit institutions were involved, such as the soft loans should 
have been granted later than other subsidies. This is confirmed by the sample under 
analysis, where the age at which companies receive the first subsidy is 3.7 years in 
the case of fiscal subsidies, 4.6 in the case of grants and 6.6 for subsidised loans.
"Never subsidised' companies are the smallest group within the Southern sample and 
in both samples, they are the group with the highest rate of failures, thus suggesting 
that subsidies may have reduced the probability of failure.
Table VII.8 Investment ratio, 1951-91
Pre-subsidy Subsidised Post-subsidy Never subsidised
Barletta
WA 0.35 0.23 0.14 0.29
St dev 0.42 1.2 3.6 0.6
Abs8 116.3 145 32.1 42.9
San Mauro Pascoli
WA 0.36 0.19 0.16 0.25
St dev 0.41 0.35 0.31 1.1
Abs8 36.9 81.7 148 22.7
Keys: Investment ratio= annual net investment divided by fixed net assets; a= simple average, absolute 
value, m 1980 lire.
Source: company balance sheets.
35 Ministero dell’Industria and Mediocredito Centrale, Indagine sulle Imprese Manifatturiere (Milan, 
1994), pp. 53-54.
36 A. Del Monte, ‘The Effects of Regional Policy on the Industrial Development o f the South of Italy’, 
Mezzogiomo d ’Europa, 4/4 (1984), pp. 578-579.
37 Ibid., p. 580; A. Del Monte and R. De Luzenberger, ‘The Effect of Regional Policy on New Firm 
Formation in Southern Italy’, Regional Studies, 23/3 (1989), p. 225.
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Table VH. 8 shows that Southern companies reach the highest level of investment 
when they are subsidised, particularly when looking at investment in absolute terms. 
The investment activity declines sharply in the post-subsidy period. This can be due 
either to the high level of fixed assets reached in the previous stage (as shown in 
table Vn.15), which would reduce the scope for further profitable investment, or else 
to the sharp decline of the companies’ profitability (table VII. 10) and increasing 
financial constraints (table VII. 14). North-eastern companies behave in the ‘ideal’ 
way, as their investment activity increases in the post-subsidy period.
In a graph similar to graph VII. 1 above, with investment instead of profits on the X 
axis, both Southern and North-eastern companies move from position 1 to position 2 
when they receive subsidies. However, when Southern companies are no longer 
subsidised they return to position 1, whereas North-eastern companies would move 
further to the right towards the ‘competitive firm’ position. This implies that in order 
to promote the investment activity of Southern firms these should be constantly
<1 A
subsidised, which m turn indicates a ‘dependence’ of recipient firms on subsidies 
and a permanent capture of government funds.
In order to investigate whether there is an association between increases in subsidies 
and increases in investment, the coefficient of correlation between these two 
variables has been calculated. These calculations rely on a limited number of 
observations particularly for grants and fiscal subsidies in the North-eastern sample. 
As shown in table VI.6 , these two types of subsidies were much less frequent in the 
San Mauro Pascoli sample than in the Barletta sample.
As table VH.9 displays, the observations available for the pre-1976 period are very 
scant for any type of subsidy except for subsidised loans in the Southern sample, 
therefore the coefficient of correlation has been calculated over the whole period for 
this type of subsidy alone.
38 The concept o f ‘dependence’ of Southern Italian industry is generally used with a different meaning, 
i.e. it indicates the non-Southern Italian ownership of modem industry in the South, while local capital 
remains concentrated in traditional and small scale sectors. See F. Martinelli, ‘Public Policy and 
Industrial Development in Southern Italy: Anatomy of a Dependent Industry’, International Journal o f 
Urban and Regional Research, 9/1 (1985), p. 48.
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Table VIL9 Coefficients of correlation between investment ratios and subsidy ratios,
1951-91 and 1976-91, number of observations in brackets.
Inv-Is (SI) Inv-Gr Inv-Fs
1951-91 1976-91 1951-91 1976-91 1951-91 1976-91
Barletta sample 0.27(45) 0.23* (33) - - ( 86) 0.5 (78) — (50) 0.73 (50)
SMP sample  (12) 0.2s1 (11) -—(5) 0.66n (5) — (5) 0.6* (5)
Note: the number of observations is given by the number of years in which the companies received 
new subsidies.
Keys: Inv= Investment ratio, annual net investment divided by fixed net assets; Subsidy ratio= net 
subsidy (Is, Gr, Fs) received in a year divided by existing long term capital; Is (Sl)= Implicit subsidies 
within subsidised loans; Gr= grants; Fs= fiscal subsidies; superscripts indicate the time lag given to the 
variables, 11 and a= investment lagged by one and two years; sl =subsidy concerned lagged by one 
year.
Source: company balance sheets.
The results clearly indicate that there is a positive correlation between subsidies and 
investment. The strength of the correlation varies with the types of subsidy, but can 
be considered satisfactorily strong, particularly when taking into account that these 
coefficients of correlation focus on one specific type of long-term capital, whereas 
there is a multiplicity of factors influencing the investment decision of the firms. 
These include changes in the level of output pointed out by the accelerator 
principle,39 the expected output discounted by the price of capital services in the 
neoclassical theory,40 the market value of the firm in the Tobin’s q theory,41 and 
financial factors, and internal finance in particular, in the cash flow approach 42
The lower coefficient presented by subsidised loans can be attributed to the difficulty 
of pointing out the exact time lag between the receipt of such subsidies and 
investment or vice versa. As mentioned in Chapter El, the Cassa was legally 
permitted to undertake financial commitment in excess to its current financial means, 
which entailed the possibility that firms would receive the secured grant or 
subsidised loan after undertaking the investment. The Barletta sample displays 
positive coefficients between implicit subsidies and investment when lagging both 
investment and subsidies (with values between 0.15 and 0.21), indicating that
39 G. Ackely, Macroeconomics: Theory and Policy (New York, 1978), pp. 254-255.
40 Jorgenson and Siebert, ‘A comparison’, p. 695.
41 Ackely, Macroeconomics, p. 655.
42 Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, ‘Financing Constraints’, pp. 141-206.
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companies undertook investment both before and after receiving the subsidy. 
Therefore, any type of time lag will capture only part of the investment.
The explanation of the low coefficient displayed by the North-Eastern samples lies in 
two observations, the exclusion of which would change the coefficient to 0 .88, 
keeping the same time lag. In both cases, considerable investment was undertaken in 
the same year in which the subsidised loan was received, therefore the correlation 
between subsidies and investment in these two cases is not captured by lagging 
subsidies by one year.
Table VII. 10 Profitability, Barletta and SMP samples, 1951-91 (percentages)
Pre-subsidy Subsidised Post-subsidy Never subsidised
Barletta
ROE wa -0.01 3.4 -9.7 11.2
ROE cv 3.7 2.7 1.3 7.7
R/fna wa 0.00 0.03 -0.08 0.1
R/fiia cv 5.9 7.3 3.4 7.8
S Mauro Pascoli
ROE wa 4.2 11.3 14.3 12.8
ROE cv 1.6 1.3 0.6 1.6
R/fna wa 0.05 0.2 0.3 0.2
R/fna cv 12.4 2 0.7 4
Keys: ROE wa= ROE weighted average; ROEcv= ROE coefficient of variation.
Source: company balance sheets.
Table VII. 10 presents two measures of profitability: return on equity and return on 
fixed net assets, the latter indicating the efficiency with which fixed assets are 
employed.43
Southern companies shift from low profitability and high risk before subsidies to 
higher profitability and slightly higher risk when subsidised. In the post-subsidy 
stage they become much less profitable and less risky, therefore they do not remain
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in position 2. Return on equities and return on fixed net assets reach negative values 
in the post-subsidy stage, for two out of the six companies are in the process of 
failing (see table VTL6) and are consistently making losses. Out of the remaining 
four, only one made profits during every year of its post-subsidy stage whereas all 
other companies are making occasional losses.
North-eastern companies display the ‘ideal* behaviour, as far as their profitability is 
concerned. They move from position 1 before subsidies to position 2 when 
subsidised, and in the post-subsidy stage they move closer to the ‘competitive firm’ 
position. Companies never subsidised in both samples seem to opt for a high-profit 
and high-risk strategy, which entails a higher probability of failures, as shown in 
table VU.6 .
Southern companies with access to subsidies seem to pursue a ‘survival’ strategy, 
whereas unsubsidised ones pursue a ‘profit maximising’ strategy, or in the words of 
the sociological literature subsidised entrepreneurs prefer to reap benefits from 
institutions and abandon the economic rationale.44 However, this might not be the 
case and Southern subsidised firms might also be pursuing an economic rationale.
The analysis of failed companies presented in tables VI. 13, VI. 14 and VI. 15 has 
indicated the different conditions in which companies in the two ID samples cease 
their activity. Southern firms fold after a long period of losses and when they are 
financially distressed, while North-Eastern firms close down as soon as their 
turnover and profits are decreasing and their level of capitalisation (in term of 
finance) is very high. This indicates that the priority of Southern firms is to continue 
trading, whereas the priority of the North-Eastern firms is making profits. Moreover, 
the low capitalisation of Southern companies, particularly the scarcity of company- 
owned capital (see indicator E/FNA, in table VI. 15) suggests that Southern 
companies would have very little capital, if any, to cover possible losses, which is 
not the case for their North-Eastern counterparts.
43 Foster, Financial Statement, p. 67. The ratio presented by Foster is net income divided by total 
assets, as this analysis is concerned with fixed assets in particular, the ratio has been adapted as in the 
text.
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With the obvious historical differences, the low-profit low-risk strategy of Southern 
subsidised firms can be compared to the behaviour of medieval English peasants as 
explained by McCloskey.45 Before the enclosures (consolidated holdings) of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, farmers opted for scattered plots, despite the 
fact that the former provided them with a higher average income. McCloskey 
explains that this happened because the farmers’ priority was avoiding disaster, 
where disaster means falling below the subsistence level. Scattered plots produced a 
lower but less variable income than consolidated land, therefore by choosing the 
former peasants reduced their chances of incurring disaster.
The scenario in which companies in the two ID samples operate, as far profitability is 
concerned, is represented in the following graph, where net profit is defined as total 
revenues minus total costs.
Graph VTL2 Profitability, risk and failure threat in the two ID samples
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Source: adapted from McCloskey, ‘English Open Fields’, p. 131.
44 C. Trigiglia, Sviluppo senza Autonomia (Bologna, 1992), pp. 93-94;
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In this case the disaster is the failure of the firm and the decision rule is minimising 
the probability of failure. If the failure threat were in position Fi neither high-profit 
high-risk (I2) nor low-profit low-risk (Ii) investment endanger the company, therefore 
an economically rational company would chose I2. If the failure threat were in 
position F2, it would choose Ii, as this would minimise its possibility of failure. If the 
failure threat were in position F3 the company has no choice, it needs high profits to 
continue trading, and has to undertake I2.
Therefore, if Fi represents the failure threat for North-eastern companies and F3 for 
Southern companies, both groups should choose I2, North-eastern companies to 
maximise their profits, and Southern companies to survive. However, there is 
another element to be taken into account, namely subsidies. The following graph 
shows what happens when subsidies are introduced in this scenario.
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45 D.N., McCloskey, ‘English Open Fields as a Behaviour towards Risk’, Research in Economic 
History, 1976/1 (1976), pp. 124-170.
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Subsidies decrease the cost of the investment and therefore increase the net profit, 
moving it from Pi to Pis. Similarly, subsidies move P2 to P2S but l2S entails a higher 
probability of falling behind F3, therefore the subsidised company will choose Iis.
However, in the long term, choosing Iis is economically rational only if the scenario 
in graph VII.3 is permanent - after all, English peasants chose scattered plots for 
centuries - meaning if there is the possibility of receiving subsidies frequently. If a 
company knew that after its current subsidy ended it had to undertake a high-risk 
high-profit investment to survive, it would perceive that undertaking this investment 
while still being subsidised would reduce the risk of such investment. In graph VII. 3, 
the area behind F3 in the case of l2S is smaller than in the case of I2. In this case, the 
company would reap higher profits, which would make its financial situation sounder 
(for instance increasing its reserves and thus increasing its credit worthiness) and 
therefore push its own F3 to the left. Moreover, Southern subsidised companies will 
keep undertaking Iis because frequent subsidies increase the potential loss that 
partners would face in case of the company failure, as it would mean losing the 
company income plus frequent and considerable subsidies. In other words, the 
access to frequent subsidies increases the opportunity cost of a company's failure.
Therefore, the different levels of the failure threat and the frequency of the subsidies 
can explain the differences in the behaviour of companies in the two ID samples. 
Companies in the North-eastern sample have a failure threat level so low (see for 
instance their level of overcapitalisation in terms of finance in table VII. 14) that 
whether non-subsidised or subsidised they choose a high-profit and high-risk 
investment. The only exception is the younger, pre-subsidy group for which the 
failure threat level might be higher, as suggested by their undercapitalization in table 
VH.14. They thus choose a low-profit and low-risk investment. Companies in the 
Southern ID sample, having a higher level of failure threat (see for instance their 
financial capitalization) choose a high-profit and high-risk strategy if that is the only 
possibility to survive, i.e. if they belong to the unsubsidised group.
Although the higher level of risk faced by companies located in Southern Italy does 
not emerge from the Bagella and Caggese analysis (see tables VII.3 and VT1.4), the
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literature focusing on the banking system and finance in the South stresses that 
Southern companies are particularly risky. The risk of the borrowers determines 
higher risk for the banks, which in turn is a major cause for higher interest rates in 
the South. Southern firms are considered riskier because of their higher mortality 
rates,46 and their lower and more variable profitability 47
Table VII. 11 Mortality rate, selected sectors, 1978-81
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone D
Metal products .083 .078 .096 .131
Food processing .078 .082 .101 .096
Textile .079 .098 .101 .086
Leather .119 .099 .137 .108
Clothing .113 .112 .101 .123
Wood and furniture .071 .086 .094 .112
Paper .063 0.61 .079 .088
Note: Mortality rate= defunct firms (in some cases plants) divided by registered firms. Zones A, B, C, 
and D do not correspond exactly to the Istat divisions of North-West, North-East, Centre and South. 
Zone A= Piedmont, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardy and Liguria, and corresponds exactly with the North- 
West; Zone B= Veneto, Trentino, Friuli, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria and Marche, of these 
regions the first four belong to the Istat classification of the North-East, the remaining three belong to 
the Centre; Zone C= Latium, Abruzzi, Molise, Puglia e Campania, of these regions Latium belongs to 
the Centre and the remainder to the South. Zone D= Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna, all 
these regions belong to the South.
Source: B. Contini and R. Revelli, ‘Natalita e Mortalita delle Imprese Italiane: Risultati Preliminari e 
Nuove Prospettive di Ricerca’, L ’Industria: Rivista di Economia e Politico Industriale, Nuova Serie 
7/2 (1986), p. 104. Data from the National Institute for Social Security (INPS).
Table VII. 11 displays the mortality rate only for those sectors containing companies 
in the two ID samples. For later years, only aggregate estimates are available. Tables 
VH.11 and VD.12 (below) clearly show that the mortality rate is greater in the South. 
However, this indicator seems too broad to assess the risk of failure in Southern 
Italy, as it includes companies that change their legal status, mergers and 
acquisitions, and also closures of plants rather than firms.
46 Banca d’ltalia, Annual Report, 1988, abridged English version (Rome, 1989), p. 183; Faini, Galli 
andGiannini, ‘Finance’, pp. 174-179.
47 D ’Amico, Parigi and Trifilidis, ‘I Tassi ’, pp. 328-329.
48 Contini and Revelli, ‘Natalita e Mortalita’, pp. 201-203.
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Table VII. 12 Mortality rates of firms (%), 1984-89
North-West 3.8
North-East 3.5
Centre excluding Latium 4.3
Latium 4.6
Southern mainland 4.8
Sicily and Sardinia 4.6
Note: Mortality rate calculated as the percentage of the number of employees belonging to firms that 
disappeared from social security files and the total initial number of employees in each year, averaged 
for 1984-89. Source: Faini, Galli, Giovannini, ‘Finance and Development’, p. 179. Data from the 
National Institute for Social Security (INPS).
Attempts to calculate the number of failures as a percentage of industrial firms have 
been made for census years, but without any clear result. Records of bankruptcies by 
regions are available in the Annuario di Statistiche Giudiziarie published by Istat, but 
these statistics present a high level of sectoral aggregation for manufacturing as a 
whole, with no disaggregation by size of bankrupt firms. Moreover, considering the 
presence of non-Southem-owned companies and the greater weight of state-owned 
enterprises in the Southern industrial sector, a comparison of the number of 
bankruptcies in the South and other regions of the country should also isolate 
Southern-owned companies. This task is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis.
Focusing on the coefficient of variation of the ROI (table VII. 13 below) the higher 
risk of Southern companies is clear. Not only are the returns of Southern companies 
lower and more variable, but also the firms’ equities are completely absorbed by their 
own fixed capital. Equities as a percentage of fixed net assets amount to 97.2% for 
Southern small manufacturing firms in 1987, thus leaving no reserves to cover 
possible losses. The corresponding value for firms in the Centre and North was 
107.1%.49
49 Siracusano and Tresoldi, ‘Le piccole’, pp. 155-156.
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Table VII. 13 ROI, coefficient of variation (%), selected sectors.
South 1984 South 1987 C-N 1984 C-N1987
ROI CV ROI CV ROI CV ROI CV
Food processing 9.5 88.8 10 110.5 13.05 76.7 14.5 78.4
Tex., cloth., leather 9.7 100.5 8.5 105.2 15.9 67.5 13.7 74.7
Wood and furniture 8.3 102.1 8.5 108.9 12.8 74.4 12 77.2
Paper 6.4 117 10.5 88.8 12.3 72 12.7 73.7
Rubber 5.2 108.1 7.25 113.3 13.5 69.6 12.8 69.4
Mechanic industry 10.9 94.7 8.9 102.8 15.8 68.4 12.9 72.8
Source: D’Amico, Parigi and Trifilidis, ‘I tassi d’interesse e la rischiosita’, p.328; data source: 
company balance sheets provided by Centrale dei Bilanci
Therefore, the higher risk faced by companies in the Southern ID sample - indicated 
by the low values of the financial ratios (E/FNA and LTC/FNA in tables VI. 10 and
VI. 15) and by the coefficient of variation of the ROE (table VT1.10) - is not 
accidental or due to the size of the sample.
Table VII. 14 Financial capitalisation, Barletta and SMP samples, 1951-91
Pre-subsidy Subsidised Post-subsidy Never subsidised
Barletta
LTC%FNA wa 66.1 114.2 95.8 131.2
LTC%FNA st dev 161.9 114.7 153.6 532.8
CA%CL wa 88.8 115.2 92.9 123.5
CA%CL st dev 93.7 118.5 138.3 76.7
S Mauro Pascoli
LTC%FNA wa 124.8 234.8 275 224
LTC%FNA st dev 1,652.7 490.2 296.6 290.7
CA%CL wa 140.2 180.3 241.2 146
CA%CL st dev 166.9 80.7 143.2 188.9
Keys: LTC = long term capital; FNA = fixed net assets; CA = current assetts; CL = current liabilities; 
wa = weighted average; st dev = standard deviation.
Source: company balance sheets
Considering the sharp decrease in the profitability of Southern companies in the post­
subsidy stage (table VII. 10), it is not surprising that these companies return to a 
situation of financial constraint, both in the long and short term. In contrast, North-
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Eastern companies, the profitability of which increases further in the post-subsidy 
stage, become even less financially constrained, thus endorsing the results expected 
by Bagella and Caggese. As already mentioned, the authors would expect that if the 
post-subsidy companies go back to position 1 in graph VII. 1 they would be perceived 
as ‘bad companies’ by the financial structure and therefore would be credit rationed 
again.50 Low profits do not allow Southern companies, whether in the subsidised or 
in the post-subsidy stage to build high levels of reserves and their financial 
undercapitalization does not make these companies creditworthy. The situation is 
exacerbated in the case of 'post-subsidy1 companies, by the lack of subsidies 
themselves and their crowding-in effect shown in tables VI. 13 and VI. 14.














FNA%TA wa 37.4 17.1 17.5 15.5
FNA%TA st dev 31.6 16.9 9.3 27.8
Keys: FNA = fixed net assets; TA = total assets. 
Source company balance sheets.
The indicator presented in table VII. 15 clearly shows that higher capital intensity 
coincides with subsidies in the Southern sample. In both samples, companies in the 
pre-subsidy stage present high percentages of fixed net assets. However, this might 
be due to the young age of those companies, particularly in the 1976-91 period, as 
these might be in the process of endowing themselves with the equipment required.
The application of the Bagella and Caggese methodology to the ID samples has 
clearly pointed out that subsidies were more effective for companies in the North- 
Eastern sample, than for their Southern counterparts. North-eastern companies not 
only invest more and are more profitable during their subsidised period than in the 
pre-subsidy period, but also their investment activity and profitability increases in
50 Bagella and Caggese, ‘Stmttura’, p. 836.
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their post-subsidy period. Moreover, they become increasingly less risky through the 
various stages. Therefore, the lower ROE and higher risk displayed by subsidised 
companies in the North-eastern sample, table VII. 5, which suggested the failure of 
the subsidies, conceals their real effectiveness. The misleading results of the North­
eastern sample in table VII. 5 are therefore due to the aggregation of pre-subsidy, 
post-subsidy and never subsidised firms in the non-subsidised group, among which 
the post-subsidy group presents the highest return and lowest risk.
The results displayed by companies in the Barletta sample in table VH.5 conceal the 
limited effectiveness of the regional subsidies. Southern companies’ investment 
activity and profitability increase during the subsidy stage, but profitability in 
particular fell in the post-subsidy stage, thus indicating a ‘dependence* on subsidies. 
Moreover, it is clear that subsidised and post-subsidy companies opt for low-profit 
and low-risk investment, as opposed to the high-profit and high-risk strategy 
followed by ‘never subsidised’ companies. It seems plausible that this behaviour is 
due to the high risk faced by companies in the Southern sample and to the frequent 
and high subsidies, which make the safer low-profit and low-risk strategy viable.
The worse performance of companies in the post-subsidy stage coincides with a 
deterioration of their long- and short-term finance. Furthermore, the higher capital 
intensity of subsidised firms, which some works interpret as a distorting effect of the 
policy, is much more pronounced in the Southern sample than in the North-Eastern 
counterpart.
7.3 Financial incentives and the profitability of investment.
This section intends to assess whether financial incentives made profitable 
investment that would not otherwise been profitable, or subsidised investment that 
would have been profitable in any case. This is analysed by comparing the rates of 
return on capital employed with subsidised interest rates and yields on long-term 
government bonds.
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The rationale lies in the classical theory of investment. In the Keynesian formulation 
of the rational decision rule for investment, an investment is profitable if its marginal 
return exceeds the interest rate, because interest is a cost incurred in financing the 
investment, if the firm borrows money to invest. If an investment is financed 
internally, the interest rate represents the opportunity cost of the investment.51
There are various ways of expressing the return on capital employed: returns on net 
assets, which are equal to profits before interest on long-term loans and taxation 
divided by long-term capital employed, or also the return on shareholders’ equity 
calculated as profit after interest and tax divided by shareholders’ equity. The first 
ratio measures the efficiency (i.e. the optimal relationship between inputs and 
outputs) with which long-term capital is being employed. The second ratio indicates 
the residual return (where return is the income or profit) to the owners on their 
investment in the business.53 In finance, returns on long-term capital are measured 
using profit before interest and taxation, because the aim is to measure the returns 
earned on investment, and the opportunity cost of capital is considered as part of 
profits in accounting. In economics, profits after interest rate and taxation are used, 
as the aim is to study the role played in the allocation of resources by the returns that 
firms make over and above the opportunity cost of their capital, which is defined as 
part of the total cost.54 In this section, the economic definition of profit, i.e. after 
interest and tax, has been applied and divided by long-term capital, where long-term 
capital includes long-term borrowed capital and equity capital.
Using a notion such as profit lends itself to criticisms, considering that as profits are 
taxed,55 companies are interested in declaring lower profits than their real ones. 
Moreover, part of the companies in the two samples are in textiles, a sector regarded
51 Ackley, Macroeconomics, p. 248.
52 Lewis and Pendrill, Advanced Financial, p. 365.
53 M.W.E. Glautier and B. Underdown, Accounting Theory and Practice (4th ed., 1991), p. 259; 
definitions in brackets from C.T. Homgren, Introduction to Management Accounting (6th ed., 
Englewood Cliffs, 1984), pp. 686, 693.
54 R.G. Lipsey and K.A. Chrystal, An Introduction to Positive Economics (8th ed., Oxford, 1995), pp. 
187-188.
55 Until 1974, the Italian profit tax had two components, the Ricchezza Mobile and Imposta sulla 
Societa. In 1974 the tax system was modified and was based on two flat rate taxes: IRPEG (national 
tax) and ILOR (local tax). While the rate of ILOR was supposed to vary according to location, it was 
generally set at 14.2%. Faini and Schiantarelli, ‘Regional Implications’, pp. 113,116.
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as particularly affected by undeclared work, because of its opportunities for home 
working.56 To correct the companies’ profit figures to account for hidden profits is 
not a simple task. The Italian bureau of statistics (Istat) has recently addressed the 
issue of estimating the black economy.57 However, their estimates concentrate on 
the labour force. By multiplying the estimated undeclared employment by per capita 
values of income and value added, an estimated GNP that includes the black 
economy is obtained.58 Therefore, the Istat estimations cannot readily be used to 
estimate hidden profits of the companies in the two samples. Alternative sources 
such as the Ministry of Finance proved very secretive - it was not possible to access 
their library - and therefore the attempt to adjust profit figures to account for 
undeclared profits had to be abandoned. However, elements emerged from the 
previous analysis suggesting that not all companies in the two samples try to lower 
profit figures in their balance sheets.
Companies in the whole country are allowed by law to apply either a straight-line 
depreciation or accelerated rate depreciation.59 The first method consists of writing 
off a constant percentage of the asset cost, in each year of the asset's economic life. 
The latter enables companies to write off a higher percentage of the asset cost in 
earlier years. The accelerated depreciation method enables firms to increase their 
operating costs, in the initial years, and thus lawfully decrease their profits, to the 
extent that in countries like Greece and Germany, the accelerated method is a 
regional subsidy, and only companies in less developed regions can adopt it. If 
companies in the two samples were trying to lower their profits, they would 
frequently adopt the accelerated depreciation method, which instead does not occur. 
Only the two best performing companies in the Barletta sample (Sro and Sco) use it, 
together with six companies in the North-Eastern sample. Moreover, as mentioned 
in section 6.2.1, few companies in the Southern sample credit subsidies to their profit 
account rather than to reserves, thus increasing their profit figures. These examples 
of accounting practice adopted by companies in the two samples suggest that
56 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on Undeclared 
Work (Brussels, 1998); COM (1998) 219, p. 8.
57 Istat, ‘Nuova Contabilita Nazionale’, in Annali di Statistica, serie IX, vol. 9 (1990); Istat, ‘The 
Underground Economy in Italian Economic Accounts’, Annali di Statistica, serie X, vol. 2 (1993).
58 P. Busetta and E. Giovannini, Capire il Sommerso (Naples, 1998), p. 44.
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companies are not willing to close their balance sheets with a very small profit, and 
even less with a loss, as this would undermine their image of credit worthiness and 
reliability with banks, suppliers and clients.
The following table displays the results obtained comparing the rates of return on 
long-term capital for each company in each year with the subsidised interest rate and 
the return on long-term government bonds. Rates of return for each company in each 
year have been classified either as ‘lower’ than subsidised interest rates, ‘between’ 
subsidised interest rates and yields on long-term government bonds, or ‘higher’ than 
yields on long-term government bonds. The total number of each rate of return has 
been expressed as a percentage of the total observations.
Table VH.16 Rates of return, subsidised companies, 1957-91
Lower Between Higher
Barletta sample 49.65 36.17 14.18
SMP sample 28.92 42.16 28.92
Keys= Lower than the subsidised interest rates; Between subsidised interest rate and yields on long­
term government bonds; Higher than yields on long-term government bonds.
Source: Company balance sheets
Table VII. 16 shows that the largest percentage of observations falls in the ‘between’ 
group in the North-Eastern sample. Therefore, applying an ex-post analysis, 
subsidies can be considered as ‘crucial’ for the profitability of capital employed, for 
the largest group of observations. Moreover, the larger percentage in the ‘higher’ 
group indicates a better performance of companies in the North-Eastern sample. The 
large percentage of annual rates of return lower than the subsidised interest rate in 
the South is striking.
Table YD. 17 Rates of return, non-subsidised companies, 1957-91
Lower Between Higher
Barletta sample 46.20 32.75 21.05
SMP sample 42.62 22.13 35.25
Keys and source as for table VII. 16.
59Astolfi and Negri, Ragioneria applicata, p. 136.
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In the Barletta sample, non-subsidised companies or companies in those years when 
they did not receive any subsidy, display slightly higher returns than subsidised 
companies, as shown by the smaller percentage of observations in the ‘lower’ group 
and the larger percentage of observations falling in the ‘higher’ group. The sample 
also displays a considerable share of observations in the middle range. As table
VII. 17 refers to non-subsidised companies, all rates of return below yields on long­
term government bonds indicate that capital employed in a given company-year was 
unprofitable, however observations in the middle range indicate that capital 
employed in those companies-years would have been made profitable by incentives.
The corresponding figures for the SMP sample in table VII. 17 suggest that incentives 
were more effective in this area, as non-subsidised companies display a larger share 
of observations in the ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ groups, as compared to subsidised 
companies in table VII. 16. Moreover, the share of observations for which incentives 
would have been ‘crucial’ (the middle group) is considerably smaller than the 
corresponding figure for subsidised companies in the same area.
In order to investigate in detail the results presented above the analysis has been 
broken down into sub-periods, and companies have been classified in four groups 
according to their performance. Their performance has been studied by looking at 
the frequency of their losses. This choice was based on the observation that in the 
Southern sample a number of companies received subsidies although they were often 
making losses. Secondly, profits and losses seem to be a reliable benchmark: 
companies would try to lower their profit figures not to incur a heavy tax burden, but 
might be reluctant to display losses in their balance sheets, as this would affect their 
reputation with banks, suppliers and clients. This idea is suggested by the fact that 
some companies credited part of their grants to the profit account: in the second 
section of this chapter it was mentioned that without the grants the companies would 
have made in some cases only a very small profit and in others a loss.
Companies have been divided into two broad categories: subsidised and non- 
subsidised. Companies in each category have been classified into groups according 
to the frequency of their losses, by sub-periods. Group A includes companies with
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no loss in the sub-period under consideration; group B companies with losses for half 
(or less) the sub-period; group C companies with losses for the majority of years in 
the sub-period; and group D, companies with losses in every year of the sub-period.
Table VII. 18 Barletta Sample: Average Rate of Return, 1951-1991, (number of 
companies in brackets)
1951-6 1957-65 1966-70 1971-■75 1976-80 1981-86 1987-91
S/A 4.40 (1) 12.28 (10) 15.15 (8) 5.20 (8)
S/B -8.16 (1) -217.31 ( 4 ) 2.34 (6) 5.23 (5)
S/C -6.90(1) -5.79 (3) -3.41 (2) -4.38 ( 3 ) -15.26 (3) -53.19(2)
S/D -31.02 (2) -22.15(1)
NS/A 19.79 (1) 118.42 (4) 9.04 (4) 7.11 (4)
NS/B -127.22 (1) -2.23 (1) -37.24 (3) -2.03 ( 4 ) 7.62 (6) 3.19 (2)
NS/C -5.44 (1) 0.70 (1) -1.64 ( 1 ) -30.18(1) -10.27 (1)
NS/D -55.01 (4) -1.59 ( 3 ) -0.65 (1) -48.17 (2)
SIRS 3-5 3-4 3-7.5 2.3- 8.8 2.6-10.1 1.8-8.9
YLTGB 5-7.4 6.5-9 7.4-11.5 13.1- 16.1 10.5-20.9 9.68-10.1
Keys: S= subsidised; NS= non-subsidised; A, B, C, D= groups; SIR= subsidised interest rate in 
Southern Italy (range); YLTGB= yields on long-term government bonds (range).
Source: company balance sheets; tables IV. 1-IV. 15.
Table VII.19 San Mauro Pascoli Sample: Average Rate of Return, 1951-1991 
(number of companies in brackets)
S 1951-56 1957-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-86 1987-91
S/A 7.35 (2) 19.77 (6) 6.62 (4)
S/B 25.78 (1) 16.76 (1) 1.70 (1) 2.05 (1)
NS/A 95.88 (1) 0.35 (1) 17.03 (2) 118.71 (1) 19.28 (6) 32.37 (9)
NS/B -2.76 (1) 3.78 (1) -16.13 (1) 15.93 (2) 1.42 (2)
NS/C -54.62 (1) -13.94 (2)
NS/D -4.78 (2)
SIRC/N 5.0-6.0 4.7-6.9 4-10.1 3.1-9.7 3.4-15.35 2.5-8.9
YLTGB 5-7.4 6.5-9.01 7.4-11.5 13.1-16.1 10.5-20.9 9.7-11.5
Note: very high and very low values o f returns are due to 1) start-up companies having little long-term 
capital; 2) companies in the last years before bankruptcy; 3) companies presenting considerable losses 
in one year and considerable profits in the following, this happens often to companies in group B.
Keys and source as above.
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The above tables show that in the San Mauro Pascoli sample, only companies 
belonging to groups A and B benefited from subsidies, despite the existence of 
companies belonging to groups C and D. In the Barletta sample companies 
belonging to group C had access to subsidies in each sub-period, as did companies 
from group D between 1971-75 and 1981-86. Moreover, between 1957 and 1970 in 
the Barletta sample, companies making losses for half or less the sub-period (group 
B) were not subsidised whereas companies making more frequent losses (group C) 
had access to subsidies. This happens also in the San Mauro Pascoli sample, but 
only from 1971 to 1975.
The consistent access to subsidies by companies in groups C and D in the Barletta 
sample suggests the bailing out of troubled firms. The following table displays the 
type of subsidies received by companies, according to groups. It is sensible to 
investigate this point only from 1971, as until 1970 the only type of subsidy received 
by the companies in the Barletta sample was subsidised loans.
Table VH.20 Subsidies by groups, Barletta sample 1971-91 (% of observations in
brackets)_____________________________________________________________
Observations SL Gr FS
A 27 12 (44.4) 22 (81.5) 13 (48.1)
B 16 6 (37.5) 13 (81.3) 5 (31.2)
C 10 2 (20) 8 (80) 3 (30)
D 3 0 2 (66.7) 1 (33.3)
Key: Observations= number of companies in each group, in each sub-period from 1971 to 1991, in 
table VII. 18. The number of observations does not coincide with the number of companies in the 
sample, as one observation corresponds to one company in one sub-period. For instance, the same 
company trading from 1971 to 1991 provides four observations, one for each sub-period in table 
VII. 18.
Source: company balance sheets
The allocation of grants does not seem to be affected by performance, with as similar 
percentage in all four groups. However, the allocation of subsidised loans seemed 
much more dependent on company performance.
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Table VH21 Access to subsidised loans by groups, Barletta sample 1971-91. 
Observations Recipients R % O R % TR
A 27 12 44.4 60
B 16 6 37.5 30
C 10 2 20 10
D 3 0
Keys: Recipients= number of observations (company by period) recipient of subsidised loans; R%0= 
recipients as % of observations; R%TR= recipient in each group as a percentage of total recipients. 
Source as above.
Table VII.21 clearly displays that companies in groups C and D had very little access 
to subsidised loans. Subsidised loans can be less appealing to poorly performing 
companies as they involve costs and the obligation of repayment. Moreover, the 
credit institutions involved in the policy would not be willing to lend to companies 
consistently making losses. As explained in chapter ID, subsidised loans were 
extended by the MTCIs at their own risk, the Cassa covering only the difference 
between the subsidised and the market interest rate. Instead, grants were provided 
entirely by the Cassa with no financial involvement of credit institutions. Moreover, 
as grants involve no obligations of repayment, they might have been particularly 
attractive to companies consistently making losses.
As in the San Mauro Pascoli sample, loans were the main type of subsidy, with only 
two companies receiving also grants, the absence of subsidised companies from 
groups C and D is more understandable.
Table VII.22 Rate of returns of subsidised companies, excluding observations in 
groups C and D, Barletta sample, 1957-91__________________
Lower Between Higher
34.16 47.52 18.32
Keys= Lower than the subsidised interest rates; Between subsidised interest rate and yields on long­
term government bonds; Higher than yields on long-term government bonds.
Source: company balance sheets.
Table VII.22 shows how the rates of return of companies in the Barletta sample 
would compare to the subsidised interest rate and yields from government bonds, 
excluding observations in groups C and D. A far smaller share of observations now 
falls into the ‘lower’ group, as compared to table VH.16, and almost half would fall
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in the middle group - the group for which subsidies are ‘crucial’ in order to make 
capital employed profitable. However, the number of investments lower than the 
subsidised interest rate remains higher than the North-eastern corresponding figure in 
table Vn.16, indicating a poorer performance of the companies in the Southern 
sample.
The comparison between tables VH.16 and VH.22 suggests that a more selective 
management of subsidies would have rendered subsidies more effective. In the first 
place, fewer subsidies, in percentage terms, would have been extended to companies 
with rates of return so low that their capital employed remained unprofitable even 
after lowering the cost of capital. In the second place, a more selective management 
of subsidies would have captured a higher percentage of companies, for which 
lowering the cost of capital was ‘crucial’ in order to make their capital employed 
profitable. Moreover, tables VH.20 and VH.21, suggest that the type of subsidy more 
prone to this less selective management was grants. However, even if subsidies were 
not extended to companies making frequent losses, this would not prevent another 
type of ineffectiveness of the subsidies, i.e. the extending of subsidies to companies 
with rates of return so high that their capital employed would be profitable even in 
the absence of subsidies.
Conclusions
The analysis of the effectiveness of subsidies conducted in this chapter has pointed 
out achievements and failures of the regional and national policies. Subsidies to 
companies in the Southern sample might be considered effective in as much as they 
enhanced the investment activity and profitability of recipient firms, and increased 
their level of financial capitalization. However, the results clearly suggest that such 
positive effects were short lived and confined to the period in which companies in 
the Southern sample received subsidies.
Companies in the North-eastern sample reach their best performance in the post­
subsidy stage, in terms of financial equilibrium, investment and profitability. This 
result together with the high percentage of investment made profitable by subsidies,
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clearly indicates that although subsidies represented a smaller source of finance for 
North-eastern companies, they have been even more effective than for Southern 
firms.
The comparison between subsidised and ‘never subsidised’ firms casts further doubts 
on the effectiveness of subsidies on companies in the Southern sample. On the one 
hand, the higher percentage of failed companies among ‘never subsidised’ companies 
indicates that subsidies reduced the probability of companies’ failure, on the other 
subsidies enabled recipient companies to pursue a low-risk low-profitability strategy.
The interpretation put forward in this chapter singles out three factors that 
determined such an outcome: the riskier economic environment in which Southern 
firms operate, the amount and frequency of subsidies, and their lack of selectivity, 
especially in the case of grants. Under these conditions, the choice of a low-profit 
and low-risk strategy of Southern firms in the sample becomes the most rational.
Therefore, the analysis does not support the sociological interpretation according to 
which Southern entrepreneurs abandon the economic rationale and reap benefit from 
institutions and/or political environment. Southern entrepreneurs in the sample 
indeed benefit from institutions but the rationale remains purely economic. The 
analysis of the two samples partly substantiates the conclusions reached by Bagella 
and Caggese, who argue, albeit on weak evidence, that the characteristics of the 
subsidies and the area in which companies are located determine whether recipient 
companies undertake high-profit and high-risk or low-profit and low-risk investment. 
However, while it seems plausible that subsidised companies in the Southern sample 
adopt a low-profit, low-risk strategy in order to maximize the probability of 
continuing trading, maximizing the possibility of receiving other subsidies seems to 
be a means rather than an end.
The analysis of the rates of return highlighted that the percentage of investment for 
which subsidies were ‘crucial’ is smaller for Southern companies than for their 
North-eastern counterparts, for a large percentage of non-profitable investment 
undertaken by Southern companies making frequent losses was subsidised,
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particularly through grants. Excluding such companies, subsidies would have been as 
‘crucial’ for the Southern sample as they were for the North-eastern firms. This 
indicates that the lower effectiveness of subsidies was due in particular to grants, 
which was a type of subsidy provided entirely by the Cassa and disconnected from 
market institutions. Such subsidies were rarely awarded to companies in the North­
eastern sample.
The previous chapter pointed out that the established interpretative framework 
regarding the types of finance used by companies within IDs, fails to capture the 
importance of government subsidies for Southern IDs in particular. The analysis 
conducted in this chapter indicates that ignoring subsidies would limit the 
understanding not only of Southern IDs but also of the more prosperous North­
eastern IDs, where companies benefited from subsidies to a much smaller extent, but 
where, nevertheless, subsidies turned out to be more effective.
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CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has investigated the system of incentives available to small and medium­
sized firms in Southern Italy after 1957, and compared it with the incentives available 
to small and medium-sized firms throughout the country. The subsidies for the 
Southern firms were part of the so-called ‘Extraordinary Intervention for the South’, 
and were managed by the Cassa. The ‘Extraordinary Intervention’ was the result of 
political and economic considerations, as well as pressure from Svimez and the 
IBRD. Officially, it was claimed that the policy would benefit the whole Italian 
economy. The availability of subsidies for small and medium-sized firms in the rest 
of the country was due to the widespread awareness of the importance of such firms 
to the Italian economy.
The complexity of the Cassa programme and the frequent shifts in its priorities have 
been shown in Chapter HI. Particularly important for this thesis was the 1962 
abandonment of the size criterion for eligibility for subsidies, which removed the 
emphasis on small and medium-sized firms. The other major turning point was 1976, 
which marked the end of the ‘jungle of incentives’. This turning point is clearly 
reflected in the expenditure of the Cassa. Until 1975, its subsidised credit and grants 
increased, both in absolute and relative terms. From 1976, expenditure, subsidised 
credit and grants all decreased. The same changes are evident in the regional 
distribution of subsidised credit. The North-East benefited least from soft loans 
throughout the whole period, whereas the South received the largest share until 1975. 
However, from 1976 the North-West was consistently the biggest beneficiary. Even 
if Cassa grants are added, the total financial subsidies going to the South after that 
date were less than subsidised credit going to the North-West. This finding is in line 
with Padoa Schioppa Kostoris’s figures for total government expenditure for the 
single year of 1988, however, by demonstrating a longer-term trend this thesis 
significantly enhances the understanding of the system of subsidies. Furthermore, the 
finding undermines the growing common assumption that subsidies to the South had 
become a burden on Northern resources, at least as far as grants and subsidised loans 
were concerned. As this assumption contributed to the end of the ‘Extraordinary 
Intervention’, the finding is even more significant.
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The harmonisation of regional and national subsidy schemes reflected the obvious 
need to simplify the soft loan system. By 1976, subsidised credit was regarded as 
particularly important, as the BoI’s tight monetary policy had made borrowing more 
expensive. However, the regional analysis of subsidised credit has shown that 1976 
also marked the redirection of subsidies away from the South to the most productive 
area of the country, and a decreasing trend in the public resources devoted to the 
regional policy. It seems plausible that following the 1975 recession, stimulating the 
national economy by directing state resources into the most productive areas became 
the new priority. Thus, as other authors have already noted, resources were diverted 
from the South to the North-west.1
Previous authors have acknowledged this change in the direction of subsidised loans 
but the timing is still controversial. Pergolesi identified it as starting from 1973-74. 
Del Monte and Giannola, using a different dataset, timed it in 1976 but do not place it 
in the context of the institutional change. Yuill et al. mention the institutional change 
but do not examine its consequences.2 This thesis clarifies the issue by bringing 
together the institutional and economic sides and confirms the periodization 
identified by Del Monte and Giannola on the basis of three different datasets - the 
Cassa balance sheets, the Bol financial statistics and unpublished records of the 
Ministry of Industry.
Using the MI records, the thesis has investigated the degree to which the national 
institutions in charge of subsidised credit responded to applications for loans. The 
issue of to what extent applications for subsidies were satisfied is covered for the first 
time in this thesis, and it is clear that overall, the distribution of subsidies was driven 
by the applications rather than by their availability. The only exception was Southern 
Italy from 1976 onwards, the only region where the share of accepted applications 
decreased from 83.1% to 75.3%. The issue is important, not only because it adds to 
the understanding of subsidies as a whole, but also because it points out that with the 
exception of Southern Italy after 1976, those areas where fewer subsidies were
1 See section 4.2, HI.
2 See section 4.2, HI for the debate.
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received were those where fewer subsidies were sought, which is important 
background information for the micro-analysis.
The importance of subsidies for the Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli samples
The importance of subsidies as a source of company finance has been analysed on the 
basis of two relatively small samples of companies, one located in the Southern ID of 
Barletta and the other in the North-Eastern ID of San Mauro Pascoli, specialized in 
the production of footwear, clothing and textiles.
The analysis of the companies’ capital structure revealed that companies in the 
Southern samples relied much more heavily on subsidies than their North-Eastern 
counterparts, both before and after 1976. This finding is consistent with the regional 
analysis, which showed that the North-East, together with the Centre, benefited least 
from subsidies throughout the whole period of analysis. The greater relative weight 
of subsidies for the Southern companies reflects several factors: a) subsidies reported 
by Southern companies were larger in absolute terms, which is consistent with the 
higher subsidies to which Southern companies were entitled by the policy; b) 
Southern companies received subsidies - particularly grants - more frequently than 
the North-Eastern firms; c) the relative weight of such subsidies (subsidies as a 
percentage of total liabilities) is greater for Southern companies because the other 
components of liabilities are smaller than those of the North-Eastern companies.
However, if the relative weight of subsidies indicates that subsidies were a more 
important source of finance for companies in the Southern sample, an interesting 
twist is provided by the analysis of the effectiveness of subsidies on companies in the 
samples, a point analysed using the new methodology proposed by Bagella and 
Caggese. The results show that the North-Eastern sample displays the ideal 
behaviour, for the investment activity and profitability of firms increases in the 
subsidised stage, but increases even further in the post-subsidy stage, whereas the 
profitability and investment activity of Southern companies increase in the subsidised 
stage but decrease in the post-subsidy stage.
335
This new finding reveals a fresh insight into the issue of the effectiveness of 
subsidies. According to a study by the World Bank,3 subsidies should not generate 
dependence of recipient firms, meaning that recipient companies perform well only 
when subsidised. A dependence on subsidies indicates that the nexus between a 
firm’s profitability and its efficiency has been broken, which in turn implies the 
permanent capture of government funds and in extreme cases the bailing out of 
troubled firms. Using this approach, the declining performance of ‘post-subsidy’ 
companies in the Southern sample can only indicate the failure of regional subsidies 
and the dependence of recipient firms. On the contrary, the improved performance of 
‘post-subsidy’ companies in the North-Eastern sample indicates the effectiveness of 
subsidies, which did not generate dependence of recipient companies. On the one 
hand, this finding casts serious doubts on the implementation of the ‘Extraordinary 
intervention’ and the way in which some companies used its funds. On the other 
hand, it suggests that there might be other factors limiting the effectiveness of 
subsidies in the South.
The comparison between Southern subsidised and unsubsidised companies yields 
striking results. Unsubsidised companies achieve higher profits than subsidised 
companies, and in line with the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the former are more 
risky than the latter. Therefore, it could be inferred that subsidised companies pursue 
a ‘survival’ strategy, whereas unsubsidised companies pursue a ‘profit maximising’ 
strategy. It seems plausible that behind this survival strategy there is a rationale 
similar to McCloskey’s concept of avoiding disaster - in this case the failure of the 
companies. Unsubsidised companies also pursue a survival strategy, but in order to 
survive they need to achieve high profits, as their low profits would not be increased 
by the subsidies, therefore they have no choice but undertake high-profit and high- 
risk investment.
Yet another point on which the effectiveness of a policy can be tested is whether it 
can be an effective mechanism for correcting capital market failures. Echoing the 
Gerschenkronian argument, the World Bank stresses that government credit can be an 
effective mechanism for correcting capital market failures in less developed regions
3 For details see Introduction to Chapter VII.
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where the capital shortage renders private banking unviable.4 However, even in 
developed and industrialized regions, government credit can correct capital market 
imperfections, such as those due to asymmetric information, by assuming the cost of 
monitoring and providing a senior status to private credit. In this respect North- 
Eastern subsidies also seem to be more effective. Subsidised companies in both 
samples display a higher percentage of long-term market borrowed funds as 
compared to non-subsidised companies, therefore subsidies seem to have a crowding- 
in effect. However, while companies in the Southern sample return to a situation of 
financial constraints in the post-subsidy stage, similar to financial constraints already 
experienced in the pre-subsidy stage, North-Eastern companies enjoy higher levels of 
liquidity in their post-subsidy stage. This result is not surprising considering that the 
profitability of companies in the Southern sample decreases in the post-subsidy stage 
whereas it increases in the North-Eastern sample. Therefore, in the post-subsidy 
stage Southern companies might be perceived as ‘bad companies’ by banks and be 
credit rationed. On the contrary, ‘post-subsidy’ companies in the North-Eastern 
sample would be perceived as ‘good companies’ and would not experience credit 
rationing.
Contributions of the thesis
This research shows that the established interpretative framework regarding sources 
of finance in IDs is limited and needs considerable revision. The new evidence 
offered by the study of a Southern ID clearly suggests that state finance should be 
taken into account in order to reach a deeper understanding of IDs throughout the 
country. State subsidies were clearly important for Southern IDs. However, the 
analysis of the sources of finance of the North-eastern sample shows that companies 
there also benefited from subsidies, if to a much smaller extent. Neverthless, 
subsidies in the North-East turned out to be more effective than in the South.
These findings are important also for the international literature on IDs. Italian IDs 
are considered a prominent feature of the country's economy, and a particularly 
successful one. However, when explaining the existence of this pattern of business
4 For details see section 6.2.3.
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organization, it is overlooked that in Italy special attention had been paid to the 
financial requirements of small and medium-sized firms since the early 1950s, by 
creating ad hoc financial institutions (RMTCIs) and by providing subsidised credit 
for such firms. The institutional contribution to the development of North-eastern IDs 
is acknowledged by Piore and Sabel, but only as far as local government is 
concerned, in that it provided infrastructures that the firms required but could not 
themselves provide.5
This research offers a further contribution to the historiography on IDs by focusing on 
an ID located in Southern Italy and by comparing it with a classical North-eastern 
example. Southern IDs are much less studied, their existence not even being 
acknowledged. Only very recently have some scholars begun paying attention to IDs 
in the South, looking mainly at their contribution to the Southern economy in terms 
of employment and exports.6 No study has yet compared a Southern ID with a North­
eastern one, which implies placing the IDs within the wider contexts of the North- 
South economic divide - the major structural problem of the Italian economy - and 
the regional and national industrial policy. Therefore, in this thesis the IDs of Barletta 
and SMP have been used also as cases to study, at the micro-level, important issues 
and policies of the last fifty years of Italian economic history.
There is wide agreement that the main achievement of the ‘Extraordinary intervention 
for the South’ lay in preventing the widening of the gap between North and South. 
This is considered a great achievement by some scholars, as the South kept pace with 
the North when the latter experienced its fastest ever growth, but disappointing by 
others stressing that convergence has not been achieved. Regional values for GDP 
per capita and the ratio of investment to output confirm the lack of convergence. 
However, given the regional distribution of subsidised credit and grants shown in this 
thesis, the common perception should be refined, by saying that the subsidised South 
failed to reduce the gap between it and other subsidised parts of the country, in 
particular the North-West, which in terms of subsidies to industry from 1976, was 
even more subsidised than the South. This was significant, and it was bound to affect
5 For details see section 1.1.2.
6 For details see section 1.2.2.
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the comparative performance of the South. Furthermore, the subsidies aimed at 
increasing the profitability of investing in the South in order to attract capital from 
other areas of the country, an effect that might have been greatly reduced by the 
availability of subsidies elsewhere.
The policy for the South has been criticized on several accounts. In particular, 
subsidised credit and capital grants have been criticized as affected by an inefficient 
bureaucracy, in turn affected by bribery; it is also claimed that financial subsidies did 
not always translate into productive investment but may have been used to fuel 
liquidity or undertake financial speculation. Various works stress that large 
investments in capital-intensive sectors were the main beneficiary of subsidies and 
that since the lifting of the size limit of eligible companies, in 1962, the system of 
subsidies in the South was diverted from its original purpose of developing an 
organic network of small and medium-sized firms. Conversely, subsidies did not 
favour the development of small local firms and the industrial policy for the South 
has failed to promote a self-sustaining industrial development similar to that which 
took place in the North-East. However, a study by Faini, based on subsidies extended 
by the Cassa by company size between 1970 and 1983, found no evidence of small 
firms having less access to subsidies than large firms.8
This thesis offers a different approach to test the effectiveness and shortcomings of 
the ‘Extraordinary intervention’ as far as financial subsidies are concerned. The 
literature on the regional policy is extensive, but the studies of the outcomes are 
based largely on regional data and very few have attempted to assess their 
effectiveness on the basis of company records.9 The findings based on the two ID 
samples remain in line with previous analysis based on company records, while 
providing a more accurate analysis bringing to light new elements. Companies in the 
Barletta sample display a higher percentage of fixed net assets to total assets, and 
considering this percentage as a proxy for capital intensity, the comparison of the two 
ID samples indicates that Southern small firms trading in traditional sectors are also
7 For the debate see section 2.3.1.
8 For details see section 2.3.2.
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more capital intensive, a result confirmed by the 1987 Bol study of a sample of 9,000 
small manufacturing companies.10
The higher capital intensity of the Southern industry as a whole is well known to the 
general literature and has been interpreted as determined by the investment by state- 
owned enterprises in sectors such as steel, chemical and oil-refining.11 The higher 
percentage of fixed net assets displayed by Southern small firms is interpreted by 
supporters of the regional policy as a consequence of underdevelopment, as more 
resources are needed to produce the same amount of output. Therefore the system of 
incentives to investment, consistently with its aim, has allowed Southern companies 
to endow themselves with the required level of fixed assets, beyond the level that 
their own capital would have allowed. However, the higher level of fixed assets could 
also be interpreted as a distortion caused by financial incentives, which lowered the 
relative cost of capital.
Moreover, Bagella and Caggese maintain that subsidised Southern companies in 
traditional sectors are less profitable and less risky than non-subsidised ones, based 
on a comparison between profitability of subsidised and non-subsidised companies. 
They found that also in the North subsidised companies are less profitable than non- 
subsidised, but at least subsidised companies are less risky. The overall picture from 
the two ID samples reflect the findings by Bagella and Caggese, but only when the ID 
samples are divided into subsidised and non-subsidised. When dividing the non- 
subsidised companies in the two ID samples into pre-subsidy, post-subsidy and 
‘never subsidised’ groups, a method that Bagella and Caggese were unable to test for 
themselves, new interesting results were brought to light. These challenge the 
findings of the two authors. By dividing non-subsidised companies in the two ID 
samples into smaller groups, it emerges that regional subsidies in the South were 
effective to a larger extent than Bagella and Caggese admit, but were even more 
effective in the North-East.
9 Bagella and Caggese, ‘Struttura del capitale’; Bagella, Becchetti and Caggese, ‘Financial 
Constraints’; Faini, Galli and Giovannini, ‘Finance and Development’; Siracusano and Tresoldi, 
‘Piccole Imprese’.
10 See section 6.2.2
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The more accurate analysis presented in this thesis was made possible by the quality 
of the data collected. The two ID samples have been compiled on the basis of raw 
company data collected at local Chambers of Commerce, and following the same 
companies for as long a period of time as permitted by the availability of data. This 
made it possible to separate subsidies from other types of long-term finance and 
studying various issues at different points in time and at various stages of the 
companies’ trading lives. On the contrary, all the other micro-economic studies are 
based on previously reclassified company records from institutions such as Centrale 
dei Bilanci or Mediocredito Centrale, which do not allow a separation between 
subsidies and other types of long-term finance. Although their samples are very large, 
they cover very short periods.
The analysis of the two ID samples supports only part of the criticisms mentioned 
above. Consistently with the Faini study, the large number of subsidised companies in 
the Southern sample (26 out of 32, the corresponding figure for the North-Eastern 
sample being 11 out of 21) does not indicate that small firms were at a disadvantage 
in accessing subsidies. As for the way Southern companies used subsidies, both the 
Bagella and Caggese method and the panel data analysis indicate an association 
between subsidies and investment. Moreover, subsidies were extremely important for 
the capitalization, in financial terms, of such firms. Only when companies in the 
Southern sample were subsidised did they cover their fixed assets with long-term 
capital. Therefore, it seems unlikely that companies in the Southern sample were 
using subsidies for purposes other than financing investment. Some companies did 
use subsidies for a different purpose, namely to consolidate short-term bank loans, 
but such loans had been obtained to bridge the delay between the approval of the 
application for subsidies and the extension of subsidies.
However, some of the criticisms are confirmed by the analysis of the two samples. 
Dividing the trading life of Southern companies into pre-subsidy, subsidised and 
post-subsidy stages, it emerged that these firms undertook the highest investment, 
enjoyed the highest rates of return and the highest level of capitalization, in financial 
terms, only when they were subsidised, whereas in the post-subsidy stage all
11 See for instance V. Castronovo, Storia economica d ’ltalia (Turin, 1995) p.433.
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indicators display lower values. On the contrary, according to the same indicators, 
North-Eastern companies improved their performance when subsidised but reached 
their best performance in the post-subsidy stage. These results clearly indicate the 
dependence of companies in the Southern sample on subsidies, whereas the North- 
Eastern firms show autonomy from subsidies, as their performance improves even in 
the absence of subsidies. Therefore, although Southern firms in the sample indicate 
an association between subsidies and investment, the growth promoted by subsidies 
cannot be considered ‘self-sustaining’ as in the North-East.
There are various factors behind the dependence displayed by the Southern firms. 
One of the reasons why investment decreases in the post-subsidy stage is likely to be 
the high endowment of fixed assets (fixed net assets as a proportion of total net assets 
is as high as 37.6% in Southern subsidised companies, compared to 17.6% for the 
North-Eastern counterparts) reached by Southern companies in the subsidised stage, 
which reduces the scope for further profitable investment in the post-subsidy stage. 
Moreover, the sharp decline of companies’ profitability and capitalization, in 
financial terms, in the post-subsidy stage, suggests that financial means to undertake 
further investment are severely limited.
There are several reasons why the profitability of companies within the Southern 
sample decreases in the post-subsidy stage, in contrast to the North-Eastern 
experience. Out of the 6 Southern post-subsidy companies only two performed well 
while subsidised (i.e. having rates of return above the average of the Southern 
subsidised group), but the rates of return of the other 4 were below the average for the 
subsidised group. Out of the 4 North-Eastern companies in the post-subsidy stage, 
three are the best performing of the entire sample and they leave the subsidised stage 
when they have reached the size limit for eligible companies. With the absence of any 
size limit in the South, the best performing companies in the sample never left the 
subsidised stage during the period of analysis. Such companies were not only larger 
in terms of fixed net assets than the best performing North-Eastern sample firms, but 
were also enjoying rates of return higher than the market interest rate, which 
demonstrates ex post that subsidies were not necessary to make their investment 
profitable.
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The example above clearly points out the inefficient use of subsidies in the South. 
Even worse, the analysis of the capital structure of failed companies in the last five 
years of their trading life has revealed that much higher subsidies were received by 
Southern companies about to fail as compared to the North-eastern companies. 
Moreover, the comparison of the rates of return of subsidised companies with yields 
on long-term government bonds shows that a larger share of ex-post unprofitable 
investment was subsidised in the Southern sample than in the North-eastern sample, 
thus suggesting that subsidies in the South were less selective than in the North-East.
However, while inefficiencies in the management of subsidies are clear, these alone 
cannot explain the poorer performance of companies in the Southern sample. The 
profitability of these companies remains lower than for their North-Eastern 
counterparts regardless of whether they are in the pre-subsidy, subsidised or post­
subsidy stage, which has both micro- and macroeconomic explanations.
The introduction mentioned the great attention devoted in economic history to the 
role of financial institutions in economic growth. From the two small samples it is 
clear that the institutions managing state subsidies did contribute to the growth of the 
two IDs. Subsidies were a vital source of finance for many firms in the Southern 
sample and were not insignificant for the majority of firms in the North-Eastern 
sample. However, the effects of the subsidies seem short-lived for the South 
companies. This was partly because of poor decisions by the institutions, which 
frequently poured money into inappropriate companies. The inefficiency of many of 
the Southern companies also reduced the effectiveness of subsidies. Finally, the 
subsidies could not compensate for the riskier environment in the South. The 
situation looks very different for the North-Eastern sample. There, companies relied 
to a much smaller extent on subsidies but these seem to be much more effective.
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Appendix A: The ‘short-term’ branch of the Italian banking system.
Ordinary banks were divided into six groups:
a) The ‘banks of national interest’ (banche di interesse nazionale). These were the 
Banca Commerciale Italiana, Credito Italiano, Banco di Roma, the three mixed banks 
that survived the banking crisis of the early 1930s. They were joint stock companies, 
and their capital was owned by the state through the holding company IRI until the 
privatisation of the 1990s. Banks of national interest operated in the whole country, but 
were not allowed to open branches in small municipalities or towns that were not 
provincial capitals. Exceptions were possible in case of industrial and commercial 
towns.1
b) The six Public Law banks were public corporations: Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 
Banco di Napoli, Banco di Sicilia, Banco di Sardegna, Monte dei Paschi di Siena and 
Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino. Among those only the Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro operated throughout the whole country, maintaining a national network of 
branches until the 1980s. The Banco di Napoli has most of its branches in the South of 
Italy, though it has a certain number in other parts of the country. The others, namely 
Banco di Sicilia, Monte dei Paschi di Siena and Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino 
are regional or at most interregional banks.2
c) Ordinary Credit banks. These are Joint Stock Companies. The 138 Ordinary banks, 
by virtue of their status are the only ones that are allowed to be, and indeed are, 
controlled by private industrial and financial groups. The group displays great 
variations in size from some banks with a few offices to others that possess more than a 
hundred branches spread over many regions. This group as well as the following ones 
is more developed in the North than in the South.3
d) Co-operative banks. The size variations in this group are still greater than in the 
preceding one. This type of banks can not be taken over, because the individual
1 Camevali, ‘British and Italian banks’, p. 195; Cassese, E ’ ancora, pp. 138-140.
2 Ceriani, ‘Italy’, p. 132.
3 Ibid., pp. 134-135.
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shareholders are permitted to hold only a limited number of shares and have the right to 
only one vote.4
e) Savings banks are public bodies. They have several features distinguishing them 
from other banks, notably a “very high ratio of savings deposits to current accounts (4 
to 1)”. In addition, “medium and long-term loans made to special classes of borrowers 
and against special guarantees” played an important role in their activities.5
Although the majority of banks is state owned this does not mean that they have public 
aims. The co-existence of public ownership and private aims is very much stressed in 
the legal literature on the topic, which also makes it clear that the state limits its 
involvement to appointing bank presidents or chairmen rather than executive managers. 
However, public banks are under the same control and discipline as private institutions 
and ultimately under the control of the Bol.6
The table below displays the relative size of each group in terms of balance sheet 
deposits as a percentage of total deposits for all types of banks.
Table A.1 Deposits share by group (%), 1930s - 1980s.
1938 1948 1956 1966 1977 1988
BNI 12 24.6 21.1 18.1 13.7 10.4
PL 20.5 21.6 22.9 18.7 19.6 17.2
OC 13.3 21.4 22.6 21.8 25 22.5
Co 11.1 11 10.9 11 14 16.4
SB 41.6 21.4 22.4 26.2 27.6 27.3
Others 1.5 0.2 6.1
Keys: BNI= Banks of national interest; PL= Public law banks; OC= Ordinary credit banks; CO = co­
operative banks; SB= Saving banks; Others = ‘Ditte’ and ‘Casse Rurali ed Artigiane’.
Source: Barca and Manghetti, L ’Italia, p. 223. and Banca d’ltalia, Bollettino, various years.
The presence of such a large number of banks does not necessarily imply competition, 
as markets are highly territorially fragmented. Until 1974 the territorial limitations 
were articulated as follows:
a) banks of national interest could operate throughout the whole country,
A Ibid, p. 135.
5 Ibid,, p. 137.
6 Cassese, E ’ ancora, pp. 89-95.
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b) banks with deposits amounting to more than 300 bn lire could operate in the regions 
where their head office was established;
c) other banks could operate in the whole province if their head office was located in 
the provincial capital;
d) banks operating only in the municipalities where their branches were located.7 
From 1975 the territorial limitations were more strictly defined and connected to the 
deposit size.
Table A.2 Territorial limits of banks by deposit size, from 1975.






Keys: a=location of head office + adjacent towns. 
b= province containing branches + adjacent provinces.
c= region containing head office + adjacent provinces + provinces containing branches.
d= region containing head office + adjacent regions + any region containing at least one branch in a
provincial capital.
Source: Barca and Manghetti, L ‘Italia, pp. 215-216.
In their lending activity banks have to respect the limit of advances which amounts to 
20% of the paid-up capital and reserves of the bank. Exceptions to this rule are still 
possible with the approval of the ICCS. However, advances can not exceed 30% of 
bank deposits.
7 Barca and Manghetti, L 'Italia, p. 215; Camevali, ‘British and Italian banks’, p. 191.
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Appendix B: The companies in the two ID samples.
B.l List of companies and records available
Companies are designated with three letters, of which the first refers to the area 
(North or South), while the following two are the initials of the company’s name. 
The first date corresponds to the year of establishment, the following dates to the 
period for which records are available. When dates of establishment or change of 
public status specify the month, it means that the relevant record (i.e. deed of 
incorporation or the official document recording the change in the company’s legal 
status) was available in the company’s folder. When the month it is not specified it 
means that the relevant record was not available, but the year was mentioned in one 
of the reports available.
Table B.l .1 Records at the Chamber of Commerce in Bari
Company Legal status Established Records available 
From To
Product
San Pb/Ltd (1988) 1936 1951 1991 Food processing
Sma Pb 1959 1959 1976 Clothing
Svr Ltd 1967 1967 1991 Food processing
Sin Ltd 1967 1968 1989 Food processing
Ser Ltd 1/1967 1969 1985 Wood processing
Sfi Ltd 1/1971 1971 1991 Textiles
Sbc Ltd 1/1972 1972 1991 Textiles
Stu Pv/Ltd (12/1977) 3/1972 1978 1991 Wood processing
Svc Ltd 11/1972 1973 1991 Food processing
Sfs Ltd 11/1972 1973 1985 Textiles
Sab Ltd/Pv (1986) 2/1973 1973 1986 Footwear
San Ltd 3/1973 1973 1983 Clothing
Sbia Pb 1973 1973 1991 Clothing
Sal Ltd 1973 1973 1979 Clothing
Sar Ltd 1973 1973 1988 Footwear
Sri Pb 10/1973 1974 1991 Footwear
Sst Pb 11/1973 1974 1990 Plastic
Spl Pv/Ltd (4/1984) 12/1973 1984 1991 Footwear
Sea Ltd 3/1974 1974 1987 Footwear
Sil Ltd 6/1974 1975 1989 Wood processing
Smo Ltd 11/1975 1976 1981 Clothing
Sga Ltd 3/1977 1979 1991 Footwear
Sto Ltd 10/1977 1978 1991 Footwear
Sbim Ltd 11/1977 1978 1991 Clothing
Ste Ltd 12/1977 1978 1991 Footwear
Sec Ltd 1/1980 1980 1991 Footwear
Sja Ltd 9/1980 1980 1991 Clothing
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Sli Ltd 6/1981 1981 1991 Footwear
Spo Pv/Ltd (1983) 1979 1983 1988 Footwear
Sro Ltd 1983 1983 1991 Footwear
Ssa Ltd 2/1983 1983 1991 Footwear
Sco Pv/Ltd (6/1984) 3/1981 1984 1991 Footwear
Keys: Pv= Private partnership; Ltd = Limited liabilities; Pb= Public share.
Table B.l.2 Records at the Chamber of Commerce in Forli
Company Legal status Established Records available 
from to
Product
Nla Ltd/Pv (1966-71) 1955 1956 1991* Footwear
Nde Pb 1962 1963 1967 Footwear
Nci Pv/Ltd (10/1974) 7/1968 1974 1991 Metal chairs
Neu Ltd 3/1974 1974 1991 Footwear equipment
Nrs Pv/Pb (12/1975) 4/1967 1976 1991 Footwear
Nwi Ltd 12/1973 1974 1979 Footwear
Nma Ltd 2/1978 1978 1987 Footwear
Nal Pb 9/1979 1979 1991 Clothing
Nca Pv/Pb (2/1980) 9/1966 1981 1991 Footwear
Npo Pv/Pb (12/1980) 2/1972 1981 1991 Footwear
Nfa Pv/Pb (4/ 1981) 1/1961 1981 1991 Footwear
Nfr Pv/Pb (6/ 1982) 2/1970 1982 1991 Clothing
Nri Ltd 6/1982 1982 1991 Footwear
Nrf Ltd 5/1982 1982 1991 Leather items
Nvi Pv/Ltd (11/1982) 8/1967 1983 1985 Footwear
Nrm Pv/Ltd (2/1983) 6/1969 1983 1987 Clothing
Npn Ltd 4/1984 1984 1991 Footwear
Nrt Pv/Ltd (9/1985) 4/1973 1985 1991 Paper/card boxes
Nti Ltd 4/1985 1985 1991 Footwear
Nip Pv/Ltd (5/1989) 9/1983 1989 1991 Packaging
Npl Pv/Ltd (7/1989) 12/1985 1989 1991 Leather items
Keys as above; * excluding 1966-71 and 1973.
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B.2 Reclassification and standardisation of records.
Tables B.2.1 and B.2.2 are two examples of how the company records have been 
reclassified. The records refer to companies San (1951-52) and Nip (1990-91). The 
two companies traded respectively in the food processing and footwear sectors. The 
tables below show that raw records with different levels of details were rendered 
comparable across sectors, periods and geographical areas, by applying a standard 
balance sheet reclassification according to financial criteria. The principle governing 
the reclassification by financial criteria is the aggregation of assets according to their 
liquidity (the ease of transferability into cash) and liabilities according to maturity. 
The aggregated components of assets and liabilities are then ordered by decreasing 
liquidity and increasing maturity.8
Table B.2.1 Company San, sector: food processing (current lire)
A ssets 1951 1952
Cash on hand 2,961,673 18,479,860
Total Cash funds 2,961,673 18,479,860
Credit to clients 26,878,629 10,263,542
Bills 7,627,382 4,288,290
Total commercial credits 34,506,011 14,551,832
Credits on various expenditure 35,640,413 21,991,492
Company’s income tax credit 1,972,380 963,160
Credit to National Institute of Social Sec. 224,220 224,220
Prepayments 158,983
Others 258,960 119,360
Total various debts 38,254,956 23,298,232




Total Inventory 217,086,470 263,186,923
Total Current asse ts 292,809,110 319,516,847
Equipment maintenance 532,235 276,474
Total fixed intangible asse ts 532,235 276,474
Office equipment 546,650 861,700
Plant and equipment (mill and stable) 40,002,849 73,139,080
8 Astolfi and Negri, Ragioneria Applicata, p. 227.
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Total fixed tangible asse ts 40,549,499 74,000,780
Total fixed asse ts 41,081,734 74,277,254
Total A ssets 333,890,844 393,794,101
Liabilities
Debts to banks 108,307,766 209,816,224
Total short term bank loans 108,307,766 209,816,224
Debts to clients 10,645,880 9,432,420
Total commercial debts 10,645,880 9,432,420
Various debts not specified 186,473,735 135,083,469
Debts to administrators 100,000 100,000
Total various debts 186,573,735 135,183,469
Total short term liabilities 305,527,381 354,432,113
Total long term borrowed funds 0 0
Fund Employees’ social insurance 3,555,018 7,921,301
Total provisions 3,555,018 7,921,301
DF equipment 7,325,351 11207623
Total depreciation funds 7,325,351 11,207,623
Paid-up Capital 1,200,000 1,200,000
Legal reserve 11,546,660 12,546,660
Total equities 12,746,660 13,746,660
Total Long term capital
Net profit 4,736,434 6,486,404
Total liabilities 333,890,844 393,794,101
Keys: DF= Depreciation fund.
Table B.2.2 Company Nip, sector: footwear (current lire).
A ssets 1990 1991
Cash on hand 130,097,567 80,562,157
Banks
bills to be discounted 693,480,257 396,440,779
Total cash funds 823,577,824 477,002,936
Credit to clients 586,194,877 656,717,580
Others 3,780,000
Total commercial credit 589,974,877 656,717,580
Various credits not specified 4,440,962 6,730,677
Credit on VAT 113,208,224 63,622,265
Others 2,600,000 2,421,236
Total various credits 120,249,186 72,774,178
Inventory 421,596,833 452,061,451
Total current assets 1,955,398,720 1,658,556,145
Costs to be depreciated 11,430,509 11,430,509
Total fixed intangible asse ts 11,430,509 11,430,509
Land and buildings 457,883,765 538,920,871
Plant 71,275,972 70,683,729
Machinery 488,784,708 538,239,108
Other equipment 25,228,702 25,228,702
car and lorry 181,801,317 133,478,572
Computers 29,423,950 30,279,450
Others 10,221,345 10,221,345
Total fixed tangible asse ts 1,264,619,759 1,347,051,777
Total fixed asse ts 1,276,050,268 1,358,482,286
Total assets 3,231,448,988 3,017,038,431
Liabilities
Banks current account 155,309,892 132,888,567
Total short term bank loans 155,309,892 132,888,567
Debts to clients 55,796,735 58,680,607
Debts to suppliers 1,316,866,655 985,278,288
Total commercial debts 1,372,663,390 1,043,958,895
Bills 75,564,568 7,739,038
Short term payables 199,473,450 140,036,230
Unspecified various debts 145,468,536 225,782,329
Total various debts 420,506,554 373,557,597
Total short term liabilities 1,948,479,836 1,550,405,059
Long term subsidised debts 53,034,056 27,435,288
Regional Mediocredito
Total Subsidised long term capital 53,034,056 27,435,288
Total long term debts 53,034,056 27,435,288
DF building 50,891,178 67,525,594
DF plant 47,794,798 56,446,193
DF equipment and machinery 262,045,352 367,063,769
DF other equipment 22,428,702 23,128,702
DF car and lorry 87,966,966 75,126,643
DF computers 19,583,322 23,455,050
Others 8,972,252 13,035,004
Total depreciation Funds 499,682,570 625,780,955
Golden hand-shake and pension fund 81,459,526 140,434,825
Fund for taxes 15,693,000 12,666,000
Provisions 97,152,526 153,100,825
Paid-up capital 90,000,000 90,000,000











B.3 Capital structure: description of the various sources of finance
Tables B.3.1-B.3.7 below present a detailed analysis of the capital structure of the 
companies in the two ID samples and separate failed companies in the last five years 
of their trading life. The analysis of the capital structure includes current and long­
term liabilities. Current liabilities are those due within one year, while long-term 
liabilities are due beyond one year.
Current or short-term liabilities include short-term debts to banks, commercial debts 
and various debts. Commercial debts include debts to suppliers, clients, subsidiaries 
and parent companies. Firms in the two IDs do not own other companies and are not 
controlled by other companies therefore they do not owe debts to subsidiaries or 
parent companies. Various debts include debts to employees, administrators, 
partners and tax payments.
Long-term capital consists of long-term borrowed capital and equities. Long-term 
borrowed capital includes subsidised loans, loans by partners, long term borrowings 
from Medium-Term Credit Institutions (MTCIs), bonds and leasing. However, it has 
been possible to include capital leases in the analysis only when companies specified 
the total amount of the leasing contract in the liability account, as companies prefer 
not to record these items and design transactions in such a way as not to give rise to 
liabilities.9 Many companies’ report only the annual rent paid in the profit and loss 
account. For these companies, it was not possible to include their total debt to the 
lending company in the analysis of the capital structure. Therefore, from these data 
it is not possible to estimate the importance of leasing as a way of financing the 
purchase of fixed capital.
The balance sheets examined present two types of loans by partners: ‘financing by 
partners’ (versamento soci in conto finanziamento) and ‘debts to partners’ (debiti 
verso soci). In accounting theory, ‘financing by partners’ is treated as a debt due 
back at a fixed or indeterminate date and it bears interest. It should be considered a 
short-term debt as it could be repaid at short notice. However, empirical observation
9 Foster, Financial Statement, pp. 65-66.
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shows that such loans appear in the balance sheets for much longer than one year, 
therefore, they have been included in the long-term liabilities. Instead, ‘debts to 
partners’ mainly refer to interest on their loan. This type of debt is less common 
than the previous one and generally it disappears in the following year, and has 
therefore been included in the short-term liabilities.
Stakeholders’ equity or net worth is the excess of total assets over total liabilities. 
Equity is composed of (1) subscribed or paid-in capital and (2) retained income. 
Paid-in capital is the capital that owners invest in the business.10 Retained profits 
build up reserves, therefore these are internally generated funds that a company has 
decided to reinvest.11 Italian companies are bound by law to form a so-called ‘legal 
reserve’ in which 5% of the annual profit has to be deposited. Apart from this ‘legal 
reserve’, which represents a minimum level of self-financing, companies establish 
reserves according to their own will, the so-called extraordinary reserve (riserva 
straordinaria o speciale) .12
A further type of reserve is ‘contributions by partners towards the company’s 
capital’ (versamento dei soci in conto capitale). These are advances by partners 
without any obligation of repayment, bearing no interest and are to be considered as 
reserves. This way of increasing a company’s equity is equivalent to increasing its 
paid-in capital. However, ‘contributions by partners’ can be preferred as a faster and 
more flexible means than increasing paid-in capital. The former does not require 
any formal procedure when partners’ contributions are made nor when such sums are 
redistributed to the partners.13
Particularly interesting reserves for the purpose of this analysis are represented by 
subsidies such as ‘grants’, ‘contributions on leasing’ and ‘exemption from Value 
Added Tax’. The accounting treatment of grants and contributions on leasing has 
already been explained (see section 6.2.1). Exemption from VAT is consistently 
reported by companies in the samples in a specific reserve named VAT exemption 
reserve (riserva detrazione IVA). Companies were exempted from the payment of
10 Homgren, Introduction to Management, p. 565.
11 Fraser and Ormiston, Understanding Financial Statements, p. 54.
12 Astolfi and Negri, Ragioneria Applicata, p. 31.
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VAT on purchased equipment up to 6% of the value of the investment good. Even 
though this analysis deals with financial subsidies, this fiscal incentive has been 
taken into account, because it was clearly an incentive to invest.14
The analysis of the capital structure includes contingency reserves or provisions. 
These are funds set aside by companies to cover risk, uncertain liabilities and future 
expenses. For instance, funds set aside for ‘golden handshakes’ at the end of 
employees’ working period, funds to cover the risk of devaluation of credits and 
funds for taxation belong to provisions.
The literature has different approaches to the interpretation of such funds, 
considering them either as liabilities or equities. Provisions are internally generated 
funds, because companies assign part of their profits to build up these funds, which 
imply an eventual liability. Although they remain at the enterprise’s disposal until 
such liability occurs and might be used to finance its investment, they cannot be 
considered equivalent to other forms of internal finance. 15 Provisions are not 
equivalent to other forms of borrowed funds either, as they are internally generated, 
do not bear interest and are not subject to any external monitoring.16 Given that the 
classification of provisions is not obvious, and their use as source of finance is 
considered improper in Italy, provisions are included in the analysis of the 
companies’ capital structure but are not considered sources to finance investment.
The exclusion of contingency reserves from long-term finance does not seem to alter 
significantly the results of the analysis. These are consistently higher in companies 
within the North-eastern sample, from 1971 onwards (see tables B.3.4 to B.3.7), 
therefore including provisions in the sources of finance would magnify the 
differences in the capital structure already pointed out, i.e. the higher availability of 
internally generated funds or of long term non-subsidised borrowed funds in the 
North-eastern sample (see table VI.9); considering that provisions do not exceed the 
3.8% of total liabilities of Southern firms, their inclusion in either internally
13 Ibid., p. 148.
14 Ibid, p. 167.
15 Edwards and Fisher, Banks, Finance, p. 58; and J. Corbett and T. Jenkinson, ‘The Financing of
Industry, 1970-1989: An International Comparison’, Journal o f the Japanese and International 
Economies, 10 (1996), p. 73.
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generated funds or long term borrowed funds would improve the financial 
equilibrium of companies in the Southern sample only to a very small extent.
B.3.1 Capital structure, Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli samples, 1951-56
Barletta SMP *
















Note: all components of the balance sheet expressed as a percentage of total liabilities; * Company 
Nla, 1956 only;
Keys: FNA/TNA = fixed net assets divided by total net assets; Stb = short tem debts to banks; Cd= 
commerce debts; Vd= various debts; St bor c= short term borrowed capital; Prov=provision; Paid-up= 
paid-up capital; Res= reserves; P= contribution from partners; E= equities; LTC= long-term capital; 
RR= rate of return on long-term capital.
16 Edwards and Fisher, Banks, Finance, p. 58.
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B.3.2 Capital structure, Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli samples, 1957-65
Barletta SMP SMP
Subs 1 NS 1 Tot 2 NS 1 Failed 1
FNA/TNA 60 22.7 35.2 71 100
Stb 39.5 65.1 56.4 9.7 0
St c/ns 0 0 0 0 14.8
Cd 9.1 14.75 12.8 30.05 0
Vd 2.7 7.8 6.1 0.1 8.1
St bor c 51.3 87.7 75.3 39.8 22.9
Prov 0.3 0.8 0.7 0 0
SI 23.7 0 8.1 0 0
Lt bor c 23.7 0 8.1 0 0
Paid-up 23.4 10.9 15.1 0.7 76.8
Res 1.3 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.3
p 0 0 0 59.4 0
E 24.7 11.4 15.95 60.2 77.1
LTC 48.4 11.4 24.0 60.2 77.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100
E/FNA 43.4 51.9 47.1 81.4 76.95
LTC/FNA 85.2 51.9 70.9 81.4 76.95
RR -7.3 -7 -7.2 7 0.35
Note: No failed company in the Barletta sample during the 1957-65 period.
St c/ns= short-term debts to other companies or not specified; Sl= subsidised loan; Lt bor c= long­
term borrowed capital; other keys as above.
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B.3.3 Capital structure Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli, samples, 1966-70
Barletta SMP
Subs 4 NS 2 Tot 5a Failed 1
FNA/TNA 48.5 40.4 46.7 98.3
Stb 40 54.95 43.1 0
St p 0.3 0 0.2 0
Cd 9.2 5.2 8.4 0
Vd 1.5 4.9 2.25 25
St bor c 51 65.1 54 25
Prov 0.7 0.1 0.55 0
SI 16 0 12.6 0
Lt bor c 16 0 12.6 0
Paid-up 30.4 33.6 31.1 74.5
Res 0.7 1.2 0.8 0.5
P 1.2 0 0.95 0
E 32.3 34.85 32.8 75
LTC 48.3 34.85 45.5 75
Total 100 100 100 100
E/FNA 71.9 88.1 75 76.3
LTC/FNA 107.6 88.1 103.9 76.3
RR -6 -0.5 -0.05 0.03
Note: No failed companies in the Barletta sample during the 1966-70 period; records available for the 
SMP sample during the 1966-70 period refer to the failed company Nde. ‘Inconsistency due to one 
company (Sma) changing from subsidised to non-subsidised during the 1966-70 period.
Keys: St p= short-term debts to partners; other keys as above
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B.3.4 Capital structure, Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli samples, 1971-75.
Barletta SMP Barletta
Subs 7 NS 13 Tot 17a Subs 1 NS 3 Tot 3b Failed 1
FNA/TNA 62.2 36.2 52.9 37.2 54.4 49.6 55.95
Stb 24.95 35.1 28.5 28.4 9.8 15.8 14.2
Cd 16 26.2 19.6 27 23.2 24.4 27.2
Vd 4.25 8.9 5.9 26 18.7 21 27.1
St bor c 49.4* 70.2 56.7* 81 51.6 61.2 68.5
Prov 2.5 1.6 2.2 5.9 5.85 5.85 0.4
Lt p 1.45 1.1 1.3 0 4.5 3.1 0
M Leas 0 0.1 0.03 0 0 0 0
M It d 0 0 0 0 1.8 1.2 0
SI 12.4 0 8 1.9 0 0.6 0
Ltborc 113.8 1.2 9.4 1.9 6.3 4.9 0
Paid-up 21.8 22.6 22.1 2.2 35.5 24.8 27.5
Res 0.9 1.6 1.15 8.75 0.7 3.3 3.6
P 6.2 2.7 5 0 0 0 0
Gr 5.3 0 3.4 0 0 0 0
E 34.3 26.95 31.7 10.9 36.2 28.05 31.1
LTC 48.1 28.15 41.1 12.8 42.5 32.9 31.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
E/FNA 57.8 75.7 62.2 62.6 115.7 104.55 89.3
LTC/FNA 81.15 79.1 80.7 73.6 135.8 122.8 89.3
RR -0.9 0.04 -0.01 18.1 6.2 7.8 -72
Note : No failed companies in the SMP sample during the 1971-75 period; *short-term borrowed 
capital does not match with the total of its components because one company reports only the total 
short term borrowed capital and does not specify its components. a = inconsistency due to three 
companies (Sfi, Sal and Sfs) changing from non-subsidised to subsidised dining thel970-75 period. 
b= Inconsistency due to one company (Nla) changing from non-subsidised to subsidised in 1974. 
Keys: Lt p= long-term debts to partners; M leas= market leasing; M lt d= market long-term debts; 
Gr= grants; other keys as above
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B.3.5 Capital structure, Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli samples, 1976-80
Barletta SMP Barletta SMP
Subs 19 NS 12 Tot 24a Subs 4 NS 4 Tot 6b Failed 4 Failed 1
FNA/TNA 40.6 28.5 39.3 20.3 8.2 19 49.6 0.8
Stb 22.7 24.6 22.9 13.2 13.6 13.2 10.5 14.8
Stp 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0
Cd 21.1 27 21.75 32.2 30.1 31.9 39.3 60.1
Vd 5.2 12.05 6 16.6 18.2 16.8 2.6 17.6
St bor c 49 63.6 50.7 61.9 61.9 61.9 52.45 92.5
Prov 3.8 2.95 3.7 8.6 3.1 7.9 3.1 7
Lt p 0.9 1 1 0 9.25 1.15 21.3 0
M It d 0.3 0 0.3 0.6 0 0.55 0 0
B 3.3 0 2.9 0 0 0 0 0
SI 3.6 0 3.2 2.1 0 1.9 0 0
Lt bor c 8.1 1 7.4 2.8 9.25 3.6 21.3 0
Paid-up 21 15.6 20.3 21.7 12.2 20.5 10.1 0.5
Res 5.1 5.2 5.1 3.4 13.6 4.6 5.4 0
P 3.9 11.6 4.7 1.7 0 1.45 0 0
Fs 0.2 0 0.1 0.01 0 0.01 0 0
Gr 9 0 7.9 0 0 0 7.6 0
E 39.1 32.4 38.25 26.7 25.8 26.6 23.1 0.5
LTC 47.2 33.4 45.3 29.5 35 30.2 44.4 0.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
E/FNA 94.95 113.4 96.2 128.9 355.8 139.6 49.6 91.7
LTC/FNA 114.6 117 113.9 142.2 483.6 158.4 95.4 91.7
RR 5.8 6.6 5.8 7.3 -4.1 5.65 -9.4 -5713.6
Note: * = Inconsistency due to seven companies (Sbc, Sbia, Sri, San, Sab, Sin, Sto) changing from 
non-subsidised to subsidised during the period. b = Inconsistency due to two companies (Nci and Nal) 
changing from non-subsidised to subsidised during the period.
Keys: B= bonds; other keys as above.
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B.3.6 Capital structure, Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli samples, 1981-86
Barletta SMP Barletta SMP
Subs 22 NS 8 Tot 27a Subs 8 NS 10 Tot 15b Failed 7 Failed 4
FNA/TNA 30.1 33.15 30.25 16.2 9.9 14.1 46.1 7.8
Stb 14.9 15 15 3.9 7.6 5.1 22 21.7
St c/ns 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0
S tp 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0
Cd 34.7 29.55 34.35 24.2 25.9 24.7 20.4 29
Vd 5.3 23.5 6.25 16.4 16.2 16.3 13.2 7.9
St bor c 55.1 68 55.8 44.5 49.7 46.2 55.7 58.6
Prov 3.3 3.8 3.3 12.4 13 12.6 4.1 7.3
Lt p 1.6 0.1 1.5 1.9 2.5 2.1 7.2 4.8
M Leas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0
M It d 0.03 0 0.03 0.2 0 0.1 0 0
B 1.5 0 1.4 6.4 2.35 5.1 0 0
SI 4.6 0 4.4 1.25 0 0.9 3.35 1.3
Lt bor c 7.7 0.1 7.3 9.7 4.8 8.1 10.75 6.2
Paid-up 12.1 13.3 12.1 21.1 11.5 17.95 12.7 10.15
Res 10.6 11.6 10.7 11.1 20.9 14.35 10 17.45
P 3.8 3.3 3.8 1.1 0.1 0.75 4.5 0.3
Fs 0.4 0 0.4 0.02 0 0 0.1 0
Gr 6.9 0 6.6 0.02 0 0 2.2 0
E 33.9 28.2 33.6 33.4 32.5 33.1 29.5 27.9
LTC 41.6 28.2 40.9 43.1 37.3 41.2 40.2 34.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
E/FNA 111.05 85.5 109.6 196.2 306.7 222.15 69.7 358.9
LTC/FNA 136.3 85.7 133.45 253.35 352.2 276.55 95.1 438.2
RR 4.35 1.1 4.2 11.1 19.5 13.6 -15 0.3
Note: a = Inconsistency due to two companies (Sbia and Sin) changing from subsidised to non- 
subsidised and one (Sro) from non-subsidised to subsidised. b = Inconsistency due to three companies 
(Nrs, Nca and Npo) changing from subsidised to non-subsidised.
Keys: Fs= fiscal subsidies; other keys as above.
B.3.7 Capital structure, Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli samples, 1987-91.
Barletta SMP Barletta SMP
Subs 17 NS 6 Tot 213 Subs 5 NS 10 Tot 15 Failed 4 Failed 3
FNA/TNA 30 27.2 29.7 18.8 18 18.2 42.2 27.7
Stb 14.3 13.2 14.2 2.8 7.9 6.3 31.85 6.9
St c/ns 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0
Cd 37.5 37.9 37.5 27.5 21.7 23.5 13.3 27.2
Vd 3.7 16.05 5.1 10.05 9.1 9.4 15.6 7.4
St bor c 55.7 67.15 56.9 40.4 38.6 39.2 60.8 41.5
Prov 4.3 4.7 4.4 12.2 13.3 13 0.45 2.8
Lt p 0.8 1.6 0.9 0 4.7 3.25 8.6 0.1
S Leas 2 0 1.8 0 0 0 0 0
M ltd 0.9 3.1 1.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0 0
B 1.1 0 1 9 3.4 5.1 0 0
SI 4.4 0 3.9 0.6 0 0.2 6.9 0
Lt bor c 9.3 4.7 8.8 9.8 8.8 9.1 15.5 0.1
Paid-up 7.2 14.7 8.01 17.9 13.2 14.6 16.55 34.2
Res 11.85 8.3 11.5 19.4 26.1 24 4.45 17.55
P 1.4 0.4 1.25 0 0 0 2.3 3.8
Fs 0.8 0 0.7 0.1 0 0.02 0 0
Gr 9.4 0 8.3 0.3 0 0.1 0 0
C/leas 0.2 0 0.15 0 0 0 0 0
E 30.8 23.5 29.95 37.6 39.3 38.8 23.3 55.55
LTC 40 28.1 38.7 47.4 48.05 47.9 38.8 55.7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
E/FNA 102.3 86.3 100.7 194.6 208.1 203.9 67.8 201.4
LTC/FNA 133.1 103.5 130.1 245.3 254.5 251.65 113 201.9
RR 4.2 3 4.1 6.6 10.6 9.4 -43.2 5.8
Note: a= Inconsistency due to two firms: Ssa changing from non-subsidised shifted to subsidised and 
Sli from subsidised shifted to non- subsidised.
Keys: S leas= subsidised leasing; C/leas= contribution on leasing (estimated reserve); other keys as 
above.
Source: Company balance sheets.
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Appendix C: The Panel data analysis, Barletta and San Mauro Pascoli IDs, 1981- 
1991
This section assesses the impact of the various sources of finance on the investment 
behaviour of firms within the two ID samples. Two works assessing the impact of 
subsidies on the investment activity of Southern firms were reviewed in section
7.1.17 This appendix adopts the model applied by Faini, Galli and Giovannini (table 
VII.2), focusing on financial explanatory variables, and adjusts it to include the 
sources of company finance concerning this thesis.
The application of econometric tools requires continuous data, and therefore the 
analysis could be conducted on a panel of eight companies in the Southern sample 
and seven in the North-Eastern one, from 1981 to 1991. The initial year of the 
analysis was dictated by the North-Eastern companies, for the Southern companies 
provided continuous data from 1974. The panel includes only subsidised companies, 
i.e. companies that received subsidies at least once in the period under analysis. This 
is the definition of subsidised companies applied throughout chapters VI and VII, 
with the only exception of section 7.2, where the Bagella and Caggese methodology 
was tested. Therefore companies in the panel are subsidised companies, but should 
not be confused with companies in the subsidised stage in section 7.2. For 
subsidised companies in the panel can cover two or three stages of the subsidised 
company's trading life, i.e. pre-subsidy, subsidised and post-subsidy.
The analysis adopts the Error Components Model to model differences in firm
investment behaviour by permitting each firm to have a different intercept parameter.
The model assumes that the intercept are random variables, and it is useful if the
individual firms are randomly chosen and taken to be representative of a larger
1 8population of firms. However, in the analysis conducted in this chapter, 
companies’ records have been randomly chosen but no assumption is made about 
them being representative.
Equation (1) is the general equation for pooling time-series and cross-sectional data.
17 Faini, ‘Incentivi e Piccole’; Faini, Galli and Giannini, ‘Finance and Development’.
18 C. Hill, W. Griffiths and G. Judge, Undergraduate Econometrics, (New York, 1997), pp. 272-273.
yit is the value of the dependent variable, X2it is the value of the explanatory 
variables, Cjt is the random error term,, is the number of groups or individuals and t is 
the time period.
y i t =  P l i +  P 2X 2i t +  + P l l X i i i t + E i t (1)
pH is taken to be random and modelled as
(2)
pj is an unknown parameter that represents the population mean intercept, and vj is 
an unobservable random error that accounts for individual differences in firms' 
behaviour. It varies across individuals, but is constant across time. £jt is the usual 
residual. It is assumed that the Vj are independent from each other and eu and that 
E(vj)=0 var(vO= crv2
Consequently, E(pn) = p j and var(Pn )= a v2
Thus, substituting equation (2) into equation (1), it follows:
Equation (3) can be estimated in three ways, with the random effect estimator, the 
fixed effect and the between effect. In order to simplify the explanation, equation (3) 
is written taking into account only one explanatory variable.
yit= ( P  +  ^ ) +  p 2x 2lt+ +  p i ix i i it+  e it
=  Pj +  p2*2it+........+  P llX iii t+  Vi + 8 it (3)
yit= a+xit|3+ Vi+8it (3)
the aim is to estimate p.
If equation (3) is true, it is also true that
Y, = a  + Z i P  + v , +e , (4)
where y, = E.y, /T,, Xi = E.Xi,/T,, ei = S.e* /Tj 
Subtracting equation (4) from (3), it follows:
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(Tit-Ti) = (Xi,-Xi)P + (eit — ei) (5)
Equations (3), (4) and (5) provide the bases for estimating p. Particularly the fixed- 
effects estimator - also known as the within estimator - amounts to using Ordinary 
Least Squares to estimate the equation (5). The between estimator amounts to using 
OLS to estimate the equation (4), the between estimator is less efficient because it 
discards the over time information in the data in favour of simple means, and it is not 
much used. The random-effects estimator is a weighted average of the estimates 
produced by the between and within estimators, the random-effects estimator turns 
out to be equivalent to the estimation of:
(Yit -  0 Y i )  =  C1 “  0 ) a +  (Xit “  0  X i )  P  +  [(1  -  0 )V j  +  ( s it +  0  S i ) ]  ( 6 )
where 0 is a function of a  v2 and a  e2 , if ct v2= 0 , meaning v, is always 0 , 0 =0  and 
equation (3) should be estimated by OLS directly. Alternatively, if c  E2 =0, meaning 
that Sit =0  , 0 =1 and the within estimator returns all the information available (which 
would be an R = 1  regression). Instead, with the fixed-effect estimator Vj are not 
assumed to have a distribution but are treated as fixed and estimable.
The random-effects estimator requires the assumption that v, and Xi are uncorrelated.
Were Vi and Xj correlated, the estimator could not determine how much of the
change in yt associated with an increase in Xj to assign to p versus how much to 
attribute to the unknown correlation.19
The Hausman test assesses whether the assumption of uncorrelation between Vi and 
the regressor xjt is correct and therefore whether the random-effects estimator is 
appropriate. Formally, the Hausman test assesses the equality of the coefficients 
estimated by the fixed and random-effects estimators. Its null hypothesis is that the 
difference in the coefficients is not systematic. If the model is correctly specified and 
the test returns a significant result, then this can be interpreted as evidence that the
19 Stata Release 5, Reference P-Z (College Station, 1997), pp. 632-633.
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random effects, Vj and the regressor Xjt, are correlated, thus the random effect 
estimator should not be used and the fixed effect estimator should be chosen.
The Faini, Galli and Giovannini model focuses on two types of finance, financial 
debts and cash flow. For the purpose of this analysis a more detailed disaggregation 
of the types of finance is appropriate, so as to assess the impact of subsidies on 
firms’ investment activity and compare it with the impact of private sources of 
finance. Therefore the estimated equation is:
invit= a  + 5Sit + Pi privit+ p2 bit+ p3 puit+ p4 resit+ + p6 isit + P7 g f i t +  Ps fs,t + uit (a)
where inv = investment ratio defined as net investment divided by net capital stock; S= 
dummy variable, where l=South and 0=North-East; priv = growth rates of regional private 
consumption, all other variables defined as ratio to long-term capital, which includes long­
term borrowed capital and equity; b= bonds; pu=paid-up capital; res= equity reserve; gr = 
grants; fs= fiscal subsidies.
Equation (a) above does not include all the various types of finance presented in 
chapter VI, as the inclusion of all types of finance would imply using too many 
explanatory variables (therefore too many degrees of freedom) as compared to the 
number of firms in the panel. The high number of degrees of freedom, as compared 
to firms, determined a statistical problem by which the random-effect estimator did 
not capture the standard deviation of the error term (vi). As the assumption of the
error component is that the error term (vi) is uncorrelated with Xi, the statistical 
package turned automatically to estimate an ordinary least square equation, losing 
the time series component of the panel. Therefore it was necessary to reduce the 
number of the explanatory variables.
The variables representing a small and less frequent source of finance in both sub­
samples, such as contributions on leasing (cl), loans by partners (pi), market long­
term loans (mltl), market leasing (mleas) and contributions by partners (pc) were not 
included in equation (a). Secondly, OLS were run on each sample separately to 
assess whether any variable was not significant for both samples and so exclude
20 Ibid., pp. 631,646.
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them. Short-term debts to banks (bd) and grants (gr) turned out to be consistently 
not statistically significant, even allowing for time lags. However only short-term 
debts to banks (bd) were excluded from equation (a), grants (gr) were not excluded 
as they represent a particularly important source of finance to be investigated in the 
context of the thesis.
The inclusion of a dummy variable in equation (a) tests whether, ceteris paribus, 
there are differences in the investment behaviour of the Southern firms and the 
North-eastern counterpart, meaning that the dummy South controls only for shifts in 
the intercept of the regression line. When the dummy variable is multiplied by the 
various variables, called the interactive dummy variable, it estimates a new 
coefficient of the variables, therefore it tests whether there are differences in the 
slope of the regression line.21
Introducing an interactive dummy variable, equation (a) changes as follows: 
invit= a  + (Pi + 8S) privit+ p2 bit+ P3 puit+ p4 resit+ (p6 + SS) isit+ (p7+ 5S) grit+ 
(pg+6S) fslt + Ujt; (b)
where inv = investment ratio defined as net investment divided by net capital stock; S= dummy 
variable, where l=South and 0=North-East; priv = growth rates of regional private consumption, all 
other variables defined as ratio to long-term capital, which includes long-term borrowed capital and 
equity; b= bonds; pu=paid-up capital; res= equity reserve; gr = grants; fs= fiscal subsidies.
Therefore when S is equal to 0, in the case of North-Eastern companies, the 
coefficient of the variables priv, is, gr and fs, are Pi, p2, etc. When S is equal to 1, in 
the case of Southern companies, the coefficient of the same variables is equal to the 
coefficient for North-Eastern firms plus the coefficient of the interactive dummy.22
The interactive dummy variable has not been introduced for all the variables not to 
incur the problem of excessive degrees of freedom as compared to firms. It has been 
introduced for the variables expressing the various types of subsidies, as these are 
particularly important for the analysis of this thesis. It has also been introduced for 
the indicator of demand (priv) as, when analyzing separately the two sub-panels, this 
variable turned out to be statistically significant for Southern companies but not for
21 Dougherty, Introduction to Econometrics, pp. 261-278.
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their North-Eastern counterparts. The dummy was not multiplied by bonds (b), paid- 
up capital (pu) and equity reserves (res) as these variables were positively associated 
with investment and statistically significant in both sub-panels.
For equation (b) the Hausman test returns a result that is not significant (chi2 =2.67, 
and the critical chi2 value for 7 degrees of freedom at the 0.05 confidence interval is 
14.07). Therefore, the random effect estimator has been adopted.
22 Ibid, p. 277.
Table C.l Panel data, 1981-1991
Random effect model; dependent variable investment ratio (inv)
Number of groups 15, 8 Southern firms, 7 North-Eastern firms
b pu res S priv S*priv is S*is gr S*gr fs S*fs c
Coef .8 .8 .9 .02 -.003 .02 -.05 1.6 .7 -.3 14.7 -4.2 .002
z 2.7 8.9 5.8 1.2 -0.5 2.4 -0.08 2.2 0.2 -0.06 0.8 -0.2 0.05
P>|z| 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.01 0.9 0.03 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.9
r 2 overall = .45
Coef .8 .8 1.0 -.07 -.002 0.14 .035 1.5 0.001
z 2.6 8.7 5.9 -1.0 -0.4 2.2 0.06 2 0.02
P>|z| 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.29 0.7 0.03 0.95 0.05 0.98
R2 overall= .46
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The random effect model returns the z value, the interpretation of which is similar to 
the t value. The third row displays the probability that the coefficient is not 
statistically different from zero. Therefore the P> |z| for bonds (b) means that the null 
hypothesis can be excluded at 99%, whereas for grants both in the South (S*gr) and 
in the North-East (gr) the null hypothesis can be excluded only at 10% probability. 
According to common practice, those variables for which the null hypothesis can be 
excluded at 95%, or at the 0.05 confidence interval, are considered as significant.
The table above displays the results returned by the random effect estimator, the first 
equation is the estimation of equation (b), and the second is the estimation obtained 
when discarding the not significant variables. Bonds (b), paid-up capital (pu) and 
equity reserves (res) turn out to be significant in explaining investment in the panel as 
a whole consistently with the results obtained when analyzing the two sub-samples 
separately.
The dummy variable South does not turn out to be significant thus indicating that 
Southern firms in the sample do not display, ceteris paribus, a difference in their 
investment behaviour as compared to firms in the North-Eastern sample.
The growth rate of regional private consumption (priv) is used here as a proxy for 
demand. It turns out to be significant and positive only for Southern firms in the 
sample, thus suggesting Southern firms’ higher dependence on demand. Other 
research points out that Southern firms are more oriented towards the national market, 
e.g. in 1980-1985 their exports represented only 10% of their turnover, as compared 
to 20% for firms in the Centre and North.23 It is not possible to study this point on 
the two ID samples as only few companies separate domestic from foreign sales in 
their balance sheets. However, company reports provide examples of Southern 
firms’ dependence on the market, such as investment projects postponed when the 
market is perceived as unstable, or resorting to subcontracting as the company’s sales 
were decreasing. 24 On the contrary, firms in the North-eastern sample seem to 
respond to difficulties in selling their products by introducing new equipment that
23 Siracusano and Tresoldi, ‘Le piccole’, pp. 106,119.
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would enable them to reduce the cost of labour in particular, and make their products 
more price competitive.25
As far as subsidies are concerned, the only type of subsidy displaying a positive and 
significant coefficient are implicit subsidies within soft loans (is) and only for 
Southern firms. The lack of significance of grants and fiscal subsidies in the Southern 
sample can be interpreted as a result of the less selective criteria applied in the 
granting of such subsidies, as shown in section 7.3. The lack of significance of any 
type of subsidy for North-eastern firms is not surprising. As mentioned above, 
companies in the panel can cover two or three stages. It is then obvious that subsidies 
are significant and positively associated only for Southern firms, which undertook the 
highest investment in the subsidised stage, whereas they are not significant for North­
eastern firms that undertook by far the highest investment in their post-subsidy stage.
The lack of significance of grants and fiscal subsidies for both samples and the 
significance of implicit subsidies only for the Southern sample, contrast strikingly 
with the values of the coefficients of correlation in table VII.9. Grants and fiscal 
subsidies display a positive and high coefficient of correlation with investment, both 
in the Southern and North-Eastern sample, whereas implicit subsidies within 
subsidised loans display a positive but much lower coefficient in both samples. The 
explanation might once again lie in the companies included in the analysis. The 
coefficients of correlation, in table VII.9, have been calculated on companies in the 
subsidised stage, whereas firms in the panel cover also other stages. Therefore, 
subsidies might show a high association when limiting investment to those 
undertaken during the subsidised stage, but not when including investment 
undertaken also in other stages.
24 CCB, Company Sfi, Annual report, 1980 and 1981; Company Sbi, Annual report, 1982 and 1983.
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Original datasets provided by the Ministry of Industry in Rome.
Ministero dell’Industria, Commercio e Artigianato:
- Serie storica delle domande di agevolazione industriale nell’ambito dell’Intervento 
Straordinario per il Mezzogiomo, 1957-1993 -  Leggi: 634/57, 717/65, 853/71, 
902/76, 657/77, 64/1986.
- Serie storica delle iniziative industriali agevolate (al netto di revoche, respinte o 
archiviate), nell’ambito dell’Intervento Straordinario per il Mezzogiomo, 1957-1993
-  Leggi: 634/57, 717/65, 853/71, 902/76, 657/77, 64/1986.
Regioni: Lazio, Marche, Abruzzi, Campania, Molise, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, 
Sicilia, Sardegna,
Legge 623/59:
- Serie storica domanda pervenute per regione e per anno, 1959-1976.
- Serie storica domande accolte per regione e per anno, 1959-1976.
Regioni: Piemonte, Val D’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, Trentiono A.A., Veneto, Friuli 
V. G., Emilia R., Marche, Toscana, Umbria, Lazio, Campania, Abruzzo, Molise, 
Puglie, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna.
DPR 902/76:
- Serie storica domanda pervenute per regione e per anno, 1976-1993.
- Serie storica domande accolte per regione e per anno, 1976-1993.
Regioni: Piemonte, Val D’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, Trentiono A.A., Veneto, Friuli 
V. G., Emilia R., Marche, Toscana, Umbria, Lazio, Campania, Abruzzo, Molise, 
Puglie, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna.
Legge 696/83:
- Contributi in conto capitale (pervenuti) distribuzione per regioni, 1986-1992.
- Contributi in conto capitale (accolti) distribuzione per regioni, 1986-1992.
Regioni: Piemonte, Val D’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, Trentiono A.A., Veneto, Friuli 
V. G., Emilia R., Marche, Toscana, Umbria, Lazio, Campania, Abruzzo, Molise, 
Puglie, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna.
Legge 399/87:
- Contributi in conto capitale (pervenuti) distribuzione per regioni, 1986-1992.
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- Contributi in conto capitale (accolti) distribuzione per regioni, 1986-1992.
Regioni: Piemonte, Val D’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, Trentiono A.A., Veneto, Friuli 
V. G., Emilia R., Marche, Toscana, Umbria, Lazio, Campania, Abruzzo, Molise, 
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